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CHAPTER I
URBANOLOGY
The emer3ence of a complex and highly urbanized industrial society
has inspired great study of urbanization and urban phenomena by social
scientists.

Unfortunately, most social scientists study urbanology

within th.e relatively narrow confines of their particular disciplines.

Sociologists concentrate on urban phenomena arising out of human-group
relationships, while political scientists concentrate on units of urban

government and intergovernmental rel ations.

Li kewi se, economi sts study

urbanology from a market perspective while geographers tend to concentrate on urban location theory and historians are concerned about the

history of urbanization.

Moreover, urban planners and research special-

ists are principally practitioners who receive and attempt to apply the
resulting fragments of theory to their professional practices.

There has

been altogether too little cross-tell between the academic disciplines,

and thus little advancement toward a wholistic theory of urbanology.
On the other hand, there have been some productive efforts to apply
theories from one discipline to the study of another discipline--notably!
group theory from sociology and elements of marginal ism from economics

are being applied to aspects of political science.

But this is on a

somewhat ethereal level with only marginal integration across disci-

plines.

Some of the hybrid results of this kind of academic cross-

pollination have only recently been applied in any meaningful way to
urbanology.

The point is that progress toward a more whol istic theory

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2

of urbanology seems all too slow under the circumstances.
The major contention of this work is that some progress toward
such a wholistic theory might be made by integrating institutional economic theory and elements of the more orthodox economic theory with
aspects of pluralist theory from political science and relating the
resulting whole in an urban context.

This chapter is the first and in-

troductory chapter in a work which attempts that synthesis.

In the way

of introducing the work, this chapter explains what is meant by "urban
context," and it briefly traces out the theories involved in the synthesis.
URBAN CONTEXT
The title of this work, Institutional Economics and Urban Pol itical
Economy, implies that institutional economics and political economy have
some kind of unique and exclusive relationship to urban affairs.

It is

the purpose of this section to disabuse the reader of any such notion
and to explain the context in which the word

lI

urban ll is used.

Neither

institutional economics nor political economy is uniquely or exclusively
related to urban phenomena.

Rather, both subjects were founded and

expanded on much more genera 1 planes.
Institutional economics is based on anthropological methodology,
and it seeks to analyze and describe the cultural antecedents to human
economic interaction at all levels.

Likewise, political economy attempts

to rationalize political behavior in economic terms and economic behavior

in political terms.

Political economy is therefore as applicable to

international and national affairs as it is to state and local affairs.
The point is that both bodies of theory apply to all kinds of social
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interaction--international, national, state, local, institutional, fraternal, familial, and interest-group as well as urban.

Acknowledging that neither institutional economics nor pol itical
economy is uniquely or exclusively urban, it is no less true that the

scopes of both subjects do include urban affairs.

It is therefore pos-

sible to study urban affairs from the institutional economic point-ofview or from the vantage point of pol itical economy.

Or it is possible

to view the latter two subjects with an urban perspective.

Hopefully,

this study will take each of these points-of-view at appropriate times
so that the reader will sometimes find urban affairs elaborated from
the position of institutional economics or political economy, and the
latter will sometimes be illuminated from an urban point-of-view.
Having said that, it remains necessary to clarify the so-called
urban context.

There does not appear to be any general agreement as to

what is meant by the adjective urban--what should properly be incl uded
and what should be excluded.

Some persons proceed on the restrictive

assumption that urban affairs means only those matters which take place
exclusively within urban boundaries.

Others believe that the term urban

affairs is broad enough to include any phenomenon which has urban consequences or is itself a consequence of urban-related activities.
The restrictive assumption is at least partly based on a fallacious
analogy.

It is observed that urban areas themselves are physically dis-

ti ngui shed from other areas by pol iti cal and geographi c boundari es.

It

follows by analogy that any activity described by the adjective "urban"
should likewise be boundaried.

That is, if an activity is truly urban,

then it must take place inside the boundaries of a city, vis-a-vis any
and all other areas outside of urban boundaries.
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However, urban areas do not exist in perfect isolation from other
so-called non-urban areas.

Nor do urban phenomena take place isolated

in some kind of vacuum from other so-called non-urban phenomena.
no urban area is self-sufficient.

Indeed,

It is always a part of a much larger

whole, and the urban and non-urban areas are interdependent entities.
To be sure, urban areas are distinguished from other geographical
environs.

But the urban areas are distinguished only in relation to such

other environs, and they are connected by transportation and communication faci).ities to those environs--both urban and non-urban.
Moreover, commercial as well as other social interaction takes
place between the interconnected parts.

Thus, changes in agricultural

productivity which takes place in rural areas affect adjacent urban
centers through the resulting changes in the prices of agricultural
goods.

And urban events which alter the s.upp1y of manufactured agri-

cultural inputs or consumer goods and services purchased by the fami1 ies
of agricultural employees affect the rural or non-urban environs.
Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a matter in the course of human
affairs which does not bear consequences of some sort for cities.

It should be clear that this writer disagrees with the restrictive
assumption and adheres to the assumption that the term urban affairs
includes any phenomenon which has urban consequences or is itself a consequence of urban-related activities.

This clarification is necessary

because the reader may sometimes find the subject at hand only indirectly or remotely related to urban affairs.

This is partly because the

work builds from economic and political theories of social interaction
that are more general in character before applying the theories in the
more specific urban context.

Nevertheless, the nexus to urban phenomena
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are

ther~

whe., the relationships are studied in an anthropological time

frame.
For example, the American labor movement is used in the next chapter to illustrate an institutional cycle.

The connection bet:-,een a

labor movement and urban affairs is not immediately obvious, and some
would insist that any connection between the two is very tenuous at best.
However, a moment's reflection recalls that labor movements arise out of

the turmoil of imperfectly competitive labor markets, and the latter
emerged

wit!"

the industrial ;zation which spawned 1arge-scale enterprises

employina masses of labor.

It is here that the connection between labor

movements and urban affairs becomes clear.
uniquely urban affair.

Industrial ization ;s a

Indeed, at least one wave of urbanization in

industrial nations was powered by the so-called industrial revolution--

a recent phase of the on-going technical revol ution which has set mankind
quite apart from other anomaly.

Labor movements are aspects of indus-

trialization, and they are therefore uniquely urban phenomena as well.
Another example appears in Chapter III where the ends-means continuum, a crucial component of institutional economic theory, is illus-

trated in terms of the Roman establishment and subsequent development of
the city of London, England.

One might, of course, use any human arti-

fact or collection of such works to illustrate the ends-means continuum.
However, it is especially appropriate to use a city as the vehicle to
describe the theory because cities are the epitome of civilized society,

and they are all at once the physical results and the major repositories
of human creati ve geni us.

Chapters IV and V, deal ing with ceremonial ism (the practice by
which institutions discharge their social functions), explores some of
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the ancient roots of the myriad of institutions which comprise a city.
Not all of the institutions examined can be called exclusively urban
institutions, but neither can they be excluded from any study of urban
institutions.

For example, a primary human institution, the family,

exists in both urban and rural settings.

It cannot, therefore, reason-

ably be excluded from any serious study of institutional matters in
either urban or rural settings.

Moreover, Chapter IV gives some insight

into how the institutional structure eventually adapted ceremonialism to
pennit the .feudal cities of antiquity to emerge.

Chapters VI, VII, and VIII on technology would at first seem to
deal with purely rural affairs.

However, the urban relevance of those

chapters lies in the relationships between technology and agriculture,
between agricultural productivity and urbanization, and finally between

technological advance and urban function and form.

The argument is made

in those chapters that the revolutions which incrementally advanced
civilization from preliterate and prehistorical folk societies to preurban folk cOJTU1lunities, from the latter to feudal cities, and from feudal

cities to industrial cities were precipitated by technological changes
which first increased agricultural production in each case.

The

increased productivity in agriculture created food surpluses and

~

passu emancipated some members of the corrnnunity from primary and rural
employments and enabled them to speCial ize in secondary or urban activities such as transportation, commerce, security, manufacturing, etc.

Finally, the essence of the last few content chapters is that
cities are arenas in which human groups interact in the choice of social
ends and in the allocation of means to attainment of the chosen ends.
The interaction opera"ces to reconcile the tensions between ceremonial
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constraints and technological opportunities, and the result is institutional change.

Cities are inimitably suited as habitations of human-

group interactions because cities are concomitantly the creatures of and
the principal domiciles for human institutions.

They are 1ikewise the

abodes of the people who populate institutions and who interact through
groups.
The point is that the connections between urban affairs and that
which follows may at times appear remote and obscure to the reader.

It

is only b'y viewing the subject in light of very long-run effects that
the urban relevance becomes clear.

And that relevance achieves clarity

with the understanding embodied in the foregoing assumption--that
matters not narrowly construed as urban frequently have urban consequences, and clearly urban matters often have consequences far beyond
the bounds of cities.

The urban context, then, construes the term urban

affairs as broad enough to include such remote but related matters.
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
The first of the theories dealt with here is institutional economics.

Institutional economics is a uniquely American contribution to

the field of economics.

Two of its founders are Thorstein Veblen and

John R. Commons. 1 Institutional economics enjoyed substantial currency
prior to World War II, but it suffered dec1 ine in the face of the socalled new economics of John Maynard Keynes.

However, it is once again

becoming popular as a research and publication field, and the works of
Veblen and Commons in particular have spawned a whole school of new or
neo-institutiona1ists within the field of economics.
The seminal 1iterature of institutional economics exists in
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fragments and is distinguished by a remarkable lack of correspondence.
This is not true of any one piece of Veblen's writing, each of which is
a gem of literary excellence.

But there is no writing which integrates

Veblen's thoughts into a single, coherent theory.

While the ambitious

and prolific work of Commons possesses better overall continuity and
roundness--especially his last statement on theory, The Economics of Collective Action--it is unnecessarily repetitive and filled with vast,
redundant abstractions and special terminology to represent matters
better d<;s.cribed, in the opinion of this author, using commonly understood terms.
Moreover, the works of Commons and Veblen are not in agreement on
some fundamental and crucial points.

Subsequent scholars have made

little effort to reconcile the differences so that the modern student can
be presented with a coherent, consistent, and integrated body of institutional t.heory.

While a studied and exhaustive reconciliation of differ-

ences between Veblen and Commons is an ambitious and worthy enterprise,
it is outside the scope of this work.

Rather, the goal at hand is simply

to bring the theories into sufficient correspondence to achieve the
purpose described at the outset--name1y, to relate institutional economic
theory to pluralist theory from political science and relate the whole
to urban affairs.
The technique used to achieve consistency between the fragments of
institutional economic theory is simply to use those parts which are
essentially in agreement, to use those parts which this author believes
are most val id where there is conf1 ict and where the material is needed
to round out the whole theory, and to ignore any remaining part which is
not particularly applicable.

Accordingly, a major part of this paper is
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given over to systematizing institutional economic theory.

The follow-

ing few paragraphs are a brief outl ine of the main tenets of that theory
as understood by this writer.

The first part is a clarification of

applicable time-period o3sumptions.

The second part describes the ends-

means continuum or the temporal institutional setting.

And the last two

parts describe the Veblenian theories of ceremonialism and what C. E.
Ayers chooses to call technology.
Time Periods of Analysis
An 'anthropological approach to social interaction in general and
economics in particular, institutional economics views social arrange-

ments in what this writer 'likes to call the very long run.

In this

sense, the ideas of institutional economists tend to receive greater
approbation from historians, anthropologists, and sociologists than
from more orthodox economists.

Indeed, institutional economists are

viewed as somewhat necessary but anomalous appendages by more traditionminded members of the profession.

And, as specialists in psychiatry

must first be medical doctors, so institutional economists must first
establish their competence in orthodox bodies of economic theory.
Orthodox economic theory does not now concern itself with the
institutional very long-run.

Rather, it recognizes three other analyti-

cal time periods--the very short-run, the short-run, and the long-run.
The chief feature which distinguishes one time period from the other is
the economist1s assumptions about variability in the supply of produc-

tive inputs.

In the very short-run, the supply of all productive

resources for the end product under study -is.. assumed to be fi xed so
that supply of the product to the market is 1 imited to whatever can be
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produced with the resources physically on hand in that time period.

It

is therefore impossible to either increase or decrease supply of the
product to the market in that time period.
Absolutely fresh broccoli, available within any given week, is a
commodity which may be in relatively fixed supply so that the price is
primarily a function of demand.

It is not usually possible within the

week (the very short run) to increase the supply because of the growth
cycle of broccoli.

The broccoli available during the week took approxi-

mately se,Venty days from sowing to harvest.

If it is cut too early the

edible yield will be small and unpalatable.

If it is cut too late it

will be in flower and unsuitable for the table.
marketed~

It must be harvested,

and consumed during its prime week for the very best results.

Its supply can be neither increased nor decreased by any significant
amount within the very short run comprising its prime week.

Thus, if the

demand for absolutely fresh broccoli that week is high in relation to its
rigid supply it will command a high price.

On the other

hand~

the price

may have to decl ine below cost in order to clear markets before spoilage

if the market demand is very low in relation to the fixed supply.

However. some resources are assumed to be variable in the short
run while other inputs are assumed to remain fixed.

Capital goods (or

producers I durables), the level of technology, and the land are examples

of resources which are generally assumed to be in fixed supply in the
short run.

Land and capital goods do not become physical components of

the products in the production of which they are employed.

On the other

hand, man hours of labor and intermediate goods which lose their identities in and become a part of the final product are assumed to be variable
in the short run.

Thus, supply of the product may be increased or
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decreased to meet changes in market demand to the extent of the changeability of the variable inputs and their technical substitutibilities
for fixed resources--for example the extent to which additional man
hours may be substituted for equipment hours.
Operation of a food-processing plant illustrates the economic short
run.

During off-harvest seasons, the pl ant processes only those fruits

and vegetables which could be held over from the previous harvest in

some temporary storage medium.

The plant characteristically operates

with a sma·ll permanent staff working a normal forty-hour week (five consecutive eight-hour days).

Moreover, the company will vacation its

permanent staff during the off-harvest seasons.

In other words, it

chooses to reduce its off-season operations by increasing its ratio of
capital to labor.

It accomplishes this by reducing the units of variable

input (man hours and produce in process) used with the units of fixed
input (permanent equipment and the real estate that houses the plant).
This has the effect of decreasing the total cost of variable inputs

while leaving the total cost of fixed inputs unchanged.
However, as fresh fruit and vegetables commence to arrive at the
plant early in the harvest season, the company will start hiring tem-

porary help to handle the accelerating input of produce.

As the season

wears on and the fresh produce backlogs, the company may increase its

hours of operation--first by going to a seven-day work week and paying
overtime rates to its employees and then by hiring temporary staff and

scheduling additional operating shifts.

In other words, the company

chooses to increase its operations during harvest season by decreasing

its ratio of capital to labor.

It accomplishes this by increasing the

units of variabl e input (man hours and produce in p:'ocess) used with the
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units of fixed inputs (equipment and real estate).

This has the effect

of increasing the total cost of variable inputs while leaving the total
cost of fixed inputs unchanged in the short run.
All productive resources are assumed to be variable in the economic long run. While this assumption does not mean that the supply of
all existing inputs is.. infinitely elastic, it does mean that technical
substitutibility between existing and potential inputs is variable.
Thus, a way will be found in the long run to produce any economic good

for which there is a market demand at a price sufficient to cover all
costs of production.

If, in the food-processing plant example, the company found that
it could not process all vegetables and fruits available in its producticn area during the year, and if it could not supply the market demand
for its output, then it might find it profitable to expand its plant-that is, to increase its short-run fixed inputs to meet the higher output
expectations.

This is a lm;g-run consideration--a time-period during

which all inputs, including capital goods and real estate, are considered

to be variable.

In expanding its plant, the company will likely pur-

chase more land and more equipment embodying the newest technology.

This should enable the company to substitute capital goods for man hours
of labor insofar as the newer and better machines can be operated with
fewer people.

Thus. the company can now achieve higher levels of output

per man hour of input.

It is said to be taking advantage of increasing

returns to scale by increasing its scale of plant and reducing its longrun average cost of output.
Economists study market phenomena--supply, demand, price, etc.-under the different states of resource variability assumed in economic
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time periods.

Their tacit assumption is always that the antecedent and

current or assumed states of institutional arrangements will not changeeven in the long run.

It is application of the time-worn ceteris

paribus to social elements which orthodox economists tre3t as exogenous

to the markets they are studying.

For this reason, orthodox economists

will study the effects on quantities and prices of changes in what is
called the quoefficient of technical substitutibility between two inputs.
That is, they study the effects within the market as an institution.
They

;gn~re

the effects of technical change .Q!!. the market as an insti-

tution as well as the effects on other institutions which make up the

social system of which the market is a part.
On the other hand, institutional economists believe that economic

phenomena are products of institutional systems and that markets, as
orthodox economists see them, will exist subject always to institutional

constraints.

Attention of the institutional economist is therefore con-

centrated on the institutional milieu in which markets exist.

In other

words, the institutional economist is concerned not just with market
phenomena according to orthodox theory, but with the feed-back effects of
market activities on institutional arrangements as \...e11.

He is concerned

as well with the economic ways in which society uses and changes its

USES

of material devices and the ways in which society's use and changes in
use of materi a1 devi ces structures and restructures soci ety itsel f.
While the orthodox economic time periods are necessary, they are
not sufficient by themselves to accommodate the institutional frame-ofreference.

The economic long-run is simply not long enough to observe

the feed-back effects of techni ca 1 change on soci al arrangements.

lnsti-

tutional changes of a substantial sort are social revolutions, and they
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take centuries and sometimes millennia to occur.

At least one more time

period is required to observe institutional change.

It is, of course,

the very long run--an anthropological time period of sufficient duration
to study the institutional changes which result from economic and quasi-

economic activities.
The very long run is, then, the principal time period of institu-

tional economic analysis.
the dawn of mankind l

cities as.

t~ey

5

It often takes the analysis back in time to

existence on earth--a time when there were no

are known today, and when human groups were primitive

family bands, the members of which lived short, hard, and frugal lives.
Within that perspective the work at hand draws heavily from that of Clarence E. Ayres, a second generation institutional economist. 2 Ayres
joined the ceremonial and technological components of institutional

economics from Veblen with the idea of an ends-means continuum described
by John Dewey.

The following is a very brief outline of the elements of

institutional economic theory which will be elaborated in remaining

chapters.
Ends and Means
According to Dewey, social interaction takes place in a temporal
setting--a longitudinal dimension in time which is called an ends-means
continuum, a continuum of on-going life processes.

If the continuum is

divided into two parts, a past and a future, then the present is the

boundary between the two.

All that exists in the present is the effects

of causes whi ch 1 i e in the past.

These present effects are also the

means, the -resources, to ends which lie in the future along the continuum. 3
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Ends are states of affairs which 1 ie in the future and which exist
in the present only as human contemplation.

Some ends-in-view may be

alternative insofar as some competing ends may be exclusive.

That is,

selection and attainment of one set of ends may absolutely preclude the
possible attainment of the competing end.

This is because means are

either too scarce to permit all sets to be secured, or the alternative
sets of ends may be incongruous.
Ends are not ends-in-themselves, but once attained become means to

on-going .ends which 1 ie farther in the future along the continuum.

Ends

have value because people, through institutions, set them out as desired,

and means have value in part because they are instrumental in achieving
desired future ends.

The crucial questions raised by the concept of the

ends-means continuum ar'e, how and why are particular ends-to-be-achieved
selected from an array of competing possible ends?

And against what cri-

terion and how are means selected and organized for the attainment of the

se 1ected ends?
Ceremonial ism

Part of the answer to the foregoing questions according to Veblen
and Ayres is found in the practice of ceremonialism.

Ceremonialism is

an institutionalized practice, and it involves the conferring and validation of status upon members of society.4

The technique is instrumental

in the social-control functions of institutions--the social ization and
the transmission of culture needed to preserve stability throughout
society.
Ceremonia 1 val ues are based on the cul tura 1 bel i efs whi ch descend

to the present from the past.

They are transmitted by the myths,
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legends, dramas, and literature which extol tribal triumphs of the past
and the mystical powers of ancestors.

The legends about those triumphs

are pervasive and are used to transmit the totems and taboos of culture--

the "right" ethical and aesthetic values to hold.
social order and status.

Such values connote

People are thus taught from their infancy the

systems of status which descended to them from their tribal pasts.
Through ceremonialism they come to understand and accept their positions

in society and the roles they must play.

Likewise, they come to accept

the mana,. t.he mystical potency attaching to each social rank, and to

recognize the distinctions between their ranks and the ranks of others,
both above and below them in the social structure.
People are also taught how to acknowledge rank and validate status
in ceremonial exchanges or transactions. ceremonial gift giving, and
ceremonial destruction of goods.

And they learn the grave consequences

and the sanctions imposed for failure to learn and conform to the pres-

cribed modes of ceremony.

Finally, the cultural beliefs or tribal leg-

ends, the totems and taboos, and the mana of rank and status, are constantly reinforced by the mystical ceremonies and they afe reconstructed
throughout peopl es I 1; fetimes by the awe-i nspiring dramas, graph; carts,
literature, and religious liturgies of their cultures.

All of this

social ization is accompl ished by institutions attempting to perpetuate
establ i shed val ue systems.

And insofar as ceremonial ism is successful

as the social izing mode of institutions. it augurs toward structure and

stabil ity in society.
Ceremonialism is necessarily backward-looking in terms of the endsmeans continuum.

It 1 inks present arrangements with the causal conquests

of the past, and it prescribes the successful methods of the past as the
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best ways to organize means to achieve future ends.

Likewise, those

ends are measured as desirable or undesirable in terms of the values
descended from the past.

The ceremonial aspect of society extends the

past forever into the future never changing and never ending.

Such is

the mucilage of society in modern as well as primitive societies.
Technology
However, institutions rise and some even decl ine, and society and

social ways do sometimes change from generation to generation.

The ques-

tion is, 'what causes such changes in the face of the powerful backwardurging of ceremonialism? The answer, according to Veblen and Ayres, is
found in the social effects of new technologies, where technology is
simply that quality of a tool that enables it to reduce or be substituted
for human effort in the creation of any good or service having human
value. S Technique, the human propensity and skill to employ particular
technologies, aims to convert ends to means as a pervasive and on-going
process.

This process is continuous, dynamic, progressive, and future-

oriented. 6
The innovation of new technologies tends to be unstabil izing to
institutional environments because the innovation of new technologies

organfzes means (divides labor) and opens ways of distributing social products in ways differing from the ceremonially-prescribed methods descending from the institutional past.

Moreover, new technologies often

radically change even the ends selected to be achieved because some
ends formerly beyond the available means are brought within reach by the
new technologies.

New technology therefore opens opportunities to

change prior existing social status and ceremonial systems of rank, and
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it affords new avenues of soci al mobil ity--avenues toward higher status
for some and diminished status for others.
The ensuing environment is, of course, fraught with confl ict
between those persons who wish to preserve the ceremonial values upon
which their ranks and statuses are founded and those persons who stand
to gain in position and status by the innovation of new technology.
Thus there is an endless struggle between the tradition-bound and
backward-cl inging forces of ceremonialism and the progressive and forward-leanin~

forces of technology, both as to choices between competing

future ends and the a 1ternati ve ways of organi zi ng means toward the
attainment of the selected ends.
How much of known new technology is actually innovated depends
upon the relative strength of ceremonialism--or, in other words, the

strength of institutional values and institutional resistance to change.
Insofar as new technology is innovated, certain ceremonial aspects of

institutional value systems wither and become quaint cultural vestiges
of the past--but never without anomy and social uPheaval. 7 The question
is, by what means does sOciety reconcile the tensions between ceremon-

i ali sm and new techno 1ogi es as the future ascends to the present and
fades into the past in an endless continuum of on-going life processes?
ORTHODOX ECONOMICS

The answer to the foregoing question is found in techniques for
weighing values and for balancing those measured values in some sort of
matrix, the outcome of which is social choice--choices that do or do not
lead to the innovation of new technologies.

These techniques are found

principally in orthodox economic theory and in political theory--
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particularly pluralist political theory.
Ralph Barton Perry has made convincing arguments to show that anything about which a person or group of persons has concern possesses
value. S A definition as broad as Perry's admits valuations across an
infinite range, and therefore a IIIYriad of competing val ues and confl icting interests.

In other words, values perceived by persons and lnstitu-

tions are as multifarious and disparate as society is pluralistic, and

there is no simple or direct method to structure and weigh competing
values in. selecting ends and ways of organizing means toward achieving
those ends.
The problem is to resolve those conflicting interests in a selection of social ends and an allocation of means which somehow maximizes
social welfare.

Such resolution involves optimizing in the allocation of

social means to the creation of social welfare.

Vilfredo Pareto des-

cribes an efficient allocation as one in which means have been allocated
such that it is impossible to improve anyone's welfare without adversely
affecting the welfare of another. 9 J. R. Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor argue
that social welfare can be improved, even though a Pareto-optimal allocation of means exists, if social product is redistributed in such a way
that those persons losing welfare value their losses less than those
persons who gain welfare value their gains. 10
Kenneth Arrow's IIpos s ibil ity theorem" asserts that there are some

conditions of choices under which no market or pol itical arrangements
will necessarily define, much less achieve, a social-welfare function
amenabl e to Paretian measurement. ll

Nevertheless, the Pareto criteria

remain a compell ing ideal to be as nearly achieved as possible.

How-

ever, any movement toward that ideal should be based soundly on
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empirically accurate valuations.

Valuations function to weigh costs and

benefits, where benefits are the hUman satisfactions achieved by securing particularly desirable sets of ends, and costs are the alternative
ends foregone to achieve those benefits.
Both costs and benefits may possess either internal attributes
(aesthetic, private, divisible, personal, visceral, etc.) or external

attributes (ethical, institutional, public, indivisible, collective,

etc.) or part internal and part exte,'na1 attributes.

Economists have

shown hal"( goods and services (and outcomes) which possess only internal
benefits and costs may be efficiently provided through the pricing mechanisms of free markets.

Such goods are viewed as so-called private goods.

Francis Bator and others have argued convincingly that goods and
services (and outcomes) which possess substantial external benefits or
costs cannot be efficiently provided through free markets because the
goods are not divisib1e. 12 Once such goods have been produced, no one
can be exel uded from enjoying the benefits or suffering the costs arising from their production.

Goods posseSSing substantial external ities

are therefore collective goods or public goods.

Since public goods

cannot be divided, they cennot be packaged and sold in consumer units.
And since each person val ues his benefits and costs differently, there
is no way to discover the true magnitude of the benefit or cost any
person experiences with public goods.

Persons, therefore, tend to ufree

ride ll in the consumption of public goods by understating their benefits
and overstating their costs.
must be provided wholly

Of"

Goods possessing substantial externalities

in part under some other institutional

arrangement than free markets. 13
The usual alternative arrangement to free markets for allocating
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public goods is some variation of government institutions and the electoral process.

Whatever institutional arrangement is set upon, some

technique for weighing social benefits and social costs is needed.

The

technique enjoying currency in recent years is lIbenefit-cost analysis. II

Mishan and others have described the process and some of the issues
involved. 14
The issues surrounding cost-benefit analysis raise substantial
doubt as to its accuracy in valuing publ ic goods.

The problems surround

the following questions:
- Which costs and benefits will be included in the analysis?
- Which are internal and which are external?
- What pecuniary values will be assigned to external costs and
benefits?
- What social discount rate will be used to discount future benefits and costs back to present val ues?
- Over what useful 1ife will the future benefits and costs be
discounted?
- What is to be maximized or minimized in the outcome?

- And the most important question of all, which institutional
values will reign over the processes deciding these questions?
Clearly, the cost-benefit analysis of any potential public activity
can lead to many different conclusions depending on how the foregoing
questi ons are answered, and they can be answered any number of ways.
Despite its obvious limitations, cost-benefit analysis appears to be the
best tool available for evaluating alternative public ends.

All of

which points up the problem--values as perceived by persons and institutions are multifarious and disparate, and there is no simple or direct
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method to structure and weigh competing values regarding ends and means.
How, then, does society reconcile the tensions between ceremonialism and
technology in selecting ends and in organizing means?
URBAN PLURALISM

The answer is found in institutional changes that are brought
about through collective action and interest-group politics.

Theories

of collective action are components of institutional economic theory,

and they ,are the original products of John R. Commons.

Theories regard-

ing interest-group politics stem f,om contemporary political theory.
The two bodies of theory attempt to explain how institutions adjust to
unstabil izing social aberrations through changes in custom and law.
Coll ective Action 15
According to Commons, conflicts of interests rise between IIgoing
concerns II (institutions) over the present and future uses of scarce
resources.

Resources are scarce because of property ri ghts, and the

confl icts of interests are resolved through "transactions
interinstitutional changes in property rights.

iJ

that affect

Transactions take place

within the 1 imits of custom and law operating as uworking rules.!!

At

the same time any transaction involves establishment of the particular

working rules that will govern the exchange with which it deals.

Thus,

customs change as working rules change and become routinized through
transactions.
Transactions are classified by Commons as bargaining transactions,
rationing transactions, and managerial transactions.

Bargaining trans-

actions are voluntary arrangements between going concerns of
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approximately equal powers, and they tend to be juridical

in nature.

Rationing transactions involve legislative powers, and they take place
between collective superiors and legal subordinates.
most part, involuntary.

They are, for the

Managerial transactions involve executive powers

in which involuntary actions arise out of decisions about

organiz~d

uses

of properties and other rights previously established out of bargaining
or rationing transactions.

All transactions involve conflicts of interest arising from
scarcity" interdependency of interests arising from the need for exchange,
and order arising from a need for working rules to facilitate exchange.
Transactions function to convert conf1 icts of interests to interdependencies of interests.

And collective action, through the power of trans-

actions, creates and changes the working rules--unorganized custom,

organized custom in the form of cOnJllon law, and the co·dified laws of
nation-states, including constitutional, statutory, and administrative

laws.
Parties to a transaction include the social organizations between

which property rights are to be exchanged, the best alternative exchange
on both sides, and collective action operating through custom and law.
Bargaining power in a transact;on is the right to deny others the future
uses of properties.

It is seldom equal between the going concerns

involved in transactions; however, any exercise of bargaining power is

legal so long as the transaction is completed within the parameters of

custom and law.

This defines what Commons calls "reasonable value ll - -

whatever bargaining power is allowed in custom and law.
The dynamism of this process is in the relationships between transactions, customs, and laws.

Transactions are structured by custom and
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law, while law slowly changes to conform to custom, and custom evolves
out of the routine practice of transactions.

Such determinations

establish and change property rights and thus the power relationships
between going concerns in transactions.

The legal foundations of govern-

ments are in the natures of the predominant forms of transactions in the
governed societies--bargaining transactions (juridical

power), ration-

ing transactions (legislative power), and managerial transactions

(executive power).
Interest-Group Pol itics
As customs evolve out of the routine practice of transactions, law

slowly changes to conform to the evolving customs.

How changes in the

law come about in an industrial democracy is explained by the pluralist

theOl·y of pol iti cs.

Much has beeh written si nce World War I I about the

group basis of politics, in which group theory from the field of sociology has been app1 ied to the study of pol itica1 interactions.
fruits of that union are pluralist political theory.16

The

Pluralist theory

does much to explain how political stability is maintained by the interaction of interest groups in which groups are free to form and dissolve
coalitions with other groups in support or opposition to issues about
which people feel strongly enough to create, join, leave, and dissolve
interest groups.
According to Dewey, any social activity involves at least two
groups, those directly involved in the activity, and those indirectly

affected for good or bad by the activity.

Those persons who are

indirectly affected and who perceive their interests involved in the

activity will organize to protect those interests.

Dewey called the
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organized interest a public, and insofar as the public commissions
agents to operate in its behalf regarding the activity, there exists the
institution CT government. 17
Earl Latham, a political plural ist writing somewhat later, argued
that social activities take place in groups.18
people are realized through groups.

All values cherished by

There are a great many accommoda-

tions made through group interactions--the common and the universal,
the diverse and the particular.

Latham included both privately and

publicly ,organized groups in his observations.
According to Latham, groups are in constant motion and it is
through group interaction that the rules of government are made and

changed, and the community is governed.

Groups organize, as Dewey said,

to concentrate power and to use that power to come to terms with their
environments.

So-called official groups are those organized as public,

and they function to provide levels of compromise in writing the rules
(laws) for other groups.

This is, of course, accomplished in the United

states under the Constitution by the various branches and levels of
governments--legislative, executive (including the myriad of administrative and regulatory agencies) and the judicial branches, as well as
federal, state. and local levels of governments.
The whole idea ;s that consensus can be reached, the laws can be
created and changed, and human welfare can be enhanced through smallgroup interactions in which individuals are free to join or leave any
group, and any group is free to form coalitions with other interest
groups in support or opposition to any action or issue.

In this way.

a public-interest equilibrium results from public opinion and the
interaction of opposing forces.

Equil ibrium is maintained by the
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interaction alone and no outside authority is needed to maintain
stability.
Thus, the tensions between ceremonialism and technology are
reconciled through transactions between going concerns in which the
transactions change working rules, and the working rules alter customs
according to the collective action theories of John R. Commons.

More-

over, laws are changed by interest-group interactions to conform to
evolving customs according to political pluralist theories.

Finally,

the result .is very long-run changes in the institutional system while
social stability is maintained.
This chapter has introduced the work at hand as a partial synthesis
of institutional economic theory and political pluralist theory and the
appl ication of the results to urban affairs.

The chapter sets forth the

assumption that urban phenomena cannot be effectively studied in isolation of other phenomena.

That is, any event that has urban consequences

or is itself the consequence of urban activities is appropriately a
subject of study by urbanologists.

This is followed by a brief outl ine

of the institutional economic theories, the orthodox economic theories,

and the political pluralist theories that are components of the synthesis.
The next chapter, Chapter II, is a brief review of selected social
science literature on institutions.

The review is undertaken to define

the word lIinstitution ll in a way that will serve throughout the remaining

chapters.

The remaining chapters are elaborations of the foregoing

theories in the context of urbanization and urban affairs.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONS
The word "institutional" appears frequently in the preceding chap-

ter, and the word lIinstitution U is in daily common usage.
have a good notion what the word means.

Most persons

However, a good word definition

of "insti.tution" remains elusive, and social scientists are not in com-

plete accord on a precise definition.

This chapter attempts to develop

a definition of "institution ll which will serve throughout the remainder

of this work.

In pursuit of such a definition, the first section

examines the relationship between institutional and non-institutional
groups.

The next few sections examine respectively the origins of instt-

tutions. their social functions, their structures, and the attempts to
classify them.

The last section loosely relates institutions to urban

areas and poses severa·] questions which will occupy the remaining

chapters.
INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS
Political science contemplates the distribution and application of
social power--the capacity of one agent or coalition of agents to
control the powers and direct the actions of other agents and groups--in
the authoritative allocation of values.

In so doing, political theorists

tend to treat interest groups as more or less homogeneous and of approximately equal power.

That is, they tend to ignore intergroup differ-

entials--although criticism over recent years has caused political
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scientists to reexamine these and other simpl ifying assumptions which
undergird pluralist theories.

The assumption of approximate intergroup homogeneity is a crucial
weakness of pluralist theory.

It seems clear enough that there are

striking differences in power between groups.

A group is defined as "two

or more people between whom there is an established pattern of psychological interaction [such that the aggregatioD? is recognized as an
entity by its own members and usually by others because of its . . . collective behavior."l

This definition may be applied to any human aggre-

gation from an entire civilization to a whole society, a nationality, a
municipality, a neighborhood or other community, or simply two persons.

Clearly the power of a community consensus to expand a city park located
in the neighborhood is weak as cOl:npared to the remaining members of the

much larger municipality who do not wish to expand the park under any
circumstances.

Thus, the magnitude of the aggregation is relevant in

some sense to a group' 5 magnitude of power.

Of equal importance ;s the relative positions of groups regarding
particular social issues.

Even groups with approximately equal numbers

of members enjoy or suffer inequalities of power simply because of their
relative positions regarding the issues of their collective concerns.
For example. groups which support an established or institutionalized
practice generally need not exert much power to justify continuation of
the practice.

That is, the position itself may possess the power

because of the institutional nature of the practice.

On the other hand,

groups which seek changes to such established practices must usually
exhaust every power at their disposal in advocacy for change.

The issues of slavery and civil rights in the United States are
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cases in pOint.

Despite the Declaration of Independence, which loudly

proclaimed in 1776 that "all men are created equal

,II

and the revered

Bill of Rights to the U. S. Constitution, which guarantees certain human
freedoms, the then existing institution of black slavery persisted until
1865.

It ended then only after a bloody Civil War anu ratification of

the Thirteenth Amendment to that Constitution.
Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment and a variety of Civil Rights
laws in the 1870's failed to operationalize the rights of freedmen, or
former sl,a.ves, until the landmark Supreme Court decision, Brown et al Y1.
Board of Education of Topeka et al in 1954.

That case released a verit-

able landslide of pent-up and bitter protest from black citizens who had
tolerated discrimination at the hands of whites, based in part upon the
prior inferior social status of slavery.

These protests were met with

angry and often violent reactions from whites, many of whom may go to
their graves bel ieving that black people are inferior and whites superior.

Discrimination continues even now in spite of recent Civil Rights Acts.
The point is that the powers of institutionalized practices and beliefs
doggedly persist even when they are demonstrably bankrupt and great
human suffering has been spent in the advocacy for change. 2
Perhaps of even greater importance is the relative character of
the groups regarding particular social issues.

That is. groups of

approximately equal numbers of members possess unequal powers because of
differences in their essential characteristics.

For example, the

officials of a municipal government--the mayor, members of the city council. city manager. city engineer, city planner, and members of the planni ng commi ssi on--wi 11 generally possess more coll ective power to deci de
land-use issues for their community than any other interested group
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because the municipal government has unique characteristics, vis othe....r
interest groups.
The quality which distinguishes the municipal government from other

groups in this simple example is its institutional character.

That is,

it possesses some of the coercive powers of the institution of govern-

ment, powers which it may apply to community land-use issues as well as
to a wide range of other municipal issues.

And these particular institu-

tional powers are not generally shared with other groups immediately

intereste.d .in the issues over which the institution enjoys province.
Thus, institutional groups generally possess crucial and decisive powers
regarding issues because of characteristics which distinguish them from

non-institutional groups.
Institutional groups are therefore unique and distinguished from

other social groups with sufficient Significance to make them objects of
especially concentrated study.

Research into the nature of institu-

tions has occupied sociologists for more than a hundred years and some
economists for more than seventy-five.

While it is intended to dwell

here on the work of economists, it seems appropriate at the outset to
summarily review some of the more significant conclusions of other social
scientists regarding institutions--notably sociologists and cultural
anthropologists.

Much has been written by those scholars which illumin-

ates some of the essential character of i nsti tutions--thei r ori gi ns,
soci al functions, structures, methods of operati on, and c1 ass ificati ons.
What follows at this point is an ontological exploration of institutions
out of which will emerge a concise and hopefully clear definition of
institutions which will serve throughout the remainder of this work.
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ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONS

Social scientists have differing perspectives as to the origins of
institutions.

Institutions have "come· out of mores, II according to Sumner,

where mores are folkways, which are commonly understood to enhance social

welfare, and the breaches of which are more severely and formally punished than breaches of ordinary folkways.

Ordinary folkways are popular

habits, the breaches of which are punished informally by avoidance, exclusion, or ostracism.
clusters

Likewise, Veblen vaguely defines institutions as

aT habits and customs--ways of doing and thinking about things--

that are sanctioned by long practice and by approval of the community. 3
The custom by which a groom carries his bride over their first
threshe>ld is a happy

1 ittle folkway which is one of a number of cere-

monies marking the advent of the couple's matrimony.

The practice enjoys

the universal approbation of the community, but the state of matrimony
wi 11 not be di sso I ved nor wi 11 the groom suffer more than verbal chastisement if he omits it from the ceremonial steps to the nuptial chamber.
However, the admonition "thou shalt not commit adulteryll is an example

of a more which has been codified into the laws of most nations as
inimical to the institution of monogamous matrimony--an institutiolJ which

has grown out of that and other related mores.

Persons who breach those

mores are generally subject to formal sanctions which may be pressed by
the injured spouse, or brought by the state, or both.
On the other hand, Chapin believes that institutions arise out of
the fundamental needs of mankind.

According to this view, institutions

come into existence because they stabil ize the behavior of people who
are striving to deal with such fundamental needs as fear, hunger, and
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sex.

Matrimony once again provides an example of an institution which

stabilizes social relations in dealing with the human need for sexual
expression.

It clearly defines the roles of husband and wife and the

socially acceptable limits upon their marital and extramarital sexual
express i cns.
Martindale disputes the biological !lneeds theoryll because institu-

tions are social phenomena and hUman needs are not immutable prerequisites of social existence.

He believes that "group needs II are a

more real,istic basis for institutions.

Among group needs are the need

for security, social stability, and perpetuation of the group.

These

needs necessarily imply constraints upon the liberties of individual

members in the interest of the group. 4
For example, the institution of private property has evolved in
part as a guarantee of minority rights for the owners to enjoy the quiet

use of that attractive cape-cod cottage down the block along with all of
its contents.

Perhaps more important, that right also impl ies the power

to deny their use to all nonowners of those particular properties.

While

the nonowners probably possess different properties of their own, they
are a nonowning majority regarding that particular cape cod and its contents.

Private property rights are, of course, reciprocal insofar as the

owners of that cape cod jOin the nonowning majority regarding the properties of others.

They therefore tacitly agree to respect the private

property rights of others as others have honored their property rights.
These institutional arrangements augur toward the stability of intragroup relations in uses of the myriad of nonhuman things which are necessary in some measure for the satisfaction of human needs--both human
group needs and the needs of the human individuals who comprise the
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group.5
Still other social scientists distinguish several periods of institutional development in what is called an "institutional cycle"--(l)
incipient organization, (2) efficient functioning, (3) formalism, (4)
disintegration, (5) disappearance or reformation.

According to this

idea, an institution may rise in its incipient phase as a reform move-

ment during a social crisis which demands new techniques for handling
social problems.

The movement develops leaders, organizational structure,

norms (ru.les or standards of behavior) for dealing with the social issues
of its special concern, and the material accouterment necessary for its

efficient operation.

During its phase of efficient functioning, the

institution comes to enjoy legitimacy and prestige and to have the power
to direct the actions of others.
cherished end-in-itself.

Eventually, the institution becomes a

Its functionaries grow complacent and reaction-

ary and its structure becomes inflexible during its formal phase.

As

society progresses, the institution may find itself overtaken and unable
to cope in a new and changing social environment.

Thus, it disinte-

grates and disappears, or, if it serves some crucial social purpose, it
is drastically reformed during another social crisis.
The rise of labor unionism and the institutionalization of labor
organization and collective bargaining in the U. S. illustrates aspects
of the institutional cycle.

Labor unionism is a modern phenomenon which

arose concomitant with modern urbanization from the social crises

accompanying what is popularly called the industrial revolution.

During

the immediate preindustrial age there were no labor unions, and industry
and commerce took place between very small business and consuming units
in small but often competitive markets.

Transactions were direct and
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face-to-face.

The buyer knew the seller and usually the maker as well.

The maker was intimately acquainted with whomever he employed Indeed, he

rarely employed more than one or two persons in his enterprise.
It was the belief that atomistic and competitive markets would make
the most efficient allocation of resources and distribution of income

that could be achieved.

These beliefs gave rise to a Common Law prohibi-

ticn against any conspiracy which would restrain trade--that is, to con-

spiratorially and artificially reduce the supply of goods and services
to markets and thereby raise prices and wages above those which would

prevail under competitive conditions.

The Common Law prohibition

against such conspiracies was later codified in the U. S. as the nSherman

Anti-Trust Act of 1890.,,6
Likewise, it was bel ieved that there was no need for government

regulation of private economic activities so long as competitive markets
functioned as they were supposed to.

Indeed, government economic inter-

vention was viewed as undesirable intrusion:
citizens.

into the private affairs of

This, coupled with a general distrust of governments resulted

in a number of well-known limitations on the powers of governments in the

U. S. Constitution.

One such limitation is Section 10 of Article I which

prohibits governments in the United States from enacting any law impairing the obligations of contracts. 7

This provision and the Common Law

and statutory prohibition against conspiracies which restrain trade and
commerce effectively barred the organization of labor and collective
bargaining in the United States for more than a century.
Agreements between an employer and his employee were, after all,
private contracts with which governments could not tamper, according to
the Constitution.

And is it not true that employees who organize and
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meet to set wages, working conditions, and other matters of employment

are conspiring to restrain free and competitive trade in labor markets?
These, then, were the pre-industrial institutional arrangements govern-

ing employment and wages.

Each agreement between an employer and an

employee was a separate, private contract arrived at by individual bargaining between the two parties.

No one else was privy to the contract

and therefore no one but the two parties could have any cause of action

on the contract under the Common Law.
However, the early Nineteenth Century witnessed the first sparks
of the industrial revolution in the United States.

Social events which

mark the succeeding era include the innovation of new power, transportation, manufacturing, and agricultural technologies, the emergency of

large-scale corporate enterprises each employing many workers, and the
migration of labor from rural areas and agricultural employments to urban
areas and manufacturing and service employments.

This latter event

effectually decreased individual or famil ial independence and greatly
increased social interdependence insofar as the revered family farm pro-

duced much of the sUbstance it consumed while the urban family relied
entirely upon a wage-earner's buying power to satisfy its consumption
needs.
Urban product markets lost their competitive flavor, becoming monopolistic and oligopolistic with large-sca1e business enterprise.

like-

wise, urban labor markets lost their competitiveness, becoming oligopsonistic and in some cases monopsonistic with the massing of many workers
in urban areas dominated by a few large enterprises.
changed from primary to secondary.

Relationships

Transactions between consumers and

producers, and between employers and employees became impersonal and
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took place at armIs length.

Thus, employer-managers came to possess

great power to dictate wages and working conditions to workers who had
little choice but to accept whatever was offered.
As one might expect, employers took advantage of the situation to
exploit labor for private gain.

Wages were abysmally low in most areas,

working conditions were primitive and working hours were long.

The

fantastic profits realized from these cost savings were used to further
fuel the industrial revolution and to enrich the corporate owners.
instituti.Dn~l

The

arrangements which descended from the preindustrial past

were simply not appropriate to the social situations introduced by the
industrial revolution.

The resulting crises gave rise to the American

labor movement and the incipient phase of the institution now known as

the labor union. 8
The labor movement was a long, mighty, and often violent struggle

for the legitimacy of labor's right to organize and bargain collectively
with employers.

The movement was met head-on by the intransigence of

private businessmen and the formidable juridical

upholding the Common Law and the Constitution.

powers of the courts

Time and space do not

permit further elaboration of the long struggle which eventually culminated in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), the so-called
IIMagna Carta of Labor."

The act formal ized the legitimacy of labor

organization and collective bargaining, and it marks the beginning of
labor unionism's institutional phase of efficient functioning.

The Act

passed its constitutionality test in 1937 when the Supreme Court handed
down its landmark decision IINational Labor Relations Board

~

Jones and

Laughlin Steel Co.,,9
The labor mores which arose with the labor union movement and which
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were not codified in the NLRA were formalized in legislation following
the Jones and Loughlin case.

Labor unions have become a fact of insti-

tutional 1ife in the United States.
possess prestige and influence.

They have recognized leaders who

They have organized structure (the

local, the international, the federation, and the convention) and institutional norms (strike, picket, union shop, check-off, col1ective bar-

gaining, and much more).

And finally, they possess the power to direct

the actions of others.
It .appears that the labor union may now have passed into its formal
phase in terms of the institutional cycle.

The union has become a cher-

i shed end-in-itself--something 1i ke motherhood, the Constitution and
democratic government in the U. S., all of which stand above serious
criticism.

All of American labor ' s major objectives stand long achieved--

the forty-hour week. paid holidays and vacations, union security, min-

imum wages, bargaining on a11 wage and employment conditions, etc.

Its

structures are inflexible in the face of labor force changes which
threaten the foundations of the union movement.

Its officers and other

functionaries have become complacent and even reactionary at a time when
labor's role in

inflation~

unemployment~

and discrimination suggest the

need for changes in both the cherished labor mores and union powers at

the bargaining table.
What the future may hold for the institution of labor unionism
cannot be known.

However, if its structural inflexibil ities and the

complacent and reactionary attitudes of its leaders cause it to be overtaken and unable to cope in new and changing social environments, it will
likely disintegrate and disappear.

Or, if it continues to serve some

crucial social purpose, it win be reformed during the ensuing social
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crisis.

The poir:t is simply that the rise of labor unionism and the

institutiunalization of labor organization and collective bargaining in
the U. S. illustrates aspects of the institutional cycle, incipient
organization, efficient functioning, formalism, disintegration, and
disappearance or reform.

The foregoing ideas do not appear to be alternative theories of the
origin of institutions.

Rather, they are complementary explanations.

Even the apparent dispute over the hUman needs '!.2. group needs theories
seems superficial.

Institutions may and probably do arise to meet either

or both kinds of needs.

At any rate, these explanations are compatible

with the idea that institutions come out of mores, or widely understood

and held values and with the idea of a so-called institutional cycle.
Whatever theory one holds of the origin of institutions, it seems clear
that they evolve with or from some particular system of values--whether
those values center upon human interacti on, materi a 1 thi ngs, or procedures governing human uses of material objects, and whether those values
are aesthetic, ethical, technical, or pecuniary in character.
SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF INSTITUTIONS

The theory of the origins of institutions is suggestive of the
principal function of institutions, that of maintaining social stability.
As already noted, Chapin argued that institutions come into existence
because they stabilize the behavior of people seeking to satisfy basic
needs.

r~ead

stresses the same phenomena, hol ding that group ex; stence

presents each member with a number of similar or identical
situations which yield to common responses.

These responses are insti-

tutional in the sense that institutions represent aspects of group
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activity that enable members to act adequately by assuming the common
group attitude toward those activities. 10
Likewise, Parsons argues that certainty and stabflity in social

interaction result. because institutions are urol e integrates" which
organize onels expectations in any given social context. 11

For example,

the participants in a common economic transaction will play the roles of
buyer and seller.

Presumably the buyer wishes to acquire possession and

legal title to some object which the seller either owns himself or is
selling as an agent of the true owner.

The institution of law--more

narrowly. commercial or contract law--will govern their transaction.
Each party. having knowledge of contract law, will know what ;s expected

of himself and the other party as the transaction proceeds.
They both know that the object of their transaction must have a
1ega1 purpose--that ; 5, the contract cannot be undertaken in contempl ation of breaking the law.

They also know that each must have contractual

capac ity before the transaction wi 11 resul tin a bi ndi ng contract.

The

seller knows that he must make an offer to sell and the buyer knows that
he must make an acceptance of the offer in order to reach the agreement
(or mutuality of assent) necessary to the contract.

Finally, there must

be consideraticn. or something in exchange. given by the buyer to the
seller at the time the seller gives over possession of the object to the
buyer.

Having met all of these conditions, both the buyer and the seller

may der-art with certainty that all other members of society will honor
the outcome of their transaction. 12
Certainty and stabil ity in social interaction result in this case
because the institutions of law and the market have integrated the roles
of buyer and seller in their economic transactions.

Thus the principal
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function of institutions is that of maintaining social stability so that
members of society might interact with some degree of certainty as to
outcomes.

Other functions are subsidiary and supportive of this one.

There are at least three of these subsidiary functions: exercise social
control, socialize persons, and transmit culture.
Institutions are the social groups which exercise social control-the modicum of processes through which society or any social subgroup
obtains conformity by its members to its mores or norms of expected behavior.

In addition to his many other observations on institutions,

Sumner stressed the social-control function.

Likewise. John R. COrmlons,

one of the founders of institutional economics, defined institutions in
terms of their social-control function--IlInstitutions are collective
action in control. liberation, and expansion of individual action.,,13
The preceding description of how the institution of law achieves
certainty and stab;l ity in social interaction by integrating the roles
of buyer and seller in their transaction serves equally well to illustrate the social-control function of institutions.

In that case, the

institution of law controlled the social interaction by prescribing the
essential elements of a binding contract; legal ity of purpose, contractual capacity, mutuality of assent, and consideration.

Social behavior

which achieves these elements is reinforced by execution of the contract
and consurrmation of the transaction to the satisfaction of all concerned.
The foregoing emphasizes the regulatory character of social control--the power to prescribe certain social actions, to proscribe other
actions, to reward proper behavior and to impose punishments for noncompl iance.

Clearly members of society must understand and accept their

roles and the social norms under which they must play out those roles if
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social control is to be effective and social stability a reality.

Thus

another function of institutions is socia1ization--a social-psychological
process whereby the personal ity is conditioned to the fo1 kways and mores
and is shaped to fit the social roles it will play in society.

It is a

process of initiation which commences when a person is born and ends for
him when he dies.
For example, the male infant, who possesses certain biological
characteristics which distinguish him from the female, immediately commences to learn about his distinctions and the roles he will play because
of those distinctions.
family.

The first institution to socialize him is the

The family dresses him in blue and his sisters in pink.

The

family applies rewards to reinforce behavior which fits the male role in
life.

He learns that he should expect to one day become a husband,

father, and bread-winner.

And he is introduced to a II1Yriad of folkways

which enforce these roles.

Likewise, he is discouraged from behavior

which does not comport with the male roles he is expected to assume.
This socialization into male roles will be carried on by every other
institution in which the maturing male finds himse1f--the school, the
law, the church, the economy, the government, etc.

He will, therefore,

learn to submit to social control and do his best in his male role to
help achieve social stability through institutional processes.
In addition to initiating persons into their roles, socialization

also transmits culture from gelleration to generation.

Malinowski

alludes to this when he calls institutions the "real units of culture"
which organize the activities of people who are attempting to satisfy
basic needs--where cul ture is a term meaning all socially-acquired

behavior patterns that are communicated by symbols.

This includes all
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material artifacts of mankind as well as the fol kways and mores, or the
nonmaterial attributes of society.14
One may cite virtually any procedure, or material object generally
used by mankind as an example of a culture item which is transmitted

from generation to generation through the process of social ization.

All

the attributes of language, as well as the books, road signs and other
physical manifestations of language are examples of cultural trans-

mission, albeit that language also happens to be an institution.
over, all language skills are learned.

More-

That is, none of the language

skills are inherited genetically or arise as normal biological phenomena.
The process by which the culture of any particular language capabi1 ity is imparted to the young is one of social ;zation in which the
reciprocal roles are those of transmitter and receiver or writer and
reader.

The social ;zation commences in the institution of the family and

is carried on by the institution of education as well as a variety of
other institutions.

The result ;s the transmission of cultural norms by

which people may communicate meanings to one another through the use of
sound and graph; c symbol s.

The abi 1 ity to successfully communi cate 1ends

itself to certainty and stability in social interaction.

It is in and

through institutions that society gets it all together--both the material
and non-material aspects of culture and all of the values attending
thereto.

And it is through the socialization process of institutions

that culture is transmitted from generation to generation.
In summation. it may be said that institutions function to preserve
social stabil ity through exercising social control. social izing persons
and transmitti ng cul ture.

On a hi gher 1evel of general izati on. it may be

claimed that institutions are the social guardians of culture and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45
proper discharge of institutional functions serves to preserve and perpetuate cultural attributes in the society of which the institutions
are a part.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Turning now to institutional structure, it is said that institutions are organized social groups--groups structured so that their purposes are achieved by dividing their functions among members or agents
who carry out those functions as individuals or as sub-groups.

SUmner

distinguishes between an institutional "concept" of socially-sanctioned
activities and a

Il

s tructure ll which provides organizational patterns for

the real ization of the concept.
not unique to institutions.

Of course this organized character is

MacIver defines institutions as established

forms of procedure which are characteristic of group activity, while

associations are organized groups with structure, identity, and
membership.15
It seems clear that institutions might be divided into their human

and non-human components, as Maciver attempts to do.

However, it also

seems artificial to refer to the non-human components as the institution,
and the human components as something else.

An institution is a

uniquely hUman and social phenomena, even though it may involve other
cultural attributes.

And it is difficult to comprehend how an institu-

ticn can possess any being or significance without its human components
and its social character.

Thus, an institution is an organized social

group which is united with and employs the establ ished forms of procedure to which MacIver refers.

Terms frequently associated with institutional groups are bureau
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and oligarchy.

That is, institutional life ;s a bureaucratic existence

in which the officers or agents of the institution occupy positions or

offices and play the roles in society dictated by those offices.

Role is

behavior expected of an individual who occupies a particular social posi-

tion in which the behavior is determined by the group or culture of which
the person is a member.

The positions or offices are generally arranged

in some scalar fashion with some offices connoting higher rank and status
or greater power than other offices in the institutional structure. 16
The modern business corporation aptly illustrates an economic
institution which possesses a scalar bureaucracy.

The corporation ;s a

legal individual created by the state through the issuance of a corporate
chat'ter.

The owners possess shares of stock as evidence of their owner-

ship and of their rights to participate in the election of a board of
directors and to receive a share of the net profits of the corporation.
The board of directors has the power to name the corporation preSident,

delegate operating authorities to the president, hold him accountable for
results stemming from those authorities, and declare the dividends by
which the owners--or shareholders--participate in profits of the corporation.

Shareholders and members of the board of directors do not typically
engage in the day-by-day management of the corporate business.

Rather,

this is the function of the person apPOinted to the position and playing
the role of president.

He is usually the general agent of the corpora-

tion with powers to bind the corporation into contracts with persons and
other corporations.

The president has an organization conSisting of

positions occupied by persons who play the roles of subordinate corporate officers and other functionaries. 17
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The typical small manufactL!""ing firm would probably have four divi-

sions: finance, materials, production, and marketing.

Examining only the

production division for a moment, the 1 ine position titles in descending

order of rank, status, and power might include the vice-president for production, the superintendent of plant operations, the plant manager for

plant #2, the plant #2 swing-shift foreman, the 1 ine A lead foreman on
plant #2 swing shift, and the assembly technician on line A in the plant

#2 swing shift.

The persons occupying each of these corporate positions

take on the habits of dress and customs of behavior primarily as they
perceive thei r ro1 es and status through the expectations of others, both
inside and outside the institution.

Thus, the modern business corpora-

tion, like other institutions, possesses a scalar bureaucracy.
Insofar as there is bureaucratization and organized structure, it

is often claimed that institutions are also oligarch',cal in that there is

control within institutions by the few officers who possess the highest
rank.

And it follows that these same few officers exercise the institu-

tional powers in interaction with other interest groups over issues of
their collective concerns.

The point is, that institutional groups are

organized social groups, and this characteristic, coupled with other
institutional attributes, endows the institution with formidable pOi'Jer
in deal ing with non-institutional groups or social issues.
Hence, the unique powers of institutions are functions of their
strategic positions on social issues and of their essential characteristics.

That is, arising from mores, institutions stand to preserve the

status quo on any issue while groups opposing the status quo stand to
challenge the mores or the fundamental beliefs of most people.

Moreover,

institutions possess special powers for the preservation of the status
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quo--or the maintenance of stabil ity and certainty in social interaction.
These special powers are crucial to the functioning of institutions
exercising social control, in socializing initiates, in transmitting

culture, and thus in maintaining stability.
The special powers of institutions are to maintain and prescribe
norms of expected behavior, award and reinforce behavior conforming to
expectations, proscribe non-conforming behavior, and impose sanctions

for non-conforming behavior.

In speaking of religion, Dewey writes:

To .say it is institutional ized is to say that it invol ves a
tough body of customs, ingrained habits of action, organized
and authorized standal"ds and methods of procedure . . . Faith
in these ideas, or at least in the catch words which express
them, become obligatory, necessary

fyS

social salvation;

disbelief or indifference is heresy.

Noninstitutional groups may possess some capacities to employ these
powers as amongst their particular memberships.

However, they generally

possess no legitimate powers to coerce persons who are not members of

their particular groups into compliance with their norms.

Indeed, their

members are free to unilaterally terminate their relationships with the
groups if they find themselves in such disagreement with group norms
that they cannot conform.

Finally, the sanctions of non-institutional

groups are informal in nature: avoidance, exclusion, and ostracism from

the group.

And these sanctions are rarely significant outside the

groups imposing them.
On the other hand, institutions possess the power to prescribe and
proscribe behavior of persons who hold

!!.Q.

offices inside the institu-

tional bureaucracies but who are members of the society whose culture
the institutions preserve and transmit.

Moreover, institutions generally

possess the power to formally coerce nonconforming persons into
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adherence with mores, or institutional norms.

In the case of the state--

one of the political institutions of a nationality--such institutional
coercion may achieve the ultimate force, the power to deprive nonconforming members of their lives.
Likewise, institutions award and reinforce conforming behavior by
conferring status and the trappings of status upon persons who behave in
accordance with the expectations attending the social roles they play.
But more important, such conferred status is universally recognized and
acclaimed throughout the society of which the institutions are a part,
whereas the status conferred by noninstitutional groups is generally
acknowledged only within the groups conferring the stat"s.
For example, one who has managed to comply with all of the requirements is awarded the status of medical doctor.

He must first be

graduated from a baccalaureate institution, usually with honors, and the
completion of a pre-medical curriculum.
medical aptitude tests.

He must score high on the

He must then apply to many medical schools and

hope that one will accept him.

If he gains admittance, he must complete

three or four years of rigorous professional schooling in medicine.

The

degree of doctor of medicine or medical doctor will be conferred upon him
by the institution from which he is graduated if he completes his work
successfully.
However, he is not yet prepared to practice medicine without
restrictions.

He must next complete a residency of one or two years at

some accredited hospital, after which he must take and pass his medical
board examinations.

He will then be certified by the state as qual ified

to practice medicine and he may thereafter play the role of medical
doctor without legal restrictions.

If he chooses to special ize in some
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narrow field of medicine, he must usually complete some additional professional training and more internship.
specialty as well as in general medicine.

He may then practice in his
He is addressed as I1doctor"

and he is accorded great admiration and respect by all and envied by
many.

If he is in the least successful in his practice, he will enjoy

the institutional status conferred upon him as well as great prestige,
influence, and income for the rest of his life.

This then is the modus operandi of institutions--they function to
stabil ize social relations by maintaining the status quo.

This is

aecampl ished through the processes of social control, social ;zatian,

and cultUre transmission.

These latter functions are carried out through

the unique institutional powers of prescribing and proscribing behavior,
formally awarding behavior which comports with institutional expectations. and formally punishing nonconforming behavior--all of which is

widely recognized, accepted and acclaimed throughout the society of
which the institutions are a part.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS
Having distinguished institutions and institutional groups from

noninstitutional groups, it needs to be noted that institutions differ
amongst themselves.

That is. they are different as to their powers and

their cultural attributes.

Notwithstanding these di fferences, all

institutions perform the functions, possess structures and operate as
described above.

The distinctions between institutions are therefore

differences of magnitude rather than of essential character.

These dif-

ferences have provoked attempts by social scientists to classify
institutions.
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For example, Herbert Spencer advanced a typology of institutions
containing three main classes--maintaining and sustaining institutions
(marriage and the family), producing and distributing institutions (the
economic system), and regulating and restraining institutions (religion
and the government).

Anthropologists and others have divided institu-

tions into a primary class and a secondary c1 ass.

According to this

classification, primary institutions are found in all hUman societies
and include marriage, the family, the economic system, and religion.
Secondary;

;~stitutions

are those derived from or functionally

amplifying the primary institutions.

Secondary institutions are language,

art, education, recreation, government, and whatever others one might
choose to list. 19
Chapin writes of "diffused" institutions as those which stabil ize
social behavior throughout a societY--language. art, recreation, etc.-and of "nucleated" institutions as those which structure behavior
within smaller units of society--the family, the business enterprise.
the church. etc.

On the other hand. Parsons distinguishes between rela-

tional, regulative, and cultural institutions.

Relational institutions

are those which prescribe reciprocal role expectations.

Regulative

institutions prescribe socially agreeable ways of striving toward certain
ends.

And cul tural i nstituti ons organize a peopl e' s cul tura 1 ori enta-

tions.

Finally, Martindale sees so-called social institutions which

organize the attainment of instrumental values. and cultural institutions
which see intrinsic values as ends-in-themselves. 20
The perception of this writer is that classifications of the foregoing sort tend to obscure the essential likenesses of institutions by
streSSing spurious and fallacious differences.

For example, it appears
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that all of the above writers have, in one way or another, confused
institutional functions with structures and methods of operation.

In

this regard, both Spencer and Parsons call one class of institutions

"regulating and restraining insti tutions ll --while regulation or social
control is a function of all institutions.
Likewise, Chapinls classification apparently assumes that the sa-

called diffused institution of language does not operate to structure
behavior in the smaller units of society, the family, school, etc.

Or,

conversely, that the so-called nucleated institutions possess no capacity
to stabilize social behavior throughout society.

And finally, Parsons

and Martindale write of so-called 'lcultural institutions Ii as a class by
itself, while it has been shown above that all institutions are
repos itori es and transmi tters of cul ture.

The poi nt is, that classi fi-

cations of institutions of the foregoing sort may serve some narrow

purposes, but they a1 so obfuscate the ontology of institutions.
A further paint against arbitrary classifications of institutions
is that institutions tend to be interdependent and intersupportive.

For

example, the institution of the family is dependent upon the institutions
of marriage, the church, the state, and ',nstitutions of the economic
system--to say nothing of language, 1a . . . . , art, education, and the like-to create the social bonds which unite the couples who are starting the
famil ies, to enforce the sets of property and other social arrangements
which protect families within society, and to produce and distribute the
goods and services which the family needs but cannot produce for itself.
Similar institutional interdependencies abound and they greatly enhance
the powers of institutions in the discharge of their stabil ;zation
functions.
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Likewise, one person may simultaneously play roles in many institutions.

That is, one woman may occupy the position and play the role of

wife in the institution of matrimony, of mother in the institution of the
family, of owner, manager, or worker in an economic institution, and city

councilwoman in an institution of government, to name only a few of her
possible institutional roles.

Thus, the interdependencies of institu-

tions is matched by interlocking institutional memberships in which one

person will occupy positions and play roles in many institutions.
Thi.5. institutional interdependency has fostered a number of elitist
theories about interinstitutional relationships.

For example, C. Wright

Mills believes that the oligarchies which control the economy, the
government, and the military establishment also control all other groups.
This idea is advanced in part as an alternative theory to the theories
of political p1ura1ism--which, of course, tend to treat all groups as
more or less homogeneous and of approximately equal power.21
Control is maintained within an elite group of persons, according
to Mills, each of whom has achieved status within the economy, the
government, or the mil itary establ ishment by being male and caucasian,
graduating from the right schools, belonging to the correct churches and

clubs, living in acceptable neighborhoods in the right cities, and
driving the right cars.

~~oreover,

the oligarchy has made it easy,

according to Mills, for persons with the proper status to fill positions
and play roles in any of three controlling institutions and to shift to
other positions, either within one institution or from one institution
to another, whenever the situation demands it.
Examples of persons who can and have played roles with high status

in several or all of the el ite institutions are legion.

One who comes
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immediately to mind is Dwight D. Eisenhower.
mil itary academy at West Point, New York.

He graduated from the

He achieved the highest active

military rank attainable in the United States.

He retired from the

profession of arms to become the president of Columbia University.

He

returned from there to a military post for a time before seeking and
winning election to the presidency of the United States.

U. S. Grant,

George C. Marshall, and Douglas MacArthur are among others who accomp1 ished similar transformations after graduation from West Point. 22
This writer has no particular quarrel with Mills or with mast
e1 itist theorists as regards the internal consistencies or the empirical
relevancies of their arguments.

Nor does he have cause to quarrel with

·p1ura1ists an either of those two criteria.

However, it appears some-

what hyperbolic for elitists to claim that their world view is alternative to pluralism, or for pluralists to argue that there is no elitism
operational in a democratic society.23
In the first place, one need only admit to imperfections in the
political sphere to see that the democracy of pluralism is flawed toward
oligarchy in the same way that imperfections in the market place flaw
sa-called "perfectly competitive markets" toward 01igopo1istic markets in
economic affairs.

Mertons alludes to such imperfections when he claims

that all institutions are nat equally supported by all social groups
because certain existing institutions may preserve a status quo which is

oppressive to same and very beneficial to others.

He thus argues that

nonconformity may reflect an unreasonable lack of opportunities within
the existing institutional fabric of society.24
The lack of opportunities to which Mertons alludes derives from
unreasonable barriers to access to positions of institutional status and
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power.

Many trade and most professional associations function in part to

erect and maintain barriers to entry into their skill s and professions.
The object of these barriers is ostensibly to protect the pub1 ic from
inferior craftsmanship and faulty professional practice.

In fact, the

real object is all too often to protect the existing craftsmen and professional persons from competition and to restrict the supply of skilled
labor and professional services so that persons already admitted to the
trade or profession may enjoy 01 igopo1 istic or artificially high wages
and fees_
This is every bit as true of union apprenticeship programs as it
is of admission requirements to the practice of law or medicine.

One

can hardly argue that intensive special training is not needed to
produce skilled medical doctors and competent attorneys.

Likewise, one

should not be expected to tolerate shoddy workmanship from a plumber or
an electrician.

The question is not whether there should be training;

r.ather, it is how much training is really necessary to produce quality

workmanship and competent professional service.
Competence in most craft skills can be acquired by the average
citizen with one year or less of training in an industrial arts school
and one additional year working as an apprentice to a journeyman or
master craftsman.

But the usual union program calls for a minimum of

four years of apprenticeship in the union before advancement to journeyman regardless of other experience or training.

The difference amounts

to an unreasonable barrier to entry into the trade.

Similar differ-

ences exist in the artificially protracted requirements for admission to
medical and legal practice as well as to other professional vocations.
The point is that these unreasonable barriers to entry restrict
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opportunities to otherwise qualified aspirants.

And these aspirants

thereafter and therefore regard the institutions with skepticism and
give them only grudging support.
One may, of course, cite other barriers, many of which are based

on more noxious criteria--religious beliefs, racial characteristics, sex,
national origin, etc.

One may also cite other social imperfections

which flaw pluralism toward oligarchy.

However, this does not mean that

a democratic pol itical system cannot achieve some measure of stabil ity

while it _allocates values in its usual authoritarian manner any more than
similar imperfections in a market system means that the market does not
or cannot achieve some measure of market equil ibrium while it allocates
1 imited resources to a1 ternati ve and competi n9 soc; a1 ends.
But, more important, both elitists and plural ists appear to have

committed and compounded some significant errors.

Pluralists tend to

treat groups as though they were all noninstitutional in character.

On

the other hand, elitists tend to treat groups as though they are all
instituti ona 1 in character.

Neither vi ew squares properly wi th reality;

for there are indeed both institutional and noninstitutional groups, as

they have been distinguished here, operating in society.

But, as

further analysis will hopefully show, the concern of both of their
operations centers on institutional change.

However, it is inappro-

priate to expand further on that pOint at this time because that is the
subject which occupies the remainder of this work.

Rather, it is appropriate at this point to rational ize this brief
search into the ontology of institutions.

The purpose has been to

establ ish a suitable working definition of an institution.

Drawing from

the ideas in the foregoing discussion, the definition of an institution
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which will serve throughout the remainder of this work is:
An institution is an organized social group which has evolved

from and is united with some particular system of cultural
val ues, and it serves through processes of soc i a 1 contra 1 to
stabilize social interaction by preserving and perpetuating
those values in the society of which the institution is a part.
The foregoing look at institutions has drawn principally from the
works of sociologists and cultural anthropologists.

While institutional

economi sts do not essentially dispute other soc; a1 sci enti sts, they do
possess a unique perspective on the functioning of institutions.

Hence-

forth con,centration will be upon that institutional economic perspective.
INSTITUTIONS AND URBAN AREAS

The close and inextricable relationship between urban affairs and

institutions is of particular importance to this paper.
of course, abound in urban areas.

their zenith in cities.

Institutions,

Indeed, nearly all institutions reach

While the traditional view is that cities exist

to house people and the things people need, it is not clear that people
need cities solely for domiciliary purposes.

Rather, the people are all

involved in social interactions under the social control of the
institutions which flourish in the cities.

In this context, the city's

principal raison d'etre may be viewed as to domicile the institutions
needed to maintain social stabil ity in a complex society.

It seems that

people should have little need for cities were this not so.
Moreover, the city itself is a creature of institutions.

That is,

city government with all of its trappings, educational institutions,

and the myriad of family and business institutions from which the former
two derive their tax bases and which tlley regulate in the interest of
social stability, are institutions without which the city would have no
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legitimacy and 1 ittle or no being.
Hence, it is hoped that some progress toward a more wholistic

theory of urbanology might be made by integrating group theory as it has
been applied to political science with institutional economic theory and
other aspects of traditional economic theory and relating the results to
urban affairs.

Toward that end, the remainder of this work will explore

the following questions:
1.

What is the temporal setting of institutions and cities?

2.

How do institutions function in that temporal setting?

(Chapter III).

(Chapters IV - V).
3.

What are the underlying causes of institutional instability,
change, and discontinuity, and what are the consequences of

thi s to the city?
4.

(Chapters VI - VI II).

How are institutional values measured in deal ing with the

stresses leading to institutional change?
5.

which lead to institutional change?
6.

(Chapter IX).

By what processes do societies reconcile the social tensions

(Chapter X).

What are the apparent social impl ications of the conclusions
stemming from the foregoing questions?

(Chapter XI).
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CHAPTER III
URBAN CONTINUUM

The foregoing was an abbreviated. cross-sectional view of institutions out of which a definition of institutions emerged.

The view was

cross-sectional in the sense that it explored the ontology of institu-

tions as static bodies or as entities at rest.
an

object~

It was like a picture of

capturing its essence at some instant in time.

The view

purposely avoided the dynamics of institutionalism except by implication.
It was, of course, implied in the descriptions of institutional
characteristics that institutions take actions which are ordered in time.
That is, institutions are not in fact static bodies.

Rather, they are

social mechanisms of choice which operate over time.

But this aspect of

institutions was not explicitly constructed in the preceding chapter.
Henceforth, concentrati on wi 11 be upon the dynami cs of ; nst;tutions
and the group and urban environments in which they exist.

This is the

realm of institutional economics--not uniquely, to be sure. for
sociologists and
institutions.

anthropologists have studied the dynamic attributes of

But i nsti tutiona 1 econom; sts have concentrated the; r

works on these dynamic attributes.

And, as economists are inexorably

bound to do, they have posited theories about such matters.
The theories of institutional economics have to do with the first
four questions raised at the conclusion of the preceding chapter.

They

have to do with the nature of the institutional environment, its setting
on a

t~mporal

plane.

They have to do with the manner of action and
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interaction of institutions in that environment.

And institutional

economic theory posits causes of institutional instability, change, and
discontinuity.

Finally, along with the more traditional theories of

economics, they suggest ways of measuring institutional values in dealing with the stresses leading to institutional changes.
While political pluralist theory is in evidence throughout the
search of the first four questions because of an inherent parallel
between institutional economics and pluralism, no effort is made to
point out the evidence or explicate the parallelism.

Rather, it is in

pursuit of answers to the fifth question that pluralist theory is brought
into the analysis to solve the institutional dilemma developed in the
early chapters by suggesting ways in which societies reconcile the
social tensions leading to institutional changes.

However, the explicit

introduction of plural ist theory must wait until chapter six.
LIFE PROCESSES AND TEMPORAL SETTING

Returning then to the point at hand, the first institutional
economic theory explored here addresses the first question at the
conclusion of chapter one--what is the temporal setting of institutions
and cities? Stated concisely, the temporal setting of institutions and
cities--indeed, of virtually everything--is a longitudinal dimension in
chronological sequence called an !lends-means continuum," a continuum of

"ongoing life processes." This chapter will deal with the characteristics of the ends-means continuum.

But first, it is important to

briefly clarify "life processes" and ntempora1" in the meanings

intended here.
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Homo Mensura
Turning first to the matter of IIlife processes," it is observed

that man is a living creature in terms of the usual meaning of the word
"1 ;ving."

He shares that distinction with the universe of both animate

and inanimate biological forms.

Mankind, therefore, has a very special

interest in life and in anything which acts upon or interacts with life
forms.

Moreover, mankind has established an order of things in which

biological forms are classe-d higher than geological forms, the animate

biological forms are classed higher than the inanimate, and man is
classified as the highest animate form--chiefly because of the relatively
greater intellectual capacities of his brain--the power of conceptual
thought--and the adaptability which this gives him.

Thus, man's great

adaptability is manifest in the wide range of choices afforded to him by
his relatively larger intellectual capacities. l
One may, of course, dispute this homocentric order of things with

appeals to metaphysical, teleological, or spiritual criteria.

However,

this writer eschews the opportunity to specul ate upon the reJ ative merits
of alternative ways of ordering things.

Rather, the position assumed

here is consistent with the homocentric view.
enunciated by the great sophist, Protagoras,

things. II

It is homo mensura, a view
II

man is the measure of all

This means that if there is no actor, there can be no choice.

If there is no choice, there are no consequences of choice.
quences means no criticism.

No conse-

And man is, above all else, a critical

animal and his criticism focuses on the consequences of choices made by

himself and his human cohorts who are taking actions on their choices. 2
Choice naturally connotes alternative courses of action from which
to choose as well as an agent to make the choice.

There are some actions
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in which there are no known alternatives from which man may choose.

For

example, an unpredictable and cataclysmic celestial aberration which
destroys all life environments in the sub1unar realm of man might

present mankind with no known alternatives.

Mankind, along with other

1 i fe forms, waul d become ext; net in those env; ronments.

Such a

catastrophe cannot be said to be part of a life process in the homo
mensura sense.

The agent perpetrating the aberration, the actor, was

not man and was not known to man.

That is, the situation resulted from

a so-called event of nature, a happening over which mankind possessed no
known power of control.

While there were indeed consequences stemming

from the event, the consequences were not relevant because they did not
arise from the choices made by man from alternatives which might affect
the outcome.
Use of the word "catastrophel! in the preceding paragraph implies
that an event resulting in the extinction of life forms on earth would be
undesirable.

The question is, for whom would it be undesirable?

To

measure it as undesirable assumes a preconception that 1 He forms on the
planet are desirable.
preconception?

And who or what is most likely to harbor such a

Man, who is heavily invested in life processes, certainly

harbors that preconception.

Li kewi se, other forms of intell i gent 1 i fe,

insofar as they too might conceptual ;ze survival in such terms, might
also harbor that preconception.
anthropomorphic speculation.

However, this latter pOint is lTere

The point is. that valuing outcomes as

desirable or undesirable is most 1 ikely a 5ubsumption of homo mensura.
One further point about life processes, the alternatives open to
hUman choices have proliferated down the centuries of man's earthly
habitation.

This is partly due to mankind's ability to organize itself
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and its activities around institutions and urban institutional complexes,
and partly from man's unique tool-usi ng capabil ity.
are more fully developed in succeeding chapters.

Both of these ideas

It is important in

passing to acknowledge that both of these abilities arise from mankind's
relatively larger intellectual abilities and that they greatly enhance

manls adaptability by further widening the range of choices open to him.
In summation, 1 ife processes are sequences of events involving
interactions with matter in any form in which the actor, man, exercises
some element of choice, bears the consequences of his choices, and is
open to critical analyses of the choices and their consequences.

The

ends-means continuum is a continuum of on-going life processes in this

homo mensura context.
Temporal Setting

Turning now to the word titemporal,'· a temporal event or environment must be understood as transitory or temporary, as worldly or
sublunary, as secular, and as ordered in time or chronological sequence.
Conversely, it is not permanent or eternal, neither spiritual nor
ecclesiastical, and not spatial or latitudinal in character. 3
A temporal event is temporary or transient, not eternal.

It occurs

in some relationship to other events in which each event is unique in
onels awareness of its existence.

For example, when one travels from

his home to his place of employment, the travel is an event which
occurred after some other event in one I s awareness--after compl eti ng a
breakfast of kippered herring and baked tomatoes.

It likewise occurred

before some other event in onels awareness--before placing his brown bag
in a locker and walking to the turret lathe he will tend until coffee
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break.
The travel was not existential in one's awareness during

existential perhaps, but not an actual occurrence.

breakfast~

Nor was it exis-

tential while he was placing his brown bag in the locker, experiential,
perhaps! but not an occurrence presently in process.

The travel was a

transitory event which was existential to the traveler after his breakfast and before his arrival at his work station.

It was, therefore, not

eternal ;n terms of the person' 5 present awareness of its actual
occurrenc.e.
A temporal event is a worldly or sublunary event rather than a

spiritual phenomenon.

It is a real thing which can be observed, measured

and verified by empirical means.
more of the human senses.

It can be experienced through one or

One can see, hear, touch, smell, or taste the

evidence of the event either directly through natural senses or through
technical ampl ification of the evidence so that it is perceptible to
one I s natural senses. 4

For exampl e. one may measure hi s rate of speed

as he travels from his herring and tomatoes to his turret lathe by
observing the rate reflected on his automotive speedometer as he moves
between the two.

Such observation is one of many pieces of evidence

that one is indeed traveling.

It is not a spiritual phenomenon insofar

as one need not rely solely on his divine faith to verify the evidence

of travel (rate of speed, in this illustration).
Likewise, a temporal event is secular, not ecclesiastical.

That

is, it is not something which can only be verified or interpreted by
priests or other ecclesiastics who purport to possess supernatural means
by

~/h;ch

to verify the existence of the event.

For example, one may

become convinced of the existence of some divine, omnipotent being
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through litanies, supplications, lamentations, testimonials, and other
ceremonial applications by clergymen.

While this may become a spiritual

reality in one's awareness, it is not temporal within the meaning of
that word. 5
Finally, a temporal event is ordered in time or chronological

sequence rather than in spatial relationships.

One might relate events

to one another in space by showing, for example, that breakfast took
place at one's domicile while tending a turret lathe took place some
distance .away at a place of employment.

On the other hand, one might

relate the events in sequence of their happening--breakfast, travel,
tend turret lathe, etc.

This latter way of relating events ;s temporal.

The former is spatial. 6
The chronological sequence is longitudinal insofar as the sequence
is a chain of events which are related in some ways and which extend into
the past in a time continuum.

Conversely, a spatial relationship is

latitudinal or cross-sectional because it views events either at some
point in time or without regard to time or sequence.
spatial relationships are not dynamic.
no account of change-over time.
because it is not eternal.
of change.

That is to say,

They are static and they take

Thus, a temporal environment is dynamic

It is temporary, transitory, and reflective

It is not spiritual, but ;s sublunary, worldly.

ecclesiastical, but is secular.

It is not

And, it is not a spatial relationship

but a chrono 1ogi ca lone.
Once again, the temporal setting of institutions and cities is a
longitudinal dimension in chronological sequence called an !lends-means
continuum," a continuum of on-going life processes.

The continuum is a

setting for human choices involving interaction in the sense of life
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processes described above.

And those choices involve society in the

temporal sense also described above.

The remainder of this chapter is

given over to an elaboration of the ends-means continuum in these
contexts.
The elaboration will first divide the continuum into a past, a
present, and a future.

It will then examine present conditions in terms

of the past, the principal idea being that all existing in the present
is the effect of causes which lie in the past.
present conditions in terms of the future.

It will next examine the

The principal idea is that

the present effects of prior causes are also the means to ends which lie
in the future along the continuum.

The elaboration will then examine the

nature of ends and their relationship to means.

Finally, the nature of

ends and their relationship to on-going life processes will be explored.
CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND MEANS
If the continuum is divided into two parts, a past and a future,

then the boundary between the two is the present.
course, the only existential part of the continuum.

The present is, of
All that occurred

in the past is experi enti a 1 and the future is expectati a 1.

One essen-

tially spends his life at the boundary between the past and the future.
Human real time is the present, a time when the past and the future con-

verge upon one's act of choosing.

All else is a great fantasy conjured

up out of the pages of history books and the speculations of prophets and
urban planners.

The aged, whose lives have been spent in the past, often

1ive out the present in fond or remorseful recollection of their past
experiences.

The young, whose lives are still short and whose life expe,..

iences are few, generally live out the present in anticipation of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69

uncertain future into which their 1ives extend.

memory and the future is speculation.

Either way, the past is

Only the present is existential.

Present Effects of Past Causes
Hhile the past is history and only the present is existential, all
that exists in the present is the effect of causes which 1ie in the past
along the continuum.

Thus, the past and the present are inextricably

linked by the milieu of creatures, artifacts, materials, and ideas which

descend to the present out of the past. 7

A moment's reflection reminds

one that he- himself is an effect of prior causes--the deliberate or

accidental sexual union of his mother and father as well as all preceding
generations of like unions and a multitude of other events which

ultimately led to his conception, birth, and maturation.
Another moment's reflection reveals that one is born into an

environment which, like himself, is the effect

of prior causes--some of

which resulted from planned and deliberate choices and actions by the
generations of mankind which preceded him in the world, and some of which
were human accidents of chance or so-called events of nature extrinsic
to man and over which man possessed no known powers.

One can only marvel

at the magnitude of the celestial universe, the geological real ity vf
the earth. the majesty of a Mt. McKinley, the vast emptiness of a Sahara,
and the cascading splendor of a Victoria Falls.
wonders did not always exist.

But these natural

They are the effects of who-knows-what

causes, but causes nevertheless.
On the other hand, much of civilized man1s habitat, and the structures, artifacts. people. and institutions which comprise that habitat,
are effects which are more clearly linked to known past causes.

In most
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cases, the causes were intrinsic to man.

They grew out of human deliber-

ations and resulted in human actions and interactions both with other

mankind and with other aspects of the environments in which humans found
themselves.

A city, any city, is the effect of guch past causes.

Take, for example, the modern city of London, England.

One who

disembarks at Heathrow Airport gives little thought to why or how London
came to be the city it is today.

He usually accepts it as it is, enjoy-

ing the commercial and cultural amenities the city offers and suffering

the congestion and other disamenities which are part of metropolitan
existence anywhere.

And yet, London is the effect' of causes which

reach back more than two millennia.

The city is the result

of human

deliberations and actions spanning more than 2,000 years of time.

The embryonic city of London was established in the First Century
6. C. at the beginning of the Roman occupation of Britain.

No doubt the

site was a market and perhaps a mil itary post before the Romans occupied
it because nature endowed it with a number of attributes which commended
it to human use.

London lies forty miles inland at one of the last

places along the Thames River accessible to deep-draft vessels.

More-

over, the city is located at the eastern terminus of a low hill system

which extends westward between the lower Midlands in the north and the
Salisbury Plain in the south to the Severn River and the Bristol

Channel on the west coast.

All of which is to say that London occupies

a very strategic location in respect to traffic to and from mainland
Europe.

It commands the most convenient north and south access routes,

and it lies astraddle a major water barrier to that access, a barrier
which is also a major water route to the English Channel and mainland

Europe. 8
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The Romans were no doubt quick to perceive the natural strategic
advantages of the site for they established their seat of government in
Britain at what they called Londinium.

The Romans built a basilica on

land now occupied by Leadenhall Market on what is presently Gracechurch
Street leading from London Bridge up to Cornhill.
Londinium in Roman times.

This was the hub of

It;s now the center af the financial district

of London with the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange, the Royal

Exchange, Lloyds of London, and other financial institutions clustered
nearby.

The original selection of that particular site as a seat of government and its subsequent transformation for use by financial institutions

in modern times refiects tiie present effects of literally millions of
human choices and actions over the intervening millennia.

One cannot

hope to capture the magnitude of the transformation in such a brief
treatise as this.

But the choices range from the decision of the Roman

governor to establ ish an institution of government there to the less
portentous but very necessary logistical and technical choices by the
architects, engineers, and craftsmen who constructed the edifices to
house the institutions as well as the choices of the multitude of plain
folk and civil servants of every rank to live in London and to work in
the i nstituti ons located there.
The point is, that the metropolitan amenities and disamenities one
experiences as London, England did not emerge in full flower from the
thin air in an instant of time.

Rather, the present effects one knows

as London were caused largely out of human deliberations, choices, and

toil extending more than 2,000 years into the past.

The principle is

that present effects, be they perceived as good or bad, are inextricably
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tied to the past causes which brought them into existence.
Effects-Means
The next principle is that the means available in the present, the

resources for the attainment of ends which lie along the continuum in
the future, are the same present effects of prior causes which occupied

the irrnnediately preceding discussion.

That is, the future ;s inexorably

built upon the means available in the present.

And insofar as those

means are the effects of prior causes, the future is inextricably linked
to the past.

That 1 inkage is through the effects-means which exist in

the present at the boundary between the past and the future. 9
One set of such effects is an understanding of causal relationships
themselves.

An understanding of those relationships arises from empir-

i cal observations and deduct; ve ins; ghts which 1i nk effects to causes.

These descriptions of causal relationships are synthesized into theories
which may then be employed to predict future outcomes with some calculable degree of certainty.

Theories likewise enable persons to prescribe

present actions to effect desired future outcomes.

It is by these

proces sua 1 a rrangements--descri pti on, predi ct i on, and prescri pt i on-that knowledge of past causes are instrumental toward achieving future
ends.

Thus, an understanding of causal relationships is itself an

effect-means which may be employed like other means toward achieving
ends which lie ;n the future. 10
In another example, the city of London was established by the
Romans with the end in view or purpose of domiciling the seat of their
institution of government in Britain.

The means available at that time

were the effects of causes which lie along the continuum in the past.
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The strategic advantages of the site were geological obliquities of
nature created over millions of years of terrestrial upheaval, erosion,

and sedimentation.

It remained only for the Roman intelligence to

discover it and for her legions to secure it.

The legions needed to

secure the site were drawn from the far reaches of the empire where
their mil itary doctrines and prowess were sharpened in more than two

hundred years of sporadi c warfare--notab1y the Puni c Wars, the Mithridatic Wars, and the Gallic Wars which ultimately brought Caesar and his
legions to Britain.

The architects and artisans required to improve the

site were available from projects in other parts of the empire where
they learned their skills after the centuries-old Athenian architectural

tradition of the post and 1 intel, to which the Romans added their monumental arch.

The stone. wood, and other materials required for site

improvements were no doubt prov;dences of nature in proximity to the
site.

The institutionalized norms of Roman provincial government were

the accreted experi ences of thei r Hell eni sti c predecessors. embell i shed
by their own experiences in governing the empire from the Caspian Sea to

the Straits of Gibralter and from Egypt to Gaul.

Finally, like the

legionnaires and the architects and artisans, civil servants were
available from other parts of the empire where they were sired, reared,
and trained in the art of administration.

All of these means were the

effects of past causes, and they were employed to attain the end in view
of creating the domicile of Roman government in Britain. l1
Effects-means, 1; ke those at the time of the Roman establ i shment
of London, possess several attributes which are important to the institutional thesis.

The first is that means have value in part because they

are instrumental in attaining desired future ends.

The second is that,
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given their instrumental qualities, means have value in part because

they are in limited supply in the present.

And finally, means are

unidirectional as to the ends toward which they are employed.
The first attribute of effects-means, that they have value in part
because they are instrumental in attaining desired future ends, is
analogous to the demand side of the orthodox economist's partial equilibrium condition in so-called factor markets.

That is, the demand for

any resource is derived from the demand for the good or service in the

production of which the resOurce will be employed.

Thus, if there is no

economic demand for an end product, there can be no effective demand
for the resources to produce it.

Li kewi se, the ; ntens i ty of demand for

the end product will reflect in the intensity of demand for the resources
to produce it. 12
One can easily apply this idea to the effects-means, or resources,
in the example of Roman London.

The good or service demanded was a

domicile for the seat of Roman government in Britain.

This arose from

the end chosen by the Romans to establish their government in Britain-ignoring any reasons why the Romans might choose to do that.

From that

decision flowed all of the choices and decisions regarding subsidiary
ends--where to locate that government?

How to secure the site?

develop the site, and on ad infinitum?

From each decision arose a series

How to

of new demands for means, and the values of those means were determi ned
in part by how instrumental they were in attaining the desired future

end toward which they would be employed.
However, the foregoing attribute accounts for only part of the
value of means.

Another part is accounted for by the second attribute--

that means which are available in the present are in 1 imited supply.
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This is. of course. analogous to the supply side of the orthodox
economist's partial equilibrium condition in factor markets.

Resources

will be suppl ied to those employments which yield the highest incomes or
greatest benefits to their owner.

And, given an effective demand, those

resources which are in the shortest supply will command the highest
incomes.

However, this goes beyond the point to be made at this time,

which is simply. that the means available in the present are 1 imited to
whatever effects of past causes exist at the time. 13
All of the means described above for Roman London--the site, mili-

tary legions to secure the site, architects, craftsmen and materials to
improve the site, institutional ized norms of Roman provincial government, and civil servants trained in the art of administration--were
available in the present as the effects of causes which 1 ie in the past.
While they were supplied partly in response to the Roman decision to
establish its government in Britain, they were not available in unlimited
quantities.

Indeed, they were 1imited both because they were not created

in infinite numbers and because some were required to pursue similar
enterpri ses e1 sewhere in the empire.

The pri nci pl e was ful fill ed for

the Romans as it was for the empires before theirs and as it has been
down all the ages of man.

The means available to attain ends which lie

;n the future are 1 imited to the present effects of past causes.
The last mentioned attribute of effects-means is that means are
unidirectional as to the ends toward which they are employed.

That is,

means which are spent in the achievement of particular ends become
embodied in those ends.· The spent means yield their identities to the
ends toward which they were spent. 14

In the example of Roman London.

the site, materials. and labor of architects and artisans lost their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
identities in the physical facilities of Londinium.

The people who pop-

ulated Londinium labored in and yielded their identities to the ir.stitutions which were domiciled there.

P,nd the institutions of the city

and the city itself merged their identities with that of Roman government
in Britain.

The consequence of this ;s simply that means or resources which

are imprudently allocated to unworthy ends are at least partially wasted
An unworthy end is one which yields less social welfare in the homo

menSlJra context per resource-means than a competing and alternative end
in view at the time the former was chosen.

The allocation is imprudent

if the relative social costs and benefits of the foregoing ends-in-view
were accurately known before the choice could no longer be retracted
without expending resources in the retraction.
Resources are wasted under such circumstances insofar as greater

social welfare could have been achieved if the same resource-means had
been allocated to the alternative end rendering the greater social
benefit.

This is analogous to maximizing net social benefits, in the

vernacular of the orthodox economist.

There are, of course, situations

in which one may choose other normative criteria than maximizing net
social benefits.

However, those options go beyond what is intended here,

and they will be considered in a subsequent chapter.

It is enough at

this point to define waste in these rudimentary terms. 15
The foregoing attri butes of effects-means--that means have value
in part because they are instrumental in attaining desired future ends.
that means which are available in the present are in limited supply, and
that means are unidirectional as to ends to be reached--imply a need to
economize in the employment of means.

They admonish care in avoiding
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waste of needed and limited resources.
utilization of available resources.

They argue for full and efficient

And these normative implications

extend logically to another--that great care to be taken in the se1ecticn of ends-to-be-attained or reached from the array of ends-in-view so
that the selected ends render the greatest possible social welfare in
terms of the homo mensura criterion.
ENDS, MEANS, AND PRDCESS

It ,is appropriate then to take up the nature of ends and to
examine their relationships to means and to on-going life processes.
Ends are simply possible alternative states-of-being which do not exist
in the present but lie in the future along the. continuum and are open
to human chaices. 16

It is important at this point to distinguish between

the possible future outcomes of so-called natural phenomena and the
possible future consequences of present choices by mankind.

Given the

homo mensura assumption and certain distinguishing characteristics of

mankind, only the latter can be viewed as ends.

Natural or Artificial Selection
One might imagine a state of nature in which the environment is
devoid of human presence and thus of hUman influence.

Pristine forests

are rooted in virgin soils, and there is a perfect ecological balance
between the vegetation, atmosphere. and animal life in the Eden-like
environment.

The whole scene is an idy-llic state in which the

ecological balance is thought to be natural because whatever selections
occur are made by agents other than man.
There are events. to be sure, which constantly tip the
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environmental equilibrium this way and that way so that minuscule changes
are discernible after some time.

The establ ished weather pattern might

change 51 ightly year by year for some obscure reason so that less vegetation is set before the animate creatures low in the food chain.
change will cause a decline in the population of vegetarians.

The

Some will

simply starve to death while the fecundity of survivors will decline and
their progeny will be less prolific than they were during more verdant
times.
The effects of the famine will reflect all the way to the top of
the food chain.
flesh.

Some of the carnivores.w.i:l.l starve for want of edible

Others may perish in conflicts with competitors over whatever

flesh and carr.ion-:is available.

The whole process may bring extinction

to some of the weaker species.

But, eventually, the natural balance

will be restored by the brutal law of survival-of-the-fittest.

And,

according to this line of reasoning, nature will be strengthened in the
process.

Moreover, the whole process is correct and proper--primarily

because it came out that way without the fettering influences of man.
It was so-called natural selection in which the selections were made by
agents other than man. l7
This so-called state of nature is one in which future outcomes are

the results of natural phenomena.

That is, they become actual outcomes

because of the present reactions of both geological and biological matter
to incipient aberrations in their environments.

Moreover, the reactions

occur with practically no conscious contemplation by the reactor of possible future consequences.

Stated another way, the reactor has no cap-

acity to analyze and therefore no capabil ity to describe causal relationships in situations it faces.

Thus the reactor cannot predict probable
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outcomes or prescribe ways of effecting a desired outcome.

There are

therefore very few or, more likely, no choices for the reactor.

Rather,

the reactions are in a sense programmed by nature so that if a particular

environmental stimulus arises, then a corresponding reaction is initiated
and will bring forth a nearly certain predetermined result so long as
there is no foreign interference with the reaction process. 18

Take, for example, the common barn swallow, Hirundo rustica, a
migratory insectivore.

The northern hemisphere perceptibly warms

shortly after the earth-track of the sun passes the vernal equinox in
its annual sojourn to the cancer equinox.

The seeds which have lain

dormant during the dark days of winter germinate and thrust tiny roots
into the warming earth.

The longer and warmer days open the buds on

trees and bushes, invite the small green tips of monocots out of the

ground and initiate the photosynthetic process that win grow the plants
upon which most insects and their larvae feed. i9

The eggs laid in the

fall by the insects which could not hope to survive the bitter winter
now respond to the warmth of spring, opening and releasing nymphs and
larvae and initiating the metamorphosis which will produce the flying
insects upon which the barn swallows feed. 20
As the track of the sun moves closer to the northern equinox, the
barn swallows arrive as far north as southern Alaska in the northern

temperate zone.

Guided by the sun, they have come from the seasonally

colder southern hemisphere seeking moderate cl imates and flying insects

suitable to their tastes.

The older birds who have migrated before

respond to a mating urge by returning to established nests.

The young

birds, who have migrated for the first time. seek out mates and set
about building new nests of mud. dried grasses. animal hair. and feathers
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in which to lay and hatch their eggs.

The swallows will take turns set-

ting their eggs so that each mate can respond to pangs of hunger by
gathering food in the only way it knows, catching and devouring
indigenous insects in flight.

After the chicks hatch, the parent

swallows spend their days gathering insects in the same way to take back
to the gaping beaks that fill their nest.
The days grow shorter after the sun passes the cancer equinox.

The

whole natural process commences to slow and the insect population
declines as the season wears on.

By now the chicks have matured and are

learning to feed on flying insects just as their parents have done.

This

combi nat; on of factors--shorter days, cool er weather. fewer insects, and
matured brood--signals time for migration to the warming c1 imates in the
southern hemisphere.

The spatial situation is reversed and the swallows

leave their nests, flock together. and again guided by the sun, journey

to the southern hemisphere.

Some flocks fly a distance of 9,000 miles

to the southern reaches of Argentina ;n this migration. 21
The swallows have been primarily reactors in the foregoing episode,

respondi ng to both external and internal stimul i.

They responded to the

changing weather patterns and subsequent ecological transformations by

migrating.

They responded to the biological urge to mate by nesting,

laying, and hatching eggs, and nurturing their young.

They essentially

sought out env; ronmenta 1 condi tions wh; ch conduced to thei r welfare.

They took natural phenomena as they found them, adapting only to the
extent of building a crude nest of indigenous materials ;n which to fulfill their biological urges to propagate.

And when the environment

turned adverse with season, the swallows responded by migrating to whence
they came.

The duration of the future into which the swallows'
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deliberations consciously projected was very brief, if indeed they projected at a11. 22

That is, they possessed no analytical capability and

they could therefore not describe past causes of present effects, predict
future outcomes, or prescribe actions to effect desired future outcomes.
Man is, of course, a reactor like other animals.

Once conception

has taken place, the prenatal events attending a human pregnancy are

essentially of the reaction sort.

Likewise, the biological processes of

physical maturing and aging are genetic reactions to time and other
features .of environment over which man has only a 1 imited power of
control.

The foregoing examples focus on stimuli and processes which

are biological and intrinsic to the reactor.

Man also reacts to some

extrinsic stimuli in his environment with little conscious thought to
pass i ble future consequences.
But more often, man does deliberate on the probable future outcomes
of his present choices.

And when his present choices are influenced by

his del iberations, man becomes more than a reactor.

He is an actor who

makes choices from an array of possible future ends.

He bears the con-

sequences of his choices and those choices are open to critical evaluations on the basis of their consequences.

Man is unique among etirthly

creatures in terms of his time-span of discretion--the duration of the
continuum over which his deliberations and choices project.

He possesses

the analytical ability to discover and describe causal relationships
descending from the past, and he can use the knowledge of those relationships to predict probable future outcomes and to prescribe ways of
effecti ng desirabl e outcomes. 23
Thus, the state of nature might be contrasted with a state of man
in which so-called artificial selection takes place.

The selection ;s
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artificial, according to this line of reasoning, because the choices are
made by man.

Man destroys the pristine forests in order to build and

heat his houses.

He clears the land of all natural vegetation, levels

the ground, and tills the virgin soil to plant and cultivate crops for
food and fiber.

He consumes the food and spins the fiber into yarn which

will produce the textiles to fashion his clothing and household fabrics.
Eventually, he builds cities here and there to house the myriad of institutions which flourish wherever man abounds.

Finally, he builds roads

to connect the farms to the cities and the cities to one another.
Many species of animals which formerly foraged the land can no
longer survive there.

They are driven into other areas, upsetting the

Iinatural balances" in those regions.

And man, who now occupies their

former habitats, takes measures to keep the natural fauna off his land

and out of his cities.

On the other hand, man does keep domestic animals

on parcels of the land which he holds out of cultivation for use as
pasture.

But these creatures are not generally capable of surviving

without man's maintenance.

They are the products of so-called artificial

selection, of husbandry choices made by man to more efficiently produce
meat for food and animal fiber for textiles.
This latter situation, the so-called state of man, is clearly one
in which man is very much involved in the selection process.

He has

looked upon the primeval region, and in the place of pristine forests he
sees a house, barn, and outbuildings surrounded by crop land and pasture.
In the place of natural fauna he sees beef and milk cattle, swine, sheep.
poultry. and other domesticated creatures grazing between his fences.
The images of possible future uses of the land which cross his mind as
he contemplates the forest in its natural state are ends-in-view.

They
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are states of being which do not exist at the time and which will not
exist unless the man chooses to take up tools and carve his homestead
out of the wilderness he sees before him.24
Clearly, the possible future outcomes of natural phenomena cannot
be considered ends in the absence of an actor such as man--one who can

visual ize a possible state of being which does not exist at the time of
the vision, but a state which can be brought into being at some future
time only if the actor chooses and couples his choice with appropriate
action.

While possible future outcomes of natural phenomena are not ends

in the absence of an actor such as man, the ultimate fruition of a possible natural outcome becomes an effect of whatever causes brought it into
existence as soon as the creative event ascends from the future to the
present and passes into the past. And, insofar as the effect may be
instrumental to ends perceived by mankind as lying in the future along
the continuum, such effects are potential means for man to achieve those
future ends.
Moreover, while the possible future outcomes of natural phenomena
cannot be viewed as ends in the absence of an actor such as man, such
possible outcomes are, in fact, ends-in-view if man looks upon them as
among the alternatives from which he may choose.

For example, choosing

to hold entire regions as wilderness areas in order to pass them to

future generations as examples of states of nature is an artificial selection.

And, in this sense, all the natural events which take place in

those regions are artificial insofar as they would not be taking place
were it not for the deliberate social choice and its complementary
actions to hold the regions in those uses rather than in other viable,
alternative uses.

Thus, it can be argued that all sublunar selection is
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artificial so long as an actor such as man inhabits the earth. 25
On the other hand, it can be argued that all of mankind's advancement--some would call it a descent out of a state of nature or a fall
from grace 26 __ i5, in essence, the acquisition and actualization of ways

in which natural outcomes can be del iberately arranged to adapt the

environment to a more agreeable habitat for man.

For example, at some

time in the ancient past, a member or members of the human species discovered how to ignite fires by means initiated by themselves.

They found

that they could choose to ignite certain common materials--probably by

briskly rubbing them together--at times and places of their choosing.
Moreover, they discovered that they could control their fires by containing them in stone and earthen hollows and vessels and by regulating the
rate at which combustible materials and air were added to them.

Fire

thereby became a tool of mankind for heating abodes and cooking food.
It subsequently led to a multitude of other techniques employing a
variety of fire forms for an even greater variety of hUman purposes.

Did the human species create the natural phenomenon known as fire?
Indeed, did the species create the elements needed to ignite fires?

Or,

did humans give fire the qualities which make it at once destructive of
bei ngs and things and i nstrumenta 1 in adapt; ng the en v; ronment to a more
agreeable habitat for man?

Clearly, the answer is no.

features accrue to fire naturally.

All of these

Rather, mankind through analysis

simply discovered and described these natural characteristics and
acquired and actualized techniques by which fire could be employed as
means to future ends selected by humans.

Thus man, a creature of nature,

is simply employing natural phenomena to secure a balance in nature which
conduces toward his own welfare.

Damming a stream ;s no less natural
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when done by man than when done by a beaver.

Both creatures have

altered the ecology in the vicinity of the dam in order to adapt the

environment to their special needs.

Accordfng to this line of reason-

ing, all selection is natural. 27
The point raised by this seeming diversion from the central argu-

ment is the question--is there

real distinction between so-called

natural selection and artificial selection? Or is the distinction
itself specious and artificial?

Is it possible that all selection is

artificial so long as man inhabits the earth?

Or is it possible that

all selection is natural insofar as man is a creature of nature and, in

the temporal context, is forever limited to natural constraints no
matter what his time span of discretion?
The position of this writer is that the distinction drawn between
natural selection and so-called artificial selection is specious and can

lead s-yllQJistically to dubious conclusions and thereby to questionable
policies.
natural.

Moreover, this writer tends to the view that all selection is
Mankind are creatures of nature.

At most they are instruments

of nature in the context of on-going life processes.

Man discovers

qual ities about natural phenomena and he devises and employs techniques
for applying his discoveries to adapt his environment to a more
habitable

abode for himself.

But he is constrained by nature and can

never successfully exceed the parameters of nature for very long, if at
all.

In short, man is not supernatural. 28
How then does one account for the distinctions described above?

A

first step is to cease conceptualizing selection in terms of the fallacious dichotomy, natural and artificial.

Rather, one can treat all sel-

ections as natural and distinguish them on the basis of the time-span of
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discretion within the selection agent's capabilities.

Man stands quite

apart from other mortal agents with this method of classification.

All

other agents are substantially of the reactor sort, while man possesses
the capacities of both reactor and actor.

The essential difference is

that the latter possesses the capability of visualizing alternate ends as
complex states of being which are not in existence and which will not

come into existence unless the actor chooses one or another and couples
his choice with equally complex series of actions usua1ly carried on over
some protracted period of time to bring his chosen state into being.
In summation, ends are possible alternative goals which lie in the
future along the continuum and which are open to hUman choices.
possible future consequences of present choices by mankind.

They are

Possible

future outcomes of selections by agents other than man are therefore not
ends in this homo mensura context un1ess they are among the alternatives
from which man ·chooses.
A1ternative Ends and Limited Means
Returning now to the nature of ends. ends possess certain attributes which are of particu1ar importance to the institutional thesis.
The attributes are: ends have value because people. through institutions.
prize them as desired.
to their attainment.

Moreover, ends cannot be severed from the means
Therefore, some ends-in-view are alternative

because means are 1imited so that only some of the competing ends-in-view
are attainable with the available means.

Some ends-in-view are alterna-

tive because they are exclusive--they are incongruent with other
competing ends-in-view.

Ends are not ends-in-themselves because, once

they are attained, they become means or impediments to on-going ends.
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And finally, on-going life processes are processes which convert ends to
means in some continuing fashion.

The first attribute of ends is that ends have value because people,
through institutions, prize them as desired.

Ends are prized or desired

as they show likelihood of satisfying perceived human wants.

The human

wants may arise from deficits or conflicts which render existing or
probable future states of affairs objectionable.

Objectionability is of

course a relative matter in that one compares alternative possible
future states of affairs and ranks them according to their preferredness
on the basis of their least objectionability.

Thus, the ends are

appraised on the basis of their ser'viceabil ity toward erasing objectionable states of affairs by filling the deficits or resolving the conflicts
out of which the human wants arise. 29

Ends are, in this sense, analogous to consumer goods and services

in the orthodox microeconomic theory of product markets.

And the

behavioral phenomena described above are similar to the concept of utility

on the demand side of the same microeconomic theory.

Economic goods and

services are chosen in the economic institution called the market place
according to the wants or preferences and the buying powers of people as
consumers.

The goods and services yield util ity or satisfaction by

filling deficits which render an existing state of affairs with the
deficits less preferred than other expectant or possible states of
affairs without the deficits. 30
These ideas have far greater applicability than to choices in
economic institutions alone.

Ends have been defined as possible alterna-

tive states of being which do not exist in the present but which lie in
the future along the continuum and are open to hUman choices.

Ends may
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therefore repose in what is narrowly defined as the realm of pol itical

institutions or in the realm of other institutions than market or
political institutions.

And in like manner, the valuing of alternative

ends, whether by economic, political, or other social institutions. can
be done, with some adaptation, in the marginal frame-of-reference of
orthodox microeconornic theory.

However, this moves ahead of the point

to be made here. which is simply that ends have value because people
through institutions prize them as desired.

It is possible to illustrate this by relying, once again. on the
example of Roman government in Britain.

In this case, the question is,

why did the Romans choose to establish (select the end) dominion over the
Britons?

The answer ;s Simple.

The Roman world view was of a distinct

empire insulated from the barbarians on all sides.

This view eventually

led to the Gallic Wars and the conquest of western Europe.

Britain

became a feature of that conquest because the northern coast of Gaul was
not secure from raids and pillage by some of the thirty or so barbaric
tribes that populated Britain at the time.
Thus, the Roman conquest of Britain was initiated to resolve conflicts which rendered an existing state of affairs more object':onable to
the Romans than the future prospect of a secure western frontier populated by conquered and submissive peoples.

The choice to secure the

submission of the Britons by military means was made by the Roman
institution of government during the reign of Emperor Claudius 1.

The

campaign was prosecuted by Roman mil itary institutions over a period of
forty years, touching the reigns of Emperors ClaUdius,
Domitian.

~!ero.

and

It was successfully concluded by General Agricola during the

reign of Domitian.

The point at hand is simply that the Roman conquest
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of Britain had value to Romans because Romans, through their ;nstitu-

tions, prized that conquest as sufficiently meritorious to allocate
substantial means to its prosecution over a span of forty· years touching

the reigns of three Roman emperors. 31
The second attribute of ends within the institutional framework is
that ends cannot be severed from the means to their attainment.

This

proposition seems so self-evident that it is hardly worthy of statement.
However, one often hears persons speak of certain goals as possessing

such merit that they shaul d be attai ned whether or not there are means
to do it.

Such statements are, of course, based on highly idealistic

beliefs--views which lead the ideologue to believe that the relationship

between ends and means ;s so tenuous as to be of no practical
consequence.

Such views are not realistic inasmuch as ends as outcomes

are neither more nor less than the interaction of the ensemble of means
which brought them into existence.

The obverse side of this is a

previous observation that means yield their identities to the ends they
achieve.

Which is to say that goals, no matter how worthy, cannot be

secured without the means to do so.32
This idea--that ends cannot be severed from the means to their
attainment--coupled with a previous observation leads to the next
attribute of ends.

The previous observation is that means-resources are

1 imited to the present effects of past causes.

Taken together, these

two propositions admonish that some ends-in-view are alternative because
means are 1 imited so that only some of the competing ends-in-viei'l are
attainable with the means available.

Ends-in-view are, of course, ends

which are discerned by people to be possible of attainment under
prevail ing circumstances. 33
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Clearly, there are many ends which qualify as ends-in-view.

When

taken singly they are possible of attainment under prevailing circumstances.

That is, there are available means which might be allocated to

their achievement.

However, when all ends-in-view are taken together, it

is generally discovered that the available means are insufficient to
attain all of them simultaneously, or perhaps even seriatim.

The paucity

of means was elaborated above and will not be further labored here.

Suf-

fice it to say that ends-in-view are constrained by available means so
that ends compete with one another for selection as ends-to-be-reached.
Ends-to-be-reached are ends-in-view which have been set apart as
more desired than competing ends.

They become ends to the achievement of

which some of the scarce means will be

a~~ocated.

An end-to-be-reached

therefore, becomes the coordinating activity around which all other subactivities are organized.

Once the choice of a particular end is made

from among competing ends-in-view, the selection and organization of
appropriate means to attainment of the chosen end follows almost
pro-forma. 34
One may deduce from the preceding observation that ends justify
their means.

Indeed, this conclusion is unavoidable, notwithstanding the

often heard proclamations to the contrary, if the word justify is understood to mean lito supply good grounds II or lito warrant ll the employment of
the means for the chosen purposes and ways. 35

However, persons who argue

that any particular means are justified by the ends they are meant to
secure appear to do so either because they have more interest in the
employment of those particular means than in the ends they are supposed
to achieve (in other words, they contemplate ulterior ends) or because
they view the ends-to-be-reached as worthy of attainment at any cost

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

(in other words, the ends are vi ewed as ends-in-themsel ves).

On the

other hand, it would appear that persons who vehemently claim that means
cannot be justified by the ends toward which they will be employed do so
either because they believe that there is little correspondence between
ends and means or because they actually believe that there are other
means more suitable or that the chosen ends are not worthy.

In fact,

which combinations of means ought to be employed toward achievement of

which particular ends is problematical and is the subject of other chapters in t,his monograph.

All of which does not defeat the pragmatic

conclusion that ends justify the means.
There is another reason why some ends-in-view are alternative, and
it has nothing whatever to do with paucity of means.

The next attribute

of ends is that some ends-in-view are alternative because they are
exclusive.

view

$0

That is, they are incongruent with other competing ends-in-

that it is simply impossible to attain all sets of such

exclusive ends at the same time and place.

This is so even if means

are sufficiently abundant to do so.36
Examples of this abound.

One cannot present his actual physical

being in two or more spatially different places at precisely the same
instant of time.

He might place an image of his physical being in many

different places instantaneously.
places at different times.

Or he might seek to be in different

But it is quite impossible to place one's

actual physical self in two different places simultaneously.
Likewise, one cannot occupy the position and play the role of
husband in the institution of matrimony and. at the same time, remain an
eligible bachelor in terms of the same institution.

At some point both

ends may stand open to selection and the means may be available to secure
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either.

One may choose to mount a campaign with the end-to-be-reached

of wooing an e1 igible female into marriage.

And once he has exchanged

nuptial vows with her, he has taken on the role of husband.

But after

initiation in that position, he is no longer an eligible bachelor.

On

the other hand, one may eschew every opportunity to involve himself in
any activity, the result of which is matrimony.

In which event, he

cannot honestly play the role of husband in the institution of matrimony.
The point is that the two ends are existentially exclusive and they
cannot be simul taneously attained.
Another institutional attribute of ends is that ends are not ends-

in-themselves because, once they are attained, they become means or

impediments (or perhaps some of both) to on-going ends.

The distinc-

ticn between ends and means is relational in the temporal sense.

It was

demonstrated earl i er how present means to future ends are the effects of

causes which 1 ie in the past.

This is the same as stating that the

present means are in part the ends or consequences of choices made in
the past.

Likewise, everything that does not exist in the present but

must be brought into existence to serve as means to a further end are

ends themselves. 37
This can be traced out in the context of the continuum developed
to this potnt. ' An

end-~n-v~e\'J

is an intellectual phenomenon.

not exist except in contemplation.

It does

If it is selected as an end-to-be-

reached, the end becomes expectatial and it is the activity around "hich
immediate means and intermediate ends are organized.

As each event which

brings the chosen end into existence ascends from the future to the present, the end emerges and becomes existential.

And as those events all

pass into the past, the residual components of the end which remain in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
the present, the embodiment of the means which brought the end into
being, become the effects of causes which 1 ie in the past.
continuum has brou9ht the contemplation to consequence.

Thus, the

And the conse-

quence may facil itate or impede or both facil itate and impede the
attainment of on-going ends.
For example, the founding of the City of London ;s seen to be a
long series of events related to one another in a continuum of ends and

means.

The coordinating element around which all subactivities,

immediate means, and intermediate ends were organized, was the Roman
world view of a distinct empire insulated on all sides from raids and
pillage by barbarians.

This ideal became an end-to-be-reached.

The

means to that end were the intermediate ends of establ ishing dominion
over and maintaining peace in all contiguous lands harboring barbarian
tribes.

This led to the Gallic Wars as Rome allocated immediate means

in the form of Roman Legions to the intermediate end of conquering

Western Europe, including Britain.
The conquest of Britain achieved an intermediate end and became a
means to a further intermediate end. the establ ishment of a Roman
government in Britain with which to maintain the peace.

The construc-

tion of a domicile for that government was an intermediate end to
establishment of the Roman government.

And, of course, the City of

London \"/as founded with the construction of that domicile.

Thus,

construction of Roman London became one of the means to establ ishment
of a Roman government in Britain.

The establ ishment of that government

became a means to maintaining the peace in Britain, and maintaining
peace in Britain became a means to insulating the Roman Empire from
pillage by barbarians on its north-western periphery.
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The foregoing example treated all attained or existential ends as
though they were, ipso facto, means to on-going ends.

It is sometimes

the case that such existential ends are found to be impediments rather

than means to some on-going ends. 38 Such a situation may come to pass
either because the attained end was selected deliberately to impede some

on-going ends, or because there was an inadequate prediction of probable
on-going consequences of attaining the selected end.

An inadequate

prediction might result if the persons choosing ends did so either
without sufficient information upon which to estimate the outcomes

accurately or because they applied defective theories as to causal
relationships, and they therefore drew unrealistic conclusions.

What-

ever the reasons, it sometimes happens that existential ends are

impediments rather than means to some on-go; n9 ends.
Suppose, for example, that a person owns some open land on the
edge of an older urban area.

Suppose further that the urban area is

shifting from mixed residential and light commercial use to industrial

use.

And finally, suppose that the owner chooses to develop the land by

constructing private, single-family dwellings to accommodate upper

middle-income famil ies, speculating that the proximity to 1ight commercia1 enterprises might be an inducement for such famil ies to buy
residences in the area.

t-Jhat are the 1 ikely consequences of the private

owner l s choice if the established trend toward industrial uses continues
on adjacent lands?
The most probable result is that the owner-developer will not succeed in selling his new units to upper middle-income families, if indeed

he can sell them at all. 39

Thus he may not real ize sufficient revenue

from sales to cover his costs of development, and he may find himself
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pushed into bankruptcy.

The owner's fail ure caul d have ori gi nated in

either inaccurate information about the land-use trend in the area (stemming from indifference on the owner l s part, an inadequate estimate of the

land-use trends in the area, or a sheer paucity of data) or defective
theory as to the causal relationship between the established trend and

its most probable effect on the potential future uses of his property.
Some would argue that the owner should not be deprived of his
folly--that he should be free to make his private market choice and to
succeed or fail upon its merits.

On the other hand, there are some sound

social reasons why his venture should be truncated before losses occur.

Insofar as means are unidirectional as to the ends to which they are
all ocated, they cannot always be economically recovered.

Thus, resource-

means will be wasted because they have been imprudently allocated to the
unworthy end of constructing private single-family dwell ings in a loca-

tion which is not suitable for residential purposes.

But. perhaps more

important. new housing is a very durable product, and it can be expected

to remain serviceable for up to twenty years with 1 ittle maintenance and
for much longer with sUbstantial maintenance.

Moreover, the cost to

reclaim the land from small residential parcels into large industrial
units is prohibitive. 40

Therefore, the housing, as an existential end,

stands as an impediment to the on-going end of developing the land for
industrial uses, its probable highest use.
Comprehensive urban planning is seen as an effort to avoid problems

of the foregoing sort in urban land-use.

The plan usually starts with a

catalogue of existing land uses and land-use regulations.

Based upon

explicit assumptions, the plan attempts to project probable demographic
and economi c changes whi ch will affect future 1and uses.

It then
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proposes ways of incrementally changing zoning ordinances and other
land-use regulations so that land-use transitions occur in an orderly
fashion in accordance with some preconceived and explicit notions about

what future land-use patterns ought to be and why they should be that
way.

Finally, the plan is updated periodically to keep it current with

changes which take place over time.

The comprehensive plan is usually

the product of careful del iberations by a city planning staff, a city
planning commission, and the elected members of city government.

It is

usually subject to extensive public hearings before ratification and
before any changes are enacted. 41
In short, comprehensive city planning looks at land-use in a
continuum which extends from the past to the future.

And it looks at

present land-use effects of past cause, at the present effects-means to
future ends and at an array of ends-to-be-reached along with the combinations of means which might be organized to their attainment.

One of

the functions of the plan is to assure with reasonable probabil ity that
existential ends become means, not impediments, to on-gOing ends in
urban land use.
On-Going Life Processes
The foregoing elaboration of the temporal setting of institutions

and cities reduces deductively to the proposition that on-going 1ife
processes operate to convert ends into means in some continuing fashion.
That is why the continuum is called an ends-means rather than a meansends continuum.

All means were something else before they were means-

resources to on-going ends.

They were either the outcomes of phenomena

not invo1ving deliberation and selection by man, or they were ends in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
the homo mensura context. 42

Ends, as ends-;n-v;ew, were inte1lectual phenomena which existed
only in the contemplation of members of the human species.

They were

states of being which did not exist at the time and which would come
into being only if the persons contemplating them chose them as ends-to-

be-reached and coupled their choices with actions to effectuate the ends.
Ends became existential as immediate means and intermediate ends were
selected and organized toward securing the ends-to-be-reached.

And.

in-as-much as ends are not ends-in-themselves. they became means (or
impediments or both) to some on-going ends when they became existential.
Thus, ends we:--e transformed into means by on-going 1 ife processes and
on-going 1 ife processes operate to convert ends into means in some
continuing progression.

In summation, the temporal setting of institutions and cities is
a longitudinal dimension in chronological sequence called an ends-means
continuum, a continuum of on-going life processes.

The setting is one

for making social choices of ends-to-be-reached from an array of
competing possible ends-in-view and for selecting and organizing
immediate means and intermediate ends toward attainment of the chosen
ends.

Finally. the setting is one in which ends are transformed into

means in some continuing fashion by on-going life processes.

The next

two chapters examine the functioning of institutions in this temporal
setting as well as the significance this has for cities.
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CHAPTER IV
CEREMONIALISM AND THE URBAN PAST

The second chapter defined institutions in terms of their
essential character and the third chapter described a temporal setting
in which institutions exist.

This chapter will examine the operation of

institutions in the setting described in Chapter Ill.

It is first

useful to recall the central ideas from the first three chapters.

The

definition arising from the examination of institutions in the second
chapter is:
An institution is an organized social group vl/hich has evolved
from and is united with some particular system of cultural
values~ and it serves through processes of social control to
stab;l ize social interaction by preserving and perpetuating
those cultural values in the society of which the institution
is a part.
The stress here is on cultural values, ways of knowing and doing

regarding all manner of social interaction.
The temporal setting of institutions which was described in
Chapter III is an ends-means continuum; a continuum of on-going life
processes; a setting for hUman choices.

It was found that the continuum

consists of a past, a present, and a future.

It was argued that all

that exists in the present is the effects of prior causes, and that
those same effects are the means available in the present to the
attainment of ends which lie in the future along the continuum.

It was

likewise argued that ends are alternative because available means are
limited and because some ends are incongruous so that not all competing
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ends-in-view are attainable.
ends-in-themselves.

Finally, it was argued that ends are not

Once they have been attained, ends become means to

on-going ends which 1 ie farther in the future along the continuum.
Human choices involve the selection of ends-to-be-reached from among
ends-in-view, and the allocation of scarce means to the attainment of
the chosen ends.
The question is, how do institutions operate in the temporal setting described in Chapter III?

in this and the next chapter.

An answer to that question is attempted

The central idea in these chapters ;s

that institutions achieve social stability and perpetuate their underlying cultural values by influencing social choices, choices involving
the selection of ends-to-be-reached from among competing ends-in-view,
and choices concerning the allocation of means to the attainment of
chosen ends.

Moreover. institutional influences in social choices will

be consistent with the cultural values out of which the institutions
arise and which they are determined to preserve and perpetuate in
service to social stability.

How, then, do institutions exercise this

influence in the temporal setting described in Chapter III?
Institutions discharge their social functions and influence social
choices through the practice of ceremonialism.

Ceremonialism is an

i nstituti anal practi ce for perpetuati ng cul tura 1 val ues by conferri n9

and rei nforci ng rank and soc; al status.

Ceremoni ali sm is therefore the

method by which institutions exercise social control, socialize
initiates, and transmit culture, and thereby maintain social stab;l ity.
Thus. any understanding of the way institutions operate in the temporal
setting described in Chapter III comes down to an understanding of
ceremonial ism.
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Ceremonialism can best be understood in terms of the attributes of
institutions described in Chapter II.

Thus, ceremonialism will be

related in this chapter to the cultural values.

This comes down to

explain how ceremonialism is the social technique by which the urban

present is related to the institutional past in terms of the ends-means
continuum.

Chapter V will examine ceremonialism in terms of institu-

tional structure, socialization, and social control.

Finally, the

operation of ceremonialism in social choices will be examined in the
last part of Chapter V.

The essence of Chapter V is that ceremonialism

is the chain which binds the urban future to the institutional past in
terms of the temporal setting of cities described in Chapter III.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the urban

present is inextricably linked by ceremonialism to the institutional
past in terms of the ends-means continuum.

The main ideas are:

ceremonialism arises out of cultural beliefs which descend to the
present out of the past.

Moreover, ceremonialism is the transmission

media of those same cultural beliefs.

It recounts the ethos of ancestors

in dramas, folk history, legends, and myths.

Of course, the ancestors

are dead and gone, and the cultural beliefs are therefore unalterably
fixed.

The cultural beliefs take the forms of taboos and totems--mores

and traditional things and ways of knowing and doing.

The totems and

taboos possess a compell ing mystique because of their 1 inkages to the
ancestors and the past. l
The following parts of this chapter will examine more closely each
of these aspects of ceremonialism and cultural beliefs.

The first part

will explore the transmission of cultural beliefs, followed in
succession by the origin of cultural beliefs, totems, and taboos, and
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the mythical past, mystical justifications, ritual and role playing, and
ceremonialism and law.

Once again, the thrust of this chapter is the

explication of ceremonialism as the chain which binds the urban present
to the institutional past in respect to the temporal setting of cities.
It is the agency for informing the present with prototypes of human
interactions from the past.

And insofar as those prototypes become

models for present actions. they tend to reduce uncertainty and create

social stabil ity by regularizing social intercourse.
THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURAL BELIEFS

One cannot know the true origins of cultural bel iefs with perfect
certainty.

He can only say that they originated sometime in the past

and that they were transmitted to the present through a variety of media
involving language in some form.

No doubt, the earliest method of

transmission was oral tradition ;n which the bel iefs were transmitted

from generation to generation by way of folk legends and tribal myths.
The legends were recalled from the memories of parents and conveyed to
children in auspicious ceremonies commemorating particularly important
events in the lives of ancestors and in the annals of the tribe.

The mystical ceremonies involved role-playing in everything from
simple rituals to complex dramas that acted out in symbolic form the
events commemorated by the ceremonies.

The dialogues usually took the

forms of lyrics and other poetic styles which were prescribed by custom,
recalled from memory, and expressed in chants, songs, and spoken
discourse.

The oral expressions were experiences of the human mind

recalling the ancestral and tribal events of the past so that they
caul d be transmitted to others and the receptors mi ght come to understand
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and believe the who, the what, the when, the how, and especially the why
of the culture.
Written language evolved later to represent the spoken words, and
in part to record and preserve the ancient ceremonies so that the

cultural legacies of the past might be transmitted with greater fidelity
to future generations.

Written languages at first took the form of

pictures or ideograms representing words, word fragments, or comb; nations

of words in the spoken language.

The modern Chinese written language is

one comprised of characters which have evolved from ancient word pictures.
However, character writing is tedious to learn and burdensome of

memory.

Thus alternatives evolved to simplify the written language.

The Devangari script, in which Sanskrit and Hindi are written,. evolved

employing symbols to represent whole syllables with each syllable
containing both consonants and vowels.

The Phoenician script, from

which the Greek alphabet developed, was of the syllabic-type employing
only consonant:;.

The Greeks appropriated some of the Phoenician

consonantal signs for which there were no Greek sounds to represent
Greek vowel sounds.

Thereby emerged a wholly phonetic alphabet that was

quickly adapted to the uses of most of the Indo-European world.
From the archaic Indo-European languages evolved most of the
modern languages.

From Latin emerged the romance languages. Italian.

French, Spanish, Portuguese. and Romanian.

From the Indian and Sanskrit

branched Hindustani, Bengal i, and the whole range of middle Indian
languages.

From the Balta-Slavic came Czech, Polish, Russian, Bulgarian,

and Lithuani an.

And from the Germani c evol ved Swedi sh. Dani sh, German.

Norwegian, Icelandic. Yiddish, Dutch, and modern English. 2
Language emerged, first in oral expressions and later in written
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form, as an institution in concert with other institutions to help
stabilize social interaction.

Language augurs toward social stability

by reduCing the uncertainties of communication--by increasing the

assurances of the speaker or writer that the information transmitted is
the information received by the recipient, and the assurances of the
receiver that the information received was the information transmitted

by the speaker or writer.

That is, language makes possible the

receiving, decoding, recording, recalling, organizing, encoding, and the

transmitting of information which could not be intell igently
communicated without language.

In short, language makes possible

transactions or exchanges of all sorts between people--exchanges which

would be impossible without language.
Early written languages arose from two dominant purposes--to
account for commercial transactions and to record and transmit cultural

beliefs by way of the folk legends and myths contained in and reinforced
by the rituals and ceremonial liturgies of tribal societies.

From this

latter purpose flowed the great pieces of ancient writing which are

extant today; the great Sanskrit texts of the Aryans, the Rg-Veda, the
Upanishads, the Bagavad-Gita, the Tantas, and more; the non-Sanskrit
texts of the Hindus, the Kabir, the Caitanya, and the Ramakrishna to
name only a few; the Torah in the Hebrew texts of Judaism; the Sutras
in many languages, containing the Dharmmas of the Buddha, Siddhartha
Gautama.

And from the Greek and Latin languages survive the enduring

tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides as well as the comedies
of Aristophanes; the epic poems of Homer and Horace, and the lyrics of
Virgil; the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Tacitus, and the
biographies of Plutarch; the great oratories of Demosthenes and Cicero;
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the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius; and the Bible of Christendom. 3
Upon these anci ent works are founded most of the subsequent
artistic and philosophic creations of Hestern Civilization.
are, of course, legion.

Examples

The influence is so pervasive that space in

this tY'eatise does not permit an exhaustive development of the point.
Nevertheless, one representative example may suffice to show the

linkages between kernels of thought in ancient works and the influence
of those ideas in elaborations by subsequent artists. authors, and great

thinkers.
The Last Supper, the magnificent surreal istic painting by the
modern artist Salvadore Oa1i, hangs in the National Gallery of Art in
Hashington, D. C.

ft. realistic painting of the same subject was completed

by Leonardo da Vinci nearly 450 years earl ier on a wall in the refectory
at the monastery of Santa Maria della Grazie in

r~ilan,

Italy.

One views

the paintings with marvel at the superb craftsmanship of the artists and
with awe at the inspirational messages they convey.

The paintings stir

deep and abiding emotions in the hearts of Christians who are reminded

of the actions and words of Jesus Christ ai; the beginning of the
Christian era. 4

For in the night in which he was betrayed, he took bread; and
when he had given thanks he brake it and gave it to his
disciples, saying, take, eat. this is my body which is given for
you; Do this in remembrance of me.

Likewise. after supper, he

took the cup; and when he had given thanks he gave it to them
saying, Drink ye all of this; for this is my blood of the New
Testament, which is shed for you and for many, for the remission
~:.5ins.
00 this as oft as ye shall drink it. in remembrance of
Hi story and ceremony record that Chri st died upon a cross of

crucifixion on the day following the last supper.

The meaning of the
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events, the Last Supper and the crucifixion is that God made a sacrificial offering of Christ, his son, that mortal mankind might be redeemed
of sins.

In the words of one holy book:

All glory be to thee, Almighty God, our heavenly Father, for
that thOll, of thy tender mercy, didst give thine only Son, Jesus
Christ, to suffer death upon the cross for our redemption; who
made there (by his one oblation of himself once offered) a full,
*~~f~~!. s~~~ ~~fr~~i:~~l !a~~;f~~g' obl at; on, and satisfaction,
The Holy Eucharist, the ceremony of the Last Supper, has descended
to modern times as a sacrificial offering in expiation of trespass or
atonement for sins.

That is, an exchange takes place between a

communicant and God through the intermediation of Jesus Christ in which
the communicant gives up some material possession to the body of Christ,

the Church, and God gives the communicant full remission of his sins.
The entire event is celebrated by a feast in which a victim, Jesus

Christ, is sacrificed on an altar to God.

The slaughter of a victim

symbol izes the just fate of the sinning communicant.

God accepts the

sacrifice and God and the communicants then consume the body and blood
of the victim in commemoration of the event.
The Holy Eucharist, the most holy of all Christian ceremonies, is
reenacted each Sunday and on other holy days in most Christian churches

throughout the world.

liorshipers, playing the roles of Christ's

disciples, recite a creed of faith, make an offering--usually in cash-and confess their sins.

After absolution in which the worshipers ' sins

are forgiven, a priest symbolically repeats the actions and words of

Christ in consecrating and serving the bread and wine (the symbolic body
and blood of Christ).

Following a priestly oblation and invocation, the

communicants receive and consume the body (the bread) and the blood
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(the wine) of Christ.

The priest recites a prayer of thanksgiving and

renders a benediction, and the communicants depart content in the belief
that the ceremony of exchange has resulted in the complete and

unequivocal remission of their sins, whatever they might have been.

The

ceremony serves to purge the communicants of debil itating feel ings of

guilt, while reinforcing their commitments to live, however imperfectly,
by the teachings of Christ--that is, to play the roles of Christians
within the institutional church.
Th~

priests are of course reenacting a ceremony which was

instituted by Christ for the Church founded in His name.

HOI,ever, Christ

was simply reenacting a much more ancient ceremony--albeit that he
endowed the ceremony with a very dramatic variation by placing himself
in the role of Issac, Abrahamls son, and making himself the immolation

victim.

Nevertheless, the idea of a sacrificial offering has a much

more ancient lineage.

For example, read of God instructing Moses

approximately 1200 years before the Last Supper:
And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, If a soul commit a trespass and sin through ignorance, in the holy things of the Lord,
then he shall bring for his trespass unto the Lord a ram without
blemish out of the flocks, with thy estimation by shekels of
silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary, for a trespass offering. And he shall make amends for the Harm that he has done in
the holy thing, and shall add the fifth part thereto, and give
it unto the priest; and the priest shall make an atonement for
him with the ram of the trespass offering, and it shall be
forgiven him. 7
Or consider the actions of the Patriarch Abraham as he carries out

the commandments of Yahweh on Mount Moriah nearly 2,000 years before the
Last Supper.
And they came to the place which God had told him of; and
Abraham built an altar there and laid the wood in order, and
bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the wood.
And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

111
slay his son. And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of
heaven and said, Abraham, Abraham; and he said, here am I. And
the angel said lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou
anything unto him; for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing
thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me. And
Abraham 1 ifted up his eyes and looked and behold, behind him a
ram caught in a thicket by his horns; and Abraham went and took
the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of
his son. 8
The sacrificial offering has yet more ancient origins.

Indeed,

one can trace the practice to its ultimate origin only by speculation.
However, reference is made to the sacrifice of victims for many purposes

in the most ancient Sanscrit texts of the Aryans. the Indo-European

ancestors of the Hindu, Greek, and Roman cultures.

The practice was

clearly widespread throughout the ancient world several millennia

before Christ instituted it as the principal sacrament of His Church. 9
Thus, ceremonies of sacrificial offerings as atonements for
trespasses against cultural codes came into being sometime in the
prehistorical era of man.

The ceremonies were transmitted by celebrants

down the generations of prehistoric man by the actions and oral
recitations of chants, hymns, and other spoken discourse.

As written

languages emerged at the dawn of history, the chants, hymns, and prose
of the ancient sacrificial ceremonies were recorded so that they might

be transmitted to future generations with greater fidel ity.

The written

texts became media for transmission of the idea of sacrificial offerings
as means of atonement.

And upon this kernel of thought is erected

philosophies, institutions, impressive edifices of worship, codes of
ethics, great works of art, and much more.
This is but one set of a boundless number of examples which might

be cited to illustrate the point that the institutional practices of
ceremonialism arise out of cultural beliefs which descend to the present
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out of the past.

The cultural beliefs are transmitted in folk history,

literature, works of art. holy symbols, ceremonies, legends, and myths

which recount the pathos of ancestors and the ethos of the tribe.

And

the cultural beliefs inspire the production of art, literature,
philosophy, and a myriad of other cultural vestiges, all of which are
designed to perpetuate further the cultural beliefs by linking the
temporal present to the institutional past.
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL BELIEFS
Although one cannot know with perfect assurance the ultimate
origins of particular cultural beliefs, a notion of those origins can

often be deduced from the texts and artifacts by which they were
transmitted to the present.

A careful examination of those remnants

from the past has occupied archeologists, historians, anthropologists,
and other scholars for many years.

The results of that scholarship

reveal much about the origins of certain cultural beliefs, and thus
much about the ceremonialism which arises out of those beliefs.'O
Many cultural beliefs are founded on faith out of the fear and awe
of natural forces over which man has no apparent power.

Those forces

take two general forms--the fear of death and the awe of natural
phenomena such as the annual seasons, rain and flood, volcanic eruptions,

earthquakes, and the like.

The cultural beliefs allay primitive fears

by ascribing unexplained phenomena to supernatural forces and
rationa1izing them in terms of mystical causes.

These mythical

justifications invoke a spirit world of mystical potencies which act and
react upon one another as though they were causally related in some
natural way.

Therefore. to the primitive mind, they could be
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beneficially manipulated in quasi-causal ways by ceremony and magical

ritual.

Ceremonial behavior involves just such ritualistic role-

playing according to the dictates of the ancient and traditional totems
and taboos which descend to the present out of the past. ll
An early example of the social consequences of the fear of death

was discovered in excavations at Chapelle aux Saints, France.

The

excavations revealed the imaginative thoughts of the primitive Mouster-

ians (a subgroup of Homo neanderthalensis from the upper paleolithic
period, ca. 100,000 to 50,000 years ago) regarding death and the needs
of the deceased.

Several skeletons were found in shallow graves dug

into the cave floor.

The dead were carefully interred. their heads

sometimes resting on stone pillows.

The graves were placed near the

hearths so the deceased could be warmed by the fires.

They were

provided with tools and joints of meat, the better to serve their needs

after their earthly 1 ives ended.
The terrifying fact of death and its ravages shocked the

~1ouster

ians into unexpected and uneconomic directions of human thought.

They

could not accept the complete cessation of earthly life, but vaguely
imagined that life must somehow continue and that the dead would have
need of the food and tools they buried with them.
ceremonially tended the dead as an act of faith.

The Mousterians
Their faith in magical

remedies was proportif'.r1ate to their perceived helplessness in the face

of death.

Objective judgments simply gave way to fear and hope and the

Mousterians desperately grasped and accepted the nearest explanation at
hand while ignoring any reason to believe there could be any other
answer.

In short, fear was the sire of faith. 12

These kinds of fears augur huge in the early formation and descent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

of the complex of cultural beliefs which survive in modern times.
font of those beliefs was the religion of the ancients.

The

The domestic

branch of the religion was founded in a fear of death not unlike that
of the Mousterians.

Indeed, the religion arose from prehistoric Indo-

European traditions and traces of it are found in the ancient Aryans and

Vedas of the Hindus as well as the classical writings of the Greeks and
Romans.

Unable to accept the notion of the cessation of life at death, the
ancients believed that the soul continued after death and that it must
have a dwelling.

Without a tomb, the soul became a wandering spirit

seeking the repose it deserved after the labor and anguish of life.

It

was believed that the un tombed soul was disquieted, an evil spirit,
delivering pestilence, famine, and disease upon its living descendants,
admonishing them to give sepulture to itself and its physical remains.
Thus it was in pursuit of their own peace in 1 ife and the assur-

ance of repose and happiness after death that the living performed the
funeral ceremony.

That is, their faithful service to the dead reinforced

their own convictions that all would not end for them when they themsel ves di ed.

Rather, their fast; di aus rituals assured the 1; ving that

their souls would also continue after death and that their living
descendants would perform the ceremonies which would provide the
sustenance needed by their souls after death.

This mythical belief was

a powerful force compelling the living to ceremonially organize their
lives to worship and serve their dead ancestors.

The deceased ancestors,

the manes whose feats were perpetuated among the 1 iving by ceremonialism, legends, and myths, were the family gods.

The primitive religion

of the ancients was a purely domestic institution.
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Service to the dead, therefore, did not cease with the funeral
ceremony.

On the contrary, since the soul of the deceased survived

death, it had need of food and drink and it was the duty of the 1 iving
to satisfy that need.

Supplying sustenance to the dead was an

obligation not to be left to chance or the capricious sentiments of
men.

Every Greek and Roman household contained a totem, an altar upon

which a few coals must always be burning.

The fire was called Vesta by

the Romans--Vesta, the goddess of the hearth.
The fire existed to warm the manes, the souls of the ancestors,
who were buried nearby and to prepare the offerings which would sustain

them.

It was the sacred duty of the master of each house to rna; ntai n

the fire without cessation.

An extinguished hearth fire was taboo.

The

fire ceased to burn upon a family altar only when there was no one left
to maintain it.

An extinguished hearth meant an extinct family to the

anci ents. 13
The damest; c rel i gi on of the anci ents forbade two fami 1 ies to

mingle.

The particular religious practices of each family were sacred

and unique.

Thus each gens. or extended family, occupied its own canton,

a family territory surrounding the sacred fire and its structure.

This

of course limited social intercourse so that the family was no doubt the
sole form of society for many centuries.

However, the restrictions

imposed by the ancient religious beliefs were t"dO narrow to allow
families in the emerging civilization to cooperate in the amelioration of
inter-gens disputes without bloodshed or in providing common security and
material needs. 14

It therefore became expedient for several fami1 ;es to

join in another worship which was common to all of them.

This was

accomplished without sacrificing any part of the special religions of the
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constituent families.

Indeed, it was essentially an expansion of the

domestic religion beyond the family.

However, it was based on the

same precepts which undergirded the antecedent domestic religion of the

ancients.
This eventual ity led to the formation of "hat came to be known as
a phratry' in ancient Greece. and a curta in ancient Rome.
some enlargement of preceding rel ;9;OU5 ideas.

It required

Members of the

constituent famil i es had to accept the common di vinity, a divinity that
was 5uper:ior in Some respects to those of the households.

Once accepted,

the worship was founded by the erection of an altar and the lighting of
a sacred fire.

Like the patron in the domestic worship. a curion

presided at sacrifices for the curia. The worship was in all other
respects 1 ike that at the domestic altars.

It consisted of preparing a

repast on the altar and consuming it in common, for the ancients
bel; eyed that nour; shment prepared and consumed in that way establ ished

a sacred bond between people which lasted until death. 15
The tribe came into existence when several curies found it advantageous to join in common association.

The tribe was constituted to be

a separate society knowing no higher authority.

Like the cury and

phratry, the tribe was founded by the erection of an altar and the
creation of unique divinities--usually men who were deified and called
"heroes."

The tribe had an annual feast day on which the entire tribe

participated in a sacrifice presided over by a tribunus.

The tribal

worship was like that of the curies which made it up, identical in form
to the domestic worships of the constituent households and based upon
the same underlying notions .16
Fi nally. a ci vitus or city was establ i shed when two or more tri bes
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found it expedient to organize on some common basis.

The ancient city

was at first a confederation which had to respect the religious beliefs

and c.ivil independence of the tribes and curias which made it up.
Unlike modern cities which evolve from village to town and from town to
city, the ancient city was created by the gods in a single day.
Founding a city was a religious event involving the founding men and

their gods.
For example, the city of Rome was founded by Romulus on the 21st
of April-.-probably in the seventh century 8. C.--an anniversary which
is still celebrated by the residents of Rome.

Of course, there were

cantons populated by members of Latin and Etruscan tribes already
establ ished on and around the seven hills of what has come to be the

City of Rome, for Rome was near the frontier between Latium and Etrusca.
But a collection of curias and gentes from several different tribes in

a common region does not a civitus make.

In the modern vernacular, it

lacked a corporate charter, and the charter could only be granted by the
gods who would live in, protect, and assure the good fortunes of the

city for its mortal citizens.
Romulus first consulted the gods for only they could say where the
city should be.

Being a Latin from the city of Alba, he consulted the

gods by observing the flight of birds.

The birds indicated that the

gods meant Rome to be establ i shed on the Pal atine.
sacrifice at the top of Palatine Hill.

Romul us offered a

He and his companions built a

fire of brushwood, and each man purified himself by jumping through the
fire.

Romulus then dug a small circular trench which he called mundus,

meani ng regi on of the manes.

Into thi s trench he threw a clod of earth

which he had carried with him from the city of Alba.

Each of his
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companions likewise cast bits of earth into the trench.

Like Romulus,

they had brought the earth from the cantons of thei r fathers.
The purpose of mundus was to bring the domestic gods from their
native sepulchers and install them in a tomb at the new urbs.

For it

was a taboo that one must not desert his manes and the lesser gods, the
lares and penates familiaris, and it would be hoped that those gods
would not desert their descendants.

With the gods properly entombed in

their new location, Romulus built an altar and 1it a sacred fire to what
now were

Jh~

lares compitalis and penates publici of Rome.

With his head veiled and wearing a white robe, Romulus traced the
boundaries of the new urbs or place of civitus by plowing a furrow

around it with a copper plowshare drawn by a

~'hite

bull and a white cow.

The furrow was interupted at places where gates (portae) would be
installed, for the furrow was sacred and it was a sacrilege to cross it.

Romul us I companions foll owed sil ently, throw; n9 the clods turned up by
the plow back into the enclosure so that none of the sacred earth would

remain outside.

Finally, a wall was built inside the sacred furrow, and

several meters of earth were reserved along each side for religious
purposes.

Just as the gens, the cury, and the tribe had its hearth and chief
priest, so did the city.

The chief priest of the ancient city was

called king, and the position and title were inherited in proper
patriCian fashion by the eldest son upon demise of his father, the king.

Worship at the public hearth fire was the basis of his dignity and power.
Just as the patron was all at once the chief prieo::"S,

;n','lgi~trate,

and

master of his family. so the king was also the political chief of the
city.l?
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So pervasive were the powers of the primitive rel i gion that it was
many centuries of bloodshed and human anguish before the gods revealed
the cury and the tribe to men that they might cooperate beyond their

gentes in common interests.

And it was doubtlessly many more centuries

of bloodshed before the gods revealed how to establish civitus and found

urbs at some place to the same end.

The new social organizations gained

currency then only when their founders in each case left the powers of
the patrons undisturbed and emulated the traditional rel igious trappings

and sacrificial offerings of their constituent gentes.
cedent ceremonial behavior continued as before.

That is, ante-

Likewise, it

constrained the new social organizations so that they possessed only the
powers allowed to them by the former.

Finally, the new social organ-

izations took on and applied the antecedent ceremonial behavior.
The lives of the ancients were dominated by religious experience.
Every action brought men into the presence of one or more gods. The gods
prevailed at birth. at the sunrise and awakening, at each repast, at
every going in and coming out, at and during repose, in war and peace,
and at and after death.

Indeed, the pantheon of domesti c gods arose

from the fear of death and a consequent preoccupation with the human
soul--with god-in-man, or approximately what Christians think of as the
Holy Ghost.
Many of the ancient beliefs about religious worship persist into
modern times.
known example.

The idea of an individual soul for each person is a well
The heroes of the ancient tribes are similar to the

saints worshipped by some modern Christian denominations.

One can find

a column dedicated to the hero George Washington at Washington, D. C., a
city named after the same hero.

Likewise, that city contains temples to
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other national heroes-- Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and the unknown

soldier to name a few.

And how many of the continuous states have cities

named after those and other national heroes as well as other cities with
streets, parks, and monuments likewise commemorating the national demigods.
The idea of worshipping an omnipotent God, albeit a single and
universal god, rather than a pantheon of deceased ancestors, is a well

established practice.

The worship involves initiation. adoration,

thanksgiving, invocation, sacrificial offerings, and the receiving of
absolution and benediction in some order and form in most religious
denominations.
sacred forms.

Some sects also hold tenaciously to other ancient,
For example, it is a practice of orthodox Judaism to make

a fire offering in which an altar fire must be perpetually burning, and
a meat offering in which God is believed to consume His portion in the
flame and the remainder is to be consumed by the priests and others
involved in the worship.18

Such is the stuff of the modern institutional

church, or synagogue. or mosque, or temple, or whatever.
The point is, that an enormously complex and powerful institutional
system founded at 1 east in part upon a human fear of death and other
matters over which man has little or no known powers has evolved out of
ancient and mostly intuitively validated beliefs.

Those beliefs were

transmitted to the present by ceremonial practices, and the
institutions which have grown out of those beliefs and practices will
continue to perpetuate them into the future.
But more than that, those ancient religious beliefs founded as
they were upon primitive fears of death, gave rise not just to religious
institutions, but to a proliferation of other institutions which also
survive in modern times.

A further examination of the writings of the
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Greeks and Romans, civilizations from which Western Civilization traces

its origins, reveals that the primitive religion established paternal
authority, matrimony, private property ri ghts. inheritance, and much

more.

After enlarging and extending the paternal family to the cury and

tribe, that primitive religion exerted its powerful influence in the
formation of and dominion over the ancient city.
of the ancient world evolved from it.

All of the institutions

And the ceremonial remnants of

many of those institutions and laws persist into modern times.
TOTEMS AND TABOOS

The cultural beliefs, upon which ceremonialism are founded, take

the forms of what anthropologists call totems and taboos.

Totems are

physical objects, trees, stones, altars, household objects, animals,
etc., "'/hich are bel ieved to possess mana, or supernatural powers or to
be inhabited by a god or gods which possess such powers.

Taboos are

approximately analogous to mores as they have been defined elsewhere in

this treatise.

That is, they are traditionally or divinely prescribed

and proscribed modes of behavior.

t~uch

of the preceding descriptions of

both ancient and modern rel igious practices are, in fact, descriptions
of totems and taboos.

The altar, the physical materials of sacrificial

offerings, the bread and wine of the Holy Eucharist, and all other socalled sacred mater; a 1s are totems.

Likewise, the prescri bed worshi p

ceremonies, as well as such admonitions as the Ten Commandments of the
Judea-Christian code, are taboos.
Much of that which is described in the remainder of this chapter
and the next wi 11 be found to fit the descri pti on of totem or taboo.
However, it is intructive to press further the illumination of ancient
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bel ;efs and thei r infl uence on the ceremonial ism of modern instituti cns

in terms of totems and taboos.1 9
It is thought that the rna 1e-domi nant househo 1d evolved from a

distant antiquity.

At a predatory and more barbarian stage of culture,

women were seized from the vanquished enemy and prized as trophies of

war.

This gave rise to a form of ownership-marriage in which the male,

who had acquired his female trophies by his predatory prowess, was head

of the household.

However it came to be, the households of ancient

Greece and Rome were headed by their senior male members. 20

The ceremonial behavior, the chants and pr:.:tyers--;n short, the

taboos--which were part of the domestic religions of the ancients were

a patrimony. a sacred tradition which members of the family were
forbidden to disclose to persons outside the family.

ceremonially passed from father to eldest son.

Those taboos were

In giving life to his

son, a father also gave him the right to continue the ceremonies of the
hearth fire, to make the sacrificial offerings. and to speak the sacred
prayers.

In this way, a mysterious and sacred bond was established

between the infant son and all of the manes, lares. and penates. the
ancestral gods of the family.

The domestic religion was patriarchal,

and the father of the household was the high priest, the pater famil ias
who alone possessed the mana or mystical potency needed to carryon and

to perpetuate the family worship.
As priest of the hearth fire. the father recognized no superior-not the ci ty, not hi s officials, nor any other power caul d change hi s
worship.

He was the supreme chief of the domestic religion.

He alone

possessed the paternal mana to perform all of the ceremonies of the
worship as he had seen his father perform them before him.

He alone
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was responsible for the perpetuation of the family and its religion.

It

was his first concern, and from that concern stemmed all of his powers,
powers which he shared with no one.
The father was master of the household as well as its magistrate
and chief priest.

According to the ancient taboos of patrimony, the

father had the right to accept or reject a child at its birth.

He could

repudiate his wife either for steril ity or adultery so that the family
would become neither extinct nor debased.

The wife had no such powers.

The father had the right to give his daughters in marriage, and the
right to sanctify the marriages of his sons.

He had the power to

emancipate or exclude a son from the family worship.

And he had the

right to adopt or to introduce a stranger into the domestic religion.

Finally, at his death, he could name a guardian for his wife and

children.

In short, he had the powers--indeed, the duty--to do anything

necessary to perpetuate the family and its damest; c worshi p. 21

While the powers of modern husbands and fathers are no longer as
prodigious as those of the ancient world, it has been only during the
last century that those traditional taboos have yielded in any

substantial way to liberalizing influences in modern industrial
countries.

Indeed, husbands and fathers in some countries continue to

wield the traditional powers little changed from those of antiquity.
Moreover, it is still very much the case in the more liberal nations

that the husband and father is the traditional, if only titular, head
of the modern household.

A wife continues to take her husband's surname,

and that name becomes the surname of all acknowledged children sired by
the man.

~..Jhen

generic reference is made to the human race, it ;s

called IImankind, II not womankind.

The male-dominant role, which was so
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soundly entrenched in antiquity and before, continues to be reinforced
in modern societies in thousands of seemingly insignificant ways.
Many practices of the ancient religious taboos have been

integrated into some modern ecclesiastical practices.

For example,

ordination is a ceremony for transmitting the mystical potency
possessed by the bishop or patriarch to the novice priest so that the
latter can execute his fatherly function of ceremonially feeding the
children of the church.

Moreover, this is a vocation of men for only

men can possess paternal mana.

It is believed that the bishop acquired

his mystical powers from his own ordination in which the hands of a

previously ordained bishop were laid upon him, and those hands were
carrying on a lineage which originated with Jesus Christ Himself and
was transmitted through Simon Peter, Christ's apostle and the first
bishop of Rome.

Only properly ordained priests possess the mana to

carryon the worship.22 The modern worship ceremony continues to
conform to many of the ancient paternal taboos.
The cultural heritage upon which the ceremonialism of paternity
has descended out of the past is an ancient taboo based upon the
rel igious bel iefs of the ancients--a bel ief that was founded upon a
fear of death.

And the ceremonies of modern institutions continue to

reinforce and perpetuate the ancient taboos.
THE MYTHICAL PAST
The totems and taboos possess a compelling mystique because of their
linkage to the past.

Linkage to the past necessarily means that the

the totems and taboos are unalterably fixed because they are founded on
the conquests of the ancestors, the legends about whom have become a part
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of the cultural heritage. The beliefs are unalterable because the ancestors
are dead, their physical remains interred and their psychic presences
resident only in the dramas, folk history, legends, and myths descended from
the past.

The myths tell it the way it was and one cannot change them.

He can only accept on faith the totems and taboos as transmitted.
Of course, one may reject and deny the cultural beliefs, but he
must bear an enormous cost to do so.

Rejection involves denial of the

essential beliefs of the society of which one is a part.

It consists of

denying the myths, folk history, legends, literature, customs and law-in short the ceremonial ism which binds together the institutional
network of society.

It is putting oneself obverse to the values held

most sacred by his contemporaries.

It is heresy, and it invites social

sanctions which include everything from simple avoidance by family and
friends to suffering death by fire at a stake erected by one's friends
and nei ghbors.
As a matter of fact, almost everyone conforms in bel i ef and
behavior to the taboos and the proper use of totems.

Moreover, they do

so on the force of intuitive faith with little, if any, understanding of
the origins of, the implicit character of, and the behavior called forth
by the beliefs they hold.

They do so in part because they are social

creatures--an idea which is more fully developed later in the following
chapter--and peer acceptance requires conforming beliefs and behavior.

In short, most persons accept the totems and taboos on faith and on the
nearly fl awless 1ogi c that one' 5 forefathers prospered and brought forth
the present happy state of affairs by conducting their affairs in the
ceremonially prescribed patterns.

One should therefore emulate the cere-

monialism of his forefathers ifhe is to perpetuate his euphoric state. 23
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For example, the traditional marriage ceremony descends little
changed in character and meaning from that of the ancients. Modern brides

and grooms conform to the taboos and the proper uses of totems according
to the ancient ceremony. They do so on the strengths of their own faiths

in social customs, and usually with no knowledge of the origins or meanings of the customs.

They conform to the customs simply because that is

the way everyone does things, and because they fear that their union may
somehow be blighted if they fail to pay homage to tradition.

The. modern marriage ceremony, conforming to tradition, is a sacred
event which takes place before an altar.

and her head is covered with a veil.
to the groom.

The bride wears a white gown

The father of the bride gives her

The ceremony proceeds with incantations, pledges, and

prayers by and on behalf of the bride and groom.
surname of her husband.
near the altar.

guests.

The bride takes the

The bride and groom light nuptial candles at or

They share a wedding cake in the presence of family and

And the groom carries the bride over their first threshold,

taking care that her feet do not touch the threshold.
The modern marriage adheres remarkably to many of the ancient

taboos even though some of the underlying beliefs have long been lost to
antiquity.

The ancient ceremony, like that of the modern ceremony,

marks the advent of matrimony in the 1 ives of the bride and groom.
However, the institution of matrimony was inextricably related to the
domestic religion of the ancients, and it was no doubt one of the first
institutions to rise from those religious beliefs.

The ancient wedding

ceremony was an essential ingredient of the domestic religion for
perpetuating the sacred hearth fire and the sacrificial offerings while
avoiding intra-family marriage and inbreeding.

Thus, each element of
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the ceremony had special meaning to the ancients.
In the ancient world a daughter took part from her birth in the
rel igion of her father.
offered it libations.

Every day she invoked his sacred fire and
His hearth fire was the altar of her gods.

More

was involved than simply passing from one household to another when a
man from another family asked the daughter's hand in marriage.

She must

be released from the sacred fire of her father and thereafter invoke the
gods of her husband, for it is a taboo that one person shall not worship
before two different ancestral fires, before two sets of totems.

Proper

ceremonies were therefore instituted to formalize the binding of a man

and a woman in matrimony--to emancipate her from her father's worship
and adopt her into that of her husband.
A sacred ceremony of marriage, differing only in modest detail,

was practiced throughout the ancient world.
dwelling of the bride.

It began in the paternal

Surrounded by his family and in the presence of

the bridegroom, the father of the bride offered a sacrifice at the
conclusion of which he sacramentally declared that he gave his daughter

to the bridegroom.

She was thus severed from all attachments to her

paternal hearth and she was free to adopt her new rel igion.
The bride was attired in white to proclaim her chastity.

She wore

a veil so that her presence did not offend the domestic gods of the
groom before the groom caul d remove the cause of offense by maki ng them
her gods a 1so.

Properly attired, the bride was carr; ed to the dwell ing

by her husband.

However, she dared not enter the dwelling on her own

accord for she had no right to do so.

Her husband must seize her and

take her by force into the presence of his gods.

She had to resist--

although perhaps not too vigorously--while her husband raised her in his
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arms and carried her over the threshold, taking care that her reet not
touch the threshold, for the threshold was a sacred totem barring
strangers from the hearth fire.

The bride was sprinkled with lustral

water in the presence of her new domestic divinity.
as she touched Vesta, the sacred flame.

Prayers were spoken

Finally, she shared a cake with

her husband in the presence of the hearth fire, plaCing herself in
corrrrnunion with her husband and his family, including the manes, lares,
and penates of the family.
It .is easy to understand that matrimony under such solemn

circumstances must be monogamous.

It involved much more than shallow

affection or a simple sexual relationship.

Husband and wife were united

by the compelling bond of the same religious beliefs and by the
worship of the same unique gods.

But, more than that, the purpose of

the union was to produce an acceptable male offspring who would continue
the hearthfire and immolations necessary to the sustenance and

tranquility of the gods.

Those effects were so grave that men did not

bel ieve it possible to have more than one wife in each house.

And for

the same reasons, such marriages were dissolvable only under the most
grave circumstances. 24
The modern weddi ng ceremony demonstrates that the totems (the
regalia and setting) and the taboos (the behavior of the participants)
possess a compelling mystique because of their linkages to the past The

modern bride and groom are compelled by the mystique to conform in

adornment and behavior to the ancient and unchanging customs.

The

mystique is compelling because of the couplels faith that adherence to

the ancient myths and traditions will somehow bless their union with
durability, success, and happiness.

The faith is founded on the
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conviction that the traditional ceremony was mysteriously instrumental
in producing those qualities in the matrimonial unions of their
ancestors--unions which, after all, produced the present bride and
groom.

Moreover, the strengths of their convictions are independent of

any knowledge of the so-called pagan origins of tile totems and taboos.
MYSTICAL JUSTIFICATIONS

The cultural beliefs which have descended from antiquity to the
present are mystical justifications.

They are rationalizations invoking

a spirit world of mystical potencies which act and react upon one another

as though they were causally related in nature.

The spirit world is man-

ipulated in quasi-causal ways by traditional rituals.

It is thought that

one can appeal through prayer, lamentati cns, and ceremony to omn; potent
spirits to use their mystical powers to perpetuate a present euphoria or

to cause and bring forth a particularly desirable future state of affairs.
Moreover, when the desirable end is achieved, its achievement is

attributed to the liturgy and ritual which invoked the spirits to employ
their mystical powers on behalf of the ends sought by the mortal liturgists.

Failure to achieve the desirable end ;s rationalized away as a

sign from the spirits that the end was somehow unworthy or the means
were inadequate.

The gods have spoken either way and their mystical

message just; fi es whatever outcome ensues.

Li kewi se. it reinforces the

faith of mortals in the mystical powers of their ceremanies--their

totems and taboos. 25
For exampl e. the anc; ent antecedent to the modern marri age ceremony
was a supplication to the domestic gods to sanctify and bless the union

of a man and woman for the purpose of preduc; og another who waul d carry
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on the worship.

As already noted, a daughter was incapable by reason of

her sex to perpetuate the domestic worship.

The ceremonies of sacrifice

and offering must be performed by a son of the patron.

~1oreover,

a son

born of any other union was a bastard and was thereby unworthy of the
domestic pr;esthood--just as Ishmael, son of Abraham and Hagar, was

unworthy to sire the Jewish people because Hagar was only Abraham's
concubi ne and the hand-servant of Sarah, Abraham' 5 wedded wi fe.

Rather,

the tribes of Israel descended from Isaac, Abraham's son by Sarah, even

though Isaac was born after Ishmae1.26 The point is that the son who is
fit to perpetuate the hearth fire and perform the sacrificial offerings
must be born of the union sanctified by the gods in the

we(d'~ng

ceremony.

Of course, even a union sanctified through proper ceremony might

fail to produce a male descendant eligible to continue the line.

The

greatest misfortune that could befall the domesti c pi ety, the dead
ancestors whose souls inhabited the hearth fire, was that its line of
descendants might end.

If this should happen, its fire would be

extingui shed and the enti re ancestral 1 i ne woul d pass into ob 1 i vi on and
endless misery.

Therefore, a man discharged his debt to his ancestors

and assured immortality for himself when his wife delivered him a son
who could assume the paternal priesthood, tend the hearthfire, and make
the sacri fi ci a 1 offeri ngs.
For these reasons, the ancients believed that a man belonged to

his family--not to himself.

He was a link in the family chain which

connected the ancestors to future descendants who would carryon the
domestic worship, and the chain must not be broken by him.

therefore prohi bited eel i bacy.

A taboo

It a1 so permitted--perhaps requi red--

divorce if the wife were sterile.

Likewise, it required that a brother
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or other relative be substituted in the husband's place if the latter
were sterile, and that a childless widow marry her husband's nearest
available relative.

A son born of either of these unions was treated as

the son of the original husband for purposes of carrying on the domestic
worship.

All else failing, one last chance to escape extinction was in

a ceremony of adoption in which a young male, not the first son of the

patron, was admitted to the sacred hearth and placed in communion with
the family gods.

The ceremony of adoption was a symbolic fiction,

namely the ceremonial rebirth of the adoptee into a new life. 27
These options to perpetuate the family worship in the face of an
inconsummateor barren matrimonial union were more frequent that one

might suppose.

For example, Augustus (Gaius Octavious), the first

emperor of Rome was the adopted son of his great-uncle, Julius Caesar.

Moreover, Augustus failed to sire a son in three marriages.

He divorced

his fi'rst wife, Claudia, who was barren, and his second wife, Scribonia,
who produced only a daughter.

Finally, Augustus adopted his stepson,

Tiberius, who was the son of his third wife, Livia, by her divorced
husband,

Tiberius Claudius Nero.

Tiberius became the second emperor

of Rome, succeeding Augustus, his father by adoption. 28
All of those arrangements were means to perpetuati ng the domest; c
worship in ways suitable to the family gods.

But none of the means were

undertaken wi thout sacri fi cial offerings and appropri ate ceremoni es
appeaSing the names and invoking the blessings of the lares and penates.

It was the "elief that a fruitful outcome could not be forthcoming without appealing to the mystical spirits to exert their omnipotence toward

the ends sought by the appellants, whether it be in a ceremony of
marriage, divorce, adoption, or emancipation.

And if the desired outcome
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was not forthcomi ng, then the spi ri ts had somehow measured the outcome
as unworthy or the means as inadequate.

Like Augustus, who was thrice

wed and twice divorced, and who finally acquired an heir by adoption,
one must petition the gods by other means until they bring forth the
desired outcome.

But whatever the outcome, the cause is attributed to

the mythi ca 1 gods whose mysti cal powers were invoked by ceremony.
RITUAL AND ROLE PLAYING
Ceremonialism involves ritualistic role playing according to the
dictates of the ancient taboos.

The role attaches to a social position,

and the role playing is the ceremonial behavior expected of one who
occupies the position.

The role, its social rationale, its powers, and

its status and rank are prescribed by tradition.

The legends and myths

surrounding a role are the agents which prime social expectations regarding the role.

And when one comes to occupy a social position, he is

expected to play the role and perform the rituals required by the
position.

Moreover, he automatically acquires the status, rank, and

powers--or lack of powers--associated with the position.

Likewise, per-

sons occupying reciprocal role-playing positions will respond to incumbents according to the same ancient taboos with deference to their own
status and rank relative to that of the incumbent.

The point is, the

ceremonialism involved in role-playing is a make-believe or contrived

situation based on mystical justifications descended from the ancient
and mythical past. 29
Take, for example, the modern institution of private property.
Few institutions have had such pervasive effects on Western Civil ization

Private property is the basis of personal wealth.

The creation,
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exchange, and preservation of private property and its rights occupy
most human activities directly and indirectly most of the time.

Onels

status, rank, and powers are very much affected by his position within

the institution of private property--by how much and what kinds of
property he and hi s pri nci pa 1s own or do not own.

And the role one is

expected to play is likewise affected by his position in the institution of private property.

What is not generally understood is that the modern institution
of private property is finnly rooted in the domestic religion of
antiquity.

While modern beliefs about private property depart

significantly from those of the ancients, much of the ritual and role
playing of the ancients has descended to the present and is evident in
modern role expectations.

It is therefore instructive to briefly

examine the ancient origins of private property and the attending ritual.

A state of propinquity existed between the ancient family. its
hearth, and its ancestors.

When they established a hearth and buried

their deceased members at some place, it was with the intention that the
family should always remain there--not for the life of one man but for
as long as descendants remained to feed its Vesta and to support its
sacred fl arr:e by ceremoni a1 offer; ngs.

The family was inextricably

attached to the altar and the altar was attached to the soil under and
around whi ch the ancestors were buri ed.

The concept of dami cil e

followed quite naturally from those circumstances.
The hearth must be isolated from everything foreign to the domestic
worship.

The worship was an intimate family affair.

It was a sacrilege

for a stranger to be in sight of the altar when the family worship ceremonies were performed.

Thus, a sacred enclosure surrounded the hearth.
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Likewise, no part of the sacred enclosure could be profaned by any other
use.

Structures could not be joined together.

Each family must have

its own free-standing dwelling much like the typical modern family dwelling.

A family did not build for the lifetime of one man, but for the

descendants who would succeed one another generation after generation.
The idea of property was easily extended from the domicile and the
family tomb to the land which surrounded them.

If the family were to

survive to carryon the domestic worship. then there must be resources
at hand to provide the sustenance, the food, clothing, drink, and other
means of livelihood to support the descendants who would repeat the
worship ceremonies in future generations.

came from the soil.

Those means of lifelihood

The contiguous lands were therefore a property of

the domestic religion.

The entire domain was under the watch of the

household divinities who, when properly appeased with sacrifices,

maintained a benign

benevolence so that peace and bountiful harvests

would prevail season by season.
The land comprising the domestic domain was bound by a band of
sacred soil a few feet in width which was never touched and which was
marked by totems or termi ni of 1 arge stones and tree trunks.

On

appointed days, the father of the family drove victims around his boundaries singing hymns and making sacrifices to his gods that they would
continue to bless his properties with good fortune.

No power on earth

could displace the totem called terminus once it was established and
maintained according to the required ceremonies.

Indeed, one who over-

turned a terminus had committed a horrible sacrilege by disturbing a god,
a totem, and encroaching upon another familys field.

Expiation required

irmnolation of the person responsible and any beasts involved with him.
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Property was such a pervasive part of the domestic religion that a
family could not abandon the former without renouncing the latter.

Nor

could a family be deprived of its property against the will of its
patron.

A man might be subjected to servitude to discharge his

obligations, but his land could not be sold to the same end.

His lands

followed him into servitude, but he remained their proprietor. 30
Much about private property has obviously changed since antiquity.
The concept of private property was intermingled with that of sovereignty
during the medieval period, and it emerged during the Protestant Reformation in a much altered state.

Indeed, the institution of private pro-

perty has been in a more or less constant state of revolution from its
beginning.

The point stressed here, however, is its remarkable durability.

and the property ritual and ceremony which have survived from antiquity.

The ritual expected of persons playing roles involving private

property is remarkably unchanged from antiquity.

When one becomes a

property owner he is thought to have a mystical bond or relationship

with the property.

It is his to enjoy as he sees fit.

Most units of

private property are related somehow to domiciliary purposes, and most
residential real properties contain free-standing dwellings occupied by
single families.

The real properties continue to be defined by bound-

ari es marked by totems, or monuments.

The owner no longer dri ves

victims around his boundaries singing hymns and making sacrifices to his
gods.

However, it is still expected that a property owner know and

preserve his properties, and, on appointed days, offer his sacrifice to

the god of state by paying the taxes assessed on his properties.

The

state reciprocates by enforcing laws which preserve the owner1s quiet
use of the properties.

And one who encroaches upon another person1s
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property can be prosecuted for trespass or conversion.

The modern

property owner may now be depri ved of hi s property under a vari ety of
circumstances, but usually not without good reason, and only with due
process of law in the United States.

Finally, one's properties descend

to heirs by testament or by process of statute if the owner expires
intestate.

If the owner dies intestate, the priority of claims by heirs

is established in most jurisdictions according to the survivors' blood
relationships to the deceased. 31
Th~

modern institution of private property clearly involves cere-

monial role playing in accord with many of the taboos which descend from
the domestic religion of antiquity.

The social rationale for the role,

its mystical powers, and the status and rank of one who occupies a roleplaying position within the institution of private property are pre,
scribed by custom and law.

The law, legends, and myths surrounding the

role of property owner create self-fulfilling expectations in the minds
of persons involved with the institution af private property.

Persons

who occupy positions in the institution are expected to play the roles
and perform the rituals attending the positions they occupy.
Literally everyone is involved in some way with the role playing and
ritual of the institutional system in the societies of which they are
parts.

~lost

persons believe they are executing edicts of the gods or

commissions of the state, or mandates of the people, or orders of some

other abstract authority in situations that are natural or inevitable, or
under the mystical powers of the spirits.

In fact, the ceremonialism

with which they play their roles is very real, but it is contrived by
men.

It is make-believe fabricated by men who allay their apprehensions

by ascribing unexplained or unexplainable phenomena to supernatural forces
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and rationalizing them in terms of mystical causes.

And the role playing

employs the ceremonialism by which mortals attempt to manipulate the

spirits in quasi-causal ways to perpetuate a tranquil state of affairs.
CEREMONIALISM AND LAW
The whole matter of institutional class, rank, and status has been
obscured by the institution of the st.ate which has codified cultural
The law, whether it be constitutional, statutory.

bel iefs in the law.

administrative, case, or common law, grows out of custom and traditional
beliefs, and it reinforces those beliefs by placing the enforcement
pO\'Jers of the state behind them.

likewise, the law gives the customs

embodied in the law an air of added permanence because it is often more
bothersome to change a law to fit evolving changes in custom than to

simply

let

custom evolve as it will.

with many tongues.

Moreover, the law often speaks

There are, after all, many diverse sources of

custom and thus many conflicting customs.

There are. therefore. many

conflicting laws.
For example, the laws of the ancient city were nothing more than
rel igious rites. prayers, and 1 iturgical directions intermixed with
1egi s1 ati ve matters.

The 1 aws of succession and property were contained

in rules for burial. sacrifice, and worship of the dead.

In brief.

they were simply the codification of prevailing religious beliefs.

And

those beliefs descended from the past in legends, myths, and folk
histories.

The laws of the ancients were immutable because they were

the work of the gods.

New laws might come into being, but the old laws

remained even when they conflicted with the new ones.

And all laws

demanded the same respect.
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The ancient law remained unencumbered by concerns about justice
or equity.

that.

Its concern was re 1i gi on and there was no need to go beyond

Likewise, the ancient law was

discussion.

mute as to reason.

It was above

It was imposed by the gods and men obeyed the law because

they saw themselves bound to their gods.

a sacrilege to break it.

The law was holy, and it was

Where there was a common religion, there was

a common 1aw.

Legislation, as it is understood in the modern world, never
existed among the ancients.
out being sought.

The laws simply presented themselves with-

As much of the preceding part of this chapter

attempts to demonstrate, the laws were the direct and necessary extension of beliefs.

A fear of death, bel ief in the sacred hearth, and the

passage of its stewardship from father to eldest son was all that was

necessary to erect the laws of the ancients.

The legislator of the

ancients was no man; it was the religious beliefs entertained by men. 32
It seems that much has changed in modern law.

Constitutions are

enacted by conventions and changed in a variety of ways.
passed as statutes by legislative assemblies.
by administrative agencies.

Laws are

Regulations are written

And case law pronounces judicial decisions

dealing with interpretations of constitutions, statutes, and administrative regulations.

f~odern

practice does not seem to rely upon

revelation or law by the gods.

Moreover. modern law seems preoccupied

with questions of justice and equity.
On the other hand. one mi ght ask by what med; urn ; s the 1aw revea 1ed
to the legislator, the regulatory commissioner, and the judge?

Have

these learned persons conjured up their statutes, regulations, and
decisions as exercises of sheer intellectual power?

On the contrary.
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they have come to their professions usually with great learning in their
fields of expertise--which is to say, they have been educated in the cultural beliefs of their societies.

Many, if not most, are members of

churches and synagogues which have had a hand in shaping their beliefs
about right and wrong and about justice and equity.

All have emerged

from school systems bent upon shaping their bel iefs in a common direc-

tion.

And most have attended colleges and universities which have

further refined their professional preconceptions about right, justice,

and equity.

The fact is that all come from a common cultural heritage,

and it would be very unusual if the products of their enterprises
departed in any significant way from their cultural preconceptions.

If one examines the laws which are products of the legislator, the
administrator, and the judge, he finds that they depart as little as
possible from antecedent customs.

He will find that transgression

against most of the commandments given to Moses by God on Mount Sinai
are still classed as felonious crimes just as they have been down the
intervening centuries.

He will find that many statutes are simply the

codification of the common law which descended from custom in Great

Britain and was adopted in most of the states comprising the United
States because the settl ers who founded the country were predominantly

of the British cultural heritage.
And if one asks from whence arises English common law he finds that

the answer is:

The common law is simply well-established cultural be-

l iefs which have evol ved from antecedent traditi ons. 1egends. and myths.
Thus the common law contemplates the surviving remnants of the institutions which were founded in antiquity and which descended to the present
out of ceremoni a 1 practi ces.

The common 1aw is concerned with the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

regulation of interhuman relations within that institutional framework.33

Moreover, the notions of justice and equity in American jurisprudence as well as those of other nominally Christian nations are very
much influenced by Christls response when the Pharisees asked Him which

was the greatest commandment.

It maybe recalle.:! that Christ replied:

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with
all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great
commandment. And the second is 1 ike unto it, thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law
and the prophets. 34
The first half of Christ's reply was in part an admonition to live
by Godls commandments.

justice.

Those commandments comprise the law component of

The second part was an appeal for equity in justice.

Therefore, on closer examination, it appears that the essence, if
not the substance, of modern law remains firmly grounded on godly revelations and that the legislator, the regulator, and the judge are as much
the cultural or religious beliefs of modern man as they were of the
ancients.

It is in that sense that the institution of law raises cere-

monialism to its ultimate as the instrument of institutional efficacy.
SUMMARY

The cultural basis of ceremonial ism has been stressed at great
length.

Thi s was done to soundly establ ish the poi nt that ceremonia 1i SI1\

the principal technique of institutions in discharging their social
functions, both rises out of bel iefs which descend to the present out of
the past and is a potent mechanism for the transmission of those bel iefs.
Ceremonial ism was therefore found to be the social practice which links
the present to the institutional past in terms of the ends-means
continuum, the temporal setting of cities.

The preceding parts of this
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chapter cited a number of examples to illustrate and expand on these
points.

Each illustration selected an institution founded in antiquity-

language, religion (and its influence on the gentes, cury, tribe, and
city), patrimony, matrimony, adoption, private property, and 1aw--and
described how many of the ceremonial attributes of the ancient
institutions have survived and continue in the ceremonial practices of
the modern descendant of those ancient institutions.
In elaboration of these points, it was demonstrated how cultural
beliefs are transmitted in folk history, legends, and myths.

The

legends recount the conquests of ancestors and the annals of the tribe.
The beliefs are unalterably fixed because the events out of which they
grew occurred in the past, and there is no way of changing accounts of
actions which descend from the past.
The cultural bel iefs take the form of taboos--mores or traditional
and customary ways of knowing and doing.

The taboos possess a

compelling mystique of their linkage to the tribal past.

And they are

mystical justifications or rationalizations invoking a spirit world of
supernatural powers which act and react upon one another as though they
were causally related in some natural way.

Those spiritual potencies

are manipulated in quasi-causal ways by ceremony and magic ritual.
Finally, ceremonial behavior involves ritual istic role playing in

contrived situations according to the dictates of totem and taboo.

It

is in these ways that ceremonial ism is the yarn which knits the urban
present with the fabric of antiquity.

Ceremonialism informs the present

with models of social interaction from the past.

Such models augur

toward social stability because they regularize present social
interact i cns.
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CHAPTER V
CEREMONIALISfl ANO URBAN CHOICES
The preceding chapter related the institutional practice of ceremonialism to the ends-means continuum. the temporal setting of cities,
by explaining the origins of urban ceremonial ism.

The chapter descri bed

how urban ceremonialism is founded upon cultural beliefs which descend

to the present from the past.

Likewise, it stressed the institutional

function of transmitting culture and described how ceremonial ism is the
vehicle by which the institutional system carries out that function.
This chapter examines ceremonial ism in terms of other functions of institutions.

In particular, it explains the relationships between ceremonial-

ism and institutional structure, socialization, social control, and
social stabilization.

In these latter functions, ceremonialism is found

to be the social mechanism which 1inks the urban future to the institutional past in terms of the temporal setting of the city.
The main idea in this chapter is that ceremonialism links the future
to the past in regard to the ends-means continuum by ;nfl uencing choices
made in the present of ends which 1ie in the future, and choices as to

the ways of organizing present means to secure the chosen future ends.
Ceremonialism wi11 point to choices which tend to be least disruptive to
institutional taboos.

This follows since ceremonialism is the practice

by which institutions maintain social stability.

Likewise, ceremonialism

will point toward choices which depart the least from customary and traditional ways--in other words, choices which adhere to institutional ized
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ways.

This follows because ceremonialism arises from and is the institu-

tional transmitter of the cultural beliefs which descend from the past.
In this way, ceremonial ism serves to extend the institutional past forAnd it is the con-

ever into the future along the ends-means continuum.

tinuity of a present and future enl ightened by precedents from the past
which tends to stabil ;ze social interaction.'
CEREMONIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

A latter part of Chapter IV described how ceremonial behavior
involves role playing in social situations contrived in accordance with

the ancient taboos.

That is, roles and their reciprocal expectations

are prescribed by customs which descend from the past.

The phenomenon

of role playing gives rise to and is the most visible evidence of institutional structure.

Thus, the mores and the customary ways of knowing and

doing operate through ceremony to structure society into institutional
systems of class and rank.

And one's status is evidenced by the mystical

totems of rank--the phYSical symbols of rank.

The resulting institutional

system promotes social stability by creating a structure of social relationships within which persons may relate to one another.

It is thought that rank and status correspond to the technical competence of the persons to whom the rank is assigned.

Such correspondence

is a feature of the make-believe quality of ceremonialism.

The distinc-

tions of class and rank were contrived first and the positions accorded
the status of class and rank \lJere thereafter assumed to coincide with
technical competence.

That is, technical competence was assumed to exist

so long as the position and its incumbent fulfilled the canOnS of ceremonial competence.

And ceremonial competence or adequacy is judged, not
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by merit or technical adequacy, but by the ritual which extols the mana
of rank and validates status.
Institutional Structure
An explanation of institutional structure was made in Chapter I, and
it need not be repeated here.

It needs only to be added that institu-

tional structure arises from the ceremonial role ?laying carried on by
persons in fulfillment of the cultural bel iefs which descend from the past.
The role playing involves reciprocal role relationships in which a ceremonial action e1 icits ceremonial responses from persons occupying recip-

rocal role positions.

The responses are likewise consistent with tradi-

tional and customary practices in a sol idly structured institutional

system.

The special nature and importance of ceremonial actions and res-

ponses is more fully developed later in this chapter.
Reciprocal role relationships imply class and rank.

That is, each

role pertains to an institutional position which relates in some way to

other roles which likewise pertain to other institutional positions.
The relative positions may be of the same or different c1asses--as
between two corporate business executives in the institution of private
enterprise, or between a corporate business executive and a minister in

the institution of religion.

And the relative positions may be of the

same or different ranks within their respective classes.

The preceding

example probably illustrates positions of approximately equal rank within
respective classes.

Positions involving different ranks within their

respective classes might be those of a corporate business executive and
a production-line assembly man in the institution of private enterprise,

or a production-1 ine assemblyman in the institution of private enterprise
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and a minister in the institution of religion.
In fact, class and rank may be defined according to a great veriety

of different criteria.
a horizontal plane.

In general, classes are thought to be related in

Thus, class represents relationships between entities

with dissimilar characteristics--as between federal, state, and local
classes of governments; or between mercantile, industrial, financial. and

service classes of business; or between classes of skilled trades such
as carpenters, electricians, and plumbers.
On the other hand, rank connotes a vertical or scalar relationship.

Thus, rank represents relationships between entities within a class--such
as the population size relationships between cities; or the power relationships between officers in state governments; or the levels of skill
within a trade, as with apprentice, journeyman, and master carpenters.
It must be noted that there is also a vertical dimension to class in
that certain social classes may enjoy greater or lesser prestige than
other classes.

For example, medical doctors as a class may enjoy greater

social approbation than plumbers as a class, even though both classes
are, in a sense, involved with plumbing.
Another exampl e drawn from the hi story of the ancients illustrates
the ceremonial nature of class, rank, and institutional structure.

It is

easy to see how inheritance came to be another institution in the social
fabric of ancient Greece and Rome.

Since the eldest son must continue

the ceremonies of the hearth fire after the demise of his father, he must
also inherit all of the properties and powers of his deceased father.

And since the property could not be divided, only the eldest son inherited
it.

I~othing

changed except the patron.

The eldest son continued in his

father's place following his father ' s demise.

The inheritance principle
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was one of primogeniture.

The other offspring of the deceased father

simply continued with unchanged status under a new chief priest.
The manner of perpetuating the family worship in cases of steril ity
were noted earl ier.

It need only be said that the succession passed col-

laterally to the next eldest son if the oldest son expired before marryin9.

On the other hand, the succession never passed to a daughter.

How-

ever, a father could give his daughter in marriage with the requirement

that her first-born son belonged to her father for purposes of continuing
his domestic worship.2

The family, perhaps the earliest institution devised by man, took
on special qual ities in the ancient world.

It is clear that only agnate

relationships were important in matters of family, inheritance, and the
like.

Persons were related to one another who could trace their paternal

1 ineage back to a common patron.

No other rel ationship \lias important in

what came to be known as the patrician society of Ancient Rome and the
Eupatridae in ancient Greece.

Matrilineage had no standing whatever.

That is, cognate and consanguine relationships which did not also involve
the patril ineal feature of agnation were of no consequence in the ancient

world.
The combination of agnation and primogeniture gave rise to a structure of family and extended family relationships in patrician society.

Clearly, the family patrons were at the head of the structure.
master, magistrate, and chief priest of his family.

Each was

And under the

ancient taboos, a patron would sire as many sons as possible in order to
increase the assurance that at least one descendant would survive to continue the domestic worship after he jOined his manes.
eldest surviving son would inherit t-he patrimony.

However, only the

While most daughters
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might be given in marriage, the unmarried daughters and other surviving

sons remained in the family.

The collected patrilineal descendants of

the patriarch were known as the gens in Roman society.

Famil ies in

ancient India and Greece were constituted in the same way.

It is probable that the gens were the only form of original society.
Indeed, their members were the aristocracy of the ancient world.
were related by birth.

They worshiped the same domestic gods.

inherit from one another according to the rules of agnation.

common tomb. and they had a common fami 1y name.

Moreover,

5i

They
They could

They had a

nee they all

shared an undivided patrimony. it was necessary that the entire gens
should answer for any of its members in matters of debt and wrongs committed against others.

Likewise, the gens had to come to the aid of any

of its members who were troubled by outsiders.

Finally, scattered members

of the gens assembled at their family shrine to make annual offerings to
their manes, penates. and lares. 3
Of course, not all persons could call themselves patriciu5 even
though the ancient societies of which they were a part were patrician.
That is, warfare, disease, crime, civil conflicts, and other such events
served to extinguish some hearth fires and other\l'Jise permanently separate
persons from their domestic gods.

There arose, therefore. at least three

distinct classes of people in the ancient world who were not patrician
members of gentes.

Those classes were servants or slaves. clients and

plebes.
Persons who knew no paternal hearth fire might enter into the service of a gens.

That relationship may have been reciprocal on some basis

of mutual need--the patron and his gens for personal and manual services
for which the gens could afford to support an outsider, and the outsider
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for the material support and physical security he might receive from the
gens in exchange for the services he rendered to it.

More likely, the

outside persons were trophies of martial conquest who became the slaves
and concubines of the patrician members of the gens.

However the union

was initiated, the servant was in fact the slave of the patrician household because a voluntary servitude which might end at the will of the
servant was not in accord with a society of families living in isolation.
Moreover, the domestic religion had no toleration of strangers in
the ancient family.

Rather, the stranger must be initiated into the

domestic worship by proper ceremony.
shared in the family religion.
hearth fire.

Properly admitted, the servant

He was protected by the family manes and

He belonged to the paternal gods and they to him.

part in the family festivals and worship ceremonies.
in the family tomb when he died.

He lost freedom for himself and his

descendants .by acquiring a worship.
trate

an~

He took

And he was buried

The master, who was also his magis-

priest, might raise the slave to a freedman or cl ient, but the

former slave became a retainer of the family and remained bound by the
family worship to the gens and subject to its patron. 4
Clients, many of whom were freed from slavery by their masters or
were offspring of freedmen, were a class inferior to all paternal descen-

dants in the gens.

Like the slaves, they could not trace their 1 ineage

back to a patron no matter how far they might ascend in their genealogy.
The meaning of this was that neither the client nor his descendants
could inherit a patrimony or its properties, and they could never become
proprietors.

Indeed, the cl ient possessed and used property and his

personal belongings at the pleasure of the patron and subject to the
patron's needs.

i4oreover, while the client took part in the domestic
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religion, sacrifices were offered for him.

He could not offer them for

himsel f even though he acknowl edged the fami ly gods as hi s gods and
sought their blessings in all that he did.

On the other hand, the gens

reinforced its cl ients in their deal ings outside the gens just as it
reinforced its patrician members. 5

Finally, the lowest class of all was that of the plebes.

plebeians were, in a word, persons without a hearth.

The

They possessed no

domestic altars and could petition no family gods to deliver and preserve
them in times of tribulation or to' bless their transactions and interactions with good fortune.

Thus, the plebeian had no extended family, no

paternal authority OVer offspring, no sacred marriage, no right of property, no law, no justice, and no political rights.

The plebeian and

the patrician were as far apart as rel igion could place two men.
plebeians had no status in patrician society.

The

They were a despised lot,

beyond the veil of religion and thus of the family, society, and law. 6
Hence, ancient society was rigidly structured in accordance with

the taboos of the domestic religion.
with their priestly powers.

The patrons capped the structure

The patrician members of the gens, the blood

descendants of the patriarch, were next in rank to the patrons.
clients were

a class

The

of free men who, possessing no paternal lineage of

their own, worshiped at the hearth of a gens, a family which traced its
agnate 1ineage back to a patron.

The servants or sl aves of the gens,

differing from the clients only in their degree of freedom and servitude,
were next in class to the lowest social class.

Finally, plebes, who had

no part whatever in the domestic re1 igions of the ancients, were the lowest

class--if indeed it can be said that they had any standing at all.
Such were the institutions which evolved from the domestic rel ;gion
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of the ancients.

The few institutions described to this point--language,

rel igion, patrimony, matrimony, adoption, and emancipation, domicile and
property, law, inheritance and primogeniture, family, patrician aristoc-

racy, slavery, and clientship--were founded on the cultural beliefs of
the domestic religion whi1e that religion, a modicum of totems and taboos,

was itself founded on a primitive fear of death.

The institutions have

prevailed--though substantially changed--and have descended out of the
ancient past into the present.

They have done so on the power of the

mystical ceremonies which served to perpetuate the cultural values upon

which they were founded.

The ceremonies transmitted those values down

the generations of descendants into the present, thereby 1inking the cultural pa,st to the institutional present and future.
The point is that both class and rank are attributes of positions
within institutional structures.

Those positions rise out of the cere-

monial role playing carried on by persons who are fulfill ing role expectations created by cultural beliefs.

And the cultural beliefs are tradi-

tional and customary ways of knowing and doing which were transmitted to
present generations by 1egends, myths, and fol k hi stories.

Rank and Status
Class and rank connote social status.

That is, one who occupies

a particular institutional position does so within a class and possesses

the rank assigned to that position by the institutional system.

The rank

and class of the, position confer social status on the person who occupies
the position.

His social status may be the same or higher or lower than

the social statuses accorded other positions of different ranks or
classes or both ranks and classes.
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Status is evidenced by the mystical totems of class and rank--the
physical and behavioral symbols of class and rank.

The symbols are some-

times very discreet habits of speech, customary gestures, and the like.
They are sometimes more conspicuous habits of dress, symbols of military
rank. place of residence. and kind of automobile owned and operated.
totems of prestige have persisted from the earl iest times.

Two

They have

taken the forms of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption.

The

stress is upon the word "conspicuous, II which is to say, periods of

leisure and levels of consumption which are beyond the means of most
people and which are indulged as symbols to others of the honorific status
one enjoys by virtue of his class and rank; or more properly, his potency

in conspicuously acquiring and consuming goods and services. 7
Modern social attitudes have been warped toward conspicuous leisure
and consumption as means of ceremonial expressions by the legends, myths,
and folk history which descend out of the past.

The myths rise from a

more primitive and more barbarian stage of hUman development--a stage
characterized by a predatory 1 ife style in which honorific status was

accorded to those who infl ict injury by strategy or force.

The hunter-

warrior enjoyed the highest status in such societies because of a divi-

sion of labor based upon physical strength and prowess.

The hunter-

warriors were always men because of their superior physical strength and
because their strengths were never impaired by childbearing.

However,

men who were physically weak were not admitted to the exploitative class.
All women and men who were unfit for the predatory activities of
the exploitative class were members of the drudging class.

They were

ceremonially barred from the barbarian exploitative class, and they were
restricted to the drudging enterprises--activities which were victual,
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logistical, submissive, peaceful, and physical.

This involved the indus-

trial and manual vocations of agriculture, housekeeping, cooking, child
rearing, weaving, handcrafts, porterage, etc.

These activities were

vulgar, demeaning, and undignified, and all members of the inferior

class were engaged in them in some way.
Those men in the tribe who possessed the strength and prowess were

ceremonially initiated into the hunter-warrior class.

Their talents were

restricted to exploitative enterprises--activities which were barbarian,
violent. aggressive, animate, and spiritual.

This involved the managerial

and non-industrial vocations of governing the tribe, engaging other tribes
in warfare, conducting rel igious ceremonies, and hunting.

They were not

permitted, even if they were so inel ined, to engage in the drudging

employments of the tribe.

Members of the hunter-"arrior class engaged

in competitive sports any time they were not involved with other exploitative activities.

All activities of the exploitative class were digni-

fied, honorific, and invidious.

Only members of the superior class were

permitted to engage in the exploitative activities.
The exploitative vocations were social activities which made very

1 ittle or no material contributions to the welfare of the tribe.

On the

contrary, with the possible exception of hunting, they all involved
material drains on the tribe.

They were activities which occupied man-

power that might have been employed to increase the material welfare of
the tribe.

And that manpower occupied domiciles, ate food, wore garments,

and demanded personal services, all of which had to be supplied by the
drudging class.

Moreover, the food they consumed, the garments they wore,

and the domiciles they occupied were the best the tribe could supply.
That is, they consumed goods conspicuously and their leisure time was
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taken with invidious and honorific games and ceremonies. 8
Many of the totems and taboos of the barbarian cultures have sur-

vived to modern times.

Chiefs of state, governors, legislators, judges,

generals, admirals, popes, bishops, chief executive officers of business
corporations, and a host of lesser exploitative functionaries are the
modern ceremonial descendants of the hunter-warriors of the barbarian
stage of human development.

class.

They are modern members of the exploitative

They occupy their leisure in invidious sports--tennis, golf,

hunting" yachting, deep-sea fishing, skiing, etc.

dignified, honorific, and invidious.

All that they do is

And, 1 ike their barbarian ceremonial

ancestors, they are engaged in activities \'o'hich make very 1ittle or no
material contributions to the public welfare, while they receive the
greatest economic· rewards society can render.

In a word, their consump-

tion and leisure are conspicuous and their 1 ifestyles set the mode for
the drudging classes. 9
There seems always to have been an overwhelming propensity for the
vulgar classes to emulate those invidious activities of the superior
classes which the former regarded as conveying honor and dignity.

That

is, one is thought to absorb mana and gain honorific status by doing
those things which occupy persons of high social esteem.

How else does

one explain the modern hunting party in which three or four men and sometimes a woman or two spend several hundreds or thousands of dollars each
to hazard injury or death from a myriad of probable accidents in traveling
to and from and foraging about in the wilderness?

They chance possible

heart attack from over_exertion; collapse from dehydration, heat prostration, ,exposure or hypothermia; fall from unimproved trails over precipitous terrain; poisoning from reptiles, insects, toxic vegetation, and
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natural water pollution; and the stray bullets of other exuberant, careless, or drunken hunters.
rounds of game.

They hazard all of this to acquire a few

It is obviously much less costly and dangerous under

ordinary circumstances to purchase the same weight of U.S.D.A. choice
beef from a local market if one is trulY. after qual ity meat.
In fact, the hunters are only incident.il1y. after the flesh of game.
They are actually spending their leisure and their money in a conspicuous
way.

They are spending in a way which appears to be irrational when

measured in a detached economic sense because the pecuniary costs of

their expedition far exceed any material benefits they can hope to secure-even if the expedition is fortunate enough to achieve its most ambitious
intent.

Indeed, the hunters are seeking a benefit which cannot be easily

measured in the mundane terms of the market place.
The hunters depart with their minds filled by the image of Ernest
Hemmingway attired in a pith helmet and bush jacket, on safari over the
grassy veldt below

[(j1imanjaro, and hunting for trophies for a lodge in

Idaho or a plantation in Cuba.

Or possibly they envision themselves as

Theodore Roosevelt similarly attired, and hunting big game trophies in
Africa for the wildlife collection of the Museum of Natural History in
Washington.

Or they see themselves as a party of hunter-warriors from a

primitive cul ture setting forth with crude weapons into an uncertain

wi 1derness to secure game to feed the tri be duri ng the comi ng wi nter.
Whatever the image, it is a phantasy etched vividly into their minds by
myths and legends, and they are setting out to reenact the hunting exploits
of those phantasies.

If their expedition fulfills their phantasies, they

will return to recall their exploits for friends so that the friends will
know that the hunters possessed the means, the potency, to spend thei r
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leisure and money conspicuously in invidious activities out of which they

could realize little or no material gain.

In short, the benefit for which

they are paying so handsomely is the personal satisfaction of flouting
invidious symbols which validate their honorific status.
Hunting was selected to illustrate the ceremonial nature of con-

spicuous consumption because the actions of a hunter more closely resemble
the predatory 1 ifestyle of the lower barbarian cultures to which hunting
is akin.

In fact, one might as easily select any of the modern forms of

participatory recreation--skiing, gambling, back-packing, golf, tennis,
horseback riding, etc.--as we11 as some forms of spectator entertainment
in which the reenactment of phantasies is accomplished for the spectator
by surrogates.

Whatever the form of conspicuous leisure and consumption,

it is behavior in which the pecuniary cost ;s intended to greatly exceed

any material benefit that might result for the participants, and in which
the nonmaterial benefit is in its use as an invidious symbol of honorific
status.
On the other hand, the supply side of recreation and entertainment

has fostered profitable and expanding enterprises.

There are highly

organized (and drudging) institutions devoted to satisfying the demand
for the growing numbers of people who are allocating more of their pecuniary means to conspicuous leisure and consumption.

For example, hunting

has led to the organization of local and national hunt and gun clubs,
state fish and game commissions, national fish and wildlife services, as
well as the commercial enterprises which manufacture and sell the totems.
the hunting materials and equipment. required to engage in the sport.

All

are involved in some way with preserving and perpetuating the invidious
sport--including the licensing and regulation of hunters. the creation and
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management of hunting preserves, and the propagation of the game which
is the ostensible object of the hunting expedition.

All of this has

emerged out of the propensities of the vulgar classes to emulate the

invidious activities of the exploitative classes in the quest for honorific status.

Both conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption require substantial economic means.

Both are therefore bound to the economic rewards

accorded positions of class and rank within the institutional system.
A consistency of institutional systems is that one must play the role
expected of the position he occupies--that is, he must maintain the hon-

orific status of the position by partaking of leisure and consuming at
levels expected of one possessing his rank--and the economic rewards

accorded the position are precisely the means required to play the role.
For example, one who has managed to enter a particularly favored

social class and ascend to a high rank in that class will be rewarded by
the institutional system with the economic means required to maintain

himself in accordance with the canons of taste expected of his position.
That is, one who was born into and reared as a member of a wealthy family
and who manages to inherit a large quantity of productive wealth will
possess sufficient income from that wealth to maintain the wealth almost
in spite of himself.

This is accomplished by the simple expedient of

using some of the income to place the wealth under the stewardship of
persons who are technically competent to manage it productively.

More-

over, the remaining income is available and necessary to finance the
conspicuous consumption required to fill the hours of conspicuous leisure
required to fulfill the status expectations attaching to the class and

rank enjoyed (or suffered) by the owner of the wealth.
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The wealthy heir might be expected to possess a substantial amount
of nonproductive property--nonproductive in the sense that it does not
enter into the creation of money income, or the income created does not
cover the cost to maintain it.

For example, he might own a penthouse

apartment in Manhatten, a bungalow and yacht in Bermuda, and a ski lodge
at Jackson Hole.

And he would need a Lear jet to travel between the

three and wherever else he might choose to go.

He would need automobiles

"
in each location--a chauffeured limoUs.ine
in New York, a Ferrari in Bermuda,

and a Land Rover at Jackson Hal e.

A small resident staff must be on hand

at each location to maintain the properties and to cater the needs of the
heir and his guests.
Likewise, the tycoon would devote most of his time to invidious
forms of recreation.

There would be skiing and hunting from Jackson Hole;

yachting, deep-sea fishing, scuba diving, golf, tennis, and sun-bathing

in Bermuda; and the theater, cocktail circuit, more golf, handball, and
business arrangements in New York.

To fill his spare time he might make

gambling junkets to Monte Carlo and Las Vegas, hunting expeditions to

Africa and India, pleasure cruises on the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas,
and world tours to places not regularly visited in the course of his
other activities.
On the other hand, one who suffers (or enjoys) a state of poverty
because of class or rank or both, is sustained by economic rewards which
comport with the status accorded him in the institutional system.

He

possesses very little personal wealth--perhaps only the clothing he and
his family wear--and his only income is whatever he can obtain from the
wages he can earn in unskilled classes of employment or from private
charity and public welfare.

There is no surplus for invidious recreation,
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and his leisure is demeaning in the eyes of others.

In both the case of

the very wealthy and that of the poverty-stricken, the economic rewards
accorded the institutional positions are precisely sufficient to play
the roles expected of persons occupying the positions.
Choice of class and rank are not always elective.

For example,

both men and women are born into the unique and distinctive biological
classes of male and female, and it is not usua1ly possible for members

of either class to change their memberships to the other classes.

More-

over, one is born of particular parents with particular descendants and

genetical composit,ions.

These genetic qualities might be manipulated,

but there is no presently known way to change them from one order to
another.

Likewise, one is born at a particular time in the ends-means

continuum and at a particular geographical place, and he matures success-

ively through infancy, childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, and aged
adulthood.

Finally, he expires at a particular geographical place and

at a particular time in the continuum.

While one may

hav~

_some choices

about this last personal event, he has practically no control over the
rest.

Each stage of biological development possesses different powers of

rank and levels of status, and the direction of movement and the speed
with which one passes from one stage to another is beyond his deliberate
control.
Excepting cases like the foregoing biological classes and ranks,
other barriers to social mobil ity are ceremonial and they are therefore

a part of the institutional system.

A rigidly structured institutional

system very 1ikely affords few or no opportunities for persons to improve
their status by changing their social classes or institutional ranks.
The class and rank system of ancient institutions aptly illustrates a
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rigidly structured institutional system.
The family arrangement of the ancients created a system of rank in

the patrician family.

It has already been stated that the patron held

the highest rank and status.

Below him in rank and status followed his

sons in descending order by age, the eldest of whom held the highest rank
next to his father by virtue of his eventual inheritance of the patrimony.
After the patron I 5 sons came hi 5 grandsons and great-grandsons followed
by his brothers, nephews, grand-nephews, etc. in descending order accord-

ing to their agnate relationships to the patron.

The lowest in rank, if

they could be said to possess any rank independent of that of their husbands, were the women of the gens, the wives and unmarried sisters,
daughters, nieces, etc. of the patron.

One entered the patrician class

by chance of birth and his rank in the class was also unalterably set by
the order of his birth.
Likewise, the class, rank, and status of all other members of

ancient society were fixed by the same set of patrician relationships
even though the other members were not born into patrician families.

This was simply because the patrician class was the aristocracy of the
ancient world, and all other social relationships were measured by patrician criteria.
of the ancients.

At any rate. three other classes existed in the society
Their statuses were based upon class, and all three

classes were inferior in status to the patrician class.

In descending

order of status, the three were clients, slaves, and plebes.

Again, the

status of each class depended upon the relationship of the class to the
patrons.

And a person became a member of one of the inferior classes

either by birth or by calamity.

It was possible for a plebe to become a

servant or 51 ave and to ascend to cl ient.

But there were only two ways
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to become a patrician:

by being born the legitimate descendant of a

patron or by adoption by a patron. 10
While these barriers to social mobility were very real, they were
not created by the gods as the ancients thought.

Rather, they were insti-

tutional arrangements created and perpetuated through ceremony and role
playing by men.

This is equally true of social barriers in the descendant

institutions of the modern world.

They, too, are institutional arrangements

created and perpetuated through ceremony and role playing by mankind.
However, most modern societies do contain ceremonially regulated

opportunities for their members to improve their social statuses by changing their classes or ranks or both.

Insofar as persons achieve greater

satisfaction from higher levels of social status, they are incentivated
by ceremonial inducements to change toward positions of more favorable

classes and higher ranks when the institutional system permits the changes.
The purpose of this portion of the chapter has been to illustrate
how one who occupies a particular position in the institutional system
enjoys the social status of the class and rank assigned to the position.
Status is evident from the invidious symbols traditionally associated
with the class and rank of the position, and the person occupying the
position is expected to maintain the status of the position by employing the appropriate ceremonial symbols in his role playing.
Rank and Technical Competence

It is thought that rank and status correspond to the actual merit
of the person to whom rank is attributed.
a contrived feature of ceremonial ism.

Such correspondence ;s actually

Distinctions of rank and status
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were establ ished first and

competence.

thei~eafter

assumed to coincide with technical

The person possessing a rank within a class ;s assumed to

possess the technical competence imputed to the position so long as he
demonstrates ceremonial adequacy.

And ceremonial adequacy is judged by

the quality of ritua 1, not by the meri t of the incumbent.

The qua 1i ty

of ritual is judged by how closely the role played by the person conforms
to the ideal role communicated to the present by tradition and custom. ll
It is generally believed that rank and status are based upon the
actual merit of the person who possesses them by virtue of institutional
position.

People believe that rank and status were derived from and

emerged out of techn; cal competence and mer; tori aus capabil ity, and that
the latter were the first and sale criteria determining the former.

This

idea conjures up a notion that Elizabeth I was the Queen of England
during her reign because she possessed the technical qualities most

needed at that time--that she was the only person technically qualified
to wear the crown and wield the authority of the emerging British

Empire.

At least she was the most qualified.

That is, Elizabeth

possessed the rank because she was technically competent.

However. the supposed correspondence between El izabeth I s rank and
her merit is another contri vance of ceremoni al i sm.

The di sti nctions of

rank and status were established first and were thereafter assumed to
caine; de with technical competence.

The posit; on of Engl i sh monarch

descended out of history to the time of Elizabeth I.

It was a well-

establ ished institution in Great Britain long before El izabeth was sired

by Henry VII I.

The offi ce descended from the past and was thought to be

a needed and effective institution because it existed.
to be filled.

Existing, it had

Elizabeth ascended the throne simply because she was alive
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and next in line after her sister, Mary I, according to the ceremonial
rules of succession.

which forces the conclusion that she was fit and

competent to reign over the empire because she did.

This tempts a

further conc1usion--a1most anyone might have done as well or better.
Hi story judges the rei gn of E1 i zabeth lin terms of the outcomes
supposed to have resulted from her rule.

That is, the emergence of

England as a formidable world power during and after the reign of
Elizabeth is attributed in part to the mystical or royal powers of
E1 izabeth.

Her powers were connected in some mysterious way to the

ceremonies by which she received and maintained those powers and to the
material objects, the totems, which were the physical evidences of her

honorific rank and powers.

For example, she was coronated as queen when

the crown of England was placed on her head and the scepter and orb of
the realm were placed into her hands.

All of this was done with appro-

priate pomp and religious ceremony as with previous and subsequent
Engl ish monarchs.

Li kewi se, El izabeth demonstrated ceremoni al adequacy

in her exercise of state powers in matters of royal court--the use of
sword and incantations in elevating heroes and patriots to the peerage,
placing the seal of state on treaties and royal decrees, issuing patents

and papers of marque, receiving ambassadors from other countries,
appointing ministers of state, worshiping in the church of England (which
by then the monarch in Eng1 and headed as well), and a host of other
ceremonial actions.

The point is, that Elizabeth's merit and technical

ability was judged by how adequate she was in ceremony.

And her

ceremonial adequacy was measured by how well her behavior conformed to
the dictum of custom and the traditional bel iefs. 12
Taking another example, the position of patron, or curion, or
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tribunus, or king was established first in the ancient world and whoever
fulfilled the rubrics of agnation inherited the patrimony and was, iI!§2.
facto, technically competent to fill the position, assume the rank, and
enjoy the status of the office.

The question of technical competence

simply never arose.

The scion was qualified, according to the gods, solely

by fortune of birth.

Moreover, his merit was judged, if at all, by how

meticulously he adhered to the traditional forms descended from his
ancestors in performing the sacrificial offerings and pronouncing the
liturgies which were his patrimony.

Nothing else mattered.

From his

relationship to Vesta, the goddess of the hearth, and his paternal ancestors stemmed his powers as chief priest, magistrate, and ru1er. 13
This leaves open the whole question of whether the patron's hokus
pokus performed any instrumental or technically redeeming services.

It

likewise leaves open the question of whether the patrician institutional
system in which the patron was accorded such lofty status possessed
sufficient redeeming qualities to justify either its initiation and
emergence as a powerful force in the forging of Western Civilization,
or its enduring longevity down through the generations of man.

The

fact that it did emerge and has had such prodigious influence on modern
institutions is a necessary but not sufficient vindication of the
system.

One can counter that Western Civil ization has somehow managed

to evolve in spite of patrician institutional influences.
It is also true of modern institutional systems that the ceremonial
distinctions of rank and status were established first and the person who
has managed to come into rank is therefore assumed to possess technical
competence.

For example, so long as a person is more than thirty-four

years of age, is a natural-born citizen of the United States, has resided
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within the United States for at least fourteen years, and can somehow
convince enough people to vote for him in appropriate primary and general
elections, he will become the President of the United States for four
years unless he dies before his term expires.

There is nothing in this

list of qual ifications about technical competence. 14
It is, of course, imp1 ied that the people will judge the candidate's
competence during the campaign, and that the most desirab1e--or, more
likely, the least undesirab1e--man will miraculously emerge victorious
after the votes have been counted.
ing technical competence at all.

In fact, the electorate is not judgThe voters are making their judgements

on the basis of the institutional positions the candidate has occupied
in the past (what marks of honorific status does the candidate possess?),
what he says (do his remarks conform to the cultural bel iefs?), and his
demeanor (is he dignified or does his appearance otherwise conform to a
ceremonially correct image of the office?).

In short, the voters will

judge his competence on the basis of his apparent ceremonial adequacy.
And the misgivings of his detractors notwithstanding, the ryew1y inaugurated president will, all at once, possess a charisma and mystical power

which somehow escaped even his most ardent supporters before the election.
Thi s part of the chapter has attempted to show how the ceremony of
role playing gives rise to an institutional structure of class and rank.
While such structure is real, it is contrived.

Likewise, the technical

competence imputed to class and rank is a contrived feature of ceremonialism.

Class and rank and the statuses associated with them evolved first

from ancient bel iefs, and technical merit was thereafter assumed to correspond to the institutional positions accorded the status of class and
rank.

Moreover,

technica~

adequacy is assumed as long as the incumbent
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person in the position demonstrates ceremonial competence.

And cere-

monial competence is judged by the rituals of rank--not by merit.

Fin-

ally, the institutional structure formed by ceremonial role-playing
serves to stabilize society by providing a framework for social inter-

action.
CEREI10NIALISM AND SOCIALIZATION
Ceremonialism, the functional technique of institutions, achieves

socialization by conferring rank and status on persons.

Socialization

helps create social stability by matching persons to institutional roles.
Rank and status are conferred within the institutional system according
to how well one adheres to the mystical taboos.

Ceremonialism can

achieve socialization because of the relationship between human emotions-love, fear, frustration, anger, etc. --and the taboos.
mora 1. stature by str; ct adherence to code or taboo.

One gains in
One absorbs mana

or mystical potency in this way by contact with virtue--with totem.

One

suffers loss of personal integrity by the unceremonious exposure of
transgressing a taboo.

Such behavior diminishes mystical potency and

one loses face by unvirtuous conduct. 15
Socialization. a process by which a person is taught to adjust himself to the mores and folkways so that he can be a functioning member of
his community, is achieved by the institutional system through ceremonialism.

All institutions practice ceremonialism in the discharge of

their socialization functions.

Ceremonialism accomplishes socialization

by conferring class. rank. and status on persons.

That is, persons are

psychologically conditioned by ceremony to accept role playing positions
in the institutional system.

They are taught by ceremony the taboos
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relating to their positions, and they are advanced into those positions
with ceremonies appropriate to the classes and ranks conferred by the
system.
Recalling the explanation of socialization from the second
chapter, it need only be emphasized that the process is carried on by

ceremonialism.

For example, it commences as soon as the infant wails

acknowledgement that the midwife's unceremonious slaps to its backside
have provoked breathing.

The very next step is usually to ceremonially

initiate the child ' 5 social existence by giving it a name and recording

the name on whatever registry of births is required by law.

The

innocent and unknowing babe shal1 ever after be known by that name

unless she elects and is able to change it.
In the first moments of life the infant has been ceremonially
assigned to several social classes and ranks by the institutional
system.

If the infant is assumed to be a girl, her birth wi 11 most

likely be recorded with a female name.
not the male class.

her birth.

She falls in the female class--

Her initial rank is set by the date and time of

The birth registry will indicate that she is the daughter

of her parents, and she is immediately assigned thereby to whatever
racial and national classes distinguish them, and to their economic and

social ranks.

Her place of birth may determine her citizenship.

These

ceremonial vestitures will remain with her all her life, sometimes
enhancing her social relationships, sometimes hindering them, but
always ceremonially constraining her within the institutional system.
As the infant gains greater sensory al'lareness, she will be initiated
by awe-inspiring ceremonies into additional classes and ranks.

And she

will learn by ceremonial practice the behavior expected of her in all
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manner of institutional situations involving her class and rank.

If she

lives a more or less nannal life in most regions of the United States,

she might expect to experience the initiation ceremonies of christening
or baptism, registration and advancement in the church or synagogue
school, registration and advancement in the Campfire girls, registration
and advancement in the publ ic school system, graduation from high school,
registration and advancement in college, registration to vote, admission

to a sorority, admission to sundry social clubs, college graduation,
marriage, registration in social security, registering the births of her
own children, licensing to operate a motor vehicle, contract recording,

registering titles to properties, employment, court judgements, enrollment in Medicare, retirement, grandmotherhood, death, and burial.

No

matter of social significance, no change in rank or status, can happen
to her without ceremonial acknolfJledgement.
Each of the foregoing initiation ceremonies will confer status upon
her by assigning her to another class or rank in the institutional system.
The psycholog·ical conditioning carried forth by ceremony will teach her

the ceremonial role expectations for each class and rank into which' she
is advanced.

And she wi 11 most 1 i kely do her best to ful fill those

expectations in her role playing.

The question is, why is she likely to

do her best to fulfill the ceremonial role-expectations of the institutional positions in which she finds herself?
Ceremonialism achieves socialization because of the relationships
between human emotions and the mores and folkways.

Coupled with the

unique intellectual qualities of the human mind, emotions make possible
the psychological conditioning of people so that they adjust to the

institutional taboos and play their roles accordingly.

The range and
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complexity of human emotions are extensive, and it is beyond the scope of

this treatise to attempt a fully enlightened elaboration of them.

However,

four sets of human emotional situations will illustrate the point.
set is marked by two polar states.

Each

The four sets are: love and hate, con-

fidence and fear, satisfaction and frustration, and tranquility and anger. 16
Love, which is- a strong affection or attachment to another person

or group of persons, is generally a pleasurable state that creates dependencies in which the person experiencing love treasures, seeks, and comes

to rely on the loved persons both as objects for expressions of love and

as reciprocators who reinforce the affections with like expressions.

The

affections which bind people together commence to develop in a person
from birth.

The affection matures during a long period of childhood

development in which the child is dependent upon others--principally her
parents in the institution of the family--for the satisfaction of most
-biological needs.
For

of hunger.

exa~ple.

the infant experiences physical discomfort from pangs

She cannot sleep, and the longer she must go without gratifi-

cation of her desire for food, the more frustrated she feels.

If action

to ease the hunger pangs is delayed for some reason, the infant1s frustration turns to anger and she cries out for someone to do something
about it.

When her mother feeds her, her anger fades and her frustration

diminishes as her hunger is satisfied.

She soon learns to connect the

countenance of her mother with the pleasant physical sensations of
ingesting milk and satisfying hunger.

She comes to depend upon that

relationship and each new feeding is another pleasant reinforcement of
an emerging affection of the babe for her mother.
In like manner, the child learns to depend on her parents for other
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foods to satisfy her hunger, water to quench her thirst, clothing to protect her from the elements, a domicile to give physical security, a bed
in which to satisfy her need for sleep, and physical contact with other
persons to gratify her infantile and emerging sexuality.
Thus, affection for others arises initially from the states of confidence, satisfaction, and tranquility created by others in the family
institution in meeting onels biological needs while she is in a state of
nearly total dependency.

Confidence is a pleasant state of full assur-

ance and freedom from fear.

Satisfaction is a state of contentment

usually achieved when most of one's appetites have been gratified.

And

tranquil ity is a state of peace in which one is free from agitation.
These, states--confidence. satisfaction, and tranquility--are periods of
pleasant existence because they are free from physical and emotional
tensions.

In short, love arises from states of pleasure induced by others.

Once the infant associates the receiving of pleasure with the countenances of her immediate family, it ;s only a short time before she
becomes receptive to other influences at their hands.

After all, if they

possess the power to induce such pleasures, what they think, say, and do
;s not just important.

It is correct.

receptive to learning from her parents.

The child therefore becomes
The learning takes place when

the child seeks their praise and avoids their condemnation--when she
accepts instruction from them and emulates their behaviors.

The parents

come thereby to have great power over their daughter and can reinforce
certain kinds of behavior by inducing the pleasant states of confidence,
satisfaction, and tranquil ity.
Likewise, the parents can deter other behavior by inducing the painful states of fear, frustration, and anger.

These latter states are very
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important to social ization because they excite responses in a person
which are useful in conditioning her to accept and play roles in the

institutional system.

Fear, which is an anxiety and agitation caused by

the presence or poss; bi 1ity of an undesirable occurr.ence, can provoke one
into action to forestall the undesirable occurr.ence. Frustration, which
is disappointment at failure to gratify desires, can provoke inquiry,

introspection, and further action directed at securing satisfaction of
the frustrated desires.

Anger, which is an intense feeling excited by

a real or supposed injury and accompanied by the desire to obtain retri-

bution from the offending party, can provoke one to seek redress of
unceremonious behavior.
HUman emotional states, when joined with the unique capabilities

of the human mind, make it possible for ceremonialism to condition persons psychologically to play their institutional roles correctly.

The

hUman intellect is uniquely capable of discovering complex relationships
between past causes and present effects.

And it can apply the knowledge

of those relationships to employ the effects as means to the achievement
of ends which lie in the future.

Likewise, the hUman intellect has an

equally unique capability of visualizing complex and alternative states
of possible future conditions.

It can weigh the relative merits of

thos~

alternative future ends, select those which appear to be the most desirable to achieve within the means available, and organize the means to
achieve the selected future ends.
The young child soon learns which parental responses connote approbation and cause pleasure and which ones mean disapprobation and cause
pain.

She likewise learns which of her actions precipitate parental

approval and praise, and which ones initiate their disapproval and
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condemnation.

Thus, she can discover and devise ways to play her role

so as to accomplish the former and avoid the latter.

That is, she can

visual ize ends for herself and she can measure their relative merits on
the basis of their ceremonial adequacy or their inadequacy according to
the cultural values she has learned within the family institution.

She

is most likely to choose that combination of ends which are within her
means and which render the greatest confidence, satisfaction, and tran-

quility to her.

The ends she chooses will, therefore, conform to the

ceremonial expectations of the persons for whom she has the greatest

affections.
The process of socialization which commenced in the institution of
the family continues in every other institution in which the individual
finds herself.

She simply transfers and adapts the associations she has

learned within the family to other institutions.
ages of the father, mother, and the brothers

The ceremonial person-

and sisters are transferred

to the priests and perishioners in the institution of the church; to the
city officials and citizens of the city; to the teachers and students in
schools; to the managers and workers on the job; and to herself and her

husband and children in her own family.
Every other institution carries on the socialization process in the
same general way.

That is, the institutional system reinforces behavior

which conforms to its ceremonial norms and condemns behavior which does
not.

One aspect of reinforcement involves the conferring of rank and

status in the system according to how well one adheres to the mystical
taboos.

That is. one gains in moral stature by strictly adhering to code.

She absorbs mystical potency and achieves confidence, satisfaction and
tranquil ity in that way by contact with virtue.

On the other hand, one
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suffers loss of moral stature and experiences fear and frustration by the
transgression of a taboo.

Such transgression diminishes mystical potency

and one suffers loss of face.

The ultimate transference occurs as one substitutes the institution,
its totems and taboos, its legends and myths, and its ceremonial vestitures for the persons who nurtured her to maturity and who were the fi rst
objects of her love.

Th'is occurs It/hen one sees the institutional system

as produci n9 confi dence, satisfaction, and tranquil ity.

That is, one

comes to love the institutional system because it augurs toward social
stability in which adherence to institutional norms are perceived as
reducing fear, frustration, and anger.

When that happens, one will make

choices which confann to ceremonially correct institutional taboos.
Clearly, modern techniques for conferring rank and status are continuous with primitive techniques.

The human infant of antiquity was as

dependent upon her parents as are modern infants.

The satisfaction of

biological needs were as instrumental in engendering love of parents in
the ancient child as in the modern.

Likcy,tise. the influence of parents

in the development and maturity of ceremonial beliefs in the ancient child
were as great as in the modern.

The institution of the family was as

important in introducing the ancient child to ceremonial ism, class, rank.
and status as are modern fam;l ies to their children.

Moreover. while

modern institutions may vary in substance from ancient institutions, they
are similar in form and the same in essence.

They achieve social ization

by assigning class and conferring rank and status through ceremony.

And

socialization creates social stability by advancing persons to ceremonial
roles in the institutional system from which they can interact with confi dence and certa i nty.
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CEREMONIALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL
There is no clear line between socialization and social control in
terms of ceremonia11sm.
rank and status.

The two institutional functions converge on

Socialization views rank and status in terms of the

ceremonies of investiture in which rank and status are conferred on a
person as part of the institutional indoctrination process.

Its purpose

is to initiate persons into the institutional system by convincing them
through ceremonies that the positions they occupy and the roles they
will play in the system are ceremonially correct for them.

It is a way

of reducing social dissonance by harnessing individual human energies to
the institutional structure or neutralizing them outside the structure.
On the other hand, social control looks to the maintenance of
social stability by ceremonially reinforcing the status and rank of

persons already established within the institutional system.
accomplished by the periodic validation of status.

This is

Status is validated

by the reciprocal acknowledgment of rank in appropriate places and at

appropriate times.

Such acknowledgment occurs in ceremonial exchange

and in ceremonial gift giving.

Such practices tend to stabilize a

community by keeping its members bound in a network of reciprocal
obligations according to their classes and statuses. 17
Ceremoni a1 Exchange

Ceremonial exchange is a process by wh1ch the statuses of the
exchange parties are validated between them.

The validation takes the

form of mutual acknowledgment of class and rank. This may involve little
more than an exchange of salutations which make the acknowledgments in

some customary way.

However, ceremonial exchange is by no means 1imited
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to simple greetings.

The more important exchanges acknowledge class and

rank by the giving of totems of value and the receiving of other totems
of value in exchange.

Each party to the exchange occupies an institutional

position and possesses the class and rank of his position.

How he plays

the role of his position in the exchange is prescribed in the law or by
ceremonial custom as applied to his position and rank.
Ceremonial exchange facil itates social control by periodically rein-

forcing the rank and status structure of institutions.

It does this by

affording opportunities for one to experience acknowledgement of his own

status by others and to acknowledge and therefore recall the ranks and
statuses of others.

It is an institutional feedback mechanism which

helps maintain the system.

It keeps persons united within a structure

of reciprocal obligations.

Ceremonial exchange is a practice of long

standing. and it has been found to exist in primitive as well as advanced
cul tures.
It

The kula ring is a primitive example of ceremonial exchange.

took place among the Tobriand Islanders of Melanesia in the South Pacific.

The natives inhabited islands comprising an atoll-like ring several hUndred miles in circumference.

The exchange involved necklaces made of

red shells and bracelets made" of white shells.

The necklaces were

exchanged for bracelets ;n one direction around the islands, and the
bracelets were exchanged for necklaces in the opposite direction.
of the kula totems had names and some had histories.

~1any

The necklaces and

bracelets were durable, but they were neither used as consumption goods
nor as a media of exchange outside of the kula ring.

Rather, they were

used to maintain rank and prestige. 18
The kul a exchange operated over estab 1i shed trade routes and with
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fixed ceremonial patterns.

Only a limited number of men could partici-

pate in the exchanges, and each man had trading partners on adjoining

islands.

The partnerships were permanent and they involved mutual trading

obligations.

The ku1,a trader would travel by canoe to the island next to

his in one direction where he would exchange bracelets for necklaces.
When he traded >lith his partner in the opposite direction, he exchanged
necklaces for bracelets.

Every detail of the exchanges was regulated by

custom and traditional taboos.

Some exchanges were accompanied with

extensive ritual.
Ordinary trading parties accompanied the kula expedition.

The

latter were involved in the exchange of consumption goods and in other
commercial transactions.

mingled.

However, the two fonns of activity never inter-

The commercial trading was done by women and other drudging

persons of inferior status.

The men involved in the kula exchange never

lowered themselves to commercial duties.
leisure.

They were men of invidious

Likewise. they never admitted persons of inferior rank into

the kula exchange.

The exchange was entirely ceremonial and it served

to val idate the institutional statuses of the men involved.
The kula exchange validated status in part because of its exclusivity.

Only men of the highest ranks were admitted to the ceremonies,

and admission was one of the marks of rank.

The process of bartering and

exchange served to validate the status of trading members because each
party to a transaction gave a totem of high value and received another
totem of high value in exchange.

The exchange was acknowledgement by

each trading party of his own status as a giver of mystical potency and
the status of the other party as a receiver of mystical potency.

Since

each party both gave and received mystical potency, the val idation was
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completely reciprocal.

The kula exchange served to stabil ize social

relations by binding its elites in a network of reciprocal obligations.
The discharge of obligations in the kula exchange served as a veil, ifnot
a reason, for social intercourse of a perhaps more instrumental nature. 19
Certain aspects of modern commercial or economic exchanges are
somewhat akin to ceremonial exchanges.

For example, transactions in the

common stocks of any of a number of widely held corporations smacks of
ceremonial exchange.

The investor/risk-bearer is accorded high status

in most industrial societies--especially if he is at all successful in
his investment strategies.

One can attain the institutional rank and

status of such a person by simply establishing an account with a stockbroker and by buying and sell ing stocks through that account.
The buying and sell ing of corporate securities involves so-called
economic transactions in which the buyer places his buy order for a
security with his stockbroker.

The stockbroker transacts the order and

delivers a totem, a receipt, which records the transaction.

The

investor gives the broker a piece of paper called a check, another
totem, in exchange for the receipt.

Of course, the receipt is only an

interim totem to suffice until the big totem, the certificate of stock,
arrives.

The mystical potency of the totems exchanged attaches to the

reei pi ents ; n the exchange. 20

It will be argued that the foregoing transaction was an important
economic exchange and that it was one of many similar transactions which
are important as a means of raising risk capital for an industrial system.

Indeed, that may be true.

However, one must seek further.

What

~

has happened in the stock transaction? Clearly, the transaction has validated the status of the buyer as an investor/risk-bearer.

li kewise, it
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has val idated the statuses of the buying broker, the sell ing broker, the
exchange specialist, the selling party, the corporation and its officers
(involved in canceling the seller's stock certificate and issuing the
buyer's stock certificate) and a myriad of other persons less directly
associated with the transaction.
Moreover, one must inquire as to the true instrumental significance

of the stock transaction.

Will the economic value exchanged actually

result in the creation of new capital goods?

The answer is, not likely.

In fact, in the vernacular of the kula exchange, the transaction simply
shifted some ceremonial necklaces and bracelets about in a role-playing

situation which had as its object the validation of status.

The stock

transaction, while very real, is hardly more than a ceremonial exchange,

a game in prestige economics.

While someone might gain wealth and some-

one might lose wealth from the transaction. their real gains and losses

are in tenns of ceremonial rank and status.
There are, of course, a great many other so-called economic transactions which contain traces of ceremonial exchange.

The exchange of

money as prices for consumer goods in retail markets validates the statuses
of purchasers as consumers, vendors as purveyors of goods. and all others
associ ated with the exchange in thei r own ways.

The 1andl ord I s status

is val idated as well as that of the tenant when the latter pays his rent
in exchange for his tenancy.

Each acknowledges the class. rank, and

status of himself and the other party in the transaction.

The same is

true of employer-employee relationships in i'Jhich labor is exchanged for
wages; government-citizen transactions in which tribute in form of taxes
is pa i d to the state, etc.

Each of these exchanges ; s part of an enormous

institutional network of reciprocal obligations which serves to maintain
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unity in a community.

And to that end, ceremonial exchange is an instru-

ment of social control which operates to perpetuate social stability.
Ceremon i alGi ft-Givi n9
Another institutional practice of social control is ceremonial giftgiving.

Like ceremonial exchange, ceremonial gift-giving is used to

val idate the statuses of the parties involved.

Ceremonial gift-giving

involves a donor who gives a gift to a recipient.

The gift must be equal

to the rank of the donor and appropriate to the rank of the recipient.
The recipient is usually expected to reciprocate the gift-giving at some

future time--although this may not be the case if the recipient is of
very low rank in relation to the rank of the donor.

Ceremonial gift-

giving val idates the status of the donor by demonstrating his powers in
giving a gift of value, and it validates the status of the recipient by
the donorls acknowledgement of the recipientls rank in the value of the
gift given.

Ceremonial gift-giving reinforces institutional structure by

tying the community together in a web of reciprocal obligations. 21
A primitive example of ceremonial gift-giving is the potlatch of

the Kwakiutl and Haida tribes and other American Indian cultures along

the Northwest Pacific coast.

The form of potlatch varied with the tribe,

but the ceremony had certain general characteristics.

ed

The ceremony

the distribution of gifts to val idate social status.

invol'l/~'

The larger and

more valuable the gifts distributed, the higher the status of the donor.
Likewise, the size of the potlatch gathering reflected the rank and
status of the donor.

Therefore, guests vlere invited from a wide territory.

and the potlatch accompanied very generous hospital ity and sumptuous
feasting.

Careful formal ities were observed in speechmaking and in the
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distribution of donor properties according to the ranks of recipients. 22
The potlatch val idated the status of the donor by demonstrating his
potency in acquiring and giving great wealth.

It validated the statuses

of recipients because the values of gifts were determined by the ranks of
the recipients.

The higher the recipient rank, the more mystical potency

his gift totems must possess.
Of course, potlatch recipients were expected to give their own

potlatches when they had accumulated enough properties to do the ceremony
justice.

It was expected that the recipients would give gifts at their

own potlatches which were at least equivalent in mana to the totems they
received.

Thus, like ceremonial exchange, ceremonial gift-giving involved

reciprocity.

However, since recipients of low rank and inferior status

received gifts of very little value, they rarely reciprocated with their
own potlatches.
The potlatch sometimes involved competitive destruction of goods.

The object was to validate the statuses of the tribes and their chiefs

by demonstrating their capacities to destroy wealth as well as to give
it away.

The potlatch proceeded as with one involved solely with cere-

monial gift-giving.
which all of the

However, the potlatch ended with a huge fire in

donOi~rS

remaining properties were destroyed while the

guests sat around the fire and watched them' burn.
tion of goods was not a widespread practice.

aberration

Ceremonial destruc-

It seems to have been an

of the gift-giving potlatch.

Almost any event was occasion for a potlatch--marriages, births,
and deaths, as well as very trivial matters.

The potlatch was not to

celebrate the event, but to validate the status of the donor.

Therefore,

potlatches were geared more to the economic capacity of the tribe than to
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whatever event served as the ostensible occasion to have one.
of a potlatch often was to impoverish the donor tribe.

The effect

It thereafter

became necessary for the tribal members to apply their industries to
building up the tribal wealth in anticipation of their next potlatch.
However, like ceremonial exchange, the potlatch served to unify the
participant tribes into a network of mutual obligations.

Those obliga-

tions no doubt led to other social intercourse of a less ceremonial nature.
The sacrificial offerings which characterized the domestic rel igion

of the ancients were forms of ceremonial gift-giving--as well as forms
of ceremonial exchange as with the trespass offerings of Judaism.

The

gifts were given as offerings to the ancestral gods through the intermediation of Vesta, the goddess of the hearth.
sacrificial offerings were feast occasions.

Like the potlatch, the
However, unlike the potlatch,

no guests were invited and no visitors were allowed.
gens participated in the feast.

Only members of the

The sacrificial victim was a totem which

acquired mystical potency as it was offered to the gods according to the
patrician taboos.

It became the meat of the communal feast which bound

the members of the gens together and further bound them to their domestic
deities.

That is, the offering val idated the statuses of gens members

by acknowledging their kinship and it validated the statuses of the
domestic gods in the same way.

Finally, the gods were expected to reci-

procate by protecting the gens and blessing it with plentitude in peace,
and prevalence in adversity. 23
Ceremonial gift-giving is not limited to primitive cultures.

It

is a much more widespread practice in so-called advanced cultures than
is generally understood.

~lost

many cases.

small remembrances given at parties to

For

example~

of it is harmless enough--even useful in
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corrunemorate birthdays, Christmases, weddings, and the like validate the

statuses of both the donor and the recipient in the same sense as in the
potlatch even though the gift-giving does not usually impoverish the
donors.

These modest celebrations usually take place between family

members, very close

friends~

and business partners, and they serve to

bind them together in reciprocal role situations within the institution
of the family and the extended family.
as a

If the extended family is viewed

worthy institution, then ceremonial gift-giving of the kinship

sort ought to be encouraged.
However, the apparently harmless but useful practice of ceremonial

gift-giving in the family institution should not blind one to other
aspects of its social significance.

The social significance of

ceremonial gift-giving is in the validation of status and the tacit
reciprocal obligations involved.

While perhaps useful and relatively

harmless within the family institution, these aspects of ceremonial
gift-giving raise ethical questions when gift-giving takes place between
certain other donors and recipients.

Ethical questions arise with gift-

giving when the gift involves charity or welfare and when it involves
contract relationships and gifts between special-interest groups and
agents of governments.
An act of pri vate charity is generally appl auded as bei ng a very
humanitarian and generous overture on the part of the donor.
indeed, it may very well be.

And,

However, if examined in light of the social

dynamics involved, the supposed generosity and humanitarianism might be
viewed differently.

Insofar as the action validates status, the donor

is found to be reinforcing his own status as social superior by giving
the gift while the recipient is seen as reinforcing his status as social
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inferior by accepting it.

Moreover, the donor's supposed humanitarianism

might, in fact, be personal avarice if he is allowed to deduct the cost
of his charity from income for tax purposes.

Finally, the reciprocity,

if any, in this kind of gift-giving must be in the recip'jent's acceptance

of the gift and his acknowledgment thereby of the donor's clearly superior
rank and status.

This can only be a demeaning experience for the recip-

ient, albeit that he is remunerated

fo~~

h'is charity in accepting the gift.

Public welfare (that is, accepting income or goods and services
from a government on the basis of one's poverty classification) is hardly
better, and it might be worse than private charity when viewed in terms

of the social dynamics of ceremonial gift-giving.

The essential difference

between the two is that the donor is a government rather than a private

individual.
status

Public welfare, as with private charity, validates the

of the donor as a social superior and the recipient as a social

inferior.

However, the donor governments act only through agents, and

the superior status must attach to the visible persons of
to the agents which act for them.

governments~

The class, rank, and institutional

importance of this phenomenon for democratic government should be obvious.
Of course, if one does not consider democratic government to be a redeem-

able feature of the modern world, then the foregoing aspect of public
welfare may not be an issue.
Ethical questions arise on at least two other issues surrounding

public welfare.

The first has to do with the consequence of validating

the status of recipients as socially inferior.

One must keep in mind that

the practice is mandated by the traditions of the hearth fire, the primitive potlatch, and a host of other taboos which have descended in one
fonn or another from prehistoric times.

That is, the social control
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powers of ceremonial gift-giving are institutional ized cultural bel iefs
which are unl ikely to change perceptively from generation to generation,
whether or not they are socially congruent bel iefs.

Thus, simply

declaring that accepting public welfare because one is poverty-stricken
is not demeaning, will not change the cultural beliefs which have descended from antiquity and are so firmly integrated into the institutional
system.

And those beliefs declare that one who accepts a gift which

exceeds his powers and his intentions to reciprocate val idates his status
as a social inferior.

This is not just because others believe it, but

because deep in his heart the welfare recipient believes it also.

After

all, he accepted the welfare gift on the basis of his poverty in a
society that accords high status to wealthy persons.
The problem becomes more pervasive as the welfare recipient comes
to accept the inferior status validated by his acceptance of the welfare
gift.

Acceptance and adjustment to his inferior status will be reinforced

each time he accepts another gift of public welfare.

Each time it

becomes easier for him to accept the inferior class and rank assigned to
him by the institutional system.

He will eventually play the role of

that class and rank with little or no notion that it could or should be
any different.
The second question has to do with the tacit reciprocal obligations
of welfare gift recipients.

The taboos of ceremonial gift-giving require

that the recipient reciprocate in some way consistent with his status and
that of the donor.

The economic circumstances of the welfare gift

recipient make it clear that reciprocation will not invol ve money or
goods and services in the usual sense.

only one form.

Rather, reciprocation can take

That form is political support for the agents of the
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governments tendering the welfare gifts.

The conclusion follows that,

in terms of the taboos of ceremonial gift-giving, public welfare is a
way of purchasing votes in a democratic form of government, and a way
of buying acquiescence to government pol icies in a total itarian form.
The second classification of gift-giving which raises ethical
questions is when the gifts are between certain contracting or potential
contracting parties and between members of special-interest groups and

the agents of governments.

In the former group is the gift-giving

between business executives and the union leaders who represent the
interests of workers employed by the businesses and between business
executives and the purchasing and contracting agents of governments.

In

the latter group is the gift-giving between members of special-interest
groups and the legislative and regulative agents of governments.
Gift-giving of the foregoing sort might be considered as between
social equals.
reciprocity.

Ethical questions therefore come down to the matter of
The questions are: what are the tacit reciprocal obliga-

tions incurred when an official of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers accepts a gift from an electrical contractor whose electricians are members of the brotherhood? What are the tacit reciprocal
obligations incurred when a contract administrator in the Department of
Defense accepts a gift from a contractor whose contract he is administer-

ing? What are the tacit reciprocal obI igations incurred when a member
of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee of the United States Senate
accepts a campaign gift from an officer of the AFL-CID? What are the
tacit reciprocal obI igations when a member of the Security and Exchange
Commission accepts a gift from a senior partner of a major brokerage

fjrm on the New York Stock Exchange?
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It is difficult to see how the donor in each of these cases can
have any interest beyond the recipient's tacit reciprocal obligations.
And, the recipient's denials notwithstanding, he is almost certain to
understand the meaning in his acceptance of the gift.

Clearly, gift-

giving under any of these and like circumstances raises the spectre of
conflicts of interest and possible graft, extortion, and bribery when
measured by the taboos of ceremonial gift-giving.
One might extrapolate the policy implications of the deductivelydrawn relationships described above into a great many possible scenarios.
However, that moves the discourse beyond the bounds of this paper.
Rather, the foregoing situations were described to illustrate the social
control possibilities of ceremonial gift-giving.

For good or bad, the

practice maintains social stabil ity by weaving members of a community
into a fabric of reciprocal obl igations based upon the ranks and statuses
of the members within the institutional system.
CEREMONIALIS~1

AND SOCIAL CHOICES

The time has come to complete the answer to the second question
posed at the end of Chapter I--how do institutions function in the urban
temporal setting?

It is recalled that institutions were defined in

Chapter II, and that the urban temporal setting was described in Chapter III.

The present and preceding chapters (Chapters IV and V) pro-

ceeded on the premise that institutions discharge their functions of
perpetuating cultural values and preserving social stability by influencing social choices.

The choices concern which alternative and compet-

ing ends shall be achieved and how means shall be allocated to the
attainment of the chosen ends.

It was posited that institutions
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influence social choices through the practice of ceremonialism--an

institutional practice of perpetuating cultural values and beliefs by
conferring and reinforcing rank and social status within the institu-

tional system.
This chapter and the preceding chapter examined the workings of
ceremonialism in the discharge of institutional functions.

It was

argued that ceremonialism is the method by which institutions transmit
culture, structure society, socialize members, and exercise social control.

Properly executed, these functions serve to discharge the institutional
ra i son dlatre--to perpetuate their own eul tural val ues and thereby pre-

serve stability in the larger community of which they are parts.

The

following four paragraphs summarize the expanded arguments of chapters
IV and V.
Ceremonialism arises from the cultural beliefs which descend to the

present from the past.

likewise, ceremonialism is the agent for trans-

mitting the cultural beliefs.

Ceremonialism recounts the legends and

myths of ancestors in literature, drama, and folk history.

The cultural

bel iefs are rigidly fixed because the ancestors are dead and buried, and

there are no ways of changing the things they did and believed.

The

bel iefs take the fonn of totems and taboos, or customary and traditional
ways.

The totems and taboos have an aura of mystique about them because

of their linkage to the ancestral past.

The beliefs are mythical justi-

fications invoking a supernatural world of mystical potencies which are

presumed to be causally related in some way.

It is thought that these

spirits can be manipulated in quasi-causal ways by ceremony to use their

mystical powers on behalf of the living.

The cultural beliefs tend to

stabilize society by giving it precedents to guide human interaction.
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Thus, ceremonialism involves role-playing in social situations
which are contrived from the ancient taboos.

The taboos operate through

ceremony in this way to structure society into institutional systems of
class and rank.

Ooels social status is communicated to others by his

invidious behavior and by the physical and honorific symbols, the mystical
totems, of the rank he possesses.

pond with technical competence.

Rank and status is assumed to corres-

However, such correspondence ;s a crea-

tion of ceremonial ism because the distinctions of class and rank were

created first, and the technical reasons-to-be thereafter.

~loreover,

technical competence is assumed to exist as long as one occupying a posi-

tion of class and rank demonstrates ceremonial competence.

And cere-

monial competence is judged by the quality of onels ritual, not by his
technical merit.

The institutional structure tends to stabilize society

by providing a matrix of human relationships in which to carryon social
interaction.
Ceremonialism discharges the socialization function of institutions
by conferring rank and status on members of society.

One is advanced in

rank and status according to how well he adheres to the ancient taboos.
Ceremonialism has power to accomplish socialization because of the relationship between human emotions and the taboos.

One gains in moral

standing and he absorbs mana by carefully adhering to the ceremonial
taboos.

He suffers loss of mana by the unvirtuous violation of a taboo.

It is by means of social ization--the conferring of rank and status--that
ceremonialism increases social harmony by assigning persons to roles in
the institutional system from which they can interact with assurances.
Likewise, ceremonialism;s the institutional instrument of social
control.

Ceremonial ism reinforces the rank and status of persons already
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within the institutional structure by the periodic validation of status.
Status is val idated by regular acknowledgments of rank in ceremonial
exchanges and ceremonial gift-giving.

Both practices involve giving

totems of values appropriate to the ranks of the parties involved.

And

both practices involve reciprocity--irrmediate quid pro guo in ceremonial
exchange, and an obligation for a future quid pro guo in ceremonial gift-

giving.

The validations of statuses in these ways tend to stabilize a

community by occupying its members with a flurry of reciprocal obligations.
Ceremonialism is, therefore, the instrument with which institutions
perpetuate their own cultural values and maintain social stability.

It

follows, therefore, that the institutional influence, through ceremony,
is applied in social choices to maintain the status quo according to the
cultural values Qut of which the institutions arise.

That is, cere-

monialism is backward-looking and backward-clinging in terms of the

ends-means continuum.

Its great powers are exerted to select those ends

and organize means to attain the ends which are consistent with institutional, or cultural values.

Ceremonialism opposes choices which depart

in even minor ways from the descended taboos. 24

Indeed, the whole cere-

monial thrust of culture transmission, socialization, and social control
is toward a stable state, a state which is fixed, immobile, unchanging.
The practical effect of a successful institutional influence on social
choice is to perpetuate ancient customs, traditions, and taboos forever
unchanged and unchanging into the future.
Of course thi s has not happened.

Institutions have changed.

Some

have receded or disappeared entirely, and new institutions have emerged
to cope with nelN problems.

Indeed. if anything is clear about institu-

tions. it is their lack of continuity.

All of the ancient institutions
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described in this and the preceding chapter have changed--many of them
radically--between then and now, even though the essence of institutions
has remained unchanged.

tions of institutions.

This is a strange outcome in view of the func-

How is it that institutions which function so

powerfully to perpetuate their underlying cultural values and thereby
preserve social stability have at least partly failed to fulfill their
functions?

Why are modern industrial cities different from the cities

of a"tiquity? And why is there instability and sometimes revolution in

human societies?
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CHAPTER VI
TECHNOLOGY

The preceding two chapters related a theory of social relationships
based upon ceremonial ism, a practice by which institutions attempt to preserve social stability by perpetuating the cultural beliefs that underlie
institutional values.

Ceremonialism operates toward those goals by

influencing social choices.

Ceremonial influences admonish choices of

future ends-to-be-reached which are in harmony with the ancient taboos
that comprise the cultural beliefs.

Moreover, ceremonialism points to

methods of organizing present means to future ends in ways that are likewise consistent with the customary and traditional techniques.

Cere-

monial ism is backward-looking and backward-cl inging, and it resists any-

thing that threatens to change traditional ways.

The continuum effects

of ceremonialism are to relate the past to the present and future and to
extend the past forever into the future.
And yet it is clear that ceremonialism has not entirely succeeded
in either preserving perfect social stabil ity or perfectly perpetuating
cultural values.

Rather. society has been racked by revolution--some-

times violent and destructive conflagrations and sometimes slow and
incremental changes, but always changes that undermine confidence in
traditional ways of knowing and doing and that precipitate cultural change.
Either way, the resulting changes are marked by social instabil ity as
people and institutions struggle to adjust to the new and revolutionary
realities.

The social instability occurs somehow despite institutional
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attempts through ceremonialism to preserve social tranquility.

In like manner, ceremonialism has not been entirely successful in
perpetuating unchanged and unchanging cultural bel iefs.

While there are

lingering ceremonial vestiges from antiquity, the present is not a carbon

copy of the past.

Times have changed, and conditions and methods have

changed almost imperceptibly with them.

People do not all believe pre-

cisely the things their ancestors believed.

New institutions have evolved,

some have gained greater social significance, others have receded in

power, and some have disappeared altogether.
is not exactly like the feudal city.

The modern industrial city

And neither the modern nor the

feudal city is the same as the prehistorical folk communities which preceded them.
The question is, what has caused the changes?

Why has social

instabil ity occurred even whil e powerful ceremon; al forces were operati n9

to preserve it?

Why have cultural bel iefs changed, and what has provoked

institutional discontinuities?

Why is the modern industrial city dif-

ferent from the feudal city, and why are the industrial and feudal cities
different from the ancient folk villages?

An answer to these questions

is attempted in this and the next two chapters.
The principal idea in this and the following two chapters is that
the innovation of new technologies causes instability in institutional
environments because the new technologies organize means in ways that
are different from the ceremonially approved methods of the past.

New

technology often changes even the ends selected to be achieved by bringing some ends within reach that were formerly beyond available means.
And it opens opportunities for distributing goods and services in ways
differing from the ceremonial past.

Thus, the innovation of new
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technologies affords new avenues of social mobil ity by creating opportunities to change existing ceremonial systems of rank and social status.'

This chapter will expand on certain crucial aspects of the foregoing ideas.

The chapter seeks to discover what technology is.

explore questions 1 ike:

It will

How is technology distinguished from and related

to technique and hUman skills?

The next chapter will ask from when does

technology arise, and how does it come into being?

How does it relate to

ceremonial ism, and how does it affect institutional systems?

Finally,

how is it related to the ends-means continuum, the continuum of on-going

1i fe processes?

TECHNOLOGY AND TOOLS

The first matter to be settled is the question, what is technology?
Technology has been defined generally as applied science having commercial

value, or as the practical or industrial arts.

There are, of course,

much more elaborate definitions, but they all resolve into something like

part or all of the above. 2 These definitions are deficient in several
ways.

First, they are too general and imprecise.

between human and material aspects of culture.

They do not distinguish

Nor are they specific

regarding important distinctive aspects of material culture.

Second, the

traditional definition of technology gives insufficient attention to the

functional aspect of technology.

Finally, the social context of tech-

nology is virtually ignored in the traditional definition.

The argument is made here that technology is that qual ity of a tool
which enables it to be sUbstituted for human effort in the creation of
any good or service having human value.

As will be shown, this defini-

tion is consistent with institutional economic theory which, alas, also
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does not precisely define technology. 3 In pursuit of precision, then,
it is useful to more carefully consider several components of this
definition.

For example, what is a tool?

What is meant by a good?

What does human effort mean in the context of this definition?

The

question of human value is considered in subsequent chapters.

Too 1s and Goods
There are a number of dictionary definitions for the word tool.

The definition most suited to its meaning here is that a tool is an
implement used by persons to work, shape, form. attach, etc. materials.

Another word having close meaning is

II

machine. II

A machine is

lIa structure consisting of a framework and various fixed and moving
parts, for doing some kind of work. II

Others have described a machine as

consisting "of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism,
the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or working machine. 114

This latter description makes the tool the working part of a machine.
On the other hand, the machine serves the tool.

That is, its raison

dl~re is to energize and perhaps control the tool.

Thus, any machine

is merely an extension of the tool to which it gives power and control.
For this reason, the word tool shall serve in this paper as short
notation for ntool

n

in its restricted sense, for "machine!! according to

the foregoing logic, and for "capital good" is a final, productive,
material, economic good other than land.

This latter term, capital

good, is more fully explained in the following paragraphs.
The preceding dictionary definition of the word tool is incomplete
for purposes of this paper. To complete the definition, one must somehow
rationalize the working of materials in terms of human purposes or reasons.
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A number of possible reasons come to mind--to occupy human time and
energies with mental and physical activities; to destroy other materials;
to wear out the tools; etc.

Whatever reasons one might conceive, they

all appear to resolve into one, and that is:

materials are worked,

shaped, formed, attached, etc. by tool s for the purpose of creating or
preserving other goods.

And goods are simply material and immaterial

things external to man that satisfy hUman wants.
The goods created by applying tools to materials may be either
intermediate or final goods.

goods.

Intermediate goods are of course not final

They are partially processed material s or sub-assembl ies which

will enter into and lose their identities in final goods.

Intermediate

goods include lumber that has been cut from trees but which has not yet
been used to build urban housing, manufacture furniture. or any other

final uses to which the lumber might be put.

Intermediate goods also

incl ude sheet and tube steel and a 1um;num, agri eul tura 1 fertil izer, vegetable and grain seeds, gasoline engines, transmissions, auto bodies,
asphaltic cement, crushed rock, crude oil and every other partially pro-

cessed good which will ultimately be used in some final good.
All final goods have reached the end of whatever processes have
gone into their production.
be used by people.

to people.

They have taken the forms in which they will

And all final goods are used up in rendering services

The services are of two general sorts, consumption services

and production services.

Final consumer goods include all household and

some public properties--furniture, appliances. food, automobiles, clothing, jewelry, art objects, etc.

Consumer items render services directly

to the people who use them for their personal comfort and satisfaction.
On the other hand. final production goods render services to persons
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who are using the goods to produce both intermediate goods and other final
goods of both the consumption and production sort.

Final production goods

are called capital goods or producers' durab1es in the national product
accounts of most countries.

meaning intended here.

Final production goods are tool s within the

They are final goods because they have reached

the end of the processes that created them, but they are used to process
other goods--not to render personal services directly to the people who

use them.

The definition of the word tool then is:

A tool is a capital

good, a producer's durable good, or any implement or machine which is

used by hUman producers to work materials in the creation of other goods

and services having human val ue.
The kind of implement that usually comes to mind when the word tool
is used is something held in the hand of a skilled craftsman who is using
it to shape or join materials in the production or repair of things used
by other people.

The carpenter's saw, the plumber's pipe wrench, and

the welder's torch are examples of this kind of tool.

However, the word

is not 1 imited to the implements of a skilled craftsman.

Any implement

which is itself a final good and is used in the production or repair of

other goods is a tool.

Thus, a thermostat is a tool for regulating the

heat of an industrial power plant or a blast furnace.
tool to do mathematical computations.

A calculator is a

An assembly 1 ine is a tool which

brings sub-assembl ies together in a process that results in the creation

of some product.

The point is that many different kinds of items fit

the deseri pti on of a tool.
Moreover, tools are tools simply because they make it possible for
people to manufacture and repair other things the accompl ishment of which
would be impossible, or at least very difficult, without tools.

That is,
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tools embody technology because they do, by their very natures, reduce

human effort in the creation of goods having human value.

For example,

how long might it take a sawyer to produce a properly shaped and sized
wooden beam from a rough log without the use of a tool?

Presumably, he

could tear the log apart with his fingernails or his teeth.

But it

would take a very long time and the work would surely debilitate him in

a short time.
wood.

Rather, a sawyer ;s a sawyer because he uses a saw to cut

It is the technical qualities of his tools that distinguish the

sawyer and that enable him to cut and shape wood.
Likewise, tools possess technical qualities which make them suitable for certain uses and unsuitable for other uses.

A motor truck is

instrumental in transporting its cargo over roads between its starting
point and its destination.

However. given the present state of automotive

science, a motor truck is absolutely useless as a tool for measuring the

amount of radiation emitted from a cathode tube.

Some tools are also more

efficient than other tools at performing the same kind of work.

The

sawyer can trim out his beam more quickly with a saw than with an adze.
And he can do it even more quickly with a power saw than with a hand saw.
The power saw therefore embodies greater technology because it enables the
sawyer to produce more units of 1umber per man-hour than he can produce
wi th an adze or a hand saw.

Finally, tools are future-oriented.

While tools are themselves the

existential ends of means which were employed to create them in the past,
they were produced in contemplation of future use.

The sawyer1s saw

was the end product in a long and complex process commencing with the
mining of iron are and concluding with the shaping and filing of the
teeth with which the saw will bite into wooden fibers.

The are was
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deliberately mined with the expectation that it would be smelted, refined,
forged, and machined into things for human use.

The latter stages of its

production were undertaken with the intention of creating a tool for saw-

ing wood.

And this expectation was a human vision looking beyond the saw

as an end product.

It comprehended the existential end, the saw, as a

means to on-going human ends.

The saw was future-oriented even in its

creat; on.
The future orientation of course extends to the use of tools.

Tools

are always brought into use for the purpose of creating states of affairs
which do not obtain in the present.

Just as the mining, smelting, and

machine equipment produced a saw in contemplation of future use, so the

saw now produces lumber in contemplation of future use.

The timbers

trimmed and shaped by the saw will be used as forms to shape concrete
foundations, as beams, joists, sins, studs, caps, trusses, sheathing,

siding, subfloor, door and window trim, base board, and many other
components in resi dentia 1, commerci a 1, and industrial structures

<

Like

all tools, the saw is employed to produce other goods having human value.
In this context, use of the saw is future-oriented and it will be instrumental in bringing to fruition states of affairs which exist in the present only as human contemplation.
It is sometimes thought that materials should be included with tools

in the definition of .techno1ogy.

Materials are physical substances which

are or can be a constituent part of a good.
in its use or contemplated use in a good.
are future-oriented.

A substance becomes a material
Thus, materials, like tools.

Likewise they do possess technical characteristics

and they are used in the creation of goods having human value.

However,

materials fail to meet the technological criterion of tools for at least
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two reasons.

The first reason is that, unlike tools, materials lose their

identities in the goods of which they become parts.

Whatever technical

characteristics they possess are merged with those of the other materials
in end products.

goods.

That is, materials are intermediate goods--not final

And they are not used in their intermediate form to shape or

attach other materials in the creation of other goods having human value.
The second reason materials fail to meet the technological criterion
is that physical substances become materials only in some relationship to

the tools with which they are extracted, refined, and combined with other
materials to produce goods.

That is, raw materials or resources are

defined in terms of existing technology.

For example, coal, crude oil,

natural gas, and uranium all coexisted on earth .with men far many centuries

before the tools needed to use them came into existence.

It was not until

the discovery and innovation of coal technology that coal became a raw
material.

Likewise, it was not until petroleum technology had advanced

substantially that crude oil could be refined into gasoline, engine oil,
fuel oil, diesel oil, cleaning solvents, lubricating oil, bearing grease,

asphaltic cement, plastics, and a host of other intermediate products.
Petroleum technology is defined by the tools with which crude oil is
extracted, refined, and used in all of its refined forms.

Without the

tools, crude oil would remain crude; a sticky substance that is more a

hindrance than a help to mankind.

The point is, that materials reflect

only the technology of the tools that shape them.
The foregoing discussion leads by reduction to the conclusion that
a tool is a finished good, a capital or producer1s durable good, any implement or machine which is used by human producers to work materials in the
creation of other goods having human value.

Moreover, technology is that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

203

quality of a tool which enables it to be substituted for human labors in
the production of goods and services.
Tools and Skill
One often hears the term IIlabor productivity. n

The term represents

a measure of industrial efficiency stated as lIoutput-per-man-hour.1I

The

measure is calculated by dividing the market value of all final goods and
services produced in an economy during some period of time (in other

words, the gross national product) by the total man hours employed in
the economy during that time.

On the basis of output-per-man-hour, the

American worker ;s said to be the most productive in the world.

That is,

the goods and services produced with each hour of American labor is

greater than that produced by the 1abor of any other country.
The terms labor productivity and output-per-man-hour conjure up
images of highly skilled men in industrial attire furiously manufacturing

goods with crude tools powered by the brawn of their own sinewy biceps.
The impression is that industrial efficiency is exclusively the product

of the working man.

His physical power, individual skill, and personal

industry are solely responsible for the efficiency of the system.

However,

most economists and a good many other people know that the picture drawn
above is far off the mark.

It is true that these labor characteristics

account at least in part for industrial efficiency.

And it is true that

the efficiency of an industrial system can val idly be, and perhaps should
be, measured as output-per-man-hour.

However, these terms foster certain

presuppositions which obscure the nature of industrial efficiency.

The fact is that the cognitive skills of the worker are neither
inherited genetically--although the capacity to learn them may be
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transmitted genetically--nor are they acquired in an environmental vacuum

as an intellectual and manipulative tour de force.

Rather, the cognitive

skills of workers are derived from the tools they use.

This is easily

observed by contrasting the skill s of two workers separated in time.

The

first is a tribes person in a hoe-culture during the early neolithic

period, and the second is an American farmer in the modern, industrial age.
Cultivation to the tribes person of the hoe-culture meant simply
clearing and digging up a small patch of ground with a stick or hoe.
motive power was the physical strength of her own body.

Her

She seeded the

patch and left it to grow and ripen.

Her seeds were those of indigenous

grasses and other edible vegetation.

She added no manure or other fertil-

izers.

She used no insecticides. fungicides, herbicides, or pesticides,

and she did nat irrigate.

At the end of the growing season she harvested

whatever her patch produced.

Her patch of ground was never fallowed.

cultivated the same plot each year.
depleted and her yields declined.

She

After a few seasons the soil was
She simply cleared another patch and

repeated her technique until that plot was also depleted.

After she had

exhausted the land near her hovel she simply moved elsewhere and began
anew. 5

The technology of the early neolithic tribes person was very primitive.

It consisted of her hoe.

Her technical skill was in her ability

to apply technique to her tool in the creation of goods.

Technique is

simply the procedure by which her tool--the hoe--was put into operation
to perform the productive service for which it was designed.

The tribes

person's technical skill was, therefore, as rudimentary as her hoe was
primitive.

It consisted of her ability to manipulate the hoe in turning

or stirring the soil sufficiently to create a suitable bed for her seeds.
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And technique involved her judgments about when, where, and how to employ

her hoe.

Her skill was derived from her tool.

Likewise, the cognitive skills of the modern farmer are derived
from his tools.

The modern farmer cultivates his land, plants his seeds,

and reaps his crops mechanically.

Unlike the primitive farmer who had

only her own physical strength as motive power, the modern farmer relies

on the mechanical power of his tractor and other farm implements to do
the work for him.

He is able to increase his yields by using carefully

prepared seeds of hybrid and bl ight-resistant crop strains.

He uses

engine-powered irrigation systems to protect his crops from the weather
vagaries of nature; and he uses insecticides, fungicides, pesticides, and
herbicides to protect against crop wastage by vermin, blight, and weeds,
because of the chemical technology which supplies him with nitrogen,
phosphorus.,

potash, 1 ime, and trace elements to rebuiid his soil.

The tool s of the modern farmer are much more complex than the
simple hoe of the neal ithic farmer.

The technique by which the modern

farmer employs his tools in the productive functions for which they were
designed is likewise much more complex.

His technical skill. his ability

to apply technique to his tools in the agricultural production of food
and fiber. is commensurately greater than that of the neolithic farmer.
The modern farmer must not only know how and when to operate his complex
pieces of farming equipment, he must also know how to properly maintain
them.

The point is that his

t~chnical

and their use in producing goods.

skill is concentrated on his tools

It follows that the tools are the

sources of his technical skill. and his skill is the measure of his mastery
of his tools.
To place this in better illumination. one might imagine that the
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mate of the neolithic farmer is all-at-once plucked out of his primitive
enironment and is advanced to the present.

He and the modern farmer are

separated from their tools and all cultural symbols so that they stand
bared before their examiners.

The question explored by the examiners is:

What are the visible differences between them?
If each man is a more-or-less average representative of his era,
one difference will inunediately stand out.

The primitive man will be

smaller in all or most of his physical dimensions.

This is simply the

result of differences in the nutritional and sanitation environments in

which the two were raised; which is, incidentally, a technological factor.
If the two are from the same racial stock, there will not likely be
other physical differences.

Each man will have the same external

appendages and sensory organs, the same internal structure and
functi onary organs.

Each man is homo sapi ens and there wi 11 be no

generic differences between them.
What is it then that distinguishes modern man from his primitive
ancestor?

It will surely be stated that modern man is

II

smarter," and

that this will not appear as a physiological or anatomical difference.
If, by "smarter," the meaning is that the average primitive man possesses

less innate intelligence than his modern descendant, the evidence does
not support the contention. 6 On the other hand, if the meaning is that
modern man possesses more acquired knowledge about himself and his environment, then one must agree.

It is not that modern man has greater intellect

than his ancestor, but that his intellect has been better developed.
The next question is: Why is the modern intellect better developed?
The answer is blatant--because modern man has more tools and tools which
are technologically superior to those of neolithic man.

It can be
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countered that the reason is because modern man possesses more goods of
all kinds.

One can have no disagreement with this statement because it

simply reinforces the original contention.

To see this one need only

inquire how the goods of modern man came into existence.
that they were produced with tools employed by people.

The answer is
Thus the intellect

of modern man is better developed because of the concentrated thought
processes required of him to fully master the techniques for productively
employing his tools.

The skills of both neolithic and modern man are

derived from tools.

The essential difference between them is therefore

the relative quantity and quality of their tools.

The physical attributes

of man remain essentially unchanged, but the properties and technical
attributes of his tools have changed substantially over the centuries.
Tools and Productivity
The preceding section of this chapter commenced with a discussion
of the terms "labor productivity" and "output-per-man-hour. II

The impres-

sion conveyed by those terms is that productivity is a function of the
skill and industry of labor.

It was demonstrated in the preceding sec-

tion how the skill of labor is derived from the tools employed with labor
to produce goods having human value.

Thus, one is left with only one

major nexus between labor and productivity, and that is the so-called
industry of labor.

However, even that nexus is on shaky premises.

This

section will argue that labor productivity and the productivity of a
modern industrial system is only minutely dependent upon the skill and
industry of labor.

Rather, productivity is mostly determined by the

quantity and technical quality of the tools employed in the system.
The preceding section conc1 uded that the essential d1fference
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between neolithic and modern man is the relative quantities and qualities

of their tools.

A major significance of that difference is in the pro-

ductivity of each man relative to the other.

The technical quality of

the neolithic hoe limits the tribes person to the tillage of a very small
plot of land, probably less than a hectare.

She simply could not turn

enough soil fast enough to bring more land under cultivation in the time

available to her.

Thus, her crop yield was small in relation to the

amount of time she spent in cultivating her land because of the 1 imitations of her tools.
Moreover, the primitive fanner's yield was small because she did
not have the modern advantages of supporting technologies.

That is, she

had no access to seeds of blight-resistant and hybrid strains of crop.
She had no sources for fertilizers. insecticides, fungicides, herbicides,
or pesticides, and she had no way of irrigating her crop land if she

suffered drought during her growing season.

She had to rely on the exist-

ing fertil ity of her soil and on the vagaries of season for the right
combinations of rainfall and sunl ight to bring in a meager crop.

And

after her losses to insects, rodents, fungus, and weeds, she might have

enough harvest to feed her family if she supplemented her larder by hunting game, the game brought in by her husband, and by occupying her family
gathering indigenous berries, nuts, and roots.

Most assuredly there were

few seasons of surplus, and there was rarely enough to simply feed her
own family.

The primitive farmerLs productivity was constrained by the

technical pauclty of her tools.
The size and richness of hUman society based on such a primitive

technology was absolutely constrained by its abysmally low agricultural
productivity.

There could be no villages, towns. or cities, or any other
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cohesive human conmunities which substantially exceeded the family number.
The self-sufficient family unit was the principal if not the only institution of the mesolithic and early neolithic periods.

While there were

undoubtedly intra-family special izations, there was no time for the
inter-family specializations which led to trade and ultimately to the
proliferation. and agglomeration of the extra-family institutions which
comprise urban areas.

Such specializations had to await a time when

agricultural productivity could support substantia11y more than the
farmer and her family.

Urbanization was, at root, an agricultural revol-

ution, and the latter was precipitated by technological developments
which increased agricultural productivity.
Like the early neolithic farmer, the modern farmer's productivity
is a function of the quantity and quality of his tools.

By using mechan-

ica11y-powered equipment, the modern farmer can farm several thousand
acres of land.

Indeed, he must usua11y cultivate at least a thousand

acres (approximately 400 hectares) in order to secure enough income to
allow him to 1ive moderately (by modern standards) at farming alone.
Moreover, he must special ize in one or only a few crops in order to take

advantage of the economies in large-scale production.

He cannot afford

to waste his time on the diverse kinds of farming that characterized the
traditional, small, family farm--an institutional entity which was rela-

tively self-sufficient.
The modern farmer's yield per unit of land is much greater than
that of the neolithic farmer because he has abundant sources of supporting technologies.

That is, he can obtain the very best seeds to plant

from firms which specialize in developing and producing b1i'ght-resistant
seeds.

And he can assure a verdant crop by applying chemical fertilizers
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that are specially formulated to compensate for deficiencies in his soils
in terms of the nutritional needs of his crops.

Likewise, he can protect

against drought by irrigating, and against crop wastage from insects,

rodents, fungus, and weeds by applying appropriate chemicals to his growing crops.

Finally, he can multiply his yields by double and sometimes

triple cropping his land most years without dep'Jeting his soil.

The modern farmer I 5 harvest measured as output-per-man-hour is very
great.

He and his family could not consume even a small fraction of the

crop he produces, and the chances are that they consume none of it at all.

Rather, the entire crop is sold to urban food-packing firms which process
it and sell it to both urban and rural consumers.

Thus the farmer lives

off the proceeds of his sales just as urban workers live off their wages
and salaries.

Only a fraction of the fannerls net income is spent on agricultural
goods, and whatever agricultural goods his family consumes are thoroughly
processed, packaged, distributed, and sold to him by business firms
operating in urban centers.

Rather, the major part of his net income is

spent on precisely the same kinds of goods and services consumed by urban
dwellers.

It is spent on housing, electricity, telephone, heating fuel,

transportation, household appl iances, television, clothing, and other
goods and serv; ces manufactured or processed in urban areas.

Li kewi se,

he 1 istens to the same radio programs and watches the same tel evision
programs as his urban counterparts.

His children attend schools in urban

areas, and he pays taxes on his properties and his incomes just the same
as urban dwellers.

In terms of his household style and the consumption

pattern of his family, the modern farmer is very much an urban creature.
Likewise, the technologies which supply the farmer with mechanical
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equipment, fuel, irrigation pipe, pumps, chemical fertilizers, insecti-

cides, herbicides, fungicides, pesticides, and a host of other goods are
products of urban industries.

The farmer is, all at once, a buyer of

products produced by industries which are essentially urban, and a major
supplier of food and fiber resources to urban industries.

Indeed, it is

precisely the phenomenal productivity of the agricultural sector which
has released manpower from the production of primary goods to special ize
in urban industrial employments.

Urban industries produce the rich variety

of relatively low-cost manufactured goods and services which are character-

istic of an advanced industrial society.7

Farmers today comprise approximately two percent of the population
of the United States.

And yet, the farm sector is so productive that the

U. S. Department of Agriculture must pay the farmer not to farm and must
purchase certain agricultural surpluses after the farmer has sold all of
his output that the U. S. economy can consume and as much as the international economy can absorb.

It has been the innovation of mechanical

and chemical technologies in agricul ture which has enabl ed the modern
American farmer to produce enough food and fiber to support a great many
urban famil ies, while the neal ithic farmer with her hoe could barely pro-

duce enough to support her own family. 8
The land and weather patterns of the North American continent have
not significantly changed while the transformation in American agriculture

occurred.

Likewise, the physiognomy of the farmer has changed not at all.

He has no new anatomical appendages.

On the other hand, he has acquired

greater knowledge of himself and his environment.

This knowledge derives

from his tools. and the tools of the American farmer are the means behind
his amazing output-per-man-hour.

More specifically, it ;s that quality
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of American farm tools which enables them to be substituted for human
effort in the production of agricultural goods.

In short, like his skill,

the American farmer's productivity is essentially a function of the technology embodied in his tools and the tools of those urban enterprises
which support him.
Of courSE\ it remains true that the skills and industry of labor are
a major source of productive eff; ci ency in a subs; stence economy.

But

even a capital-scarce economy relies heavily on the tools it has.

More-

over, the ability of a more primitive economy to improve the welfare of
its members comes down to its success in somehow increasing its stock of

capital goods or tools relative to its labor force, and in improving the
technical qual ities of its capital goods at the same time.

Improvements

in the technical qualities of tools means acquiring and employing new
units of capital goods that increase the units of output-per-man-hour for

the whole economy--in other words, new units of capital goods which substitute for more units af labor in producing all kinds of goods.

somehow replacing the sawyer's hand saw with a power saw.

how replacing the Mountagnard 1 s hoe and bush knife with modern
tural equipment.

This

is~

of course, a tall

order~

It means

It means someagricul~

and the issues

sur~

rounding it are examined in subsequent chapters.

TOOLS AND HUMAN EFFORT
What happened between the early neol ithic era and the modern times
to change man1s productivity so markedly?

Indeed, what has happened since

primeval times before man succeeded in domesticating animals?

The simple

answer is that tools have been perfected and substituted for hUman labors
to produce goods down through the ages of man.

Yet the answer is not as
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simple as that.

The complexities of substituting tools, or capital goods

for labor in production processes are taken up in the next few chapters.

It is sufficient for the moment, however, to deal with the simple statement--too1s have been substituted for human labor in the production of goods.
Consider a thankfully by-gone era, a primeval time when man stood
bare of textile adornment and with only the most primitive stone, bone,

and shell tools.

Ten thousand years ago, at the end of the pleistocene

geological period when the Wurm glaciers of the last ice age receded from

Centra 1 Europe. neanthropic man, or homo sap; ens, emerged probably from
the Aurignacian, Sol utrean , and Magdelenian cultures of the upper paleo-

lithic period.

Human culture was of the food-gathering kind Agriculture,

the domestication of animals, pottery, and polished (rather than chipped)
stone tool s that typified neal ithic culture had not yet emerged.
Except for very crude implements fashioned from stone. bone, and
shell, one finds that mesalithic man possessed practically no tools.

deed, man himself ;s the essential tool.

to provide power.

In-

There were no domestic beasts

The motive powers to manipulate his crude implements

came from mesalithic man 1 s

O\'1n

anatomy.

It was from the dexterity and

strength of his own back, arms, and hands that man marshalled the power
to slam his stone axe into the skull of a wild beast.

More than that,

it was his legs that prope11ed him on the hunt--and it was his sight,
hearing, and senses of smell, taste, and touch that enabled him to
navigate, avoid calamity while moving about, track and find the beast.

land the killing blow, and return the meat to his abode.

Finally, it

was his own mind that coordinated the entire episode according to the
techniques learned from his tools and his ancestors.

The hi story of techno1 ogi ca 1 development during the mill enni a that
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separate modern man from his mesol ithic ancestors is one of systematically
removing man from the processes by which he produces goods and services.

This has been accomplished by substituting tools for human effort in production processes.

The first great technological innovations created

opportunities to remove the muscles of man's legs, back, and arms as
primary sources of industrial power.

The second wave of technological

advance opened the way for removal of his skeletal frame, his manipulative dexterity, from industrial processes.

The third advancement made

it possible to remove man's voice and nervous systems, and the most

recent advances are opening opportunities to supplant man's brain as a
device for coordinating industrial activities.

so discreetly organized as they appear here.
another.

These advances are not

Rather, they overlap one

For example, research in power technology. the first stated

above, continues to produce new and revolutionary tools to the present.
Power Devices
The first major technological innovations were the initial steps
in a long series of advances toward removing man I s body as a source of
power in industrial processes.

They started at the outset of the neal ithic

period with the first human efforts to gain better control over the food
supply.

The effort advanced along two lines--the tillage of crops and the

domestication of animals.

The domestication of animals brought the meat

supply under man's dominion.

However, as animal husbandry merged with

crop tillage, domestic beasts came to be used as work animals as well as
for meat.

It was soon discovered that the oxen which suppl ied the primi-

tive·meal was also useful as a beast of burden.

The ox replaced man at

the draw of the plow, a primitive tool that was little more than a pointed
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stick.

The plow replaced the hoe as a tool for turning the soil in pre-

paration for planting.
wagons.

The ox also came into use to draw cargo sleds and

Eventually the ox gave way in western civilization to the horse

as the principal draft animal. 9
The substituti on of fi rst the ox and then the horse for man as the
source of industrial power had the effect all at once of freeing man for

other activities and of increasing the output-per-man-hour for those hours

of human labor devoted to production.

For example, an average draft horse

is capable of exerting 120 pounds of force at a velocity of 3.6 feet per
second for 432 foot-pounds per second of power or work.

This compares

with approximately 18 pounds of force exerted by a man turning a 'o'/inch
at a velocity of 2.5 feet per second for 45 foot-pounds per second of

work.

The average man can only produce about one-tenth the amount of

work as the average draft horse per unit of time (45 ; 432 = .104 or
10.4%).

The power of the ox or horse pulling the plow simply turned more

earth more rapidly than could be done by a single man.

The change to a

power technology based on draft animals was so significant and prevailed

so long that mechanical forms of power continue to be measured today in

draw-bar horse power or brake horse power. 10
The advance of technology did not stop with shifting the power load
from human muscular systems to those of domesticated draft animals.

Water

power and wind power were developed between 150 B.C. and 1500 A.D. to
operate grain, textile, and other mills and to propel cargo and passenger
vehicles and vessels.

Like the ox and the horse, wind and water power

have fallen into disuse in the face of power produced by mechanical
devices discovered and innovated since the eighteenth century.

Water

power continues to be significant only in the generation of electricity

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216
in a few regions of the world. ll
The next major advance in power technology occurred in England in
the eighteenth century when James Watt perfected a steam engine from a
reciprocating steam device developed earl ier by Thomas Savery and Thomas
Newcomen.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the steam engine

had been adapted to power pumps, ships, rail locomotives, electrical
power generators, and a variety of industrial mills.

The widespread

innovation of the steam engine made it possible to shift industrial
loads from the backs of draft animals and from the more 1 imiting wind- and

water-power devices to the more powerful and versatile mechanical power
units fueled by wood and fossil fuels. 12

The development and widespread use of internal combustion engines
marked the next major advance in power technology.

The first of these

was the reciprocating, gasoline-powered engine built in 1820 by

of Cambridge, England.

Brown. an English scientist.
in quantity.

~4.

Cecil

Cecil's engine was improved in 1823 by Samuel

The

Brown version was produced and sold

The reciprocating 9a501 ine engine has since been adapted

for use to power automobiles, aircraft, sma11 electrical-generating

plants, agricultural equipment and countless other units.

The diesel

engine, 9a501 ine turbine engine, jet engine, and rocket motor are all
internal-combustion engines developed and innovated subsequent to the
reci procating gaso1 ine-po~Jered engines. 13

Dr. William Gilbert, physician to Queen Elizabeth I, discovered
electricity in 1600 A.D. while examining the properties of magnets and
amber.

There have been many other persons associated thereafter with

discoveries built upon electricity--Benjamin Franklin, Luigi Galvani.
Alessandro Volta. Hans Christian Oersted, Andre Ampiere, Michael Faraday.
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and others.

It was Faraday who, in 1831, discovered electromagnetic

induction, the principle upon which the electric generator and the
electric motor are based.

These tools--the electric generator and the

electric motor--enable power to be transformed from such other forms as
fossil fuels, water and wind power, and nuclear energy into electrical
energy for transmission over wires to users and for further transformation into usable motive power.

For example, electricity might be gener-

ated by a generator or dynamo which is powered by water spill ing over a
dam.

The electricity is carried by transmission lines to users who

reconvert the electricity to power by use of an electric motor.

The

electric motor is, of course, connected to other industrial tools used by

the recipient to produce goods. 14
The most recent innovation in power technology is the nuclearfission reactor.

The nuclear reactor is coming into wider use for energiz-

ing large electrical-power generators.

It has also been used to replace

steam and internal combustion engines in ocean-going vessels.

Nuclear

technology remains very much inchoate with additional research pointing
toward development of so-called IIfast breeder ll fission reactors and the
possible development of .fusion reactors.

Finally, a great deal of

interest now centers on ways to harness the sun I s rays as a power source.
Likewise, more attention is given to possible ways of improving wind- and
water-power technologies and ways of developing geothermal potentialities.

These latter efforts anticipate the eventual depletion of fossil fuels
as sources of energy to fuel steam engines and internal-combustion engines.

The practical effect of emergent power technologies has been and
remains the extrication of man's muscular system as the source of physical
power in industrial processes.

As the power requirements of industry in
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agriculture was shifted from the body of neal ithic man to the bodies of
draft animals, so the power requirements of all industrial activities

were systematically shifted from the backs of oxen, horses, el ephants,
and other draft animals to wind- and water-power devices, to steam
engines, internal-combustion engines, and to electric motors powered by

electrical generators attached to one or more of the foregoing power
sources or by nue 1ear reactors.

Moreover, the physical power of man's body is less than puny when
compared to the physical powers of the various tools devised by man to

give motive power to his industrial processes.

For example. consider

the comparative transportation efficiency between a man on foot and a
modern jet aircraft.

If the purpose is simply to move one's self and

his baggage from Los Angeles to New York, there is clearly no contest.
The aircraft will accomplish the feat in a few hours with hardly any
human hardship.

The man afoot will take several months, and he will

endure great physical hardships.

The difference is the tool, the jet-

powered aircraft, which can move many people and their baggage in one
trip between the two cities in a few hours.

The powers of the tools

substituted for hUman effort utterly dwarf man's pitiful meagerness by

comparison.
Transmission Devices

The second wave of technological advance could as well be called
the first because it originated and developed concomitant with power

technologies.

Indeed, the devices here allocated to the second wave

complemented power devices by translating the forces created by the latter
into directed motion.

They are known in the realm of physics as simple
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machines--the wheel and a_x1e, the lever and fulcrum, the wedge (or inclined
plane), the pulley, the screw, and the gear.

These devices might be

called transmission or manipulative technologies because they transmit

force from the motor mechanism to the working component of a machine or
tool--much as manls skeletal structure transmits the force of his muscular

system in whatever he is doing.

Thus, the simple machines make it pos-

sible to remove much of man's manipulative dexterity from production

processes.
Evidences of simple machines are found in the works and arts of the

ancients.

Some simple machines have doubtlessly been in common use at

least since the early centuries of ancient Egypt.

For example, the prin-

cip1e of the lever is found as a sweep to lift >later from a well in
Egypt as early as 1550 B.C.

The works of Phi10n of Byzantium and

Vitrivius Pollio, the Roman architect, dating from the first century B.C.
contain some of the earliest descriptions of simple machines.

The Greek

scientist, Hero of Alexandria, authored works in mathematics, physics.
and mechanics during the third century A.D.

Herols writings contain care-

ful descriptions of the Simple machines corrunonly understood and used in

all forms of industrial activity today.15
A simple machine translates force into directed motion in some combination of force and motion called work.

Thus, if a fifty-pound weight

is 1 ifted vertically a distance of ten feet, 500 foot.-pounds of work have
been accomplished (10 feet X 50 pounds = 500 foot-pounds).

However, one

can lift the weight ten feet (ignoring friction; etc.) by employing a
force of only ten pounds in combination with any of the aforenamed simple
machines having a mechanical advantage of at least five--where mechanical
advantage is the ratio of the force exerted to the weight moved, or the
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ratio of the distance over which the force moves to the distance moved
by the weight.

The simple machine accomplishes this by substituting

motion for force, or force for motion.

That is, the ten-pound force

must move fifty feet to produce 500 foot-pounds of work, or enough work
to 1 ift the fifty-pound weight ten feet.

The simple machine is an

implement which enables this to be done. 16
Taking the wheel and axle as an example, it is found that a draft
horse pulling a loaded two-wheeled cart can move 1500 pounds over a level
surface at 3.6 feet per second produci ng 5400 foot-pounds of work per

second.

Recall ing from a previous example that an average draft horse

can produce 432 foot-pounds per second of work on a straight draw-bar

pull, it is seen that the wheel and axle under a cargo compartment harnessed to a horse has increased the power efficiency of the horse by more

than 12 times.

The mechanical advantage of the wheel and axle in this

example is probably something between eleven and twelve, taking account

of power lost to

friction~

etc.

By comparison, a man can move approx-

imately 225 pounds in a two-wheeled barrow at 1.66 feet per second for

work of 372 foot-pounds per second.

While this ;s an improvement over a

man simply carrying a burden, note that a man's work capability with a

two-wheeled conveyance is only about 6.9% of that produced by the horse

under similar conditions. 17
However, even the power of the horse ;s dwarfed by the immense
power of a diesel engine.

Such an engine linked by gears and other drive

mechanisms to the wheels of a locomotive can draw fifty or more rail cars,
each rolling on steel wheels and carrying a hundred or more tons of cargo
over steel rails across the breadth of a continent.

The combination of

power technology and the manipulative technology of simple machines has
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enormously multiplied mankind's capacity to accomplish work.

More than

that, these technologies have made it possible to remove the muscular
power and the structural dexterity of man's body from many of the productive processes by which mankind produces goods and services having human

value.
Control Devices
The third great advance came with the discovery and innovation of
communications technologies.

The tools arising from this advance have

made it possible to remove much of man's perceptual equipment, his nervous
system, and his voice from production processes.

Communication tech-

nOlogies have advanced most rapidly since the discovery and development

of electricity.

More specifically, modern tools of communication are

based on the electromagnet and the vacuum tube--or the vacuum tube's

modern descendants, the transistor and the integrated circuit.

The

entire world of electronic communication is built upon these tools.
William Sturgeon, an English electrician, invented the electromagnet
in 1823.

It is considered by many scientists to be the greatest inven-

tion of modern times.

And yet it is a simple device consisting of an

iron bar around which coils of insulated wire are wound.

The bar is not

magnetic until electrical current passes through the coil, and its magneti sm ceases as soon as the current stops.

The magneti c strength of the

electromagnet is a function of the size of the coil and the amount of
electrical current passing through the coil.

It is so sensitive to fluc-

tuations in current that it will precisely reproduce the voice and words
spoken into a telephone by a person at one end for a listener at the
other end of a circuit spanning many miles.
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The amazing electromagnet is unconsciously used many times each day
by everyone in the modern world.

All push-button switches are connected

to electromagnets (solenoids or relays) to control door bells, elevators,
traffic signals, self-opening doors, automobile starters, automatic
washers and dryers, and thousands of other implements in daily use.

It

is an essential component of all control devices in modern homes and in
offices and factories.

And it is a technical basis of all electrical

communication of sound and symbols by telephone, radio, intercom, and
tel e-typewriter. 18
Consider for a moment the use of an electromagnet in a simple,
servo-mechanism, the ordinary thermostat used to control heating units
in urban households.

The heat inside a dwelling was adjusted before the

thermostat by a person whose sense of feel detected a drop in the room
temperature.

When the temperature dropped sufficiently to cause discom-

fort, the person would place another log or shovel of coal on the fire.
If this produced too much heat, the person might open the damper on his

fire unit to allow more heat to escape up the chimney.

The point is that

the person's sensory apparatus was needed to detect the temperature
change.

His brain recognized the problem and transmitted instructions

over his motor nervous system to take appropriate action.

The needed

physical action was then taken by the person to correct the temperature
problem.
But no more.
process.

A servo-mechanism has entirely replaced man in this

The change in temperature is detected by a thermometer composed

of pieces of metal held apart by an adjustable plastic device.

As the

temperature drops, the metal contracts and warps until the pieces touch,
closing an electrical circuit wired to a solenoid (Dr electromagnet)
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in a furnace installed in some unobtrusive place in the home.

The ener-

gized solenoid turns on a switch to a motor powering a pump and igniter.
The pump forces oil through a nozzle, atomizing it in a firebox where the
igniter sets the oil afire.

The heat builds up in the firebox until

another thermostat, sensing the rising temperature ;n the firebox,

activates a fan which distributes the heat through a duct system to the
rooms requiring the heat.

When the temperature in the dwelling reaches

proper levels, the thermostat senses it and reverses the process to
extinguish the flame and inactivate the fan.

And the human occupants

are relieved of the burdens to sense temperature changes and take action

to make physical adjustments to the heating unit.

Moreover, the thermostat

is a slave which never tires and which operates with far greater precision

than any human sensory and motor nervous systems.
Impressive as its powers are, the electromagnet alone does not
account for the proliferating myriad of communication devices.

electromagnet is essentially a terminal device.
impulses to action.

The

It converts transmitted

The impulses are transmitted by other means--copper

wire, radio waves, etc.

Transmission by radio wave was made possible by

invention of the vacuum tube and its modern successors, the transistor
and the integrated circuit.
Many scientists working over a span of time invented the vacuum tube
and its variations.

1883.

The "Edison effect" was patented by Thomas Edison in

The effect was ignored until 1899 when Sir J. J. Thomson, a

British SCientist, offered what came to be an accurate explanation of

the Edison effect.

The effect was achieved by enclosing a small copper

plate near but not in contact with the filament inside an electric light

bulb.

When the plate is charged with positive electricity, the electrons

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

224

emitted by the energized 1 ight filament are attracted to the plate.

The

attraction continues so long as the filament is energized and heated to
the correct temperature.

The flow of electron current is the means by

which the gap between the plate and filament is bridged, closing the
circuit in the tube.

It was not until 1904 that Sir John Fleming, a British physicist,
produced a vacuum tube from the principles underlying the Edison effect.
Fleming's tube is a diode, a two-element device.

It is used today as a

rectifier to convert alternating current to direct current.

It was two

years later that Lee DeForest, an American engineer, created the triode
or audion tube by inserting a wire grid between the filament and plate of

the Fleming diode.

It is the DeForest triode that has been the basis of

all amplification in radio. television, radar, sound movies, electron
microscopes, photo transmission, calculators, computers, X-ray sets. and
scores of other electronic imPlements. 19
Radio, television, and all forms of wireless transmission occur when
sound and light waves are converted to electrical pulsations.
sations are much too weak to be transmitted.

Those pul-

The vacuum tube modulates

and amplifies the pulsations until they are millions of times more powerful and broadcasts them across the face of the earth and into space.

The

journey around the world actually takes less than a fiftieth of a second.
But when the amplified pulsations arrive a continent or more away, they
are once again too weak to register on video screens and speaker systems.
The vacuum tube in the receiver set once again ampl ifies the weak pulsations until they are powerful enough to energize the speaker and video
systems at the receiver end. 20
Prior to discovery and innovation of the vacuum tube, industrial
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data and cantrall ing responses had to be received through the sensory
organs and nervous systems of humans located at industrial sites, and
had to be transmitted through the motor nervous systems and voices of
the same persons.

That is, the measurement, recording, and analysis of

data, and the formulation and transmission of controlling reactions to
the data were all manual, immediate, and on site.

By the use of electronic

sensing devices and radio and television communication equipment, it is
now possible for persons on the earth to measure, record, and analyze
data from unmanned vehicles traveling millions of miles in space at
thousands of miles per hour and to control the vehicle direction, velocity, and much more.

The radio and television transmission and recep-

tion of data and commands are possible without the sensory and motor
nervous systems of man because the vacuum tube--or, more accurately, the
transistors and integrated circuits which are replacing vacuum tubes-performs the transmission functions both more accurately and at a tremendously greater range than is capable with man's innate physical endowments
alone.
The vacuum tube has taken many forms and was used wherever electrical current had to be rectified, modulated, or amplified.

The simple

Fleming valve, a diode, was elaborated into the triode, the pentode, the
photo-electric cell, and the many other variations used in electronic
devices.

However, important as it was to the invention of these signif-

icant devices, the vacuum tube is rapidly giving way to the transistor,
the discovery in 1948 of John Bardeen and Walter Brattain of the Bell
Laboratories in New York.

Transistors and integrated circuits are capable

of all that can be accompl ished by vacuum tubes and much more.

Moreover,

additional research is exploring the possible use of laser beams as a
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technique for transmitting electri cal pul sations. 21
The invention and development of radio, television, and the plethora

of other electronic devices which abound in modern industrial societies
depended upon other discoveries by many scientists--men like James Clark
Maxwell,. Heinrich Hertz, and Marchese Marconi for the radio, and Vladimir
Zworykin and Philo Farnsworth for television.

Nevertheless, all modern

electronic communication and calculating devices are based upon the
amazing electromagnet and the vacuum tube, and it was the discovery of
these technical implements which opened the way to the latter. 22
The discovery and innovation of communication technologies based
upon the vacuum tube and the electromagnet have revolutionized the production of goods and services by enabling people to coordinate and control
complex and widely-separated industrial processes from locations which
are mobile and far removed from those processes.

But more than

that~

communication technologies are resident in tools such as telephones,
radi as, and tel evi s ions, whi ch repl ace human sensory and motor nervous
systems in the creation of goods and services having human value.

Moreover,

those tools and the technologies resident in them are far more durable
and much more reliable than the human components which they replace in
industrial processes.
Thought Devi ces
The most recent wave of technical advance is the innovation of the
digital computer, a device that thinks.

The computer supplements and in

some cases completely replaces man l s brain in production processes.

The

computer, 1 ike the servo-mechanism described in the preceding section,
receives input and produces output.

However, the servo-mechanism simply
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measures a single input against predetermined and rigid parameters and

produces a single output as a reaction to the measured input.

The

servo-mechanism is a simple reaction device within a closed feedback

loop.

It is a very simple form of an analogue computer.

The digital

computer, by contrast, can be programmed to process complex bodies of
input data from diverse sources and to produce output choices according

to

the controlling program.

Moreover, the program can be written to

produce many different combinations of output from a given body of data.
The digital computer is a true thinking device.
Electronic data processing (EDP), as it is performed on a digital
computer, is based upon the binary numeri c system.

The system uses a

base of two and consists of only two digits--zero and one.

The digits

translate as no and yes, or stop and go, or on and off, or reject and
accept in electronic data processing.

The binary system was elaborated

in Principia Mathematica. a pioneering work in symbolic logic produced
in the early part of the twentieth century by the philosophers Bertrand

Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. 23
Application of the binary system in electronic data processing was

pioneered in the late 1940s by the Eckert-Mauchly Company.

The

e1 ectroni c components of the Eckert-MauchlY computer were vacuum tubes.
Eckert-r~auchly

was purchased by the Remmington Rand Corporation (now

Spery-Rand) in the early 19505.

International Business Machines

Corporation, which had an early background in punch-card tabulating
machines, entered the field in 1953 and gained a clear and enduring

lead in electronic data processing by 1956.

The vacuum tubes of the

early Eckert-Mauchly computer have long since given way to transistors
and integrated circuits in modern digital computers. 24
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All computers consist of input and output hardware connected to
central processing units (CPU).

Input hardware and software are imple-

ments and techniques for translating man-readable data to machinereadable data and for reading the data into the computer's CPU for processing.

The input side of the computer is analogous to the perceptual

apparatus and sensory nervous system of man.

The output hardware are

implements for translating data processed by the CPU from machine-readable language to man-readable language for practical application.

The

output hardware is analogous to the motor nervous system and the communication and action extremities of man's body.

The functions of the sensory

and motor nervous systems were described under "control devices" above.

The heart of any computer is its central processing unit.

The

central processing unit is analogous to the brain of man, and it

functions to process data read into it through the input hardware and
to feed the processed data to the output hardware.

The CPU of a digital

computer consists of doughnut-shaped, magnetic cores each of which is

smaller than the head of a pin.

The cores are organized into core

planes which are stacked horizontally or vertically.

Each core can be

placed in two possible states, magnetized or not magnetized.

Or they

can be magnetized in two possible directions--clockwise or counter
clock~/ise.

The magnetized cores therefore operate in a program

language like IIgates" in a fence system to control the information in

the process.

The two magnetic states correspond to the two digits of

the binary system--zero and one.

For this reason, a core state is

called a bit--short for binary digit. 25

The bit can signal no or yes,

stop or start, reject or accept, etc. as well as zero and one.
There are, of course, other ways to wire a CPU. A recent innovation
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involves integrated circuits built into sil icon, a semiconductor.

A

single silicon chip small enough to hold in the palm of the hand may contain as many as 30,000 electronic parts.

This innovation holds the pros-

pect of revolutionizing electronic data processing because it has increased
computer speeds--100,OOO,OOO instructions per second and retrieval times
of 1/4,000,000 of a second.

It is significantly reducing the size of com-

puter storage units, with an attending reduction in their costs.

Whatever

the wiring method, computer memories operate on the binary principle, and
a core magnetic state is called a bit.
A computer core is analogous to a neuron cell in the human brain.
A human brain is estimated to contain approximately ten bill ion neuron
cells which. rea.ct like computer electronic cores by transmitting excitatory
or inhibitory electrical impulses to other neurons.
be connected to as many as 10,000 others.

Each neuron cell may

Most researchers believe that

human learning is related in some way to the number and strength of interneuron-cell connections. 26

Of course, the number of cares in a computer

CPU is only a small fraction of the number of neuron cells in a human
brain.

The neuron cells are numbered in the billions while computer cores

are numbered in the thousands.
Just as neuron ce 11 s are connected wi th one another, so computer

cores are further organized in one of several different combinations
depending upon the computers and programming systems used.

One common

system divides the CPU into segments of eight adjacent cores.

An eight-

core segment is called a byte and can have 256 different combinations of

magnetic core states.

The various combinations of magnetic-core states--

zeroes and ones--in a byte are known as the Extended Binary Coded Decimal
Interchange Code (EBCDIC).

Each particular code is assigned to an
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alphabetic, numeric, or special character.

Each byte, (indeed, each bit)

can be addressed separately in a program using the EBCDIC code.

It is

therefore possible to encode anything known by man, and represented by
alphabetic, numeric, or other symbols and to place it in a computer CPU-subject, of course, to the physical core 1imitations of the computer.
A portion of the CPU cores of any computer is given over to a control unit while other parts are allocated to a main storage unit (memory),
and an arithmetic-logic unit (ALU).

The control unit contains the computer

program, and it functions to interpret the program instructions placed in

the computer by the programmer and to direct the actions of other units
of the computer.

It initiates execution of computer programs.

mits data into and out of the main storage unit.

It trans-

It appl ies the arith-

metic-logic from the ALU to process data according to program instructions.
And it initiates input and output devices.
The arithmetic-logic unit of the CPU is in essence a calculator.
It is an electronic calculator in a true digital computer and it consists

of a series of electronic storage units (registers) and other circuits
capable of performing mathematical operations.
nomographic device in an analogue computer.

The ALU may be a

An analogue computer is to

a digital computer as a slide rule is to an electronic calculator.

And

as the electronic calculator is more precise and more rapid than a slide

rule, so the digital computer is both more accurate and more versatile
than an analogue computer.

The ALU suppl ies the patterns of logic by

which data from main storage are processed according to the program instructions in the control unit of the CPU.
The main storage, or memory, occupies whatever cores remain in the

CPU after allocation of cores to the control unit and the ALU. The main
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storage unit is used to hold bath reference data required to execute the
computer program (tables of constants, cades, etc.) and variable data
for processing.

Since all information handled by the computer must pass

through the CPU, the CPU must have sufficient care capacity to handle
control unit and ALU requirements as well as to stare all data needed in
the program under process.
The relatively small number of cares which may be built into a computer CPU at the present state of technical development poses a restriction an computer use.

For example, it requires 40 cares to write a five-

letter ward using the EBCDI code described above--one byte per letter and
eight cores per byte.

Thus, one can effectively store fewer than 25,

five-letter wards in one thousand cores in the main storage.

At the

present mast computers have less than 1000-K (1,000,000) storage units or
bytes in the CPU.
The paucity of care capacity has been partly overcame by creating
shorter codes and by devising auxil ;ary storage hardware.

The Binary

Coded Decimal (BCD) system uses six consecutive cares to represent 64
different characters.

The American Standard Code for Information Exchange

(ASCIE) uses seven consecutive cares to represent 128 symbols.

Auxiliary

or secondary storage of data is achieved by use of sequential access media
in the farm of magnetic tape, or direct access media in the farm of data
cells, magnetic drums, and magnetic disks.

The CPU accesses auxiliary

storage through a technique called sequencing so that the auxil iary storage capacity is thought of as "virtual memory

II

because it is easily

accessible to the main storage unit of the CPU. 27
Whatever the limitations of computers, their powers and potentialities in production activities are impressive.

Examples of effective use
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of computers abound in the worlds of business and government.

One of

many examples that might be cited is the experience of Lockheed, one of
the worl d's 1eaders in aircraft and aerospace manufacturing.

Lockheed

had used computers since the early 1950s for such things as calculating
trajectories and designing airborne and space vehicles.

In 1958, Lockheed's Missiles and Space Division sought a system
capable of cantrall ing its production.

The division's production accounted

for approximately 40% of Lockheed's total employment.

The plants at

Sunnyvale and Van Nuys, California had between 40,000 and 60,000 different
items in different stages of simultaneous production.

Ranging from min-

iscule electronic devices to entire space vehicles, each item had its own
production schedule.

Moreover. the specifications of many items were

often altered after they were well into production.

A staff of more than

600 expediters was required to monitor and control this complex production

maze.

After more than a year of study, Lockheed settled on R.C.A. data
gathering components which could be connected with ordinary telephone

wire and coupled with computer hardware.

The outcome was what Lockheed

called its Automatic Data Acquisition system (ADA).

The system is a

ureal time" one, meaning that access to the computer is random and

immediate from the 260 input stations located around the plants, and

that constantly updated output can be obtained from any enquiry station.
The system works by reading each item of material entering the
plants into computer memory.

An employee records each time the item is

moved or worked by inserting his card and punching appropriate variable
data into the nearest input station.

The computer, therefore, knows at

all times where an item is, who has worked on it, and the wage cost of
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the work performed.

The computer also controls inventory on common items,

calculating control levels and reordering when stocks drop below reorder
points.

More than simply

co~nting

items, the computer acts heuristically,

making judgments about usage factors, etc.

By 1965, ADA had accomplished

the following:
It saved more than $2,000,000 per year against an original onetime development and installation cost of only $2,300,000.

The saving

was achieved by the discharge of 400 expediters and 200 clerks who were
no longer needed to control production.
It enabled Lockheed to accurately forecast manpower and plant needs
by providing timely and accurate production-machine and manpower costs.

Supervisors tended to conceal the real output and capacities of their
departments under the old system by averaging out workloads over the work
week.

With ADA, management knows exactly how long each job takes and

how much work a department can perform on any day or week.
Line employees readily accepted ADA because they felt that they
were able to corrununicate directly to the top management without the

sometimes prejudiced interpretations of their immediate supervisors.
Work in progress could be located irrunediately to incorporate the
frequent engineering changes inherent to the rapidly changing aerospace
world.

It was not uncommon under the former system to occupy an expediter

two or more days simply trying to locate an item subject to engineering

change .
. Ready access to the qual ity and cost of goods purchased in the
past enabled purchasing agents to make more rapid and accurate decisions

about what, how much, and where to buy.

Under the ADA system, inven-

tories could be kept at optimum levels.
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Finally, ADA relieved top management of superfluous details by com-

pressing data and supplying only "exception information!! or information
requiring action by top management. 28
The results obtained by Lockheed's ADA are characteristic of results
generally achieved by successful management appl ications of computer

systems "in government and business.

The surface has only been scratched

in the possible uses of computers in planning and cantrall ing production

processes.

The chief advantages of computers over antecedent manual

techniques are speed and accuracy in information retrieval and processing.
That is, the computer is superior to the human brain in sifting and

evaluating large. complex bodies of data to reach conclusions and make
choices.

The natural consequence is that computers are being brought

into more and more uses to augmer"· hUman brain power or to replace it
altogether in some cases.
The use of the computer is only the most recent in a series of
technological advances commencing at the advent of the neolithic revolu-

tion and having the effect of removing the physique of man from production processes.

To be sure, man 1 s body has not and perhaps will never

be totally unburdened with productive 1abor.

But the mi 11 ennia between

mesol ithic man and modern man are witness to an unburdening of fantastic
magnitude.
The first advance was the commencement of a revol ution in power

technology which continues to the present day and which has had the effect
of substituting power devices--draft animals, water and wind power, fossilfuel powered engines, electrical energy, and nuclear power--for man 1 s
muscular systems in production processes.

The second stage of technical

advance involved the innovation of transmission or manipulative
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techno10gies--the wheel and axle, the lever and fulcrum, the inclined
plane or wedge, the pulley, the screw, and the gear.

The effect of the

second stage was to reduce reliance on man's skeletal structure for the
transmission of force in production processes.

The third great advance

occurred with discovery and innovation of control devices based upon the

electromagnet and the vacuum tube.

This advance shifted much of the

control of production processes from man' 5 perceptual endowments, and his
sensory and motor nervous systems to electronic tools.

And the last

per~

ceptible advance has commenced in the last thirty years, and it involves
the use of computers in production decision-making.

This last advance

has only begun, but it holds the prospect of at least partially supplanting man I 5 brain in production processes.

The total effect of these technological advances has been to remove
man more and more from the mundane, day-to-day labors of production while
substantially increasing the productive powers of society--both as to the

quantity and quality as well as the tremendous diversity of goods and
services available to all of society.

This has been possible because of

the technology resident in the tools which have been substituted down
through the ages of man for human labor in the creation of goods and
services having human value.

It has been the purpose of this chapter to precisely define technology in a new and different way and to justify that definition in terms
of institutional economic theory.

The concl usion is that technology is

that quality of a tool which enables it to be substituted for human effort
in the creation of any good or service having human value.

This has

required a distinction between tools and other artifacts of material

culture.

And it has made the tool, broadly defined, the repository of
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technology as well as the harbinger of the material progress attributed
to technology.

It has mandated a distinction between the techno10gy-

embodying tool and the hUman skill applying technique in the employment
of the tool.

Finally it has been necessary to briefly outline enough

history of technical advance to demonstrate that the unique character of
technology is its power to facilitate the sUbstitution of tools for

human labor in production processes.
While the social consequences of technologies have been broadly
implied here and there in. the foregoing discourse, they have not been
examined in any explicit or systematic way.

It has been more than suf-

ficient to deal here with the attributes of technology alone.

It remains

for the next chapters to briefly examine social questions surrounding
technology--How is it discovered?

When is it innovated?

What are its

soc i a1 consequences?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

237

END NOTES, CHAPTER VI

'The institutional economic theory in this chapter draws from Ayres,
Theory of Economic Progress, pp. 98-108.
2Cf . Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change, (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 10-11. Fairchild, Dictionary
of Sociology, p. 317.

31n all the works of Commons, Dewey, and Veblen previously mentioned,
there is no definition of technology. Ayres is almost as circumspect.
However, he does associate technology, tools, and human skill in at least
one place. His definition of technology appears to be skill organized
by too 1s. Theory of Economi c Progress, pp. 105-108 ff.
4Abbott Payson Usher, A History of Mechanical Inventions, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1959), p. 116.
5Childe, Man Makes Himself, p. 64.

6Sherwood L. Washburn, "Tools and Human Evolution,1I Scientific
American, CCII (September, 1960).
7Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier; Agriculture, 18601897, (Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 140-47.

8wayne D. Rasmussen and Gladys L. Baker, "Programs for Agriculture,
1933-1965," in Agricul tura 1 Pol icy in an Affl uent Soci ety; An Introduction to a Current Issue of Public Policy, ed. by Vernon W. Ruttan, Arley
D. Waldo, and James P. Houck, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969),

pp. 69-88.
9Childe, Man Makes Himself, pp. 59-86.
lOUsher, History of Mechanical Inventions, p. 156.

llJerome S. Meyer, Great Inventions, (New York: Pocket Books, Inc.,
1962), pp. 23-30.

12Meyer, Great Inventions. pp. 88-98.
l3 Ibid , pp. 98-130.
l4 Ibid , pp. 131-55.

l5~, pp. 9-22.

Usher, History of Mechanical Inventions, pp. 120-23.

l6See the chapter deal ing with mechanics in any high-school physics
textbook.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238
17usher, Historl of Mechanical Inventions, p. 157.
18Meyer, Great Inventions, pp. 155-81.
19 Ibid , pp. 185-94, 218-29.
20 Ibid , pp. 193-94.
21 Ibid, pp. 270-72.
22 Ibid , pp. 201-217.
23Gil bert Burck, The Computer Age; And Its Potential for Management,
(new York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 129.
24 Ibid , pp. 81-82.
25Jehosua Friedmann, Philip Greenberg, and Alan M. Hoffberg,
Fortran IV, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975), pp. 3-4.

26Burck, Computer Age, pp. 126-27.
27Friedmann, et al, Fortran, pp. 3-19.
28surck, Computer Age, pp. 39-42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VI I
TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM
The preceding chapter commenced with the question:

What are the

underlying causes of institutional instability. change, and discontinuity~

and what are the consequences for the city?

The tentative answer

was that the innovation of new technologies tends to be unstabil izing
to institutional environments. and institutions along with their underlying value beliefs change as they react toward the new technologies.

And since institutions are principally domiciled in cities, and since

cities are creatures of the institutions that populate them, cities
al so change with the urgings of new technologies.

Chapter VI did not directly address the question or provide an
answer.

Rather, the chapter laid the foundation for an answer by

precise1y defining technology, technique, and hUman skill.

The

conclusions were that technology is that qual ity of a tool which enab1es
it to be substituted for human effort in the creation of any good or
service having human value; that technique is the procedure or method
by which a tool is put into operation or employed to perform the
productive services for which it was designed; and that technica1 skill

is the human capability of applying technique to the use of tools in
the creation of goods and services having human value.
This chapter starts an el aboration of the suggested answer to the
above question.

The main ideas are that technologies and the tech-

niques which they mandate are continuous, dynamic, and progressive.

By
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continuous, it is meant tha,t technologies are based on scientific understanding, and current scientific understanding ;s cumulative and is

founded squarely upon all past discoveries.

By dynamic, it is meant

that the innovation of new technologies is unstabilizing to society

because it organizes means (including productive labor) and opens ways
of distributing social products in ways differing from the ceremonially
prescribed methods descending from the past.

By progressive, it is

meant that the integration and diffusion of new technologies is forwardurging in terms of the ends-means continuum.

The remainder of this chap-

ter expands the first two of these propositions more fully.
TECHNOLOGICAL CONTINUITY

This section takes up the first stated proposition above--that techoology ;s continuous in terms of the ends-means continuum.

The dynamic

and progressive qualities of technology are examined in subsequent sections and chapters.

Technological continuity relates to where new tech-

nology originates and how it ;s invented. while technological dynamism
relates to change or how new technology is innovated.

And the progressive

nature of new technology has to do with the social integration and dif-

fusion of technology.
Technology and Science
To say that technology is continuous is simply to say that the discoveries of new scientific insights upon which the invention of new technical means rests is cumulative.

New scientific insights involve discover-

ing the existence of something which had been in existence before but had
not been previously observed.

Invention of new technical means involves
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a deliberate change or adjustment in objects or practices so that a new
kind emerges.

it.

Invention is always built on the discoveries that precede

That is, invention of technical means is always based on scientific

understanding where that understanding consists of systematized knowledge,

and the latter results from the critical testing and verification of
hypotheses which purport to link events causally.

It is scientific

understanding that is cumul ative. l
It is argued by some that the linkage between technology and science
is very tenuous. 2 According to this view, knowledge is the concern of

pure science while use is the concern of technology.

Moreover. the dis-

covery of new scientific principles is not an essential precondition to
the invention of new technical means.

Finally, it is said that early

technical discoveries were made by practical men not by men of science.
and that little practical use was made of so-called scientific knowledge
until the mid-nineteenth century.

It can be shown that none of these

arguments obviates the nexus between technology and science.
If knowledge is the concern of pure science and use is the concern
of technology, it must follow that science has no concern with practical
use and technology has no concern with knowledge.

Such a view must rest

on the notion that knowledge and use are exclusive terms.

It might be

demonstrated that knowledge may exist independently of its expected uses.
However. past and present practical uses of knowledge is a substantial part of the body of scientific understanding.

Therefore. science

cannot and does not ignore practical uses because it employs existing
understanding to beget additional knowledge, and the uses to which knowledge is put is one form of understanding which science uses in the propagation of so-called new knowledge.
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Moreover, knowledge is a necessary requisite to practical use or

appl ication.
practical way.

uses.

Indeed, virtually all knowledge is ultimately used in some
In that sense, knowledge anticipates or even mandates

Which is to say that practical uses grow out of knowledge.

An

important contention in the preceding chapter is that tools which embody
technology are important sources of knowledge.

Thus, technology is both

founded on knowledge and is a significant part of the scientific body
of knowledge.

It follows that both science and technology are concerned

with both knowledge and use or application.

Science;s concerned with

the discovery of knowledge while technology is directed toward the uses
or applications of knowledge.

Science involves the applications of

knowledge to propagate new knowledge, while technology involves the
employment of knowledge to new applications.
It is argued that the discovery of new scientific principles is
not a necessary precondition for the invention of new technical means,

and that technology is therefore not clearly related to science.
However, the contention in no way mitigates against the proposition that

all technology is founded on scientific understanding.
simply non seguitof to the former.
based on new knowledge.

The latter is

New technological means need not be

It can merely be a new application of already

existing scientific understanding--as, indeed, much new technology is.
Likewise it is argued that so-called practical men (and presumably
not the men of science) made the important technical discoveries before
the mid-nineteenth century.

Here again, the connections between science

and technology are supposedly blurred.

The argument is apparently based

on the unduly restrictive definition of science as only that knowledge
which is discovered and systematized through formal research employing
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the so-called scientific method.

If one accepts that definition, then

only those persons who conduct research may be classified as men of
science.

All others must be placed in other classes.

On the other hand, if one defines science as systematized knowledge,
however it comes to be accepted, then the foregoing classification is

invalid and the argument is defeated.

For example, some systematized

knowledge was critically tested and verified by ordinary practice.

And

yet. such knowledge is accepted by the scientific community without
dispute.

Is it then less scientific than systematized knowledge that

was originally tested and verified by research in a laboratory?
There is no reason why practical men cannot be scientists, or that
scientists cannot be practical men.

Indeed, the history of science

largely ascribes a high degree of practicality to early scientists.

And

it would seem that modern research scholars achieve greater successes
because they also possess practical skills and knowledge of a practical
sort.

Research ski 11 5 and knowl edge of sci enti fi c methods are genuinely

practical whether or not one is carrying on scientific research.

Finally, it is argued that little practical use was made of so-called
scientific knowledge until the middle of the last century, and that there
is therefore no clear connection between science and technology.

The

argument is based upon the same restrictive definition of science--that
only knowledge discovered and systematized through formal research is
scientific knowledge.

However, if scientific knowledge includes all

systematized knowledge, then this argument is also defeated.
Moreover, the enormous acceleration in technical progress since
the last century, when scientific understanding became the clear and
evident basis of practical applications, further
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vindicates the notion that science and technology are inextricably and
positively related.

Thus the nexus between science and technology remains

distinct.

That is, all technical means are based on scientific under-

standing.

And scientific understanding is continuous and cumulative.

It

follows that technology is likewise continuous and cumulative.
Cumulative Synthesis
An example of the cumulative nature of scientific understanding is

the history of electrical discovery and the invention of tools based on
pri ncipl es of el ectricity.

Sal i ent features of that history were exposed

in the preceding chapter.

However, it is useful to draw some of the events

out in summary to underscore the continuous nature of technology.

It is recalled that Dr. William Gilbert discovered the existence
of electricity in 1600 A.D.

While it remained a scientific curiosity for

more than 200 years, much was added to the understanding of electricity

by other men.

It was not until 1823 that William Sturgeon invented the

electromagnet.

The invention of this 1 ittle device opened way for the

creation of a multitude of tools for control of other implements and for
communication.

Indeed, all modern communication and control devices use

electromagnets in some way.
Eight years later, in 1831, Michael Farraday discovered the principle of electromagnetic induction upon which electric motors and electricpower generators are based.

The subsequent invention, innovation, and

diffusion of electrical generators and motors has made possible the
invention of all kinds of mechanical tools, the development of which
would have been impossible without electromagnetic induction.

Thomas Edi son invented the incandescent 81 ectri c-l i ght bul b in 1879.
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While tinkering with his invention he stumbled on the electrical phenomenon which led to the discovery of the vacuum tube.

Lee DeForest invent-

ed the triode, a variation of the vacuum tube, in 1906.
vacuum tube led to invention of the radio by Marconi.

The DeForest
Subsequent devel-

opment of the vacuum tube led to the invention of television and digital
computers, both of which have become widely used only since World War II.
The di scoveries which 1 ed to greater sci enti fi c knowl edge about

electricity and its properties were continuous at least from the time of
Dr. !;illiam Gilbert.

Each new discovery was built upon the previous

expans; cns of knowledge.

Thus, causal rel ationshi ps whi ch were

di scovered in the past became means to future di seover; es.

Moreover,

the knowledge was cumulative insofar as each new generation of discovery
made a net addition to the pool of scientific knowledge.

Finally, the

expansions of knowledge were geometrical ;n that. like a free electron

in a critical atomic mass, each new discovery led to more than one

additional invention or application.

All of which says little about the psychological process of invention.

There are many theories of invention.

One extreme holds that

some persons are uniquely endowed with superior intellectual powers and
talents which enable them to excel in creative inSights.

An opposite

extreme posits that invention is a coalescing of events which arranges
matters so that the invention is inevitable and the inventor was simply
fortunate enough to fall into the coal escent situation at a crucial
time.

Invention is a very complex matter and it is likely that no

single, Simple explanation will fit every inventive situation.
Nevertheless, persons who have studied the inventive process
theorize that it occurs in four distinct steps.

The first step is the
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perception of a problem--an unfilled want.

The second step involves

assembly of the data or elements needed to solve the problem.

This must,

of course, inciude an individual with the skills needed to manipulate

the other elements toward solution.

The third step is an act of creative

insight in which a novel solution to the problem is conceived.

The last

step is one of critical revision in which the solution is elaborated and

embellished.

The solution to one problem leads to new sets of problems

so that the process is repeated in what is called a

Il

cumu lative synthesis U

until a "strategic invention" ;s developed. 3
An example of this process, especially novelty in the act of insight,
is evident in the words of James Watt.

Watt had been studying the New-

comen steam engine for about two years.

I had gone to take a walk on a fine Sabbath afternoon. I had
entered the Green and passed the old washing house. I was thinking
of the engine at the time. I had gone as far as the Ord' shouse
when the idea came into my mind that as steam is an elastic body
it would rush into a vacuum, and if a connection were made between
the cylinder and an exhausting vessel it would rush into it and
might there be condensed without cooling the cylinder. I then saw
that I must get rid of the condensed steam and injection water if
I used a jet, as in the Newcomen engine. Two ways of doing this
occurred to me: First. the water might be run off by a descending pipe, if an offlet could be got at a depth of 35 or 36 feet,
and any air might be extracted by a small pump. The second was
to make the pump large enough to extract both water and air . . .

I had not walked farther than the Golf house when the whole thing

was arranged in my mind. 4

Of course, much work remained before Watt could construct a working
model of his novel concept.

However, the example illustrates how Watt's

creative insight was based on elements previously discovered by others-the engine invented by Newcomen, the idea that steam ;s an elastic body,
use of a pump which was the product of novel inSights by others, etc.
Moreover, Watt's invention produced a practical, working steam engine,
but it was only one step in a process of cumulative synthesis which opened
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the way to others who subsequently improved the efficiency of the steam
engine by their own inventive insights.
Technological Cross Fertilization
One additional significance is to be noted.
gain access to those sundry bits of information.

Watt had somehow to
This was no simple feat,

since nearly instantaneous communication and enormous banks of information
and data did not exist in his day.

On the contrary, information which now

may be transmitted and received half way around the world in less than a
second to~k several months to travel the same distance under the very best
of conditions in Watt's day.

Moreover, crucial information was rarely"

to be found by simply finding the right book in the nearest library.

Where

then did the inventors, like Watt, of Western Europe gain the information
that sparked their ingenuities?
It was a nearly unique conspiration of circumstances which led to
the inventions, innovations, and diffusions of technological implements
in Western Europe resulting in the renaissance, the reformation, and ultim-

ately in industrialization and urbanization of the Western World.

Tech-

nological advance emerged in the !Iest from two essential conditions.

The

first was technological cross-ferti1 ization which introduced diverse
technical devices into Europe from other places at crucial times.
second condition was a social c1 imate conducive to innovation.

The

This

latter condition is the subject of a subsequent section of this chapter.
It is the former condition which is appropriate to the matter at hand.
Technological cross fertilization involves the diffusion of component
techno1ogies--somehow bringing together diverse technical devices in the
same place and time so that the immediacies and proximities of the devices
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provoke the curious, stimulate their ingenuities, and lead them toward
creative insights as to novel technical combinations of the devices.

This is accompl ished in modern times by the publ ication of research
results which has the effect of cormnunicating new scientific discoveries

so they can be critically examined and used by other scholars.

However,

as noted above, these arrangements did not exist until relatively recent

times.

How then did it occur in medieval and renaissance Europe?5

Technological cross fertilization occurred in Western Europe as a

consequence of at least three significant, interconnected series of
diffusive events.

The first was the repeated invasions from the east,

north, and south endured off and on for at least 2,000 years by the

peoples of Western Europe.

The second was the aggressive responses of

the Europeans themselves to threats to their holy places by the Moslem
Turks.

The third was the resumption of East-West trade during the fif-

teenth century A. D.
The repeated invasions of Western and Central Europe by the Huns,
Turks, and Mongols from the East, the Carthaginians, Romans, and Arabs

from the South, and the Vikings from the North brought European tribes
forcefully into contact with wi dely-di vergent cultures.

Whil e the

Europeans feared and resisted the barbarian invaders, they were brought
face to face with both technological and ceremonial aspects of the foreign

cultures.

They doubtlessly had cause to carefully compare the instru-

mentalism of the strange technologies with that of their own, and sometimes the tools of the invaders were found to be superior to their own.

Occupation of the Holy Land (Palestine) by the Moslem Turks in the
e1 eventh century gave ri se to the viol ent responses of Chri stendom known
as the Crusades.

Christianized Europeans responded eight times during
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the 300 years between the tenth and fourteenth centuries to calls by their
religious leaders to liberate the Holy Lands from the infidels.

More

than anything else, the Crusades mark the end of the Dark Ages and the
beginning of the Renaissance in Europe.

This time the invading Europeans

found themselves immersed in the oriental cultures of the Mtddle East,
and they acquired tastes for Eastern products and Oriental art which
could not be satisfied in their homelands.
The thirst for Oriental culture heightened by the Crusades led to
resumption and expansion of trade between Europe and the Far Eastern
empires.

While the COrTD11erce was in fine fabrics, spices, and objects of

Oriental art, trading brought other aspects of cultures together.

Again,

the Europeans were able to measure the powers of their own technologies
against that of their trading partners.

And once again, the Europeans

discovered aspects of Oriental technologies complementary or superior to

their own. 6
The many centuries of invasions by foreigners, the three centuries

of the Crusades, and the resumption and expansion of trade between Europe

and the Far East in the centuries following the Crusades brought together
in Western Europe the conditions needed to launch the mechanical power
phase of the industrial revolution.

The technological cross fertil ization

which took place, particularly between the eighth and twelfth centuries
A.D. resulted ;n the diffusion ;n Europe of many implements and ideas
from other areas of the world.

The Europeans learned of numerals from

the Arabs and zero from the Hindus.

They borrowed foot stirrups, the

-breast harness for horses, paper, moveable type, gun powder, the magnetic
compass, and windmills from China.

From the Vikings they learned the

skill of tacking into the wind with their sail ing ships and of rudders
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to steer the shi ps.
It was immersion in a cross-fertilized technical environment which
sparked the ingenuity of inventive men like Watt.

And it was their

ingenuities operating in such an environment that led to creative insights
and novel solutions to the scientific and technical problems of their
times.

It was the whole process of cumulative synthesis that produced the

inventions upon which technological progress was and is founded.

Finally,

the process of cumulative synthesis demonstrates the cumulative character
of science.

Since technology is based on scientific understanding, tech-

nology is continuous.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This section of the chapter examines the dynamic character of technology.

Dynamism is simply the propensity toward motion in anything.

It is the opposite of static which is simply the propensity toward rest
in anything.

changeless.

To call a body static is to regard it as motionless or

When one refers to the dynamic quality of technology, he is

essentially regarding the power of technology to induce

~hange.

Tools and Change
It is recalled once more from the preceding chapter that technology
is that qual ity of a tool which enables the tool to be substituted for
human effort in the creation of goods and services having human value.
Likewise, it was argued in the same chapter that tools are forward-looking in the temporal and homomensura senses.

That is, the use of tools is

part of a process of change.
Tools are ends-to-be-reached before they are produced.

They exist
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there is a deliberate human choice coupled with actions to allocate means
to their production.

Thus, the creation of tools is forward-regarding in

terms of on-going life processes.

After tools are created, they are the

present effects of the past causes that created them, and they are part
of the present means to ends which lie in the future.

Finally, theyare

deliberately brought into use to change existing states of affairs.

That

is, they are always employed in the present to attain some future end-to-

be-reached.

Thus the employment of tools is likewise forward-looking in

terms of on-going life processes.

Tools are therefore implements of

change, and their powers of change depend on the technologies resident in

them.
It is worthwhile to observe that changes will occur in people and

their environments whether or not they possess or use tools.

One will

starve to death if he does not consume food whether or not he produces
the food through tool use.

Climates change annually and geological

changes occur usually over relatively long spans of time whether or not

people use tools.
use tools.

Individuals grow older day by day whether or not they

Iron rusts, copper corrodes, and wood decays whether or not

people use tools.

All of which is to say that in the very long run there

are no truly static situations.

Rather. there are only relative states

of dynamism, and the dynamism of so-called nature is heavily weighted on
the side of what man can only view as decline and decay.

tools and technology will therefore not stop change.

To repudiate

It will only reduce

man's ability to influence change in his own interests.
Mankind. like all living creatures. seeks to enhance his own welfare
by controlling the direction and magnitude of change.

His capacity to
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influence' change is obviously related to the quantity and quality of the
tools,he uses and the intensities with which he uses them.

From this,

one can conceive of at least three separate scenarios of change.

The

first has to do with the intensity with which society uses the existing
stock of tools.

The second is the rate at which net additions are made

to the existing stock of tools, assuming no qualitative changes.

The

third is the rate at which the technical qual ity of tools is changed.
Technical quality relates, of course, to the ability of a tool to substitute for human effort in production processes.

Thus, the third scenario

concentrates on technol ogica 1 change.
One can also think in terms of a fourth scenario of change, a composite of the three separate scenarios; the rates at which both the

quantity and quality of tools are increased, and the intensity of use of
existing tools.

This is more realistic because all three scenarios are

playing more or less simultaneously most of the time in most societies.
However, it is useful to separate the scenarios for purposes of study.
The focus of this section is on the third scenario, the one dealing

with technological change.

It is acknowledged that the preceding two

scenarios--intensity of tool use and net increases to the stocK of tools-will reflect social changes.

The principal changes with scenarios one

and two are economic and pol itical adjustments within existing institutional arrangements.

That is, they are very unl ;kely to trigger forces

with the power and direction to affect any significant institutional
changes.

On the other hand, the third scenario reveals the root causes

of social revolutions.

That is, technical change is most likely to

trigger forces with the power and direction to affect significant institutional changes.

It is. therefore. technological change which has the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253

greatest dynami sm.
Focusing then on the third scenario, it is argued that the innovation of new techno10gy--to improve the technical qualities of tools so
tools substitute for more units of labor in production--is socially unstabilizing because it organizes means (divides labor) and opens ways of
distributing social products differing from the ceremonially-prescribed
methods descending from the past.

It therefore opens opportunities to

change prior existing social statuses and ceremonial systems of rank, and
it affords new avenues of social mobility.

The roots of social revolu-

tion are therefore grounded in the innovation of new techno10gies--techno10gies that increase productivity in terms of output per man-hour.
Revolutions occur when technological innovation changes interinstitutional relationships such that one or more institutions cease to be
wholly complementary within the institutional system.

That is, there is

a lack of integration and correspondence between interinstitutional ceremonies.

Some institutional values and the ceremonies built on them

become dysfunctional.

The ensuing social instability reflects attempts

by the institutional system to adjust itself in the face of the technical
change.

Social stability is resumed when the new technology is fully

integrated and institutions have adjusted their ceremonial systems to
account for the technical changes.
ive qual ity of technology.

Integration relates to the progress-

Technological integration and diffusion are

introduced in the next chapter and described in the remaining chapters
of this work.
Technology and Cities
The foregoing is an abstract and syllogistic argument based on
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several definitional presuppositions which were developed in earl ier
chapters.

Little more need be said at this juncture in explanation of

the propositions.

However, they require embellishment with concrete

examples in the context of institutional economic theory.

An example

which illustrates the dynamism of new technology in accord with the
theory is drawn from the history or urbanization ln the Western World.
It is necessary to pause for a moment to consider why cities come
into existence at all.

An answer is found in central-place theory and

in the theories of location and agglomerative economies.

The first has

to do with special izations based on the internal economies of large-scale
production, and the latter has to do with external economies of location
and scale. 8
Central-place theory argues that specializations occur because of
internal economies of large-scale production, and it is 1imited by the
cost of transporting the resulting products to customers.

If, for pur-

poses of illustration, one assumes a featureless plain (a so-called von
Thunen plain) on which transportation is as efficient in one direction
as in another, and resources are distributed evenly, then there need be

no inter-family special ization. g Society might consist of many lndependent and self-sufficient families evenly distributed over the plain.
According to the foregoing assumptions, each family would grow lts
own grain, mill its own flour, and bake its own bread.

would weave its own cloth and fashion its clothing.

Likewise, it

In addition to pro-

vi ding its own material needs, it would render needed services.

The

family would supply whatever medical care its members required, and it
would govern itself, educate its young, and provide religious services

for the spiritual needs of its members.

The quality of goods and services
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would be extremely primitive and the quantity meager, consisting of only
that which the family could produce for itself.

While there might be

intrafamily specializations, there would be no interfamily specializations,

and no trade or commerce between families.

In short, society would con-

sist of few institutions--perhaps only the family, marriage, and spoken

language.

One can easily see why the family would 100m enormously impor-

tant in human affairs under such primitive circumstances.

The question is, are there any forces that might operate toward
interfamily special ;zat;ons?

The answer ;s that there might be if fam-

ilies lived close enough to one another that goods and services could be
economically transported between them with the prevai 1ing transportation

technology.

That is, the division of labor (specialization) is limited

by the extent of the market.

As should soon be evident, the extent of

the market is likewise limited by the state of technological development.
But this moves ahead of the matter at hand.

It is enough now to deal with

specialization in terms of the extent of the market--given a state of

technological development.
For example, suppose that one family on the plain acquired a par-

ticular aptitude for milling flour.

Members of the family accordingly

developed great skill in milling techniques.

That is, they became

especially adept at employing the milling tools.

They perhaps accom-

plished this by discovering that the mill stones and other milling equipment employed by them and by their neighboring farmers possessed greater
productive capacity than was generally achieved in small-scale operations.
That was because the average farmer could not achieve an optimum rate of
output for the tools if he milled only for his own family.

Thus, economies

in the form of lower man-hour costs could be achieved per pound of flour
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milled by increasing the rate of output.

Increases in the rate of out-

put necessarily meant changing the milling technique by organizing production around the milling process.

That is, the human skills of the

efficient miller are organized by the milling tools he uses.
Suppose further that the family decides to offer to mill the flour
of several neighboring famil ies if the farming famil ies will supply the
miller family with grain.

Under what conditions is the miller family

enterprise likely to be successful? Clearly, the exchange must prove to
be

benefi~ial

to all parties if the enterprise is to succeed.

Therefore,

the neighboring farmers will purchase the miller services only if the
man hours gained in not mill ing their own flour are equal to or exceed
the man hours expended to cultivate, harvest, thresh, and transport the
grain given the miller family in payment for its service.

Likewise,

the miller family will find it worthwhile to mill its'neighbors' flour so
long as the man hours taken in milling the flour are equal to or less than
the man hours it would have to expend to cultivate, harvest, and thresh
the grain it receives in payment for the milling services.
The miller family would succeed in selling its services under the

foregoing circumstances so long as the cost it saved by milling in large
quantities exceeded the cost to transport the grain to the mill and the
flour back to the neighboring farmers.

To illustrate this, suppose that

the average farm family can produce one bushel of grain (on the average)
with five man hours of labor.

Suppose further that the average farm

family can mill 33.3 pounds of flour at home from approximately one
bushel of grain in one and two-thirds man hours of labor.

Thus, the

opportunity cost (the grain production that must be given up) to mill
33.3 pounds of flour is one-third bushel of grain, and the opportunity
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cost for the average farmer to produce one bushel of grain is 100 pounds
of flour.

The average farmer family will be willing to pay up to one-

third bushel of grain for milling 33.3 pounds of flour.
Assuming that the prospective miller family is also an average farm
family regarding grain production, it can produce one bushel of grain
with the average expenditure of five man-hours.

However, it finds that

it can mill 33.3 pounds of flour in only one hour by milling in large
quantities.

The opportunity cost (the amount of grain production that

must be given up) for the miller family to mill 33.3 pounds of flour is
therefore only one-fifth bushel of grain.

That is, the family will be

willing to mill 33.3 pounds of its neighbors' flour so long as it receives
no less than one-fifth bushel of grain in payment.

Thus, the prospec-

tive miller family has a comparative advantage in the milling of flour
because its opportunity cost to mill is less than that of its average
farming neighbor.

On the other hand, it has a comparative disadvantage

in the production of grain because it must forego the milling of 167
pounds of flour to produce one bushel of grain, as compared with only 100
pounds for its average farming neighbor.
Since the miller family has a comparative advantage in milling flour,
and its farming neighbors have comparative advantages in producing grain,
inter-family specialization is possible as long as the spread between
their reciprocal offer prices is sufficient to cover the costs to transport the grain to the mill and to return the flour to the neighboring
farmers.

It is recalled that the farming families are willing to pay not

more than one-third bushel ·of grain to have 33.3 pounds of flour milled.
And the miller family is willing to mill 33.3 pounds of its neighbors'
flour for not less than one-fifth of a bushel of grain.

Thus, the spread
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between their reciprocal offer prices is 1/3 - liS = 3/15 bushels of
grain for milling 33.3 pounds of flour.
Assuming that the most efficient means of transporting cargo is a
two-wheeled ox cart, and that the cart can effectively carry 500 pounds
of cargo at three miles per hour, who will transport the grain and flour?
The farmers?

Or the miller? And why?

It can be shown that the farm

families will transport their grains to the mill and return the milled
flour to their farms.

This 1s because the farmer's opportunity cost to

transport, goods 1s less than that of the miller if the latter has succeeded
in specializing in milling flour.

It is true that the opportunity costs

in terms of the bushels of grain foregone to transport goods under the
above assumptions is the same for the farmers and the miller (liS bushel
to carry 500 pounds three miles in one hour).

However, their opportunity

costs in terms of pounds of flour are different.

The farmer must forego

only twenty pounds of flour to transport goods subject to the preceding
constraints.

The miller's opportunity cost is 33.3 pounds of flour

(approximately equal to one bushel of unmilled grain). Thus, the farmer
will transport both the grain and the flour.
What, then, is the extent of the miller family's market?

It is nec-

essary to calculate the maximum allowable transport cost, and then apply
that to the farmer's opportunity cost for transporting his grain and
flour to and from the mill.

It will be found that the maximum allowable

transportation under the foregoing assumptions is the spread between the
reciprocal offer prices (2/15 bushels of grain per 33.3 pounds of flour)
mu1tip1 ied by the cart capacity (SaO pounds of flour).

This places the

maximum transportation cost the farmers are willing to bear at two bushels
of grain.

The same results obtain if one calculates the total transport
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cost using the spread between offer prices stated in pounds of flour.
However, it is desirable to keep the cost and price stated in terms of

bushels of grain since that is the medium in which the farmer will pay
the miller.
The total allowable travel distance is then the maximum transportation cost (two bushels of grain) divided by the farmer's opportunity cost
for transportation (1/5 bushel of grain per three miles in one hour).
The maximum allowable travel distance is therefore thirty miles.

If it

is assumed that four trips (two in and two back) are required to complete
the transaction, then the miller's effective market radius is 7-1/2 miles
(30 miles divided by four trips).

That is, farming families living within

7-1/2 miles of the miller's farm will find it beneficial to use the
miller's services, if the miller family charges no more than one-fifth

bushel of grain to mill 33.3 pounds of flour, or 3/5 bushel for 100 pounds
of flour.

Clearly, those families living closer than 7-1/2 miles from

the miller place will receive a bargain because of their lower

tation cost.

transpor~

And families living more distant than 7-1/2 miles will

choose to mill their own flour.
One can see that the miller family might devote so much time to the
mill ing of flour that it could no longer farm its land efficiently.

It

would perhaps trade some of its land for the mill stores and other mill·
ing equipment no longer used by neighboring families.

Moreover. as the

miller family became more and more specialized in milling flour, it would

gain in skill at milling while diminishing in the skills of farming.

And,

as the millers concentrated more and more on their tools, they might
invent technical improvements in them so as to further increase their pro-

ductivities.

Likew;se, the neighboring families could efficiently farm
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the additional lands they acquired from the miller family by simply
reallocating the man hours released from mill ing flour to the cultivation
of crops.
The preceding analysis demonstrates how conditions might coalesce
to cause interfamily specialization.

In the example, the miller place

became a central place; a point to which the surrounding farmers brought

their grains for milling into flour.

This came into being because of

the specialization precipitated by the technology resident in tools that
led to internal economies of large-scale production, and because the
market was great enough to permit expansion to a scale of output that
could achieve those economies.

But more important, the extent of the

market was constrained by the cost of transportation, and this latter

cost was a function of the technology resident in the tool of transport-the ox and two-wheeled cart.
Milling flour in this example became an export base industry--an

industry that produced a surpl us that could only be sold outside the
region in which it was produced.

The miller family milled a surplus by

producing at a rate of output sufficient to achieve maximum efficiency
from its tools.

And the surplus was exported in exchange for grain which

neighboring families could likewise produce in modest surplus.

The grain

surplus was possible because the neighboring families could more fully
specialize in cultivation by reallocating some of their productive labors
from milling to farming, and exchanging parts of their surpluses for

flour milled by the miller family.

Thus, the surpluses behind export-

base activities are found primarily in internal economies of large-scale
product; on.
On the other hand, the extent of the market for the miller's surplus
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was detennined by the density of population and the cost of transportation.

The cost of transportation was a function of location and the

technology resident in the tools of transportation.
economies were external to the miller family.
economies of location and scale.

Both of these

That is, they were external

They were therefore local base phenomena--

economies related to the attributes of locale.

The significance of both

local-base and export-base activities will be expanded below and in the
next chapter.
If one central place for milling flour can emerge because of internal
economies of large-scale production and the consequent interfamily specialization, then it will likely occur in other areas by diffusion.

Observ-

ing the benefits of specialization, other families might also choose to
specialize in milling flour.

In so doing, they would seek to avoid com-

petition by locating sufficiently distant from the original miller family
and any others who might be emulating it so that their market areas were
exclusive.

That is, they would attempt to create a geOgraphic monopoly.

However, as more and more families entered milling, all market areas would
be taken and competition would emerge.

Eventually, the entire plain would

be covered by central miller places so that no farming family was more
distant from a miller place than 7.5 miles.

Thus, the circles of adjoin-

ing market areas would overlap slightly because some farm families would
be more distant from a miller place than 7.5 miles if they did not overlap.
Therefore, the shape of each miller place would be hexagonal--according
to the von Thunen assumptions.

And the maximum distance between central

miller places would be only thirteen miles (2 X 7.5 X sine 60 degrees)
rather than double the radius (or fifteen miles).
The forces that brought forth central miller places will operate in
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time to produce other forms of interfamily special izations.

For example,

another family might have a particular aptitude for baking bread, and
its members may have developed great skill in employing the tools of
baking.

If the family found that it could reduce its average man-hour

cost per loaf of bread by increasing the number of loaves it baked at one
time, it likewise found that it had a comparative advantage in baking.
If it also found that there were enough neighbors willing to exchange
grain for the bread it baked, the family could choose to specialize in

baking.
Like the miller family, the family that chose to specialize in
baking created a central place--a place where neighboring families could

exchange grain for bread, allowing those neighboring families to reallocate their productive labor from baking to those other productions in
which they were relatively more efficient.

However, the baker family need

not necessarily be located at the same pl ace as the mi 11 er family.

Li ke-

wise, the baker family will have a different market area--probably much
smaller than that of a miller family.

While it might be feasible to

make only two round trips per year to the miller, the purchase of fresh
bread will obviously require more trips to the baker.

Moreover, the oppor-

tunity cost to travel any distance simply to purchase four or five loaves
of bread is very great, and thus the distance one was willing to travel

to buy bread would be commensurately short.
And again, like the diffusion of milling, a successful specializa-

tion in baking is likely to migrate to other areas of the plain until the
entire plain is covered by a network of small markets, each one surrounding a central baker place.

In time, one might also find networks of

central places for wagoner families. weaver families, tailor families,
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shoemaker families, cartwright families, seller families, and many more.
All will have come into existence as specia11sts 1n pursuit of increasing returns to scale.

That is, they will have taken advantage of the

internal economies of large-scale production. And the magnitudes of
those economies were determined by the
of their trades.

technologi~s

resident in the tools

Likewise, the extents of their market areas were con-

strained by the technical qualities of their tools of transport.
However, a central place established around a single economic insti-

tution like a flour mill or a bakery does not make a city.

It is true

that cities might rise simply because of the coincidences of many networks of central places spread randomly over a featureless plain.

That

is, some central places would assume greater importance than others because
the random distribution of networks of miller central places, baker central
places, weaver central places, and other central places would coincide
at some points.

Thus, more than one specialization could be found at the

points of coincidence.

A hierarchy of central places would eventually

emerge in which the first order comprised those central places at which
a single specialization was located--say a bakery.

Second-order central

places would be those at which two or three specializations were found-a baker, a miller, and a weaver.

The highest-order central place would

be that one on the plain at which the greatest number of specializations
was located.
While central-place theory produces a consistent and relevant
explanation of urbanization built upon internal economies of scale, it

is grossly over-simplified.

One can visualize something like the fore-

going example occurring near the center of a large, homogeneous mass of

flat, arable land.

But even under those conditions, there are other
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forces operating to produce urbanization.

The example can be brought

closer to real ity where those other forces can be observed by relaxing
its simplifying assumptions.

To do so, however, introduces complexities

that go beyond the level of analysis desired here.

Nevertheless, it is

useful to relax the most gross assumptions of the model so that

economics of location and agglomeration can be illustrated.

When one departs from the von Thunen assumption, he contemplates
a geography on which each site possesses unique spatial and locational
qualities.

The land possesses peculiar topographic features like

forests, rivers, alluvial valleys, hills, coastal reaches, and regions
with particular mineral deposits.

That is, the land endowment is

heterogeneous, absolutely finite, and perfectly immobile so that no one
site is a perfect substitute for any other site.

Communities in such

a world tend to form at those places that confer on their users
particular advantages of location or access.

Such advantages stem from

external economies--cost advantages of location that lie outside the
control of individual institutions.

The external economies are

attributes of local base activities.
External economies may apply to transportation cost or to production cost.

Transportation-cost orientation arises when the transporta-

tion costs are high in relation to production costs, and productioncost orientation prevails when transportation costs are low in relation
to production costs. 10

It can be shown that institutions which are

transportation-cost oriented will settle on locations that minimize
transportation costs.

This will be at either the market locations for

their products, or at the resource locations.

To locate some place

between their markets and their resources will involve higher
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transportation costs because they must bear two sets of terminal costs-one for resources and one for finished products.

One set of terminal

costs can be avoided by locating at either the market or the resource end.
In general, transportation costs will be lower at the resource end
for those institutions which produce goods that lose perishabil ity,
weight, or volume in production.

For example, the smelting of ore

results in the loss of both weight and volume.
sing results in loss of perishabil ity.
in their, resource areas.

Likewise, food proces-

Those industries tend to locate

On the other hand, transportation costs will be

lower at the market end for those institutions that produce goods that
gain fragility, perishability, weight, or volume in production.

For

example, baked goods gain perishability, and automobiles gain volume in
production. Those industries therefore tend to locate near their markets.
Conversely, some institutions are production-cost oriented. ll
That is, their products possess low bulk-to-value ratios so that transportation costs are low in relation to production costs.

Such institu-

tions tend to settle on locations that minimize production-related
costs.

Thus industries that use labor-intensive processes tend to

locate in areas where the wages are relatively low for the skills they
employ.

Likewise, industries that use power-intensive processes tend

to locate where electrical power is relatively less expensive.

Finally,

those firms that require specialized auxiliary services or regular faceto-face contacts with suppliers or clients tend to locate where those
services and contacts can be readily obtained at least cost.
The point is that special izations rising to internal economies of
large-scale production produce economic institutions.

Those specialized

institutions locate themselves so as to take advantage of external
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economies of location where the costs of transportation or production or
both can be minimized.

Once established, such locations become central

places where human interactions take place according to the character of

the institutions located there.

And major cities rise at those places

where external economies confer abundant cost advantages.
In addition to external economies of location, cities also possess
external economies of large urban scale.

Such scale economies arise

from agglomeration--a balling up of many interdependent institutions at
some central place. 12

External economies of urban scale stem from the

progressive specialization of institutions.

For example, it is not

profitable to invest in expensive equipment to make a single component
on a small scale, and production of such a component may be very laborintensive on a small scale.

But as the industry expands, a new firm may

come into exi stence to manufacture the component on a 1arge scale and
supply it to other firms in the industry.

And, of course, those other

firms will cease to make the component on a small scale.
The functions delegated by one industry to auxiliary and complementary industries must usually be performed in close proximity.
is a potent factor in the geographic concentration of industries.

This
And

the geographi c concentration of industri es all ows an effi cient specia 1ization of the local base firms that create the external economies for
the industries they serve.

Moreover, the external economies involve

true reductions in the real costs of social output.

They are not just

zero-sum savings--savings by one firm at the expense of another firm.
Therefore urban aggl omerati on is a soci ally-redeemabl e phenomenon. 13
Agglomeration may be understood in terms of the example describing
interna 1 economi es of 1arge-scal e production and the special i zati on of
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millers and bakers.

One may consider whether there are any factors that

might cause a baker family to locate at or near the site of a miller
family. Clearly, the baker family will find economies external to itself
operating to cause it to locate near a miller family.

It will find some

commerce already centered on the miller place, and the miller can supply
the flour needed in baking without charging a transportation fee.
In time, perhaps, a wagoner family wi 11 locate near the mill er
place; then a weaver, a tailor, a shoemaker, a cartwright, and a seller.

Before long a community of famil ies and other institutions grows large
enough to organize itself and to provide public services like a school,
hospital, and constabulary.

It is when this kind of ball ing-up occurs

at some central place that a city is formed.

The process is called

agglomeration, and the organizing principle is external economies of
urban scale.
The foregoing is an explanation of why cities come into existence.
The explanation was found in central-place theory and in the economic
theories of location and urban agglomeration.

The first had to do with

interinstitutional specializations rising to the internal economies of

large-scale production, and the latter had to do with the external
economies of location and urban scale.

Both internal and external

economies relate to productivity in terms of output per man hour, and
productivity is a function of the technical qualities of tools.

Thus,

cities are fundamentally creatures of technology--agglomerations of
institutions that have come into existence through interhuman specializations developed in pursuit of increasing returns to scale.

With this

background, one can more clearly understand the forces compelling
urbanization in the Western world.
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Technology and Urbanization
Time and space do not permit any more than a bri ef summary of the
urbanization features salient to the theory at hand.

Moreover, the pro-

cessua1 details of innovation are left to subsequent parts of this chapter.

This section introduces the antecedent technological causes of the

urbanization which occurred in Western Europe, particularly, following

the medieval period.

This was a time of rapid urbanization followed by

shifts in pol itica1 and economic power from Mediterranean regions to
northern

~urope.

In the way of prefatory background, the first cities were believed
to have been founded in Mesopotamia during the fourth millennium B.C.
They evolved from quasi-urban communities of less complex social organization.

And quasi-urban communities evolved from neolithic folk societies

on the order of those described in preceding chapters.

The typical fo1 k

society is small, illiterate and self-sufficient with a biological division of labor based on the most primitive neo1 ithic technologies.

The

members are exc1 usive1y engaged in collecting food in an unremitting
struggle for existence.

Norms are highly prescriptive and there are

virtually no alternative lifestyles open to members. 14
Quasi-urban communities arose from pre1iterate folk societies with
the agricultural surpluses produced by the domestication of animals and
the merging of animal husbandry with crop cultivation.

The oldest known

quasi-urban community is prehistoric Jericho at the conf1 ux of the Jordan
River and the Dead Sea.

Jericho is believed to have been founded some-

time in the seventh millennium B. C.

The conditions necessary for develop-

ment of such pre1iterate communities were a technology capable of producing a surplus of agricultural products, a suitable ecological base, and
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a social organization extending beyond the family institution.

Technological advance must be great enough to allow the production
of a food surplus beyond that needed to sustain the farmers between
harvests.

The agricultural surplus must be great enough to free some

members from the primary employments of food cultivation and gathering
so that they may specialize in skills needed to augment the community
in secondary empl oyments--securi ty, transportation, and admi ni strati on.

As noted above, the technological advance that presaged evolution of
quasi-urban communities was domestication of animals and the subsequent

employment of animals at draught.

These technical improvements led to

the internal economies of scale that facilitated the specialization and

division of labor.
A suitable ecological base is one in which there ;s an adequate
water supply, and the soil and c1 imate are capable of producing

sufficient agricultural goods with the prevailing technology to support
the population of the community.

This accounts in part for the

selection of places like Jericho in the Jordan River Valley and Jarmo
in the Mesopotamian riverine system as the first sites for quasi-urban
communities in the West.

It also suggests why cities did not emerge in

the northern-most and southern-most reaches of the temperate zones until
much later.

Weather in those zones was less hospitable and the

technology needed to sustain an agricultural surplus in those soils and
climates did not exist until much later.
The social organization of a quasi-urban community must be sufficiently advanced to provide an institution of government vdth enough
power and abil ity to direct the activities of others.

Likewise, there

must be economi c i nstituti ons of suffi ciently integrated occupati ons and
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specialized labor skills to provide security for the community and to
manage the agricultural surpluses.

ing,

and harvesting.

fields to storage.

The crops require planting, cultivat-

Harvested products must be transported from the

They must be secured from marauders, and they must

be rationed out to members of the community at appropriate times.
The chi ef di fferences between quasi-urban comrnuniti es 1i ke Jericho

and Jarmo and urban Ur and other feudal cities of the Tigris-Euphrates
riverine system are technologies, the complexity of social organization,

and literacy.

It is no coincidence that the first feudal cities were

founded pari passu with the invention and innovation of copper tools.
The technological advances that first produced feudal urbanization was
meta 11 urgy--copper mining, smel ting, and smithing.

The use of copper

produced more productive tools and improved means of transportation.

These in turn led to larger agricultural surpluses and increased
specialization and agglomeration--the movement of more persons from
primary to secondary employments.
Likewise social organization in feudal cities had to be much more
complex.

In addition to the security and management of agricultural

SUI"'-

pluses provided in quasi-urban centers the new urban areas added manufacturing and commercial institutions.

The mining of copper generally took

place some distance from cities, and ore of semi-processed copper had to

be transported back to the city.

Some part of the urban popul ati on had

to be organized as craftsmen and artisans in well-integrated processes
for copper smelting and smithing to produce the tools and implements

made of the new metal.

Finally, the economy had to be far enough ad-

vanced to carryon commerce in resources, manufactured goods, and food. 15
Commerce, of course, gave rise to record keeping and thus to
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developments in mathematics and written language.

Indeed, most anthro-

pologists distinguish the city from the quasi-urban community on the
basis of literacy.

According to this idea, a written language is clear

evidence of a well-advanced and complex social organization.
community had no written language, and the feudal city did.

The folk
However,

one should not miss the point that the social organization is a complex

of institutions which have been shaped in part by technology--that quality of a tool that enables it to be substituted for human labor in production processes. 16

The feudal cities of Mesopotamia at the end of the fourth millennium
B.C. contained populations estimated between 5,000 and 20,000 persons.

By the beginning of the second millennium, the inner city of Ur was
believed to domicile upwards to 34,000 persons.

Such cities that somehow

survived into the 19th century ranged in population from 5,000 to 100,000
inhabitants. 17
The spatial and institutional arrangements of feudal cities are
remarkab1y similar.

The center of the city is the seat of governmental

and rel igious activities, and it generally contains the residences of the
elite.

Lower classes are scattered in descending social order toward the

city boundaries.

The members of an occupational skill 1 ive and work in

a particular area of the city.

The family unit is patriarchal, and it is

the principal socializing institution in the city.

One is born into a

family in a particular social stratum, and he must usually live out his
life according to the norms of his class.

because only the elite are educated.

Only the elite are literate

And the educational system is

oriented to transmission of the city's traditions and ceremonial values.
For the vast majority communication is by word of mouth, and news is
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disseminated by heralds and crierS.
Economic institutions in the feudal city are not well developed as
compared with an industrial city.

Production is based exclusively on

human power and the power of other animals.
ters on product, not process.

The division of labor cen-

The principal production institution is

therefore the guild, and the guild functions primarily to set prices and
limit competition in its line of commerce.

Typically, there is little

standardization of weights, measures, and currencies.
institutions are very meager if they exist at all.

Credit and thrift

Each feudal city with

its agricultural environs is a self-sufficient entity and there is a minimum of commerce and other friendly intercourse between feudal cities.

The ruling authorities of the feudal city are based on absolutes
and tradition.

The pol itical and rel igious institutions are rigidly

hierarchical, and decision-making knows no rules beyond the ceremonial
status and power of the person in authority.

Religion is very prescrip-

tive, and it is a powerful instrument for preserving order and maintain-

ing social stabil ity in the feudal city.

In a word, the feudal city

lIemphasizes ceremonial rigidity and particularism."lS

By contrast with the feudal city, the modern industrial city
flourishes because of class fluidity and universalism.

Status is based

more on achievement than birth, and occupational positions are filled

according to universalistic principles rather than particularistic.

The

family unit is loosely organized and members are relatively free to depart
its influences with few restrictions.
socialization processes.

A particularly important socializing institu-

tion is the public-school system.
in the industrial city.

Many institutions are involved in

Universal mass education is a necessity

And only an industrial society is economically
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capable of freeing large segments of its population from productive
employments to be educated.
The economy of an industrial city thrives on mass-production methods
powered by mechanical engines and electric motors.

Indeed, the widespread

use of mechanical power to replace animal power is the chief technical

distinction between industrial and feudal cities.

The distinction is

crucial because it is the foundation upon which other distinctions are
based.

Production is carried on by large-scale enterprises in the indus-

trial city. and labor ;s specialized along process lines rather than by
product 1 ines.

and currencies.

There is strict standardization of weights. measures,

The institution of banking is well developed and credit

is usually available.

Industrial cities are interdependent and they are

connected by well-used transportation routes. communi cation systems, and

commerce and banking ties.
While the social organization is complex, the industrial city usually

has a weak power structure as compared with the feudal city.

Formal rules

rather than ceremonial appeals to personal authorities are more used in
bureaucratic decision making.

Governing authority is based mainly on cere-

monial consent of the governed and appeals to scientific expe,rts.

Indeed,

the scientific tradition is a particular ceremonial mark which distin

guishes the industrial city from the feudal city.

4

Finally, religion is

usually more permissive than prescriptive in an industrial city.19
The foregoing relates to the spatial and institutional characteristics of the societies described.
elements in society.

These characteristics are the static

They are cross-sectional 1 ike a photograph snapped

at some particular time.

They show what apparently existed at the time.

but they reveal nothing about how the objects in the photo came to be
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what they were when the picture was taken.

The question is, what were

the dynamic elements that caused changes over time?

The essential differences in the states of development from a folk
society to an industrial city are the productivities of each in terms of

product outputs per unit of labor input.

Thus they are differences in

states of technological development, or the technical qual ities of tools
used by each.

The agent for change in each case was new technology.

It

was the innovation, integration, and diffusion of draft animals for cul-

tivation and transportation that moved society from the fol k stage to the
prel iterate, quasi-urban community.

It was the innovation, integration,

and diffusion of metal tools that moved society from the quasi-urban

community to the feudal city stage.

And it was the innovation, integra-

tion, and diffusion of mechanical power and electrical-control devices

that moved society from the feudal city to the industrial-city stage.
TUI~ning

now to European urbanization, Europe was populated by small

tribes organized as folk societies until well into the first millennium
B.C.

Cities did not appear on the continent of Europe until nearly 3,000

years after the founding of the first cities of

I~esopotamia.

The first

European cities were built by Achaeans, Dorians, and other indo-European
tribes who invaded from the north into the Aegean area and by the Etruscans in Italy.

The former were masters of iron, and their triumphs over

the original inhabitants of the Aegean lands were the triumphs of iron,

for the original inhabitants had not yet acquired skill with the new metal.
The new Greeks found the unyielding terrains of the Balkan Peninsula
and the Peloponnesus unsuited, with the technologies prevail ing at the
time. to the production of suffi cient agri cul tura 1 surpl uses to support
cities.

They therefore learned seafaring from their Minoan and Phoenician
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predecessors, and they produced their surpluses by fishing and by trading
and warring with other Mediterranean peoples.

The Greeks also learned

city bui 1ding from thei r southern Mediterranean nei ghbors, and Cor; nth,

Sparta, Athens, and other Greek cities were established by the eighth
century B. C.
At the same time, the Etruscans were building Pisa, Siena, and other
cities on the Apennine Peninsula.

As alreadY noted in Chapter IV, Rome

was founded in the seventh century B. C. at the frontier between Etrusca
and Latium.

Rome ascended to dominance over Etrusca by 500 B.C. and over

Greece, Persia, and Carthage by the end of the Punic Wars.

She pushed

her borders to the outward 1 imits of the then civil ized world by the end
of the first century B.C.

Indeed, wherever one found Rome, he found at

least a veneer of civilization also.

Many of the major cities of Europe

were establ ished by Rome or because of Rome.

They incl ude such cities

as Paris, London, Brussels. Cologne. Seville, Bordeaux, Vienna. and
Bel grade.
The collapse of Roman power and the recession of her authority from

Central and Western Europe in the fifth century A.D. brought chaos and
decl ine in European commerce and trade with the East.

It also brought

the internal strife and the barbarian invasions from the east, north, and
south which merited comment earl ier in this chapter.

The result was an

arrestation and retrogression in European city development.

Except for

those cities under the influence of Byzantine and Moslem administrations,
the cities of Europe declined in population and power.
After nearly five centuries of ecl ipse. the cities of Europe commenced a vigorous resurgence.

Starting in the tenth century A. D., the

center of economic and political power shifted gradually northward from
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the Mediterranean to west central Europe.

One manifestation of the shift

was a rapid increase in both population and urbanization.

The old EurD-

pean urban centers revived and the era is distinguished by the pro1 ifera-

ticn of new urban communities in northern Europe. 20
The question is, why did urbanization resurge in Europe when it
did?

And how did Western European nations come to possess the powers

that accrued to them in the middle of the second millennium A.D.?

Some

writers attribute the revolution to developments in Christian religious

thought.

Others bel ieve that it occurred because of charismati c pol itica 1

and mil itary leadership on the parts of some monarchs which enabled them
to win diplomatic and military capitulations from lesser adversaries so

that kingdoms were expanded and empires formed.

Still others believe it

was the early seeds of capital ism with its rel iance on markets and the

expansion of commerce and banking.
In a sense it was all of these phenomena--and in another sense it
was none of them.
times.

All of these happenings did, indeed. occur at crucial

But they were the surface conditions of causes that lay much

deeper.

The roots of the revolution lay buried in the soil of techno1ogi-

cal change.

Moreover, the technological changes occurred between the

middle and end of the medieval period preceding the emergence of Europe
out of the Dark Ages and into the Renaissance.
The technical changes which lay behind the vigorous resurgence of
European cities took place first in agriculture and warfare, and then in
transportation.

The changes involved the innovation of a heavy plow to

replace the ancient scratch plow, innovation of a triennial system of
crop rotation, and development and use of the heavy horse first in warfare
then in agriculture and transportation.

The combined effects of these
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innovations was a substantial increase in agricultural productivity, '
increased efficiency in overland transportation, increases in populations,

and rural to urban migrations.
The next chapter deals with the integration and diffusion of the
heavy plow, the triennial system of crop rotation, and the heavy horse,
and with the demographic changes and social progress precipitated by

innovation of those technical improvements.

However. the matter at hand

is: why did innovation of these devices first take place in Europe at
that time?

Most of the technical means were known earl ier by other soci-

eties in other parts of the world.

Why did those other cultures fail to

innovate and exploit the technical devices that initiated revolution and

social progress in Europe?

What was the unique combination of circum-

stances that caused Europeans to pick up on some technologies that were

discovered but not effectively innovated by other cultures?
TECHNOLOGY AND CEREMONIALISM
The reasons the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy
horse were first innovated in European agriculture was because of the
invention spurred by the technical diffusion and technological cross-fertilization that was taking place there and because ceremonialism had a

very tenuous hold on the peoples of Europe at the time.

The technolo-

gical cross-fertilization taking place there was described earlier in
this chapter as an element in invention.

The reasons ceremonial ism was

weak in Europe during that period will be described later in this section.
First it is necessary to set the ceremonial conditions of pre-renaissance
Europe aside to examine the elements of institutional economic theory
that impinge upon the innovation of new technologies and its relationship
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to ceremonialism.

The existence of technological cross-fertilization is necessary for
invention and thus for innovation, but it is not a sufficient condition
for the innovation of new technologies.

It is possible for new scientific

discoveries and technical inventions to occur without innovation, integratian, and diffusion following.

required.

A weak ceremonial system is also

It;s the simultaneous occurrence of technological cross-fertil-

ization--to fac;l itate invention--and weak ceremonial practices that
leads to the innovation and integration of new technologies.
Weak ceremonial practices are necessary to the innovation of new

technologies because of the disaccord between technology and ceremonialism.
Ceremonialism is tradition-bound and change-resistant while technology is
dynamic and change-producing.

The remainder of this section examines the

nature and conditions of the innovation of new technologies and the relationship of technical innovation to ceremonial ism and institutional change. 21
Innovation of New Technology

New technologies are initiated through a process of innovation.
Innovation ;s simply the production of changes through the introduction
of novelties.

The novelties are, of course, the new technologies, while

the changes are the cul tura 1 consequences of the novel ti es.
;s different from discovery and invention.

Innovati on

Invention is a deliberate

change or adjustment in objects so that a new kind emerges, while discovery
is the perceiving of something which had been in existence before but had
not previously been observed.

Invention is a condition of innovation as

discovery is a condition of invention.

It is possible to have discovery

without invention, and invention without innovation.

It is not possible
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to have innovation without invention, or invention without discovery.22

There are no social effects from discovery and invention alone.
The social consequences of invention do not commence until innovation

takes place and the novelties of invention are introduced.
invention ;s a necessary ingredient of innovation.

To be sure,

But nothing will

happen, whatever is invented, until innovation takes place.

Moreover,

both discovery and invention in the modern age are largely products of
institutional research carried on with the expectation of innovation.
Thus,

i~noyatiQn

is the centerpiece of technical progress and institu-

tional change.
As invention is the product of the inventor's genius, so innovation is the work of the innovator.

The inventor of a technical improve-

ment is rarely its innovator because the motives and tinkering skins of
the inventor are not the same as the entrepreneurial skills of the
innovator.

It is the rare person who possesses genius for both invention

and entrepreneurship.

For example, DeForest, mentioned earlier as

inventor of the triode, went broke several times trying to put his invention to commerci a 1 use.
important inventions.

Yet others successfully innovated DeForest I s
The same fate has befallen many inventors.

have tried to be innovators.

Few have succeeded.

Many

Ironically, the pages

of history are covered with the names of inventors, but one finds few
names of innovators.

Given the central and crucial nature of innovation.

it would appear that altogether too little attention has been given to
the study of innovation and innovators.
Nevertheless, the innovator is the key to innovation. the centerpiece of technical advance and institutional change.
of entrepreneur.

His role is that

As such, he is forward-looking in terms of the ends-
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means continuum.

He seeks to organize present means in the least costly

and most efficient way to achieve future ends-to-be-reached.

And since

the future cannot be known with certainty, there is risk that the outcomes of present choices will not be as expected.

Thus, the function of

the entrepreneur is to bear the risks of failure--not to fail, but to
make calculated present decisions, the future outcomes of which are
inherently uncertain.

And the future outcomes are more uncertain,

albeit potentially more beneficial, if promising technical novelties
are introduced among the means.
The entrepreneurial function is discharged by an elite class in
whatever society it is performed.
authoritative nature of allocation.

This is a natural consequence of the
The entrepreneur has been

empowered, by whatever means, to make social choices as to the allocation of scarce resources to the attainment of future ends.

On the other

hand, entrepreneurship has not been the exclusive province of a
particular elite.
body.

It might sometimes be born by a ruler or a governing

It might be served by business persons in a market system.

Or it

might sometimes result from a coalition of these and other elite groups.
For example, almost the only innovators in electronic data processing
have been private corporations 1ike International Business Machines,

National Cash Register, National Semi-Conductor, etc.

On the other

hand, the only innovator in the original development of nuclear energy
was the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, followed by the Atomic Energy
Commission, both agencies of the U. S. Federal Government.
Whatever person or group carries out entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur' 5 method is to maximize the net benefits of whatever future ends

are sought and hopefully attained.

He achieves this by economizing in
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the allocation of present means.

That is, he selects and organizes

present means in the least-costly fashion consistent with the future
ends selected to be achieved.

Thus, he is able to improve his alloca-

tion if he increases the ends attainable with a given set of scarce
means, or if he can secure the usual benefits of future ends at lesscostly employment of present means.

increased net benefits.

Either way, he may be said to have

The drive to maximize net future benefits

therefore leads the entrepreneur to innovate where innovation is likely
to result in economizing in the allocation of scarce means.
The innovation of new technologies is considered successful and

socially redeemable if it produces a sustaining increase in net benefits.
That is, an innovation is a worthy one if i t increases human welfare,
and human wel fare is increased any time some persons can be made better

off without making anyone worse off.

Thus human welfare will be

increased, ceteris paribus, any time the output of goods and services
having human value is increased per man-hour of input.

An innovation is

worthless if it fails for any reason to produce the foregoing outcome at
some time in the ends-means continuum.

Successful innovations lead to

diffusion--the spread and integration of the new technologies. and the

adjustment of the institutional system to the new technical conditions.
The entrepreneur or entrepreneurial group is rewarded for successful innovations and penalized for failure.

Indeed. it is the substantial

rewards open to the successful entrepreneur that gives him incentive to
innovate.

The entrepreneurial reward for a successful innovation is a

share in the increase in the net benefits which are created by the innovation.

This is known as private profits if the entrepreneur ;s a pri-

vate person operating in a market system If the entrepreneur is a ruleror
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a rul ing body, the private benefits may be greater security in office
for the ruler or political party stemming from increased approbation of
their subjects or political constituents--and, of course, a share of
the increase in net benefits accrueing to the office of ruler.
The innovation may fail for some reason to produce the expected
increase in net social benefits.

Indeed an unsuccessful innovation

might result in the diminution of net social benefits under some circumstances.

The penalty the entrepreneur must bear for a worthless innova-

tion depends, of course, on the nature and magnitude of the costs
involved.

If the innovation involves the introduction of an invention

through a market process and fails for some reason to increase profits as
planned--to increase sales revenues or decrease production costs or

bot~

then the maximum penalty could be business failure for the entrepreneur
firm as that firm absorbs some of any net loss in benefits.

If the

unsuccessful innovation were carried out by a ruler or governing body,

then the maximUl" private penalty could be a fall from political power
along with loss of the benefits available to persons in political office
The point is that new technologies are introduced by a process of
innovation.

Innovation is performed by an entrepreneurial elite that

makes decisions about the selection of future ends-to-be-reached and the
allocation of present means to attainment of selected future ends.

The

outcomes of entrepreneurial decisions made in the present therefore repose in the future, and since the future cannot be known with certainty,

there is risk that the outcomes will not fulfill the expectations with
which the decisions were made.

The risks of failure are therefore borne

by the entrepreneur who is incentivated to bear the risks by the prospect of rewards for success.

He is likewise encouraged to be prudent and
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plan carefully by the possible penalties for failure.

The entrepreneurial

role is crucial to innovation, and innovation is crucial to technical

progrc:;:s.
Ceremonialism and Innovation
The foregoing explanation of innovation was deceptively simple.

It

sought to explain innovation in the singular dimension of entrepreneurship.

Certainly, the entrepreneur is immensely important, but the insti-

tutional environment is equally important.

Indeed, the institutional

dimension makes the innovation and integration of new technologies among
the most complex of all forms of social interaction.

The institutional

system exposes the entrepreneur to ceremonial risk, and ceremonial risk

is one of the greatest deterrents to the entrepreneur and innovation.
Ceremonial risk is simply the risk that the institutional system
will defeat the innovation no matter how instrumental the technology
promises to be.

Ceremonial risk arises from the inherent tensions

between technology and ceremonial ism.

That is technology is forward-

urging in terms of the ends-means continuum, while ceremonialism is
backward-cl ingi ng.

Technology is dynamic and change-producing, and cere-

monialism is static and change-retardant.

The innovation of new tech-

nologies is particularly dynamic because it opens ways of organizing
means (including productive labor) and of distributing social products
in ways differing from the ceremonially-prescribed methods descending
from the past.

New technologies therefore open opportunities to change

prior existing social statuses and ceremonial systems of rank. affording
new avenues to social mobil ity.
This character of technology brings it into conflict with tradition-
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bound and backward-cl i ngi ng ceremonial i sm both as to the choices between
alternative and competing future ends-;n-v;ew, and the alternative ways
of organizing means to the attainment of the chosen ends.

Ceremonialism

prescribes that only those ends be selected that are in harmony with and
reinforce the institutional values which descend from the past.

like-

wise, ceremonialism prescribes that traditional means be employed and
that they be organized in traditional ways.
deviation from antecedent procedures.

Ceremonialism brooks no

A rigid and strong institutional

structure buttressed by entrenched ceremonia 1i sm operates to preserve

social stability and perpetuate established cultural traits by opposing
anything that threatens institutional changes.

It achieves this ;n part

by truncating technical progress--by proscribing the innovatio.n of new

technologies.
How much of new technology is actually innovated therefore depends

upon the strength of ceremonial ism--the strength of institutional values
and institutional resistance to change.

Insofar as new technologies are

innovated, confl icting aspects of institutional value systems--ceremonialism--become redundant, wither, and are forgotten or become quaint cultural
vestiges of the past.

However, the institutional system does not yield

easily no matter how weak it might be.

Thus institutions submit to tech-

nica 1 progress and change only after anomy and soci a 1 upheaval. 23

Thi s

part of the paper regards the ceremonial restraints on innovation and the
ceremonial conditions necessary to innovation.

This latter point resumes

consideration of the ceremonial state of affairs that permitted the innovation of the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy horse
in the agriculture of Western Europe.
It is recalled from Chapter V that ceremonialism is the institutional
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instrument for maintaining social stability by preserving and transmitting
the cultural values that descend from the past.

And Chapter V illustra-

ted how traditional values are preserved and transmitted by institutions
through the powers of ceremony.

Ceremony structures society into status

systems based on ancient customs.

It social izes members into accepting

and playing traditional roles within the institutional structure.

And it

exercises social control by prescribing the correct modes of ceremonial
exchange for the periodic validation of status.

As noted above, the

effect of a strong ceremonial system is a stable institutional environment in which the status quo is rigidly maintained and there is neither

desire for nor expectation of change.
immobile, unchanging.

The state of affairs is static,

The pract; cal effect is to perpetuate the anc; ent

customs eternally into the future.
One who is a member of such an environment has invested much of
his past in an expected future stability that is founded on the preservation of the traditional values. -He finds security--confidence, satisfaction, and tranquil ity--in the only SOCiety he knows or wishes to know,
and his security is

consta~tly

reinforced by the tribal customs and tra-

ditional ceremonies of his father and his people.

They give him status

and they keep him emotionally and intellectually occupied with his social
roles.

They involve him in ceremonial interaction with the other members

of his SOCiety who are likewise involved.

One finds peace of mind and

tranquility in the certainty that life has always been the way he understands it and that it will always be so, generation upon generation.

The

gods have ordained it and there is nothing he can do to change matters
even if he shaul d want to.
Indeed, one who is imbued with such institutional certainty and
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ceremonial security views any deviation from traditional ways with a mix-

ture of fear, frustration, and anger--fear, because it disrupts his sense
of security with unfamiliar and thus uncertain elements, and frustration
and anger because the deviation is not in accord with the customs that

are the sources of his security and that he has learned to respect and

love.

Therefore, he will eagerly join the other members of his society

as they respond to the cries of the high shamans to rise against the
abominations that violate their taboos and threaten their tribal tranquility. Manand

hi~

society will obey the commands of ceremonialism to

defeat technical innovations and to preserve and perpetuate tribal customs.

It is the grip of ceremonialism that holds a society in a state of technological retardation and social arrest.

It is a well-developed and

stable institutional system sustained by a powerful ceremonialism that
precludes the innovation of new technologies.
It was precisely the ceremonial fixations of the institutionally
advanced Oriental societies that prevented those societies from effectively innovating the heavy horse and its trappings in agriculture and
transportation.

It was the preoccupation with solidly established tradi-

tional ideal s reinforced by ancient and powerful ceremonies that arrested
technical progress in Oriental cultures and continues to do so in modern
times.

A similar institutional rigidity derived from He·llenistic bel iefs

and Roman institutions held the peasant farmers of the Apennine Peninsula
in a similar ceremonial transfixion regarding effective innovation of the

heavy plow.
On the other hand, it was a very feeble ceremonial ism that permitted
the heavy plow, the heavy horse, and triennial field rotation to be innovated in Europe.

The question is:

Why were the peoples of Europe
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relatively less encumbered by ceremony? Why were custom and tradition so
irresolute at the time? The answer is found in the unsettled conditions
commencing before the rise of Rome and continuing for at least three
thousand years in Western Europe. 24
The people of Europe have endured more than three millennia of
strife.

The area was a melting pot of human types unprecedented in his-

torical times.

The Europeans have suffered almost continual political

and mil itary turmoil either from within or without since before the rise
of Rome.

Comprised of many small and scattered barbarian tribes, the

Europeans knew no common languages or culture.

Between periods of inter-

tribal warfare, the people have endured conquest by outsiders.

The

Carthaginians maintained enclaves in the Iberian peninsula until the
defeat of Hannibal at the hand of Proconsul Correlius Scipio in the
Battle of Zama.
The European tribes fell increasingly under control of the Romans
after the Punic Wars, finally succumbing to Caesar's Legions in the Gallic
Wars of the first century B.C.

The Pax Romana witnessed a consolidation

of Roman hegemony over the European tribes.

Roman control continued

until the decl ine and eventual withdrawal of Roman power from Europe
during the fifth century.

The period was anything but peaceful as Roman

power was used in Europe to quell disputes between her subject tribes, to
extend her influence to peripheral lands, to expel invaders from the East
and North, and to put down revolts against her administration.
After the collapse of Rome, the fragmented European tribes lay prey
to first the Huns who rode out of the East in the fourth and fifth centuries to plunder and rape most of Europe as far west as Drli;ans.

They

drove the Dstrogoths toward the Danube, the Visigoths into Thrace and
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Illyria, the Vandals through Gaul and into Spain, the Burgundians into
Savoy, and the Saxons and Angles into Britain.

The advance of the Huns

finally collapsed in 453 A.D. with the death of their leader, Attila.

However, Europe was terrorized again by descendants of the Huns in
subsequent centuries interspersed with invasions by other barbarians
from the north and the south.

The Bulgars invaded from the East in the

sixth and seventh centuries, the moslem Arabs--Moors or Saracens--from
the South in the first half of the eighth century, the Magyars or
Hungarians from the East in the latter half of the eighth century, the
Vikings--Norwegians, Swedes, and Danes--from the North in the ninth and

tenth centuries, the Turks from the East in the eleventh century, the
Mongols from the East in the thirteenth, and the Turks--Ottoman and

Tamerlane--again in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
While the Huns and subsequent invaders rushed in to occupy the

social vacuum created by the collapse of Rome, a dispute amongst
insiders waged over who should succeed and restore the ceremonial glory
of Rome.

The fi rst contenders were the emperors of the Eastern emp; re

at Byzantium during the sixth and seventh centuries.

The Franks, under

authority of the Bishop of Rome, claimed power during the eighth and
ninth centuries.

And the Germans--Teutons and Alamanni--asserted their

claims to succession during the tenth and eleventh centuries.
Interspersed all the whil e between wars of conquest and ci vi 1 stri fe
were famines and pestilences that delivered even more misery and death

upon European tribes.

Food shortages frequently followed the disrup-

tions of war and revolution causing starvation and malnutrition.
latter conduced toward pestilence.

Indeed~

And the

plague was a constant menace.

Verus' troops brought plague from the East to Rome in 166-167, and
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Emperor Claudius II died of the plague barely one hundred years later.
Attila's army was afflicted with the plague in 452.

The bubonic plague

moved from Egypt to Asia Minor, to Constantinople, and to other parts of
Southern Europe in 541-543, and sporadic outbreaks of the disease continued in Europe and along the European periphery during the medieval
centuries.

The Black Death reduced European population by half between

1346 and 1350.

It struck again in Portugal in 1436, and in London in

1664-1665. 25
It was as though Western Europe were the cryptic personification

of the Apocalyptic Revelations of Saint John the Divine. 26

Western

Europe was a frontier over which the four horsemen rode rough-shod for
many centuries.

War, civil strife, famine, and pestilence trampled

whatever traditions and ceremonies might rise to stifle the triumph of

technical progress.

These were cataclysmic events of cosmic proportions

to the peoples of Western Europe.

Some might believe that the times were

ruled by the Prince of Evil and his Demonic spirits bringing down damnation and destruction on the sinful, purging mankind, and preparing the
righteous for triumph of the Prince of Peace.

Whatever it was, it smashed

institutional shackles nearly as rapidly as they were forged in preRenaissance Europe.
How could a sixth century Visigothic scion find tranquility in an

existence threatened by Bulgars descending on him and his people from the
East, or have confidence in perpetuating a cultural past in which the
hovels of his recent ancestors were pillaged and razed by the Huns, their
kin raped and slaughtered by the armies of Attila, and their survivors
driven into a hostile Thrace or I1lyria--inhospitable lands where their
descendants

eked out less than satisfactory subsistences only to be
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dE!!cimated each year by famine, or pestilence, or civil strife, or by all

of these calamities together.

Opportunities to establish family shrines

on the burial grounds of their ancestors were cut short each generation

or so by one or another apocalyptic calamity.

Indeed, the ancestors

were interred all over Europe, if they were buried at all.

Stable pro-

perty and other institutional relationships simply could not rise for
very long.
The point is that Visigothic descendant, or the Ostrogothid descendant, or the descendant of the Burgundians or of any other indigenous
Western European tribe either knew few ancient traditions instrumentally
worthy of descendancy, or experienced disillusionment in most values

descended from the past.

His recollections of the past were filled with

fear, frustration. and anger.

Moreover, he was unlikely to assimilate

the declining ceremonial traditions of the Romans--an oppressor empire

that he neither understood nor trusted.

Perhaps the term most descrip-

tive of his temperament is accute anomie--an ideology divided within

itself leaving a sense of rootless disorganization, a feeling of pointlessness, or that no certain bounds exist, a lack of strong national

identity, and no pervasive notion of ethical constraint. 27

If he had

knowledge of the ancient traditions of his tribe, he had no confidence in
their powers to render a future tranquility with certainty.
The only escape open to him were into insanity, or suicide, or
some kind of mass movement.

Escape into the former was perhaps retreat

into the fantasy of a completely fabricated past devoid of causal linkages
to the intolerably anomic present.

Suicide was escape into an unbearable

present that possessed no salutary linkages to either the past or the
future.

Escape into a mass movement could have been an hysterical drive
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into a euphoric future contrived of ends as ends-in-themselves, or of

ends toward which there were apparently no adequate means in the present.
Societies predominantly populated by persons of the former dispositions
were more 1 ikely to perish completely.
However, a society substantially populated by persons of the latter
disposition possessed somewhat greater prospects for survival.

And it

was likely to place much more stress on the irrunediate concerns of survival--but more important, survival by any means that promised ascendancy

of -a future which was hardly certain of ascendancy.

Such a society is

unlikely to guide itself by the ceremonialism of a patently bankrupt
modicum of tradition.

Conditions simply would not permit it the luxury

of preoccupation with its past.

And those members who spent their time

in idle fantasies about the "good old daysll perished as surely as the

contrived objects of their fantasies.

Rather, such a society was most

likely to accept any means that were demonstrably instrumental to its ongoing future ends.

That is, its preoccupation was predominantly toward

the future, and only incidentaJly, if.at all, with the past. 28
In short, the peoples of medieval Europe inherited the sciences and
technologies of the Roman empire and the Oriental world without the ceremanial burdens of the latter's institutions.

Moreover, there were few

opportunities and perhaps fewer incentives for the Europeans of the times

to establ ish their own stable and enduring institutions resplendent with

ceremonies founded on ancient customs.

Europe was a frontier on which

whatever institutions existed were social expediencies with few, if any,

commonly understood 1inkages with antiquity.

European ceremonial systems

were accordingly weak with a very tenuous hold on the peoPle. 29

Innovation of the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the
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heavy horse in agriculture therefore took place first in Europe because
of the spur to invention caused by technological cross-fertil ;zation, and
because ceremonial i sm possessed 1 ittle···power at the time to prevent the

innovation of newly-invented tools.

Both of these conditions prevailed

in medieval Europe mostly because of the tumultuous conditions that
prevailed there during and after the decline of Roman power.

The latter

condition. weak ceremonialism, resulted from centuries of warfare, civil

strife, famine, and pestilence.

A caveat is necessary at this point.

The preceding illustration

is based on the theory that innovation of new technologies requires a

weak ceremonial system, and that the means by which a ceremonial system
becomes weak is manifest hUman misery delivered by warfare, civil strife,
famine, and pestilence.

This may have been so in the quasi-urban com-

munities of antiquity and in the feudal cities of the pre-industrial ages.

It may even be true today of those places in the world where industrialism
is not the dominant mode of social organization and the industrial city

is not the habitat of the vast majority of the people.
However, it is not entirely so in the lands where industrialism is

well establ ished and the people and their institutions have adopted
industrial life styles.

Indeed, a delicately balanced institutional

system is a condition necessary for industrialism to flourish.

Thus, a

viable industrial system is founded on an institutional base that has
essentially internal ized innovation and technical change.

To be sure,

ceremonial restraints are ever present--even in an efficiently functioning industrial city.

However, the tenuity of ceremonialism is made

del iberately pennissive so that it may operate to transmit culture,
structure society, socialize people, and control them to the purpose of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

293

achievin9 social stability without unduly impeding the innovation and
integration of new technologies.

points to be made at this time.

But this discourse moves ahead of the

The institutional characteristics of

industrial societies are analyzed in subsequent chapters.

This chapter has commenced an answer to the question:

What are the

underlying causes of institutional instability, change and discontinuity,
and what are the consequences for the city?

The answer given here is that

the innovation of new technologies tends to be unstabilizing to institutional enyironments, and that institutions along with their underlying
val ue bel iefs and ceremonial systems change as they react toward the new

technologies.

Accordingly the institutional compositions of cities change

with changes in technology.
The chapter initiates an elaboration of the above theme, the main
ideas of which are that technologies and their associated techniques are
continuous and dynamic.

Technology is continuous because the invention

of new technical means is based on scientific understanding. and the
latter is cumulative and is founded on all past discoveries.

Technology

is dynamic because the innovation of new technologies introduces ways of
organizing means and distributing social products which differ from the
ceremonial methods descending from the past.

The innovation of new tech-

nologies therefore induces very long-run changes in the institutional
system that functions to stabil ize society.

The continuous quality of technology was developed in terms of
invention.

Invention is explained as a process of

I'

cumu lative synthesis U

in which a problem is perceived, the solution elements are assembled, an
act of creative insight conceives a novel solution from the assembled
elements, and critical revision elaborates and embellishes the solution.
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The solution to one problem leads to new sets of problems and the process
is repeated until a strategic invention is developed.

A crucial component

of the synthesis process is the assembling of data and elements to solve
the perceived problem.

This is partly accomplished by technological

cross-fertil ization--bringing together diverse technical devices in the
same place and time, stimulating the ingenuities of inventors, and leading them toward creative insights as to new technical combinations of the
devices.

Technological cross-fertilization is therefore a crucial element

in invent; on.

However, invention is only one step in technologically induced
social change.

There are no social effects of discovery and invention

until innovation takes place--until the new technical devices are introduced.

Technical innovation is the function of entrepreneurs who make

choices as to the allocation of present means to the attainment of future
ends-to-be-reached.

If successful, the entrepreneur's choices resul t in

an economical allocation of means--that is, the greatest total benefits
are achieved from the attained ends at the least costly employment of
scarce means.

The use of new technical devices may improve efficiency

of the entrepreneur's allocation if it helps secure the selected ends at
less-costly employment of means or if it secures greater benefits from
the attained ends with the same means cost as before.
But the outcomes of entrepreneurial choices made in the present 1ie
in the future, and since the future is uncertain, there is risk that the
allocation of means chosen in the present will not produce the selected
future ends.

The risks of failure are borne by the entrepreneur who is

incentivated to bear the risks by the prospect of rewards for success.
The entrepreneur I s rewards are a private share of the net benefits secured
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by the attained ends.

The entrepreneur is, of course, admonished to

plan prudently by the possible private losses for failure.

The entre-

preneur is the key person in the innovation process, and innovation ;s
a key feature in technical change.

One of the risks borne by the entrepreneur is that his technical
innovation will be defeated by ceremonialism.

This is because the dynamic

character of technology brings it into conflict with the static character
of ceremonialism.

New technoiogies are change-inducing and forward-urging

in terms of the ends-means continuum, while ceremonialism is changeresisting and backward-clinging.

How much of new technology is actually

innovated therefore depends on the ceremonial powers of institutions to
resist changes.

The conclusion follows that a weak ceremonial system is

a necessary condition to the innovation of new technologies.

This latter point, weak ceremonial ism, was developed in terms of the
chaotic institutional conditions leading to the innovation of the heavy
plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy horse in medieval European
agriculture.

Innovation of those technical means revital ized urbaniza-

tion in medieval and Renaissance Europe. and it helped set the institu-

tional stage for the Industrial Revolution which rose with and followed
on the Protestant Refonnation.

Some of the social effects of those

innovations are described in the next chapter where the integration and

diffusion phases of technical change are described.
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CHAPTER VII I
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

This is the last of the chapters dealing with the technology element of institutional economics.

The first, Chapter VI, defined technology

as that quality of a tool that enables it to be substituted for human
effort in the creation of goods and services having human value.

It

defined the human component as technical skill in applying technique to
employment of the tools embodying technology.

And it defined technique

as the procedure by which humans employ a tool in the production of goods
and services having human value.
The preceding chapter, Chapter VI!, argued that technology is continuous because it is based on scientific knowledge, and such knowledge
;s cumulative and geometrical.

That is, the invention of ne"., technology

is based on past scientific discoveries and their technical applications.
Moreover, the invention of new technology usually opens avenues to a
number of possible on-going inventions.

Therefore, invention of new

technical means depends on technological cross-fertil ization--the assembly
of diverse tools and technical knowledge at the same place and time, provoking the curious and stimulating their inventive propensities.
The chapter also argued that new technologies are dynamic because
their innovation opens opportunities for organizing means and distributing
social products in ways differing from the ceremonially mandated methods
descending from the past.

That is, new technology is forward-urging and

change-producing in terms of the ends-means continuum.

This brings
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technology into conflict with ceremonialism because ceremonialism is
change-resistant.

That is, ceremonialism is backward-leaning in terms

of the ends-means continuum, requiring that only traditional ends be
sought and that traditional means be employed according to customs descended from the past.

Thus change-producing new technologies are locked

in a struggle with change-resisting ceremonialism as to the selection of
future ends-to-be-reached and the employment and organization of means to
the ends selected.
How. much of new technology is actually innovated therefore depends
on the power of ceremonialism.

It follows that a necessary condition to

the innovation of new technology is a weak ceremonial system.

These ideas

were developed around the history of early urbanization in the West, and
around the surge in .urbanization that took place in Ilestern Europe
during the medieval era.

The cause behind the unprecedented urbanization

of this latter period was alleged to be the innovation of the heavy plow,
triennial field rotation, and the heavy horse in agriculture.

And the

reasons these innovations took place in medieval Europe was the technological cross-fertil ization that was taking place there as well as the

feeble condition of European ceremonialism at the time.
This chapter argues that new technology is progressive.

That is,

successfully innovated new technology results in technological integration
and diffusion, and these latter outcomes increase human welfare.

Tech-

nology facilitates this by economizing in the employment of scarce means.
That is, it reduces the amount of human effort required to secure desirable sets of future ends.

In other words, it decreases the man hours of

labor input per unit of output of goods and services having human val ue.
It therefore makes possible a more humane society by providing means
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whereby social products may be distributed more equitably throughout
society.l
The first part of this chapter illustrates the foregoing by describing more thoroughly the innovation and diffusion of the heavy plow,
triennial crop rotation, and the heavy horse in medieval Europe.

It will

be argued that these events increased the internal economies of largescale production in agriculture, increasing agricultural surpluses and
liberating large numbers of peasants from primary employments so that
they could specialize in secondary, or urban, employments.

The second

part of the chapter illustrates increases in external economies of urban
scale initiated by the agricultural surplus and the further integration
of the horse as a draft animal in ordinary commerce.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE - TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNAL ECONOMIES
It was argued in the preceding chapter that social revol utions
occur when innovations of new technologies first increase internal

economies of large-scale production and then increase the external economies of location or scale.

Such changes alter interinstitutional arrange-

ments so that some institutions are not entirely compl imentary within the
system of institutions.

Aspects of ceremonialism founded on certain

institutional values become

hindrances in light of the new technologies.

The resulting social tensions reflect efforts of the institutional system
to realign itself in accord with the new technologies.
Social stability is resumed when diffusion and integration of a
new technology is complete.

Complete integration occurs when the tech-

nological innovation is fully incatinated across the institutional system,

and all institutions are once again complimentary within that system.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

302

This does not happen until ceremonies and ceremonial statuses have been

changed to account for the new technology.

Complete integration and dif-

fusion of major technological innovations often take centuries and sometimes millennia to occur.
Technological diffusion is essentially an inter-culture phenomenon.
That is, technological diffusion is the spread of technology from one
culture, area, or group to another by borrowing or migration.

ing of technology involves acculturation or assimilation.

The borrow-

Acculturation

is a process by which culture is transmitted through continuous first-hand
contacts between groups with different cultures--one often having a more
advanced civilization.

Assimilation is a process whereby two or more

heterogeneous groups occupying a common territory achieve a substantial

cultural homogeneity that ultimately results in a national unity.

The

migration of technology involves convergence in which distinctive culture
traits from different areas become similar or merge completely.2
On the other hand, technological integration is the variety of
social processes whereby the confl icts between newly innovated technologies and ceremonial ism are ame1 iorated, and the institutional system is
brought into social harmony with the new technologies.

Both innovation

and integration are essentially intraculture phenomena.

That is, they

take place within a culture, ~ between cultures. 3 The remaining content
chapters deal with the social mechanics of technological integration in
an industrial society.
The result of diffusion and integration is a new social stabil ity
in which institutional powers have been redistributed in consonance with
the new technological realities.
and some will have lost power.

Some institutions will have gained power,
New institutions will have emerged, and
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some will have disappeared.

According to institutional economic theory,

it is social revolution precipitated by technological change that accounts
for institutional discontinuities.

This part of the chapter regards the

institutional changes resulting from diffusion and integration of agricultural technologies in medieval Europe.
Kings, clerics, craftsmen, costermongers, and camelots were a tiny

fraction of the population in medieval Europe.

They were supported by

the vast multitude of peasant farmers comprising the rest of humanity.
Thus, anything that affected peasant agricultural producti vi ty--weather ,
soil, or tools--must also affect civilization--population, health, wealth,
and stealth.

Two parallel developments brought together the technolo-

gical means by which the Europeans ascended to dominance in the postmedieval Western World.

The first was innovation and diffusion of the

heavy plow to cultivate the hard soils of European uplands.

The second

was introduction of the heavy horse and its accouterment--first in warfare,
then in agriculture and commercial transportation.

Both developments are

traced to events commencing in the first century, A.D., and they merged
after the eighth century.

Finally, those technical improvements were

augmented by a shift from two-field to three-field crop rotation.

The

initial effect of these events was an increase in internal economies of
large-scale production in agriculture, and thus an increase in agricul-

tural output per man hour of labor input.
The Heavy Plow4
Although the age is by no means certain, the first plow is bel ieved
to have come into use sometime before 6,000 B. C., no doubt as an adaptation of a digging stick.

It

is thought to have consisted of a triangular
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or conical shape for digging the soil and handles for pulling or pushing
the plow.
plow.

Eventually an ox was used to provide the motive power for the

Modern adaptations of this prehistoric scratch plow remain in use

in some p1 aces even today.
The scratch plow does not turn the soil.

Rather, it agitates the

soil in its trace, leaving a strip of undisturbed earth between its furrows.
Cross-plowing is done to further pulverize the soil.

Thus, fields tend

to be as wide as they are long where the scratch plow is used.

the

scrat~h

Moreover,

plow is only suitable for cultivating the light, dry, alluvial

soils of river deltas.

It is useless against heavy upland soils.

This

restricted early agriculture to the river areas where soils were suitable
to the primitive scratch plow.
The soils of Northern Europe are mostly of the latter type--moist,
heavy, and up1and--and they are much more resistant than the light, dry,
soils of Mediterranean and adjacent river deltas.

Even when drawn by two

oxen, the scratch plow could not handle the richer upland soils.

If

Europe were to prosper, some way had to be found to efficiently cultivate
its upland soils.

That way came in part with innovation of the heavy plow.

The heavy plow possesses four technical features which distinguish
it from the primitive scratch plow.
cuts the soil vertically.

The heavy plow has a coulter which

The coulter Is attached at right angle to a

flat share that cuts the earth horizontally below the sad.

A mould board

is attached to the plow and serves to lay the sad over in a furrow
against the previously plowed edge.

Finally, the entire plow is equipped

with a set of wheels arranged to carry the non-cutting dead load of the
plow.
Lineage of the complete heavy plow is not fully known.

Some
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components of the heavy plow were known to be used with scratch plow
shares.

Coulters and wheels are bel ieved to have been in use in the Poe

Valley as early as the first century.
use coulters in the fourth century.

Likewise, the Goths were known to
However, the first appearance of the

complete heavy plow was in the hands of the Slavs in the latter half of
the sixth century.

Credit for innovation of the heavy plow therefore

appears to belong to the Slavs of Central Europe.

The new plow was

diffused westward, probably by migration, so that it was in use among
the German tribes in the seventh century, among the French tribes in the
eighth, and among the British tribes in the tenth.
Integration of the heavy plow involved revolutionary changes in
medieval European institutions.

The chan§es stemmed from the increased

agricultural productivity and from the techniques required to efficiently
employ the plow.
plow.

The heavy plow had several advantages over the scratch

It turned the soil with such force that it could be effectively

used to bring the hard soils of European uplands into agricultural production.

This, of course, greatly multiplied the amount of arable land in

Europe.

Moreover, there was no need for cross plowing because the heavy

plow pulverized the entire surface of a field with a single plowing.

The

time saved allowed a peasant to cultivate nearly twice as much land in
the same amount of plowing.

It was a case of substituting a tool, the

heavy plow, for labor in agricultural production.
Finally, the elimination of cross plowing made it more economical
to plow land in long strips.

Thus, fields tended to be long and narrow,

rather than square as with scratch plowing.

This latter effect was very

important to soil conservation on sloping uplands.

The long narrow fields

were usually plowed in a clockwise direction with the furrow turned to
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the right.

As the years passed the fields tended to become terrace-like,

each parallel field containing a low center ridge with a slight swail
adjoining adjacent fields on either side with like characteristics.

The

fields therefore trapped and held water while preventing destructive
erosion.

Crops could usually be harvested from the depression between

fields in drought years, and from the ridge in years with heavy
precipitation.

And, of course, crops were harvested from both ridges

and depressions during normal climate years.
Long open fields also changed the pattern of pasturage for cattle.
As long as the population was sparsely settled over the land, animals
could be grazed in permanent pastures located on tillable lands.

But as

population increased and the heavy plow made such lands tillable, less
land was available for pasturage on a permanent basis.

As long as each

farmer cultivated his own small plot. his fallow could not be economically
used for grazing.

However. strip plowing and open fields permitted crops

to be cooperatively sown in several large fields during any particular
season. leaving a large community fallow free for grazing cattle.

This

had the added advantage of allowing the manure to drop on the next

season's crop land rather than on open meadows.
Innovation of the heavy plow also brought revolutionary social
changes in Northern and Western Europe.

Sometime during or just before

the seventh century, there was an unprecedented upsurge in population and
emigration from the Rhineland and contiguous areas.

This correlates

with an increase in open fields, and it is believed that use of the heavy
plow accounts for both phenomena.

According to this theory, the heavy

plow increased agricultural productivity supplying the surpluses to support greater fecundity in peasant families and all at once liberating
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significant numbers of peasants from farming.
At the same time the heavy plow was restricted to use in areas having a relatively dense settlement.
afford to acquire and use it.

A single family could not usually

This was because land was allotted to

peasants from a very early time on the basis of that which was needed to
support a family and render. tribute to king and deity.

The family lands

were therefore not large enough to efficiently employ the much more pro-

ductive heavy plow.

Moreover, the new plow was costly to acquire.

The

suspension and wheels were much more complex than the simple frame of the

primitive scratch plow, and they were therefore comensurately more expensive.

LikeWise, the working parts which were greater in number and size,

had to be of metal, and all metals were scarce and costly in sixth and
seventh century Europe.

The heavy plow was also more costly to operate, both because it was

heavier and because it was used in heavier and more resistant soil.
new plow could not be drawn by a single yoke of oxen.
required four yoke--;n other words, eight oxen.

The

Indeed, it usually

It was rare for a peasant

family to own more than a single yoke, and it was necessary for them to

pool their plow teams to effectively use the heavy plow.

As already noted, it was more efficient to cultivate long, narrow
fields with the new plow.

Thus, whenever the heavy plow was placed into

use in Western Europe, the village lands were usually reorganized from
squarish, fenced fields into large open fields which were plowed in long,
narrow strips.

The only reasonable way to allocate land was, therefore,

to distribute the strips to the peasants who owned the plow and the individual yokes of oxen comprising a cooperative plow team.

On that basis,

one peasant family might cultivate many small dispersed strips of land.
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Thus, land commenced to be allocated to peasants on the basis of
their contributions to their cooperative plow teams.

This had immense

importance because the criteria of efficient land distribution ceased to
be the amount needed to sustain one family.

With the right technologies,

a peasant family could clearly produce a substantial and enduring surplus.
Therefore, the basis of land distribution became the amount that could be
effectively tilled by the tool of tillage--the plow and the plow team.
Cooperative agriculture posed problems of control and coordination.

Clearly, such dispersed narrow plots of land could not be cultivated at
the whim of the peasant to whom they were allocated.

They had to be

plowed in concert with the adjoining strips that were owned by other

members of the plow team if all were to be efficiently cultivated.
Inevitably disputes arose.

As a consequence. strong peasant tribunals

emerged in hamlets to adjudicate disputes and to make decisions on land

management for the community.
of a manorial system.

These conditions were one of the bases

And such economies were found only in Northern

Europe where the heavy plow was used to cultivate open fields.

Oiffusion and integration of the heavy plow in medieval Europe
increased internal economies of large-seal e agri cul tura 1 product; on, all

at once multiplying the potential for growth in agricultural output,
creating a substantial agricultural surplus, and 1 iberating large numbers
of peasants from farming so they could gravitate to secondary and urban
employments.

In order to secure the significant increase in social

benefits, society was reorganized to efficiently employ the heavy plow.
This involved realigning real property boundaries, reallocating peasant
lands from a basis of family subsistence to a basis of tool productivity,
shifting farming from an individual family enterprise to a cooperative
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community enterprise, and creating peasant councils to cooperatively

manage the community arable.
Triennial Field Rotations
An innovation in the eighth century augmented the gains reaped from
use of the heavy plow.

A system of three-field-crop rotations replaced

the two-field system which descended from antiquity. The triennial rotation was initiated in Frank lands between the Seine and Rhine Rivers with
rise of the Carolingian Empire.

It was quickly integrated in that region,

but diffusion to other regions of Europe was very slol<, perhaps reflecting
ceremonial rigidities in land tenures.

England abandoned biennial rota-

tion in favor of triennial in the twelfth century following the Norman
conquest, while the Slavs in Poland and southern Sweden waited until the
thirteenth century fallowing the Mongol sweep across Eastern Europe.

The rotation system allowed land to lay fallow biennially under the
two-field system and triennially under the three-field system. The fallow
period was to rest the soil and allow it time to replenish nutrients

through capillary action, and by plowing under the indigenous cover. The
parcels were reversed the next year so that the previously fallowed parcel was cultivated, and the previously cultivated parcel was fallowed.
The two-field system was used universally. if not uniformly, throughout
Europe.

The principal variation involved planting seasons.

Main crops

were planted in the southern part of the north temperate and sub-tropical zones in autumn and were harvested in late spring or early summer.

On the other hand, main crops were originally planted in the early spring
and harvested in the late summer or early autumn throughout the northern
part of the north temperate zone and in the northern sub-arctic zone.
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Three field-crop rotation recognizes that there are indeed two sea-

sons for planting and harvesting and that significant gains in productivity
can be realized by organizing agrarian work around the fact.

The three-

field system divided the croplands into three equal parcels. One was
planted in the fall with winter-growing grains for harvest late the following spring.

The second field was planted in early spring with summer-grow-

ing crops for fall harvest.

The third field was left fallow. The fields

were rotated each year so that each would have been once in winter crops,
once in spring crops, and once in fallow during any three-year period.

A comparison of the two methods of crop rotation illustrates the
gains in the triennial system over the biennial.

If the total annual

plow capacity of a manor is 900 acres, then it is easy to see that a
single plowing of the fallow will allow the manor to farm 900 acres
under either rotation system.

However, 450 acres must be kept fallow

under the two-field system leaving 450 acres for crops.

On the other

hand, only 300 acres are kept fallow under the three-field system leaving
600 acres for crops.

Thus the gain of the triennial method in product

units per unit of plow input is 33 percent over the biennial system.
The gain is even more dramatic if the fallow is plowed twice dur-

ing the year.

Of course, double plowing the fallow reduces the total

acres of land tillable by a given plow team.

However, this poses no

problem as long as the increase in productivity from double plowing is

at least equal to the output foregone by reducing the acreage plowed.
Indeed, overall efficiency is thereby gained in land use because the out-

put per acre is increased while the units of product produced per unit of
plow input remains at least the same.

At any rate, the three-field

rotation gain is even greater with a double plowing of the fallow.
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For example, assuming the same plow team constraint as before, 900

acres per year, it is seen that 600 acres of that capacity must be allocated to double plow 300 acres of fallow under a biennial rotation.
This leaves only 300 acres of capacity for plowing cropland, and the
total acres farmed by the manor is 600.

On the other hand, only 450

acres of plow capacity is allocated to double plow 225 acres of fallow
under the triennial rotation.
for the manor arable.

This leaves 450 acres of plow capacity

The manor can therefore keep 150 more acres in

crop for an increase ·of 50 percent with the same plow input.

Part of

that increase is derived from the additional land cultivated by the saving in plow-team capacity.

That

;S~

the manor can farm 675 acres

(450 + 225) with triennial rotation, and only 600 acres with biennial
rotation.

The three-field rotation system had other advantages over and above
the obvious gains in productivity.

It increased labor efficiency by dis-

tributing peasants I work more uniformly across the year.

By enabling

crop diversification, the technique reduced the propensity toward famine.

And finally, the system resulted in a substantial increase in the production of crops that were particularly important to subsequent events.
One was the use of legumes in the spring planting, and the other was the
cultivation of oats also as a spring crop.
Commencing in the ei ghth century, 1egumes--l intel s, peas. broad
beans, and chickpeas--were sown in the spring planting because they
replaced the nitrogen taken from the soil by the previous year1s crops
of wheat and rye.

They were essential to success of the triennial rota-

tion of crops because of the greater intensity of soil use with that
system.

An important by-product of that procedure was the infusion of
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protein-rich vegetables into the human diet, and this had a positive
effect on both the level of population and the health and vigor of the
These factors weighed heavily in the outcome of subsequent events.

people.

Further consequences stem from the spring crops of the triennial
field rotation.

Qats, which came to Europe as a weed from Asia Minor in

prehistoric times, was a major spring crop.

Oats happen to be the prime

diet for horses, and Europeans found precisely the correct food among
their agricultural surp"uses for the proper care and feeding of horses-a fact of considerable future importance to the Franks.
In summation to this point, it is clear that innovation and integration of the heavy plow increased agricultural productivity because it
embodied greater technology than its predecessor, the primitive scratch
plow.

That is, the heavy plow had a greater capacity to substitute for

labor in agricultural production.

Likewise the change from biennial to

triennial crop rotation augmented the greater efficiency of the heavy
plow so that the two events worked toward a long-run excess of labor in
farming.

They did this by releasing peasants from agricultural employ-

ments while increasing the food surpluses by which populations could
expand.

At the same time, the new plow enabled theretofore untillable

lands to be brought under cultivation, substantially increasing the longrun potential for the production of a continuing agricultural surplus.
Finally, the exigencies of the technology mandated a radical reordering
of land tenure and the reorganization of peasant employment from individual
to cooperative farming techniques.
This discourse on the heavy plow must be interrupted for a time in
order to pick up the other technological means by which the Europeans
ascended to dominance in the post-medieval Western World.

The other means
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was by introduction of the heavy horse.

Like the innovation of the heavy

plow, introduction and diffusion of the heavy horse is traced to events
which conunenced in the first century A.D.

And the two means merge after

the ei ghth century.
The Heavy Horse 6
The horse has seven epochs.

It apparently originated on the Steppes

of central Asia where it foraged the wilds for native grasses.

Its sec-

ond epoch is as game for the Indo-European savages who hunted the Steppes
before the dawn of history.

Early domestication of the horse for meat,

milk, and hides by the same Indo-Europeans marks its third epoch.

The

fourth finds the horse drawing a travois loaded with cargo or drawing a
chariot in warfare.

The fifth equestrian epoch sees the animal bearing

a rider with broad sword or spear.

The sixth sees the horse replacing

oxen drawing a plow and other forms of heavy drayage.

Finally the horse

becomes a totally ceremonial appendage in the modern industrial world
where its technical and productive qual ities are completely surpassed by
mechani ca 1 forms of power.
The domestic horse was exclusively a creature of warfare in the
Western World until the early ninth century.

It served three successive

military masters--the charioteer, the rider without stirrups, and the
rider equipped with stirrups.

Horse-mounted warriors were used by the

PerSians, the Greeks, and the Romans, and of course, by the barbarians
that periodically swept across Europe during the thousand years following the decl ine of Rome.
However, combat from the back of a moving horse was a precarious
enterprise in antiquity.

The warrior sat bare "back gripping the horse
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with his knees.

At most he had only a blanket or cushion between himself

and his horse.

He had no pommel or cantle to give front and back support,

and no stirrups for lateral support.

This severely limited the warrior's

ability to wield a sword or thrust a spear or lance from horseback.

More-

over, the horse of antiquity was too small to bear an armored warrior or
to be armored itself.

Thus cavalry was never a decisive arm in those

times.
The heavy horse, ancestor to both the medieval warhorse and the
draft horse, was introduced to the Western World in the first century.
The pedigree of the heavy horse is not clearly known.

It is clear, how-

ever, the heavy horse opened the way to use of heavier accouterment.
The rigid-frame saddle soon made an appearance, and both the horse and

its rider could be armored for combat.

The saddle with pommel and cantle but without stirrups appeared
also in the first century A.D.

The saddle burst upon the Roman Empire

under barbarian warriors charging out of the east.

Hhile the porrnnel and

cantle improved efficiency of warfare from horseback, the p1 ight of the
cavalryman remained precarious without stirrups.

And seven more centuries

elapsed before the stirrup appeared in Europe.
The stirrup is first found in India during the second century B. C.
supporting only the big toe of an unshod rider.

Of course, the toe stir-

rup is unsuitable Tor the shod rider of colder climates, and the first

attempt to support the whole foot appears as a hook stirrup in Pakistan
and Afghanistan during the latter part of the first century or the early
part of the second.

The hook stirrup had a penchant for snagging and

dragging a fallen rider.

It gave way to the ordinary foot stirrup in

China by the fifth century.

The foot stirrup found its way to Persia by
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the end of the seventh century.

Finally, it was innovated in Europe by

Charles Martel, de facto King of the Franks, in sweeping military reforms
during the first half of the eighth century.
Significance of the foot stirrup to subsequent institutional changes
in Europe cannot be overemphasized.

The foot stirrup was the keystone to

a radical reordering of Frank arms and warfare, and the logistics of mili-

tary reorganization mandated revolutionary changes in society itself.

At

the same time the importance of the horse in warfare led to the breeding
and prol iferation of more powerful horses, and it eventually opened the

way to widespread use of the horse in agriculture and transportation.
Finally, the Franks ascended to dominate European pol itical affairs for
nearly three centuries.

The new horse-based technologies were force-

fully diffused throughout Europe during those centuries.
To understand how and why the foot stirrup was so important to
European civil ;zation, one must understand its function.

While the

saddle gave front and back support, it was the stirrup that gave lateral

support to the rider.

The stirrup therefore fixed the rider to his mount

and the combination made for a fighting unit of unprecedented might.
blow was no longer delivered by force of the warrior's arm alone.

The

He

could now grip his lance between his body and his upper arm, and guiding
it with his hand, he could land the blow on an adversary with the combined

force of himself and his galloping mount.

Thus, the power of the human

body was replaced by that of the horse, and the arrangement made possible
a new method of warfare--mounted shock combat.
The advent of mounted shock combat reversed the order of battl e and
within a generation the mounted warrior ceased to simply support infantry.
Cavalry replaced infantry as the principal Frankish arm, and infantry,
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the traditional queen of battle, became a supporting arm to cavalry.

The

mil itary import of these events was immediate, but the social conse-

quences were revolutionary and pervasive.
The ceremonial aspects of society had to be reorganized to support
mounted warfare.

The Frankish army consisted of infantry levies of free-

men until the middle of the eighth century.

The process derived from

the Germanic tradition that every freeman was a soldier.

It was a rela-

tively inexpensive way for the monarch to maintain an army.

The military

potential ities of the foot stirrup changed all of that, and virtually
every European institution was ultimately affected.
The new method of warfare was costly.
needed several mounts.

To be effective, a knight

In addition to remounts for horses killed in

battle, the knight's squire must be mounted.

Additionally, the knight

must be armed and he and his mounts must be armored.

In all, the cost

to equip one knight was about twenty oxen, the plough teams of ten or
more peasant famil ies.
sive.

The cost to maintain a knight was equally expen-

Each horse had to be maintained in top condition, and horses con-

sume large amounts of grain whether or not they see combat.

Here then,

is the importance to the Frankish kingdom of a spring planting of oats
under the triennial crop-rotation plan.
The monetary and taxing systems of medieval Europe were primitive,
and ther~ was no way a monarch could rely on taxation to support a retinue
of knights.

The most important income-producing wealth at the time was

arable land, and land endowments became the method by which mounted
warriors could be maintained in suitable number.

Charles Martel seized

ecclesiastical properties in 732--approximately the time triennial crop
rotation was innovated in those lands.

He gave possession of the land
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(benefice) to an expanded group of cavaliers with the condition that
they serve him (servile tenure) in mounted combat.
the tenure involved forfeiture of the fief.

Failure to discharge

The result of these arrange-

ments was a wide extension of the feudal institution of vassalage.
Thus, European feudalism was a military organization of society to

support cavalry.

It stressed the breeding and rearing of horses and the

training and support of men capable of carrying on the new method of warfare.

For this reason, Pippin changed the Saxon tribute from cattle to

horses in 758.

One can imagine the impact of this requirement on the

breeding of cattle and horses.

The ceremonial aspects of the agricultural

system to support cavalry, manorial ism, descended from the Roman pro-

prietary system described in a prior chapter.

It needed only to be

adapted from pagan to Christian ceremonies and to be wed with the cere-

monial system of land tenure and agricultural techniques that were emerging with innovation of the heavy plow.

The knight's personal ity and hi s environment were shaped by hi s
mode of fighting, and his mode of fighting stemmed from innovation and

diffusion of the foot stirrup.

The two distinguishing ceremonial qual-

ities of the caval ier were loyalty to his 1 iege and mil itary prowess
based on the new methods of mounted shock combat.

And these two qual-

ities were the corner-stones of medieval chi va 1 ry.

The new warriors had to be skilled professionals.

They had to be

in superb physical condition and they underwent long periods of mil itary
training.

crafts.

There was simply no time for homey vocations 1 ike farming and

And here is one si gnif; canee of an agri cul tura 1 surpl us--support

of a full-time, professional military elite.

The institution of knight-

hood produced a proud and cohesive military caste that ceremonially
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vented its competitiveness and sharpened its prowess in the lethal but
pragmatic wargame--the jousting tournament--a series of encounters between mounted knights in which opponents charged and attempted to unseat
one another with lances.

Military service therefore became a matter of

ceremonial class, and freedom became a matter of property tenure sufficient to support a mounted warrior.

Like the patriarchal estates of

antiquity, feudal tenures soon became hereditary, conditioned always on
one's ability to fulfill knight's service.
Wherever the Frankish kingdom extended its realm, it introduced its
methods of warfare and its feudal institutions.

Mounted shock combat

became the practice of the Lombards in Italy by the end of the eighth
century--Byzantium by the tenth.

And Will iam the Conqueror introduced

the technique to the Anglo Saxons at Hastings in 1066.

The crusades

brought mounted shock combat forcefully to attention of the Moslems, and
the Syrians and Egyptians were staging jousting tournaments by the thirteenth century.
Finally, the feudal warrior intentionally created by the Franks to
serve their military needs became the ruling class on collapse of the
Carol ingian Empire.

Of course, this perfectly preserved the savage

tradition that the elite men of invidious leisure shall eschew the debasing occupations involved with the creation and maintenance of material
welfare, and shall occupy themselves with only the ceremonial barbarian
vocations--pol itics, rel igion,

warfare~

and maleficent games.

Quite the

oppOSite of the vulgar occupations, the feudal warrior's vocation stressed
invidious leisure and the ceremonial destruction of goods.
But another consequence of feudal warfare commands attention.

That

is, of course, the breeding up and widespread diffusion of horses suitable
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for heavy draught.

For it was harnessing of the heavy horse to the

heavy plow that ultimately accelerated the political ascendancy of
Europe in affairs of the renaissance world by further advancing
agricultural productivity, increasing food surpluses, and freeing labor
from agricultural employment.

However, the event had to await two

other deve10pments--a suitable harness and a nailed horseshoe.?
The Slavs reckoned a unit of p10w1and in the twelfth century as
that which could be cultivated by two oxen or one horse.

While a

properly harnessed and shod draft horse produces approximately the same
pull as an ox, the horse moves more rapidly so that it actually
accomplishes one and one-half times the foot pounds per second of work
done by the ox.

And the horse has more stayi ng power than the ox so

that the farmer can work several hours longer each day.

In all, the

work advantage of the horse is approximately twice that of an ox.
Horses were harnessed 1i ke oxen in anti quity--whi ch is understandable since the draft animal of prehistory was the ox, and it would seem

that the yoke harness which worked very well with oxen had simply to be
adapted to the horse.
horse.

However, the yoke did not work well with the

The horse could be harnessed to the yoke only with long straps

attached to the ends of the yoke and passed around the creature's neck
and under its belly.

The straps pressed on the windpipe and jugular

ve; n when the horse attempted to pull. Moreover, the yoke rested on the
horsels shoulders, a point of traction that is much to high for a horse.

The key feature of a modern harness is a padded collar that rests
on the withers of the horse so as not to constrict blood and airflow.

Traces or shafts attach the collar to the load so that the traction point
is near the chest of the horse.

This allows the beast to place its entire
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weight into pull ing.

It has been demonstrated that a horse rigged with

a modern collar harness can pull as much as five times the load it can
pull with the ancient yoke harness.

Clearly, horses could not be used

in place of oxen for heavy drayage until the collar harness came into use.
Early attempts by the Romans to overcome the defects of the yoke
harness produced unsatisfactory variations of breast straps and collars.
Likewise, China is known to have had the breast harness in the sixth century.

At any rate, the evidence points to a satisfactory collar harness

in Germany by the latter half of the eighth century.

However, diffusion

of the collar harness and use of the heavy horse with the heavy plow did
not take place in Europe until the late tenth or early eleventh century.
It is probable that the horse was not harnessed to the heavy plow
even though the collar harness had been known for two or more centuries
because horse hooves are not very durable in moist climates like those
of Northern Europe.

After all, a draft horse is no better than his

hooves when it comes to the long pull.

While the horse hoof is durable

in dry c1 imates, it becomes soft and is easily damaged with moisture.
Oxen appear to be better equipped than horses in this regard because
their hooves stand up better.

The nailed, iron horseshoe remedied the

problem of hoof durability for horses.

However, nailed horseshoes do not

appear in Europe until the latter half of the tenth century.

The first

archeo1ogica11y-confirmed evidence of a nailed horseshoe was found in the
grave of a Siberian nomad in the Yenisei region dating from the ninth
century.

Evidence indicates that they were known in Byzantium soon after,

and in Europe soon after that.

However, widespread use of the nailed

horseshoe does not occur until the eleventh century.
It was finally in the e1 eventh century that the properly-shod draft
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horse was efficiently harnessed to the heavy plow in Europe.

The plow

had been in expanding use for nearly five centuries, and the collar harness had been in existence for more than two hundred years.

The com-

bined effects of the innovation, diffusion, and integration of the
heavy plow, the three field rotatiol\ and the heavy horse in agriculture
were astounding increases in internal economies of large-scale agricul-

tural production, resulting in equally astounding increases in agricultural productivity and surpluses in agricultural products, the emancipation of significant numbers of peasants from farming, and a radical
reordering of institutional arrangements.
Those effects were caused by qualitative improvements in tools.
That is, they stemmed from technological advances that permitted the
improved tools to better substitute for labor in the production of goods
and services having human value.
going ends.

Those results became the means to on-

Indeed, they served to bring ends into view that had there-

tofore been beyond human reach.

It became possible to organize means in

different ways than the traditional methods descended from the past.

Thus,

the forward-urging new technologies were in conflict with change-resistant ceremonialism.

That is, some inter-institutional arrangements were

not entirely compl imentary within the institutional system, and aspects
of ceremonialism based on those institutional values became hindrances

in light of the new technologies.

This led to social conflicts as the

institutional system first struggled to resist, then to realign itself in
accord with the new technologies.
Social stability did not resume until diffusion and integration of
the new technology was complete. That did not happen until the technological innovations were fully harmonized with the institutional system,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

322
and all institutions were once again compl imentary within that system.
That happened when ceremonies and ceremonial statuses were changed to
account for the new technologies.

While the innovation and diffusion

of the heavy plow and the heavy horse in Hedieval Europe took almost a
thousand years, the social adjustments needed to fully integrate those
technical arrangements took another four hundred years, give or take a
century or two.
URBANIZATION - TECHNOLOGY AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIES
The preceding part of this chapter described how the innovation and
diffusion of the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy
horse increased the returns to scale in agricultural production in medieval Europe.

It resulted in the creation of a substantial and enduring

agricultural surplus, the liberation of large numbers of peasants from
farming, and the precipitation of revolutionary institutional changes.

The changes described in the foregoing part of this chapter related to
institutions in a rural setting.

Of course, the revolution did not end

with the changes in agricultural production.

Indeed, the revolution in

agriculture had profound effects on all aspects of medieval and postmedieval 1 ife.
In addition to first increasing the internal economies of largescale production. the diffusion and integration of the heavy plow,
triennial crop rotation. and the heavy horse also affected the external
economies of location and urban scale.

The distribution and size of

urban settl ements. rural to urban migrati ons. and urban growth and form

were ultimately affected.

This part of the chapter describes the progres-

sive qualities of technological innovation and diffusion by illustrating
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the secondary and urban consequences of integrating the heavy plow and
the heavy horse in medieval Europe.
Distribution of Urban Settlements
Substitution of the horse for the ox in farming led to the same
substitution in other uses.

The horse replaced the ox as draft animal

in overland transportation resulting in reductions in transportation

costs and commuting times, and therefore in changes in market areas and
the distribution of settlements.

That is, use of the horse at draw

increased the external economies of certain urban locations and led to

profound alterations in the hierarchy of central urban places.

The

changes obtained because of the greater speed of the horse over the ox.

The horse coul d haul goods and passengers greater di stances per hour of
drayage than the ox.

r~oreover,

the horse could endure longer periods at

the draw, and it was a more efficient converter of forage to work than

was the ox.
Use of the horse at draw mandated other techni ca 1 improvements.
The common drayage vehicle of Roman times was an ox-drawn, two-wheeled

cart.

By the twelfth century, the two-wheel ed cart had given way to

expanding use of four-wheel ed wagons capabl e of haul i ng very heavy loads.
~1oreover.

wagons were improved to take advantage of the greater eff;-

ciency of the properly shod and harnessed horse.
were turning front axl es,

5 iog1 etrees,

Among the improvements

and brakes. 8

The benefit of these technical improvements was a substantial reduc-

tion in the cost of overland transportation.

It is estimated that the

cost of transporting grain overland in Roman times doubled its price each
100 miles.

On the other hand, water transport was so inexpensive that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

324

grains shipped to the city of Rome from North Africa undersold grains
grown by Romans only a few miles from the city.

By contrast, the cost

of overland transportation of grains in the thirteenth century is estimated to have doubled its price each 300 miles, a reduction to only 33
. percent of the former cost.
The sizes of marketing areas and the distribution of settlements
were greatly affected by the reductions in overland transportation costs.
The relevant principle is found in the relationship between the radius
and the area of a circle.
circle is quadrupled.
nine times.

If the radius is doubled, the area of that

If the radius is tripled, the area is increased

In other words, the area multipl ier is the square of the

radius mul tipl ier.
Applying the foregoing principle and assuming a transportation cost
reduction of two-thirds, one can see that, ceteris paribus, goods can
now be transported three times as far at no additional cost.
the radius multiplier is three.

That is,

Thus, the area served by a market

village has expanded by a multiple of nine; in other words, by the square
of the radius multiplier.

For example, if the distance from the central

business district of a market area were three miles, its market area is

approximately 28 square miles ( A =1Tr2 ).

If the cost of transportation

to and from that market town is somehow reduced by two-thirds, then the
effective radius of its market area may be increased by as much as three
times, or to approximately nine miles.

This implies an expansion of

that townls market area from 28 square miles to approximately 254 square
miles, or by a multiple of nine.
The same effect can be demonstrated using a market theory of land
allocation. 9

For purposes of explanation, it is assumed that the value
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of land is determined by its productivity, and that the central market
price per acre of harvested product is the same at any given time for
all producers.

The profit per acre to producers is therefore the central

market price per acre of harvested product less all costs per acre to
produce the product and deliver it to the market.

The costs are the land

rent per acre, the transportation cost per acre, and other costs per

acre.

Other per-acre costs include the cost of seed, fertilizer, etc.,

and they are approximately the same for all producers.

On the other hand,

transportation costs are directly related to the distance the land 1 ies

from the central market place.

The farther the land is from the central

place, the greater the transportation cost.
If farmer-producers bid against one another for use of the land in
accordance with the foregoing assumptions, it will be found that the

emerging bid-rent function is inversely proportionate to the transportation-cost function.

For example, if the product price at the central

market place for all producers is $200.00 per acre of output, the per-acre
costs other than rent and transportation are $25.00, and the profit normally expected and required to keep farmers cultivating the product is

$75.00 per acre, there remains $100 per acre to cover rent and the cost
of transportation.

Finally, if annual transportation costs are $33.00

per acre per mile from the central place. then the effective radius of

the central market place is approximately three miles ($100/acre divided
by $33 per acre per mile), and its area is approximately 28 square miles.
It is easy to see that farmer-producers will bid higher rents for
parcels of land closer to the central market place because the transportation cost associated with those parcels are lower.

That is. rent is a

premium paid for access to the central places, and the closer the land
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to the center, the higher the rent.

For example, if the distance from

the central market place is one mile, the annual transportation cost per

acre of product is $33.00.

Under these conditions, the producer would be

will ing to bi d up to $67.00 rent per acre.

On the other hand, the trans-

portation cost on a parcel two miles from the central marketplace is

$67.00 per acre, and the farmer-producer would be willing to bid only
$33.00 rent per acre.

And, of course, the producer would not bid on

lands more distant than three miles from the central marketplace.
It is also easy to see that a general reduction in transportation
costs will increase the radius of the market arable.

For example, if the

transportation cost on the last mentioned parcel of land dropped from

$100.00 per acre of output to $33.00 (implying an annual transportation
cost of $11.00 per acre per mile from the central market place) it would
become economically feasible to farm the land, and producers would be

wi 11 i ng to bi d up to $67.00 rent per acre.

But more than that, the lower

transportation costs make it feasible to bring land lying even more distant from the central market into cultivation, thus increasing the radius

of the market arable from three miles to nine, and its area from 28
square miles to 254 square miles.
~~hi1e

this simple explanation demonstrates the point, it ignores

other economic variables.

For example, a reduction in transportation

costs would first increase profits and attract more farmers into cultivating the product.

This would increase the number of bidders for the

arable lands and force rents up.

The increased rents would make the more

distant and perhaps less suitable lands more attractive alternatives to

the land alreadY under cultivation.

Finally, the additional supply of

product harvested from the newly cultivated lands would force product
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prices downward and restore lower profits.

The net result would be a new

long-run market equilibrium with normal profits, lower product prices, a
larger central market area with rents on farm lands lower than before
near the central place and higher than before at the periphery.
Other factors are likely to mitigate against expansions on the
order suggested above.

Topographic features 1; ke mountains, 1 akes, and

rivers! will affect the direction and extent of expansion.

Similarly,

property and political boundaries may place limits on expansions of

market areas.

Nevertheless, the pOint is made that the innovation and

diffusion of new technologies (heavy horse, breast harness, horse shoes,
improved wagons, etc.) reduced the cost of Dverl and transportati on.

And

the lower transportation costs effected profound changes in urban

arrangements in medieval and post-medieval Europe.
di stri bution of settl ements, rural

The size and

to urban mi gration. urban growth.

and many other social arrangements were ultimately affected.
The number and distribution of settlements (the hierarchy of
centra 1 pl aces) were effected because as transportati on costs decl ined
and potential village arables enlarged. the market and commuting areas

of adjoining hamlets and villages expanded to overlapping.

Each

community was affected differently depending on its position in the
emerging networks of central places.

Assume, for example, that a very

long-run stability based on the ox-drawn, two-wheeled cart as the

primary transport vehicle located hamlets an average three and one-half
miles apart.

That is. each settlement consisted of ten or twelve

peasant cottages serving an area of a little more than eleven square
miles with an outside radius of two miles.
Now assume that the last fifty years witnesses a general change to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

328
horse-drawn wagons and a resulting reduction in transportation costs of

two-thirds.

What is 1 ikely to happen? According to the foregoing theory,

one community in nine will eventually expand and the remaining eight will

decline so that the resulting very-long-run distribution locates first
order settlements an average ten and a half miles apart.

That is, each

of the expanding villages serves an area of approximately 100 square
miles with an outside radius of six miles.

And if the surviving villages

absorbed the families of the defunct hamlets, the village populations
would expand by one hundred or more families.

Something on that order

seems to have occurred in Europe between the tenth and fourteenth centuries.
The point is that substitution of the horse for the ox in overland
transportation had transilient effects on the distribution and sizes of

European urban settlements.

The horse technology reduced transportation

costs, changed the external economies of urban locations, and led to the
growth of some first-order settlements and the demise of others.

More-

over, growth of some settl ements accompanied increases in the speci a 1iza·
tion of urban employments and in proliferation of the urban institutions

staffed by the new specialists.
Rural to Urban Migration lO
Two of the foregoing occurrences brought about other changes that
profoundly affected city development in Europe.

The first was the increase

in internal economies of large-scale production in agriculture caused by
innovation and diffusion of the heavy plow and the heavy horse.

The sec-

ond was alterations in the distribution and sizes of settlements caused
by the reduction in transportation cost attributed to substitution of
the heavy horse for the ox in overland transportation.

Together. the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

329

two phenomena resulted in increases in' the external economies of large
urban scale and thus increases in urban agglomeration.
An itinerant merchant made his appearance across Europe in the
eighth and ninth centuries.

His 1 ineage is not certain, but he and most

of his retinue were probably former serfs or sons of serfs whose bondage
could not be proven.

The itinerant merchant as well as all of the traders

involved in medieval and post-medieval European commerce were responding

to the emerging economic productivities of Western Europe.

However, their

responses were themselves instrumental toward several important on-going
changes.

The first was the economic resurgence of European towns and the

founding of new towns as medieval trading centers.

The second was the

gradual monetization of feudal obl igations.
The itinerant merchant was the final link in a chain of commerce
that commenced at Constantinople, Alexandria, and other Eastern Mediterranean ports, and made a tortous journey through the great maritime
cities of Venice, P;sa, and Genoa to the fair at Champagne and to the
sma11er trading centers emerging in the European river valleys--Hamburg
on the Elbe, Cologne on the Rhine, Paris on the Seine, London on the
Thames.

From those centers, the itinerant merchant peddled the silks,

spices, precious metals, drugs, and finely-worked jewelry from the Orient
to the nobil ity that occupied the castles and manors of Europe.

The

moneys he acquired in this way were used to purchase furs, honey, fish,
wine, salt, timber, iron, and woolens which were returned over the same
routes to be exchanged for more Oriental goods.
Wherever a merchant stopped, he encamped his retinue on a site protected by a church, or a castle.

In time, a permanent trading place grew

outside the walls of those edifices.

Such places soon became the nuclei
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of small trading towns or bourgs, as they were called in France.

The free

men--burgesses or bourgeois--who inhabited the new burgs remained outside

the manorial system, and there were no precedents founded on tradition to
regulate their relationships with the fuedal nobility.

Thus they formed

the market institutions and developed the ceremonial arrangements that

would eventually displace the fuedal order.

For the first time the

cities were not the outposts of central governments, as they had been in
previous civilizations.

Rather, they succeeded in maintaining their inde-

pendence ?utside the main structure of social power.
The second change toward which the itinerant merchant was instru-

mental was the monetization of feudal obligations.

Trade with itinerant

merchants gave rise to demands for money as media of exchange.

Indeed,

much of the money was ultimately supplied through the buying transactions
of the merchants themselves.

the merchants.

However, the use of money d; d not end wi th

Gradually, over the centuries between 900 and 1400. most

economic transactions were placed on a money basis.

As a result, feudal

servitude gave way to the payment of tallage (or taxes) by the vassal in
exchange for the fief.
lord1s lands.

Likewise, rents were paid in money for use of the

Finally, the lord commenced to reward serfs with money

wages for work performed on the lord's demesne.

The resulting monetary

reci procities--wages for 1abor, rent for 1and, interest for money, and

profit for entrepreneurship--pealed the death knell for the institutions
of feudal society, and they were harbingers of a coming system of market
institutions.
The increase in agricultural productivity described in the early
parts of this chapter drove agriculture prices down in relation to the
prices of other goods.

In international trade parlance, the corrunodity
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terms of trade turned adverse to the primary producers.

By the thirteenth

century, the landed aristocracy found itself pinched between low revenues and high prices.
and farming the

COJ1111Cr.

Many of the nobles sought relief by enclosing
lands, and denying use of those lands as pastures

for the peasants to graze their stock.

Moreover, the fecundity of

peasant families and the practice of dividing and distributing a peasant's
arable strips among his sons· was making it increasingly difficult for

peasants to support themselves, and they were gradually pressed off the

land.

Entire hamlets were wiped out in England where tenants were some-

times simply thrown off the land.

The dispossessed tenants became a land-

less labor force compelled to work for wages wherever work might be found.

These events coincided to produce the food and fiber and the labor
resources needed to support an expansion in urban employments.

Peasants,

finding no gainful opportunities for agricultural vocations. migrated to

villages where they became the cadres from which the increasing demands
for urban services were supplied, and they eventually specialized in the
secondary employments that abound in urban settlements.

They became

millers, bakers, wagoners, cartwrights. weavers, tailors, shoemakers,
sell ers, music; ans, smiths. carpenters, masons, butchers, teachers.
clerics, constables, and the host of other specialists that populate the
institutions that agglomerate at urban places.
Not only dispossessed tenants, but peasants who continued to farm

found urban 1 iving preferable as well.

Historical geographers investiga-

ting demographic changes in Germany found that peasants were abandoning
their settlements but not their fields starting in the eleventh century
and continuing with greater frequency into the thirteenth century.

The

peasants were moving to nearby cities and villages and commuting to their
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fields each day during planting and harvesting seasons.

Clearly, the

improved transportati on technology was the enabl i ng factor.

As long as

peasants must rely on the slow and plodding oxen as their means of trans-

portation, they must 1 ive close to their fields.

However, use of the

much faster horse allowed the peasants to commute greater distances in
the same amount of time as before.

Thus, the shift from oxen to equestrian-based transportation led to

the urbanization of German peasants.
many-fold.

The advantages to the peasants were

Life in a rural hamlet of ten or twelve peasant families was

drab, indeed.

On the other hand, life in a large village of a hundred or

more families gave one access to a large church. perhaps a church school,
a tavern, better security against marauders, merchants with a greater
variety of goods and services. more frequent and accurate news of national
and international events, and other urban amenities. ll
It ;s hard to imagine a more revolutionary change in the family

institution than occurred with urbanization.

A rural family was much

more isolated, independent, and self-sufficient than an urban family.

This meant that the family produced most of its own food and clothing.
Governance, education, and worship were directed by the elders of the

family.

Chi'ld delivery, health care, and burial of the dead were all

internal functions of the rural family.

The isolation of a rural family

in medieval times caused its members to be almost entirely dependent upon

the family for their living needs.

And the responsibilities of the

family elders in such isolation endowed the elders with great paternal

authority.
On the other hand, the same family removed to an urban setting
finds paternal authorities traumatical1y eroded.

The family is no longer
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isolated, self-sufficient, or independent.
imity with many di fferent fami 1i es.

It now lives in close prox-

The goods and servi ces provi ded for

itself by the rural family are provided by other specialized institutions
external to the urban family, and the family must pay for the goods and
services from money wages earned in employments outside the family.

Food

and clothing are suppl ied through retail merchants in the town, and governance is carried on by a municipal administration.
by schools, and worship is done in a church.
take

plac~

Education is provided

Child delivery may still

in the home, but it is most likely assisted by a midwife who

has no blood relationship with the family.

Health care is provided by

hospitals, medical doctors, and nurses, and burial of the dead is done

in a churchyard or other community burial plot.
The point is that the potency of the fami ly as an institution is
greatly diminished in an urban setting, vis a rural setting, because of
the plethora of other specialized institutions which exist in urban areas.
Those institutions simply take over many of the functions that were performed by the family in isolation.

The members of an urban family learn

to rely on institutions outside the family, and they are therefore no
longer solely dependent on the family for most of their 1iving needs.
The paradox is that urban family interdependence leads to intrafamily
independence, and to diminution of rural family cohesion and erosion of

rural paternal authority.

Urbanization of European peasants was indeed

revolutionary.
Here again, the external economies of large urban scale and the

urban agglomeration it produced in medieval Europe is traced to innovation and diffusion of the heavy plow and the heavy horse in agriculture
and to subsequent use of the horse in commercial draught.

Those
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technical improvements led to an agricultural surplus, and, at the same
time 1iberated many peasants from agricul tura 1 vocations.

The former

peasant farmers migrated to urban settings where they specialized in secondary employments and staffed the myriad of institutions that agglomerated there in response to the economic stimulus created by the increased

agricultural productiviti es.
Urban Growth
While the cultural integration of the heavy plow and the heavy
horse impacted initially on the internal economies of large-scale production in agriculture, the secondary and on-going effects had to do with

the external economies of location and urban scale, and thus with the
sizes and distribution of urban settlements, the rural to urban migrations,
and urban growth.

The sizes and distribution of urban settlements, and

the rural to urban migrations were described above.

This section elab-

orates the phenomenon of urban growth in medieval Europe as an on-going
consequence of the new technologies in agriculture.
The fact of urban growth in medieval Europe was, of course,

implicit in both of the preceding sections.

The villages that survived

the redistribution of settlements occasioned by the decrease in overland

transportation costs grew by simply absorbing both the populations and
the commerces of the defunct hamlets.

Likewise, rural to urban migra-

tions further swelled urban populations.

Indeed, the populations of

medieval urban centers did not grow from within, but expanded because of
migrations.

However, there had to be more to urban growth than simply

population increases.

There had to be some kind of economic basis to

expand urban employments so that the new urban dwellers could be
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accommodated,
The explanation of urban growth in medieval Europe is found in the
interregional trade and exchange relations in which the itinerant
merchant described above was a key figure,

A section of the preceding

chapter dealt with comparative advantage, interfamily specialization,

and trade in the context of central-place theory.

Precisely the same

principles apply to interregional and international trade,

Just as

persons possess differential aptitudes and tool-using skills, so regions
possess 9ifferent resource or factor endowments.

That is, the quantity,

or quality, or both quantity and quality of land, labor', capital, and
entrepreneurship are different from region to region.
Even if this were not so with labor, capital, and
entrepreneurshi p--whi ch are mobil e in varying degrees and coul d

theoretically be distributed uniformly over the lando-variations in the
productivity of land resources alone would differentiate regions from

one another.

This is because land is heterogeneous, absolutely finite.

and absolutely immobile.

And insofar as labor, capital, and entre-

preneurship are allocated at least in part according to land produc-

tivities, it is unlikely that they will be uniformly distributed across
regions--or, for that matter, uniformly within a particular region.
Each region would, therefore, possess particular advantages and
di sadvantages o.s compared to other regions. and each woul d eventually
specialize in the production of those goods and services in which it had
a comparative advantage.

~loreover,

it would trade parts of its special-

ized outputs with other regions for the goods and services foregone in
speci a 1izi ng its own productions.

Greater eff; c; ency and wel fare are

presumably achieved, as international trade theory attempts to
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demonstrate, by international and interregional specializations based on

the principle of comparative advantage.

And once the residents of a

region seek to improve their efficiency through specialization, they
forego self-sufficiency and economic independence.

They become one

segment of an inter-dependent web of specialized economic regions, each

one of which is dependent on all others.
And so it was in medieval Europe and between Europe and the
cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The itinerant merchants became

the burgesses of Europe, and they continued to mark up and sell Oriental

silks, spices, drugs, jewelry. and precious metals and stones to the
nobility.

Moreover, they continued to buy food stuffs, fabrics, and

building materials from the manors, and they sold those goods to the
oriental cultures at handsome profits.

In short, the burgs enjoyed very

favorable balances of payments while the Eastern cultures were suffering
a net outflow of exchange, and the European nobility were slowly becom-

ing impoverished.

It was the net injection of exchange payments that

created the economic base for urban expansion in medieval Europe.
The key to understanding why and how interregional trade and
exchange resulted in urban growth is to understand the principle of the
export-base mul ti pl ier in economic-base theory.12 Accardi ng to economi cbase theory, productive activities in a city and its hinterlands may be

divided into export-base (basic) and local-base (non-basic) industries.
Export-base industries produce primarily for export to other cities and
regions while local-base industries produce only goods and services that
are consumed locally.

Local-base industries are therefore those produc-

tive activities that generate the external economies of urban scale
which cause agglomeration.

On the other hand, it ;s the export-base
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industries of a city that generate the revenues from outside the region

that cause economic growth of a city, including growth of the localbase industries within its boundaries and hinterlands.

The export-base multiplier is the ratio of the change in total
regional employment to the change in export-base employment.

In other

words, it states the change induced in total employment by the addition

of one employee to an export-base industry.

The export-base multiplier

may also be understood solely in terms of regional incomes.

The levels

of regional incomes and regional employments are directly related, and

it matters 1ittle which statistic is emphasized.

However. it is desired

to explain here how rurai-to-urban migrations resulted in part from the

rapid and SUbstantial increases in urban employment opportunities over
much of medieval Europe.

Thus, the export-base multiplier will be des-

cribed here emphasizing the employment effects.
The multiplier relates export base to urban growth as follows:
For some reason an economic demand is initiated from outside a region for
products produced in the reg; on.

Thi 5 gi ves ri se to a demand ; n the

region for the resources needed to produce the products to be exported.
This, of course, includes an increase in the demand for units of labor
to carry out the production.

The increased demand for labor will be met

either from unemployed persons in the region or by the migration of labor
into the region, or both.

The added employee will. of course, receive

wages from his employer, .,nd the employer will pay the wages from the
revenues he receives from selling the product outside the region.

The

wages paid the new employee, as well as payments made to other factors
involved in the production, are injections of buying power into the region.
The new workers wi 11 use their wages to pay 1i vi ng expenses, perhaps
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including the purchase of some items imported from outside the region.
The payments for imported goods are ultimately made to vendors outside
the region, and the moneys so paid are therefore leaked from the region's
income stream.

The new workers may also save part of their wages, and

insofar as their savings do not go directly to merchants inside the
region, they too are leaked from the income stream.

However, their pay-

ments to defray 1 iving expenses remain in the region's income stream

because they are made to landlords, vendors, and tradesmen within the
region,

i~creasing

the demand for the goods and services supplied by the

local-base businesses and employees.
Each person receiving payments from the new employees will 1ikewise
spend part and save part.

This process will continue through many spend-

ing-saving revolutions until funds equal to the entire original injection have leaked away to savings or to payments for goods imported from
outside the region.

After all spending and saving initiated by the

original injection have ended, it will be found that the full value of
additional regional income generated is several times the value of new
export revenue.

Likewise, it will be found that the new regional income

is supporting local-base employees that are several times the number of
employees added by export-base industries to meet the new external demands
for thei r goods.
The key element here is what economists call the marginal propensity for local consumers to consume locally-produced goods and services.
The greater that propensity is, the greater is the export-base multiplier.
In other words, leakages to savings and to payments for imported goods
weaken the power of the multipl ier.

There are, of course, other reasons

why communities might wish to have high propensities to save and to import.
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However, those reasons are beyond the matter at hand, and it is sufficient
for this analysis to recognize that the latter propensities dampen the
expansive effects of new export revenues.

Export-base multip1 iers are

found to range from slightly less than three to slightly less than seven
in modern times, with the higher multipliers associated with the larger
cities.

Larger cities have higher export-base multip1 iers because their

citizens have higher propensities to consume local goods.

This is

apparently because larger cities have well-developed local bases that are
capable a! producing much of what the residents of such cities consume.
An example of the expansive powers of a vigorous export base is
found in Flanders.

The usual populations of towns in medieval Flanders--

Northeastern France., Belgium, and Southern Holland--was from 2,000 to
6,000 persons.

However, the populations of Ypres, Bruges, and Ghent

each swelled to more than 35,000 persons.

These latter cities gained

their prominences from specializing in weaving and exporting fine woolen
textiles.

Incidently, much of the raw wool was imported from England

where the nobility had created "sheepwa1ks" by enclosing and depriving
the peasants' use of manorial common lands.

Some notion of the rapid

growth in export revenues is evi dent in Ypres where the number of 1ead
seal s attached to the fabrics produced by its weavers increased from
10,500 in 1306 to 92,500 in 1313.

Likewise, loanable funds became so

abundant in Lubeck, the Hanseatic League city to the north of Flanders.
that the rate of interest dropped from 10 to 5% in the preceding twenty
or so years, reflecting a substantial injection of payments made for
exported goods. 13
It is perhaps not wise to over general ize on such data.

However,

economic-base theory suggests a causal relationship between the surge in
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the export of woolen fabrics and the growth in the populations of Ypres
and the other major textile-producing cities of Flanders.

If one

assumes that those cities would have grown to something 1 ike the average
of other towns in Flanders, their growths would have arrested at populations of only 4,000.
times that number.

However, their populations grew to nearly ten
And it was growth of the employment opportunities

in such exporting cit';es as Ypres, Ghent, and Bruges that attracted
medieval peasants into migration from rural to urban areas.
Of course medieval urban growth was much less a blessing than has

been suggested here.

The warfare, famine, and pestilence that

periodically swept across medieval Europe was cited above, and ruralto urban-migration resulted in concentrated populations that were
particularly vulnerable to those maladies.

Indeed, by the time of the

Black Death in 134B, migrations had clearly resulted in the overexpansion of urban centers, and the ensuing retrenchment lasted nearly
300 years.

Nevertheless, the urbanization that took place between the

tenth and thirteenth centuries in Europe set the stage for the
Industrial Revolution that commenced in the nineteenth century.14

The argument here runs as follows:

Urban agglomeration and growth

in medieval Europe was possible because of exchange payments generated by
interregional trade.

Interregional trade was possi ble because of regional

specializations rising to take advantage of internal economies of largescale production.

Regional specializations were possible because of

technical improvements that lowered the costs of transportation and
widened the markets for specialized products, and because of the agricultural surpluses that allowed some peasants to abandon agricultural
employments and specialize in the urban employments on which the trade
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flourished.

And the surpluses were possible because the heavy plow and

the heavy horse were innovated in Medieval European agriculture.

Thus,

the causal ity is traced once again to the increased productivity attributed to important technical improvements--improvements that allowed
tools to more effectively substitute for human labor 1n the production of
goods and services having human value.
TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS
The .previous chapter described the dynamic qual ities of technology.
The innovation of new technology is dynamic because it induces change by
permitting means to be organized in ways differing from the traditional
methods descended from the past.

That is, it enabl es soci ety to secure

future ends with the expenditure of fewer present means, and it sometimes
brings desirable future ends within human reach that were previously
beyond known means.

Thi s ultimately reduces the amount of human effort

required to secure future ends.

In other words, it decreases the man

hours of labor input per unit of output of goods and services having
human value.

It accomplishes this by enabling the tools embodying the

new technology to substitute for more units of human labor in production

processes.
It has been argued in this chapter that technology is also progressive.

Technology is progressive because it is forward-urging in terms of

the ends-means continuum.

By forward-urging, it is meant that technology

is oriented toward future human ends--but more than that, future ends
that improve upon human welfare.

Such improvement is possible because

of the dynamic quality of technology described above.

The great strides

in human progress were those sequences of events that produced substantial
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improvements in human conditions, whether the improvements were seen as
reductions in human travail, declines in famine and disease, or increases

in human longevity.

Whatever the gains, the events that produced them

were sol idly based on antecedent technological advances.

The point is

that human progress is ultimately keyed to technical progress, and it
is in this sense that technology is progressive.
However, the progressive qual ities of technology are not real ized
until newly innovated technologies are diffused and integrated.
not

enoug~

to simply innovate new technologies.

It is

Society itself must be

restructured to exploit the new technologies if their full benefits are
to be realized.

It is the integration process that brings forth the

institutional changes involved with social structure.

It often takes

centuries to achieve full integration of pervasive technologies; to adapt
human skills, to embellish the technical devices, to perfect the techniques
required to effectively employ the tools embodying the new technologies,
and to alter distributional arrangements so that everyone enjoys his full
share of the benefits created in the process.
This chapter has been an attempt to illustrate the progressive
character of technological diffusion and integration by describing some
of the institutional changes resulting from development of the heavy plow
and the heavy horse in medieval European agriculture.

Those technologies

produced internal economies of large-scale production that improved agricultural production, all at once creating a substantial surplus of food
and fiber, and 1iberating many peasants from farming and forcing them to
migrate to urban centers where they eventually specialized in secondary
employments.

The new plow and horse technologies therefore created the

environing conditions for urban agglomeration as well.

Of course, there
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were other technical improvements in the medieval period that similarly
facilitated craft specializations.

Such improvements have only been

impl ied in the preceding descriptions, and while it is not intended to
slight the latter it has been enough to trace out the progressive consequences of the heavy plow and the heavy horse.
The point is that the plow and horse technologies that were new to
medieval Europe altered interinstitutional relationships so that some
institutions were not completely complimentary in the institutional
system.

Certain ceremonial practices based on particular institutional

values became obstacles before the new technologies.

Social tensions

resulted as the institutional system at first opposed and then adjusted
itself to the new technologies.

The details of the adjustment process

were not expl icitly described--indeed, archeology and history do not
deliver those details up from the medieval period with any degree of
clarity.

Those processual details could only be inferred from the cir-

cumstances.

However, the apparent effects, the resul ting i nstituti ana 1

changes, could be described with some degree of certainty.
At any rate, the social instability preCipitated by innovation and

exacerbated by integration of the heavy plow and the heavy horse abated
only when diffusion and integration of the new technologies were complete.
Integration was not complete until the technologies were accommodated by
the institutional system, and al1 institutions were once again in harmony.
That did not happen until ce'(emonies and ceremonial statuses were altered
to account for the new technologies.
Complete integration resulted in a new social stability in which
institutional powers were redistributed in congruity with the new technologies.

Some institutions acquired greater power while others suffered
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diminished power.

Some old institutions disappeared and some new insti-

tutions came into being.

It was social revolution initiated and carried

through by technological change that produced institutional discontinuities in the medieval period--as well as in all other periods.

And it

was the post-revolution stability in which the full benefits of the
integrated technologies were realized.

But it was the future genera-

tions that based their own progressions on the medieval technologies
that achieved the full measure of benefits.

It is the nature of

technical progress that one generation's technical accompl i shments are
all at once founded on those of previous generations and become the
foundation for technical progress by future generations.

As technology

is continuous, technical progress is also continuous.

This concludes description of the technology component of institutional economic theory as it is interpreted by this author.

Chap-

ter VI defined technology as that qual ity of a tool that enables it to
be substituted for human effort in the creation of goods and services
having human value.

Moreover, it distinguished technology from tech-

nique and hUman skill.

Chapter VII described technological continuity

and related it to scientific discovery and invention.

Likewise,

Chapter VII described technological dynamism--the power to initiate
change--and related it to the process of innovation.

And the present

chapter described the progressive qualities of technology and related
them to processes of social diffusion and integration.
This and the preceding two chapters have described technology and
its relationship to the ends-means continuum--the continuum of on-going
life processes.

Likewise, the next preceding two chapters, Chapters IV

and V, described ceremonialism and its relationship to the continuum,
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and the continuum itself was described in Chapter III.

The question

remaining unanswered in all of this is how the tensions between forwardurging technology and backward-clinging ceremonialism are resolved.

The remaining two content chapters deal with that question.
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CHAPTER IX
URBAN VALUATIONS
Considerable verbiage has been invested to this point in
distinguishing the technological aspect of human culture from the
ceremonial aspect, and in showing how each aspect relates to the
continuum of on-going life processes, the end-means continuum.

To

repeat once again, ceremonialism is backward-reaching while technology
is forward-urging in relation to the continuum.

Thus, the ceremonial

and technological aspects of culture are pitted against one another
regarding the selection of future ends-to-be-reached and the means to
be employed to secure the selected ends.
Parts of the preceding two chapters have dealt with the conflict
between ceremonialism and technology in the context of urbanization in
Western Civilization.

Attention was focused on the powers of new

technologies to bring about institutional changes in the face of
ceremonial practices that were systematically weakened by social
calamities.

It was possible to infer the social choices from the

consequent circumstances--in other words, to reconstruct the probable

causes from the observable effects.

However, practically nothing was

said about the political and economic processes for resolving the
tensions between ceremonial ism and technology into institutional

change and social progress.
And yet it cannot be doubted that the revolutionary changes
emerged in the wake of del iberate human choices made after reflections
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on the costs and probable benefits of the alternatives open to choice.
Unfortunately. little is found in the literature to inform the present
of precisely what costs and benefits were perceived by monarchs or
peasants in arriving at chosen courses of action.

Attempting to impute

from observable circumstances the particular valuations they made in

arriving at decisions would involve the most sheer speculations.
Therefore there will be no attempt here to embell ish the events
described in the preceding chapter with speculations on how medieval
decision-makers perceived their alternatives, or how much weight they

assigned to the particular benefits and costs they might have

cons i dered.
However, much social change has occurred between the medieval
and modern eras.

The technological progress and institutional changes

secured in the Dark Ages formed the base from which the Industrial
Revolution was launched.

And the Industrial Revolution, ',oIhich is a

stage of the technical revolution that has been underway from the
beginning of man, is still in progress.

Much has obviously happened

between then and now, not least of which is enormous gains in human

welfare carried forth by the revolutionary powers of technological
change.
Much of the western world has become industrialized during the
intervening period.

Many of the feudal cities of Roman Gaul have

become the industrial cities of Europe.

The use of draft animals to

power agricultural equipment and commercial transport vehicles has
given way to the use of mechanical power devices.

Mechanical power

equipment and electronic-control devices have replaced men in manufacturing~

moving society from reliance on scarce and costly hand-
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crafted products to an abundance of relatively low-priced goods and
services which are mass produced in industrial processes.

Moreover, technical changes occur much more rapidly in the
present age than at any other time in the history of man.

This is

partly because of preceding technological developments that have
decreased the costs of communication and therefore the costs of

knowledge.

One effect has been to spur invention by heightening

technological cross-fertilization.

Another effect has been to further

weaken the powers of ceremonialism to resist technological innovation
by raising expectations of change and reducing the fears of technical

progress and institutional changes in the minds of persons who will
bear the costs as well as enjoy the benefits of change.

And yet

another effect has been to shorten the time required to achieve the

cultural diffusion and integration of new technologies.

All of these

changes are themselves the effects of technological developments--the
most important of which is innovation and integration of electronic

communi cat; on equ; pment. 1
The foregoing effects also result from another feature of
industrial societies that distinguish them from feudal societies.
feature is that technical change is at
in industrial societies.

le~st

The

partly institutional ized

By this, it is meant that members of such

societies expect some technological development in the form of
technical changes that produce net positive social benefits or a
surplus of benefits over costs in the long run.

Thus, ceremonial

practices in industrial societies are directed more toward control-

ling technical change than toward stopping it all together.

This means

neither that ceremonialism ;s absent under industrialism nor that the
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inherent tensions between ceremonialism and technology no longer exist.
Rather, it simply means that ceremonialism is deliberately weakened
vis-a-vis the powers of technology in an industrial system.
Since industrial society ls a present reality, much more is
known about its techniques of social choice, and it therefore serves
as a better object for the study of socla1 choice than medieval
society.

This chapter and the next examine the cultural mechanisms

for making social choices in an industrial society--choices that
resolve the tensions between ceremonial ism and technology into

technical change and social progress.

This chapter considers the

institutionalized criterion of valuation in selecting ends and
organizing means, drawing primarily from orthodox economic theory--

particularly from welfare economics and the economics of public choice.
The next chapter examines the processes of social choice in an
industrial society, drawing from elements of pluralist political
theory and from institutional economic theory.
The principal idea in the present chapter is that attitudes
toward value in an industrial society are as multifarious and disparate

as society is pluralistic, and there is no simple or direct method to
structure and wei gh val ues in choosi ng between competing future ends
and between alternative methods for employing present means toward
whatever ends are selected.

The first part of the chapter looks

briefly at values and welfare in the context of choosing.

The remain-

ing parts examine aspects of benefit-cost analysis in terms of the
values described in the first part.
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VALUES AND WELFARE

Values
The concept of value is simple to understand, but its applications lead to inordinate complexities.

Value is that quality of a

thing or state-of-affairs that distinguishes it as more or less
desirable.

So-called subjectivists in the philosophy of axiology

argue that anything about which anyone has concern possesses value. 2

On the other hand, so-called metaphysical objectivists claim that
things are desiY'ed because they have value. 3

Finally, logical

objectivists believe there can be no logical or ontological theory of
value, only a theory of valuation. 4 It matters little which idea one
subscribes to because each one allows valuations across an enormous
range, and it admits a myriad of competing values and conflicting

interests--particularly in the pluralist societies that characterize
industrial nations.
Society is an environment of great contrasts.

It is a source of

humane compassion and a refuse heap for human dereliction.

It is a11-

at-once a source of ecstatic pleasures and excruciating pains, of
great creativity and terrible waste. of resounding hope and crushing
despair, of glorious successes

and dismal failures, of grand and

auspicious wealth and abject poverty, of abiding love and vicious hate.
In short, it is many diverse things to many diverse people.
Likewise, industrial society is composed of disparate creatures--

fat, thin, tall, and short--male and female--young and old--black,
white, and almost every variation between--rich and poor--educated
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and not-so educated--a society of creatures common in their humaneness
or lack of it.

All have aspirations, hopes, fears, and despairs.

loves and hates and experiences varieties of pleasure and pain.

Each
Each

is an individual effect of prior causes (deliberate or accidental),
and he is a means (l ike it or not) to future ends--though hardly the

only means.

How he is organized toward the future depends not only on

the causes that brought him and his environment into being, but also
on the choices made by the pluralistic, institutional society of which

he is a part as well as the decisions he himself made on those choices
1eft open to him.
Both individual and collective choices involve the selection of

future ends-to-be-reached, and the employment of means toward the
attainment of those future ends.

Such choices are necessarily

structured by the values people hold.

And those values are partly

functions of the ceremonial causes and effects which transmit culture,
social ize persons to their institutional roles, control social
interactions, and thereby maintain social stability.

In short, the

attitudes of people about values and the valuing of competing future
ends and alternative ways to employ means are mostly the products of
the institutional system described in Chapters II. IV, and V above.
Reca 11 i ng from Chapter I I :
An institution is an organized social group that has evolved
from and is united with some particular system of cultural
values. and it serves through processes of social control to
stabilize social interaction by preserving and perpetuating
those values in the society of which the institution is a part.
Industrial society is essentially an urban one, and since an
urban area ;s Simply one at which many highly special ized institutions
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have agglomerated, it follows that industrial society is a valuecharged environment.

It is an environment that is charged with tech-

nical values, pecuniary values, ethical values, and aesthetic values--

a matrix of values as various and complex as the institutions that

agglomerate in urban areas, and as the people who populate the
institutions and espouse their ceremonial values.

There may be little argument with such technical values as water
freezes at sea level when the temperature drops below zero degrees
centigrade.

And there may be substantial agreement as to pecuniary

or economic valuations ordered out in market places as prices, wages,
rents, profits, etc.

However, such pecuniary valuations may be

challenged as unjust on ethical, moral, or social grounds.

Likewise,

ethical or social considerations might be challenged on aesthetic or

intrinsic grounds.

And aesthetic valuations might be condemned on

moral or ethical grounds.

Industrial society, therefore, abounds with

clashes between values, each one vying for preeminence in weighting
choices for and against particular sets of competing future ends and
al ternative ways of organizing means.
The point ;s that peoples ' attitudes about values and valuing in
an industrial society are as multifarious and disparate as society ;s
pluralistic, and some method must be found to resolve conflicting
interests in a selection of social ends and allocation of means that
maximizes social welfare.

The method commonly used is some variation

of benefit-cost analysis.

Before taking up benefit-cost analysis,

however, the question of welfare criteria must be examined in the
context of choosing from competing ends and from alternative techniques
for employing means.
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Social Welfare
Welfare is simply a state of being or doing well, and it applies
in this case to conditions of human health, prosperity, and happiness.

Thus social welfare has to do with the health, prosperity, and
happiness of society as a whole.

Economists are preoccupied with a so-

called social-welfare function.

The social-welfare function is a gross

abstraction, the derivation of which is found in orthodox microeconomic theory.

Time and space do not allow for a rigorous explica-

tion of the underlying microeconomic theory.

However, a brief summary

of the major premises of the applicable welfare economic theory is
necessary and possible.

It is necessary because the theories

implicitly pervade the thinking of most modern policy-makers.
The entire framework of welfare economics rests on several
simplifying aS5umptions--some explicit and some implicit.

The follow-

ing list of assumptions and deductions therefrom is not exhaustive. 5

1.

People achieve satisfaction (or utility, or happiness) in

the consumption of goods and services.

(Note that "services H admits

to happiness in human experiences which are not narrowly construed as
material or pecuniary).

Persons will therefore attempt to maximize

their satisfactions while attempting to minimize the costs (or

disutil ity) to them of securing those satisfactions.
2.

The human animal is hedonistic so that, in the long run,

his wants are insatiable.
3.

Thus, human wants are potentially infinite.

On the other hand, most of the resource-means from which

human wants are satisfied are finite in nature. and they are therefore
scarce.

Thus, it is important to allocate scarce resource means in

such a way that the greatest possible hUman satisfactions are attained.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

355
4.

Efficiency is achieved when a so-called Pareto-optimal

allocation of resources is attained. 6 A Pareto-optimal allocation
exists when resources have been allocated in such a way that it is not
possible to increase anyone's satisfaction (or improve his welfare)
without detracting from some other person's satisfaction (or welfare).
A Pareto-optimal allocation cannot be improved in terms of efficiency
criteria.

However, such an allocation may be improved in terms of

equity criteria if goods and services are redistributed in such a way
that the gaining persons value their gains more than the losing

persons value their losses. 7
5.

The economic system functions to allocate scarce resources to

competing human wants.

A market economy carries out its allocative

function by an exchange system based on the price interaction of the
supply of and the demand for goods and services.

(The term Tlprice ll is

generally conceived in a pecuniary or monetary connotation when used
in connection with an economic system.
restricted to pecuniary appl ications.

However, its use is not
The price anyone pays for some-

thing is really those other things he gives up or "trades off ll to
secure the good or service he acquires).
6.

Allocative efficiency in the way of Pareto criteria can

only be achieved in a perfectly competitive market economy.
conditions necessary for a perfectly competitive economy are:
must be homogeneous.
searchers.

The
Products

All market agents must be price takers--not price

This is usually thought to exist when there are many

sellers and many buyers such that the actions of anyone seller or any
one buyer will not affect the market price.

Moreover, there must be

perfect market knowledge on the part of every market agent.

Finally,
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there must be perfect factor mobil ity
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that resources may move into

or out of the production of any good or service according to market
conditions.

This also means that there can be no barriers to entry

of any firm into any industry.
7.

A perfectly competitive market system distributes income on

the basis of the supply of and demand for the resource receiving the

income.

The demand for a productive resource is the marginal revenue

product of the resource.

The marginal revenue product of a resource

is the net addition to the manufacturer I 5 total revenue occasioned by
the addition of one more unit of the productive resource.

A wage

that is simultaneously equal to the marginal revenue product (demand)
and the average cost (supply) of a productive resource is an efficient
and equitable wage.

Thus, an efficient distribution of income is an

equitable distribution in such a system.

Which is to say that if

income is to be redistributed according to some other concept of

equity, such redistribution is extra-market.
8.

Human satisfactions can be maximized subject to available

resources if perfectly competitive conditions prevail and if the entire

system is in a state of general equi1ibrium--that is, if there are no

economic incentives for changes anywhere in the system. 8
9.

Production is said to be in a Pareto-maximum general

equilibrium when the marginal rate of technical substitution between
every set of inputs is the same for all producers using the inputs.
The marginal rate of technica1 substitution is simply the amount by
which one productive input must be reduced per unit of increase in
another productive input such that a constant rate of productive output
is maintained.
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10.

A production possibility frontier (or transformation curve)

reflecting the number of units by which the production of one good
must be decreased in order to expand the production of other goods, is
derived from the foregoing.

The production possibil ity curve shows

the maximum attainable output of one commodity for every possible level
of output of other commodities. given the finite resource pool.

11.

A Pareto-maximum general equil ibrium of exchange occurs

within the constraint of the production possibility frontier where the
marginal rate of substitution between every set of goods is the same
for all parties consuming the goods.

The marginal rate of substitution

is simply the number of units of one good that one consumer must
sacrifice per unit gain of other goods so that a constant level of

satisfaction is maintained.

The marginal rate of substitution for

exchange partners must equal the marginal rate of transformation on

the production pass i bil ity frontier.

There is one unique exchange

equil ibrium for every pOint on the production possibil ity frontier.

12.

A utility-possibility frontier reflecting the maximum level

of satisfaction attainable by one exchange partner for every level of
satisfaction of other exchange partners is constructed from the above
exchange sol utions.

The outward-most reach of a family of util ity-

possibility frontiers is called the grand utility possibility frontier.
13.

A socia1-we1fare function is assumed to exist.

The social-

welfare function is presumably an aggregation of the individual
preference functions of all members of society. and it therefore
possesses the properties of an individual preference function (or
indifference map).

An indifference map is a graphic representation

of a family of indifference curves.

An indifference curve is a locus
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of points representing different combinations of goods, each
combination of which renders the same level of satisfaction.
14.

Maximum social welfare is achieved where a social

indifference curve (a component of the social welfare function) is
tangent to the grand utility possibllity frontier.

The point of

tangency is called the point of "constrained bliss" because it is the
one and only Pareto-optimal organization of production and exchange
that maximizes human satisfaction throughout society subject to the
availability of resources.
The foregoing is a bare-bones outline of the principal tenets of
welfare economics.

As the reader can see, the theories involve a high

degree of abstraction.

However, all theories are abstractional made

from reality for purposes of explaining past causes and effects.

Such

abstractions are theories that can be used to predict future outcomes
of present actions, and to prescribe present actions to effect desired
future outcomes.

The marks of good theory are therefore i nterna 1

consistency, emp.irical validity, and relevancy, or predictive accuracy.
It can be shown that welfare economics fares very well in tests

of internal consistency.

By internal consistency· it is meant that a

theory is free of contradictions whereby one or more components of the
theory are incongruent with the major premises of the theory.

Welfare

economics and the microeconomic theories upon which it is based are

virtual paragons of internal consistency, and no significant defects
may be cited from that quarter to sully the theories.

What then of the

other tests of good theory? Can welfare economics stand the tests of
empirical validity and predictive accuracy?

It is found that the

principal defects with welfare economics stem from a lack of empirical
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validity, and that such defects render its predictive accuracy very

suspect--no matter how consistent the theory mi ght be internally.
Welfare economics suffers from a dearth of empirical verification.

The two major defects of welfare economics are the requirement that
markets be perfectly competitive, and the assumption of a social-OJelfare
function.

Other related difficulties that plague the theory are the

high-jevel of abstraction, the static approach to analYSiS, and the

stress of pecuniary valuations.

That which follows will deal with

the relatively minor defects first and end with discussion of the two
maj or defects.
It has already been noted that a theory is an abstraction from

real ity made for purposes of explaining and applying causal relationships.

Thus, an abstraction is a generalization that ;s assumed into

existence to explain reality.

A theory ;s defective if it is based an

abstractions or assumed general izations that do not, in fact, explain
real ity, or they describe some empirically verifiable but minute
aspect of reality, and they are advanced as a total explanation of
reality.

No matter how attractive a theory might be intuitively. it

is an intellectual exercise of 1ittle practical value if it cannot be
verified empirically.
welfare economics.

As will soon be clear, this is a problem with

The level of abstraction so removes welfare

economic theory from reality that the theory is of little practical
value.
A second and related defect of welfare economic theory is that
it is a static form of analysis used to explain an essentially dynamic
reality.

The whole notion of equilibrium is that of a stable state--

a state of being in wrlich there are no operant forces for change.

In
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the so-called state of general equilibrium on which the concept of
social welfare is partly based, the whole of society is theoretically.
at rest.

There are no economic incentives for change anywhere.

The

whole notion is manifestly false because the real world abounds with
forces pressing for change.
dynamic environment.
of change.

That is, the real world is inherently a

It is constantly, if sometimes slowly, in a state

No matter how attractive the general equil ibrium

abstraction, it ;s defective because it attempts to relate the real
world in purely static terms.
A third defect of welfare economics is the implicit elevation of
pecuniary valuations over other forms of valuation.

It must be

admitted, however, that welfare economics need not be couched solely
in the pecuniary frame of reference.

But, as a practical matter, the

underlying economic theories are most instrumental in explaining human

interactions in pecuniary tenns.

This is no doubt because pecuniary

valuations are far and away the easiest to recognize in market terms
and to veri fy empiri cally.

Pecuni ary val uati ons are therefore often

used. however imperfectly. as proxies for technical, aesthetic, and
ethical valuations.

The point, however, is that not all values can be

reduced to money prices.

Pecuni ary val uati ons, no matter how practi cal

or well substanti ated, are very poor surrogates for other forms of
va 1uation.

And insofar as wel fare economics rel i es upon pecuni ary

valuations. it offers a poor explanation of realities that abound in
technical, aesthetic, ethical, and other values.

This idea is

elaborated much more fully under "external benefits and costs II below.
A major defect of welfare economics is the deductive conclusion
that a Pareto-efficient

allo~ation

can be achieved only in a perfectly
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competitive economy.

This is tantamount to declaring that a Pareto-

efficient allocation cannot be achieved simply because perfectly
competitive markets are impossible of achievement in modern, industrial
economies.

And perfectly competitive markets cannot be achieved

because the conditions necessary for existence of perfect competition

do not ex; st.
For example, products are simply not homogeneous.

Near perfect

homogeneity exists with fungible goods such as wheat. sugar. and crude

oil.

However, even fungible goods are differentiated by qualities and

conditions.

Moreover. very few goods are of the fungible sort.

On

the contrary, a mark of an industrial system ;s its mu1titude of markets
comprising wide :xarieties of differentiated goods and services.

The

empirical conclusion is that the real world abounds with heterogeneous
goods and services, and that product homogeneity is a somewhat rare
exception.
Likewise, many producers are price makers rather than price
takers partly because it is possible for them to differentiate their
products from otherwi se close substitutes.

Thi sis accompl i shed by

quality and style variations, brand naming, and advertising.

Moreover,

some markets are highly concentrated on the seller side so that one or
a few producers control the quantity of goods flowing to their markets.
To the extent that markets are concentrated or products are differentiated, producers may restrict suppl ies and thereby raise prices in
their markets.

In like manner, consumers are often price searchers

rather than price takers simply because product differentiation has
produced variations in quality and style, and therefore in the prices
of close product substitutes.

The empirical point ;s that market
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agents are generally not price takers in the real world.
It is also impossible to meet the necessary condition of perfect
market knowledge on the part of each market agent in the real world.
As good as communication technology is, it is not yet capable of
instantaneously and preci 5e1y recording, storing, reca 11 ing, and
processing all transactions in all markets, and immediately
transmitting the necessary market information to every agent who needs
the information to make informed market choices.

The empirical

conclusion is that the real world is one of imperfect market knowledge.
Finally, there is not perfect factor mobility in the real world.
It is not always possible for resources to move into or out of the
production of particular goods or services in response to market

conditions.

In the first place, land resources are absolutely finite

and immobile, and while the use of any particular parcel of land might
be changed, this can occur only in the economic long run.

But the land

itself cannot be relocated in response to market conditions.

This. of

course. appl i es with nearly equal force to structures and equi pment
permanently installed on the land.
Labor resources in the real world are only slightly more mobile.
It is a major personal disruption to pick up and move a household from
one region to another. and persons tend to ignore or resist market
incentives to make interregional moves.

Massive short-run interregional

relocations of labor in response to market differentials are therefore
rare.

And international labor mobility is even less real because of

the added cultural shocks involved.

On the other hand, labor resources

might be somewhat mobile within a local market where a job change does
not involve a family or household relocation.

However. there are labor
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market rigidities even in local areas because units of labor are simply

not homogeneous.

Units of labor are differentiated by technical skills,

and they are not perfect substitutes for one another.

For the same

reason, there are labor market barriers to entry in the form of labor
union restrictions and state licensing requirements.

Thus, unfilled

shortages and persistent surpluses of particular skills do occur from
time to time in labor markets because labor resources in the real world

are not perfectly mobile.
In similar fashion, business firms cannot usually enter or exit
particular industries in response to market signals.

An industrial

system is composed of many highly specialized institutions.

The

institutions employ specialized tools and hUman labor with particular
technical skills.

They operate at particular locations, and they

supply goods and render services to persons in those and related
locations.

Technical and locational constraints alone would 1 imit the

mobil Hy of such institutions.

But the high capital costs required to

retool for most new markets may be an even more formidable barrier.
Business firms are further limited by other barriers to entry.
Economies of scale in many industries may preclude entry by firms with

small-scale plants because they cannot produce at high enough rates of
output to bring their average total costs of production down low enough

in target markets to allow them to compete effectively with established
forms of larger scales of plant.

This is particularly true if the

established firms practice exclusionary pricing techniques whereby

they price their goods low enough to limit entry by potential entrant
firms. but high enough to enjoy some monopolistic profits.

Here again,

factor mobility is imperfect because businesses are often barred from
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entry for one reason or another into many real-world markets even
though market conditions might otherwise signal needs for changes.
Perhaps the most mobile of factors is capital, and it is also
somewhat more responsive to market forces because of its greater

mobil ity.

But factor mobil ity is imperfect even in capital markets.

At least two elements restrict the mobility of capital.

The first is

the range of problems associated with international exchange.

The risks

and transfer costs involved with exchanging one national monetary unit

for another tend to limit the mobil ity of capital over national
boundar; es.

Li kewi se, exchange controls, host government control of

profit repatriation, and the problems of taxation of income by host as
well as home governments tend to fUrther limit the international

mobil ity of capital.
The second element is government controls in the form of domestic

monetary and fiscal policies that limit capital mobility within a
national economy.

Such government policies are pursued for purposes

of allocating resources to the provision of public goods and services,
redistributing income, and maintaining economic stability.

The

pol icies are discharged through the tax and expenditure processes of

public budgets and through central management of the monetary stock.
Monetary and fiscal policies as well as direct regulation of market
activities by governments are inimical to so-called competitivg,
private enterprise markets for the simple reason that they cause

allocational and distributional effects that are different from purely
market outcomes.

This does not mean that the effects are necessarily

better or worse--only that they are different and they involve
limitations on the free mobility of capital.
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The point is that the conditions necessary for perfectly
competitive markets to exist simply do not prevail and cannot be

brought into existence in an industrial system.

Products are not

homogeneous and they are therefore not perfect substitutes for one
another.

Not all market agents are price takers.

Some on the demand

side are price searchers, while some suppliers are price makers.
There cannot be perfect knowledge of market conditions by every agent
operating in markets.

Fina11y, not all resources are perfectly mobile,

and they cannot always enter or exit industries in response to market

forces.
Since the necessary conditions cannot exist,' then perfectly
competitive markets cannot exist.

Since perfectly competitive markets

cannot exist, it is impossible to determine whether or not a Pareto-

efficient allocation of resources existS. Of course, there is the
question of whether most, but not all. of the necessary conditions
will produce a better allocation than if none of the conditions exists.
It has been persuasively argued by others that so-called second-best
sol utions cannot be demonstrated to be better in any way than other
nonoptimal solutions. 9 The conclusion ;s then that the requirement
that a Pareto-efficient allocation can only be achieved and measured
in a perfectly competitive market economy is a major defect in welfare
economic theory because perfectly competitive market conditions are not
empirically validated characteristics of society.

And one is placed in

the position of attempting to measure and adjust real welfare outcomes
to an unreal and unattainable ideal.
In defense of economists. it must be noted that any economist
worth his salt does not bel ieve that the perfectly competitive market
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model is a faithful representation of the real world.

One may there-

fore wonder why economists are so preoccupied with the perfectly

competitive model.

The answer is that the model is one of two polar

mode 1s used as idea 1 states by whi ch ma rket performance in the real
world may be measured.

The opposite polar model is the so-called pure

monopoly model in which there is a single supplier and many buyers and
which also is not a faithful representation of the real world.

That

is, real world markets are simply imperfectly competitive in one degree
or another on a continuum that extends from a perfectly competitive
pole at one extremity to a pure monopoly pole at the other extremit:l.

Regarding the arguments at hand, it ;s one thing to acknowledge ar.
ideal state as such.

It;s quite another to require the actual i;~at;on

of an unattainable ideal state as a necessary condition to forming sound
social policy--as welfare economics appears to do with the concepts of

Pareto efficiency and perfectly competitive markets.
Another major defect in welfare economic theory ;s the assumptiG:'l
that a social-welfare function exists and might be disclosed in some

way if only a method could be found to continuously reveal and aggregate
the individual preference functions for every consumer in the economy.
Presumably, a market system accomplishes this in some mysterious way.
But, as a practical matter, there ;s no known way to accurately reveal
a social-welfare function if one does exist.

Indeed, one economist was

awarded a Nobel Prize essentially for rigorously demonstrating that
there are common preference patterns which, if held by the individual
members of society, will give rise to an inconsistent pattern of social
choice.

r~oreover.

no market technique, voting scheme, or system of

representation will necessarily produce a rational social choice.'O
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One is inclined to the view that a social-welfare function does not
exist except in the grand assumptions and abstruse abstractions of
welfare economists.
All of which is to say that welfare economic theory appears to
fail the test of empirical validity.

It fails because of at least two

major defects--the requirement that markets be perfectly competitive in
order to achieve and measure a Pareto-efficient allocative outcome, and
the assumption of a social-welfare function.

Other related and

significant defects include the high level of abstraction, the static
approach to analysis, and the stress on pecuniary valuations.

Each of

these defects and all of them together so remove welfare economic
theory from real ity that the theory is hardly more than an intellectual
exercise of 1ittle practical use.

And while the theory may possess

superb internal consistency, its empirical defects cast serious doubt
on its relevancy--or its probable accuracy in predicting future
outcomes--and thus on its viability as an instrumentality for policy
formulations.

In other words, its weakness as a positive analysis

casts doubt on its normative powers.

Where does all of the foregoing leave the matter of social
welfare? Clearly, it admonishes caution in the normative application
of orthodox economic criteria to welfare problems.

On the other hand,

the theory is the refined product of some of the most learned and
scholarly minds of the industrial era.
compell ing and enduring qualities.

It must therefore possess some

And, notwithstanding its afore-

mentioned defects, it does indeed possess some redeeming attributes.
Perhaps the most attractive component of the theory is the notion of a
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources.

And next to that are the
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criteria for income redistribution, given a Pareto-efficient allocation.
There are no doubt other elements of the theory that are good guides
for policy.

But it seems to this author that the former two components

are ideal states that ought to be as nearly achieved in practice as
the frailties of real ity permit.
At the same time, there are no delusions about the practical

difficulties surrounding the attainment of a Pareto-efficient allocation
of resources and an equitable distribution of income within a Pareto

framework.

The paucity of realistic and operational theories under-

scores the problem--values are as multifarious and disparate as society
is pluralistic, and there is no simple or direct way to measure and
weigh competing values and conflicting interests in the selection of
ends and the employment of means so that social welfare ;s maximized.

The first aspect of the problem concerns the accurate definition and
measurement of values in the form of benefits and costs so that they
can be weighed in making choices from among alternative and competing
social ends and as to the employment of resource means.

The second

part of the problem is to reach some consensus on choice or
preferretiness criteri,a. And finally, the choices must be made and
actualized in practice.

Benefit-cost analysis is one technique that is

emp 1oyed to these ends.
Benefit-Cost Anal ysi s 11
Benefit-cost analysis is a structured technique for defining and
measuring benefits and costs for purposes of evaluating alternative
public investment projects.

Indeed, the technique is used by private

agencies in arriving at investment decisions. and informal variations
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of benefit-cost analysis are implicitly involved in the economic and
political decisions of many, if not most, private individuals.

Benefit-cost analysis is a logical extension of cost-effective-

ness analysis, operations research, systems engineering, systems
analysi 5, and program-eval uati on-and-review-technique.

Indeed, benefit-

cost analysis is a natural complement to the latter technique.

it is more comprehensive than the former.

However,

Benefit-cost analysis is

probably less akin to other types of analysis that are sometimes
applied to policy problems, such as psychological analYSiS,

bureaucratic analysis, and implementation analysis.
The earliest documented efforts of the U. S. Federal Government

to expl icitly employ benefit-cost approaches were made by the U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers in the evaluation of river and harbors projects

in the early years of the present century.

The technique was expanded

in the late 1940s by the Rand Corporation to decide which aircraft
should be developed as the next generation strategic bomber for the

U. S. Air Force.

Benefit-cost analYSis was officially adopted by the

U. S. Department of Defense in 1961 following publication of a book
describing the technique and cQiluthored by Charles Hitch, then
comptroller of the Department of Defense.

The benefit-cost procedure

was incorporated into a comprehensive federal budgeting technique

called the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS).

The PPBS

approach was extended to all federal agencies in 1965 by President
Lyndon Johnson, but the PPBS requirement was rescinded in 1971 by
President Richard Nixon.

However, benefit-cost analysis continues in

wi de federa 1 use.
The benefit-cost analysis procedure involves estimating and
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discounting present and future benefits and costs back to
values.

presen~

Discounting is based. on the principle that future value

possesses less present worth than it possesses at the time of future
transaction.

This is because the future is uncertain, and hence

people tend to favor current enjoyment of present values over possible
future values, and they therefore tend to save only small amounts of
their disposable incomes, if they choose to save at all.

Thus, one

dimension of interest is as compensation to induce people to save-that is, to forego some current consumption in favor of possible future
consumption.

And, of course, the interest is paid by those persons who

use the money saved by others--in other words, by the persons who
forego possible future consumption in favor of current consumption.
Using the interest principle, one can see that if he must make

some future payment--he can deposit a sum in the present to draw
interest until the payment must be made.

For example, one can currently

deposit $1000 at five percent annual interest to make a $2000 payment
in fifteen years.

That is, the future $2000 obligation has a present

value of only $1000 if it is discounted at five percent per year.
Likewise, if one is to receive $2000 in fifteen years, its present
worth is only $1000 if it is discounted at five percent per year.
At any rate. benefit-cost analysis uses the discounting technique
to set a present value on both future benefits and future costs.
benefit-cost ratio is then calculated for each alternative way of
achieving a particular future end-in-view.

That alternative rendering

the highest benefit-cost ratio is selected as the method to be used
in securing that particular end-in-view if the end ;s selected as an
end-to-be-reached.

An alternative sometimes used in place of benefit-
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cost ratios is net present values.

The net present value of a project

is simply the difference between the present value of benefits and the
present value of costs.

The project method selected under that

procedure is the one rendering the highest net present value.
Whichever technique is used, it is applied to every end-in-view,

and all ends-in-view are arrayed in descending order according to their

estimated benefit-cost ratios (or their net present values).

Of course,

those projects for which the best benefit-cost ratio is less than one,
or the estimated net present value is negative (the present value of
benefits is less than the present value of costs) are excluded from
the 1ist.

Selection of ends-to-be-reached is then made from that

prioritized list.

The end possessing the highest estimated benefit-

cost ratio (or net present value) is the first to be initiated.

It is

followed by the project possessing the next highest benefit-cost ratio
and so on down the list until the budget for such projects is exhausted.
As one can see, benefit-cost analysis ;s instrumental both in selecting
ends-to-be-reached and in choosing among alternative ways of employing

means to the ends selected ..

A simple example involving a private investment decision will
illustrate the point.

Assume that a person has somehow come into ten

thousand dollars and is seeking to invest it in a way that will
maximize his net present value in the investment.

Assume fUrther that

he has considered investing in real property, a U. S. Treasury bond,

gold, commodity future, and common stocks.
He first eliminates commodity futUres because he considers the

risk of loss too high in relation to his ability to bear risk, and the
duration of his investment would be too short to qualify any possible
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gain as long-term for tax purposes.

He then eliminates gold because he

believes that its potential for long-term gain has already been
discounted by the market.

Finally, he eliminates any kind of bond

because the expected return is not high enough, and he believes that
he is capable of bearing a greater risk for a commensurately greater

return.

However, he notes that the coupon rate on the Treasury bond

is eight percent, and that he can obtain that rate of return virtually
free from risk of solvency loss.
On the other hand, he reasons that population pressures and
inflation will place continuing upward pressures on rents and real

property prices, and he feels that common stocks are badly under-priced
consjdering their book values and earnings potentials.

Thus, his

investment choice is between real estate and common stocks.
He first estimated net present values of possible investments in

severa 1 pi eces of real property.

He di scovered that the hi ghest

estimated net present value was obtainable with a three-year-old
apartment quadriplex that was well situated for mul tiple-fami 1y

dwellings.

He determined the net present value by subtracting the

present val ue of present and future costs from the present val ue of
present and future revenues.

He calculated the present value of revenues by using the following
progression where PYA is the present value of revenues. A is the revenue
received in a calendar year, r is the discount rate, i is the initial
expression, and n is the number of discount periods--usually the
productive duration of the investment in years.
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(2)

n

.

A
A
A
PV A ~ ,L_A_'_-. = _1_ + __2_ _ + . . + __n_ _
i = 1 (l + r)'
1 + r
(1 + r)2
• (1 + r)n

He reasoned that his revenues would include annual rents over the
duration of his ownership plus the net scale price of the property when
he decided to sell it.

He chose to ignore the income-tax impl ications--

depreciation tax shelter during ownership, long-tem capital gains tax

upon sale--of his possible investment.

He assumed that his rents would

inflate at approximately ten percent per year and that he would
experience an average vacancy rate of ten percent.

He assumed that the

market value of the property would 1 ikewise inflate by ten percent per

year.

He decided to use an eight percent discount rate because he knew

that he could receive that return on U.S. Treasury bonds with almost no
risk of solvency loss.

Finally, he considered holding the property for

twenty years, the duration of the mortgage note required to secure it.
Thus, the revenue during any given year except the year of sale
would be the following in which Ro is the annual rent in the preceding

year and Rl is the annual rent in the current year.

(3)

Al

= Rl = Ro

+ .1 Ro - .1 (Ro + . 1Ro) .

And the revenue during the year of sale would be the following in which
S is the sale price less transaction costs.
(4)

An = Rn + S.

Substituting the latter two expressions into progression (2), renders
the following:
(5)

PV A

=

Rl

l+Y'

+ Rl + .1R l _ .1(R l + .1R l ) + . . .
(1 + r)2

+Rn-l + .1Rn-l - .1(Rn-l + .1Rn +S)
(1 = r)n
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Each apartment unit is presently leased for $325 rent per month,
and the tenant pays all of his own utility charges.
offered at $115,000.

The property is

However, the prospective investor believes that

he can buY it for $100,000 because it is part of an estate liquidation
and the heirs do not wish to keep the property.

However, they are

will ing to take back a purchase-money mortgage at 10 percent interest as
part of the transaction.

Substituting appropriate values into

progression (5) produces the following estimated present value of
revenues:

(6) PV A = $404,779.
He then calculated the present value of present and future costs
by USin9 the following progression in which PVc is the present value of
costs and C is the costs incurred during a particular calendar year.
(7) PVc '=

L

n

i +1

Ci __
__

= _1_

(1 + r) i

1+r

C

C2 _ _ +
+ __
(1 + r)2

+ _C_n_ _•
(1 + r)n

He reasoned that his annual costs would include acquisition costs
(Ca), management and maintenance costs (Cm), and property taxes (T).
(8) Ci = Ca i + Cmi + Ti

His acquisition costs included his down payment in the first year
($10,000), and the interest and payment on principal each year ($5195 in
the first year, and $10,390 in each subsequent year).

He assumed that

his management and maintenance costs would average ten percent of his
annual rents each year.
(9) Cmi = • 1Ri .

Substituting expression (9) into expression (8) and the expanded
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expression (8) into equation (7) produces the following progression:

= Cal +

(10) PV
c

.lR1 + T1 + Ca2 + .lR2 + T2
Can + .1Rn + Tn
1 +r
(1 + r)2
+... I
(1 + r)n

And substituting the appropriate values into progression (10) and
solving for the present value of costs results in
(11) PVc = $166,930.
Finally, substituting results (6) and (11) into equation (1)
renders the estimated net present value.

(12) PV N + PV A - PVc

= $404,779

- $166,930

= $237,849.

The prospective investor followed a similar procedure in estimating

the net present values of possible investments in a number of widely
traded and promising common stocks.

The highest estimated net present

value he could find, taking inflation into account, was approximately

$40,000.

By comparison, the net present value of a twenty-year

treasury bond with an eight percent interest rate discounted at eight
percent is precisely zero if inflation is ignored.

On the other hand,

the net present value of such a bond is negative if there is consumer-

price inflation over the life of the bond.

Naturally, the investor

purchased the quadrip1ex.
The foregoing example illustrated the use of benefit-cost analysis
in making a private investment choice.
unequivocal.

The procedure seemed clear and

One Simply estimates the present value of benefits

(revenues in this case) and the present values of costs, and he
subtracts the latter from the former in arriving at net present value.
Choice is Simply a matter of comparing alternative results and selecting

the result yielding the highest net present value.
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Choices in the realm of corporate enterprise are often made
employing a procedure similar to the technique illustrated in the
example.

Likewise, governments use variations of the same technique

to tentatively select and proffer alternatives to the public and its
elected representatives.

However, aspects of the benefit-cost procedure

become controversial when 1t is employed in pub1 ic decision-making.
Controversy centers around at least five questions:

What elements are

to be classified and inc1 uded as benefits and costs? What pecuniary
values shall be assigned to the benefit and cost elements? What
preferredness criteria shall be used?

(Preferredness criteria include

two elements--the social-discount rate, and the time over which benefits

and costs will be discounted back to present values).

What shall be

maximized or minimized in attempting to improve social welfare? And,
finally, who will control the process and decide the foregoing questions?
The remainder of this chapter briefly examines each of these questions.
INTERNAL BENEFITS AND COSTS 12

Internal benefits and costs are those tangible values that are
easily measured in pecuniary terms, and with which orthodox economists
are most at home.

They are the prices, revenues, costs, wages, rents,

interest rates, and profits that occupy both the dreams and the waking
hours of businessmen and that fill the pages of sophomore textbooks on
economic principles.

They are the elemental and divisible stuff of

market systems and gross national products.

And they are all of the

other values that lie behind the money terms that represent them in
market affairs.

They are the aesthetic, subjective, persona1, private,

visceral, individual, and intrinsic valuations that lurk behind and are
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somehow manifested in market behaviors.

Internal benefits and costs are perhaps the least controversial

aspects of benefit-cost analysis because they are the easiest to

measure with some degree of accuracy.

When one makes a personal market

choice, he actualizes it with a private transaction in which.he either
buys or sells something and pays or receives a price in exchange.

The

good or service is divisible and the agent buys or sells only as much
of it as he wishes at the price.

He is said to reveal his preference

for the good or service by the consummated transaction.

Moreover, his

preference is recorded in the market, and it will have some effect, no
matter how slight, on demand and supply factors in the market.

The

meaning of this for benefit-cost analysis is that the supply of and
demand for private or divisible goods and services can be estimated
with considerable precision, and there is usually little controversy
surrounding which internal benefits and costs should be included or
what money values should be assigned to them.

Most private market decisions explicitly employ only internal
benefits and costs.

The preceding example illustrating a private

investment decision was one expl ;citly involving only internal benefits

and costs.

The example was developed to illustrate the procedure for

using benefit·cost analysis in arriVing at an investment decision.
The procedure is essentially the same with minor variations to adapt it

to corporate and public purposes.

Thus, the reader will be spared

additional examples of the same kind to illustrate corporate and public
applications of benefit-cost analysis.

On the other hand, it is

necessary to develop a corporate investment example to illustrate other
aspects of benefit-cost analysiS that give rise to controversy.
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Suppose, therefore, that a private, electric utility company
serving an area of the Pacific Northwestern part of the United States
has forecast its future electrical power generating requirements, and

it has found that it must somehow provide more electrical power than
it can presently generate and purchase if it is to meet the estimated
future demands for its power.

Suppose further that the company

employed some variation of the benefit-cost analysis described above
as a way to evaluate alternatives for solving its production problem,
and that its investigations also revealed that additional hydroelectric

development would not be profitable because all good hydroelectric
sites in the area had already been exploited.

The profitable options

and their expected net future profits discounted back to present
valUes were as follows:

Option A:

Construct one high-capacity nuclear-fueled, electrical-

power generating plant.
Present value of costs
Option B:

Net present value

= $575,000,000.

Construct one large-capacity generating plant based

on fossil-fuel.
value of costs

Present value of revenues = $800,000,000.

= $225,000,000.

Present value of revenues = $800,000,000.

Present

= $240,000,000. Net present value = $560,000,000.

Option C:

Expand generating capacity by constructing several

plants: one central nuclear-powered plant, several dispersed fossilfuel fired plants (to minimize transmission costs), and develop
renewable energy (wind, sea, or solar) plants where possible.
value of revenues

$370,000,000.
Option D:

=

$800,000,000.

Present

Present value of costs

Net present value = $430,000,000.
Do nothing.

Acquiesce in the construction of

additional generating capacity by other utilities, and simply purchase
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the needed electrical power from those other companies, mark the price
up, and sa'l it to the company' 5 customers.

= $800,000,000.

Present value of revenues

Present value of costs = $550,000,000.

Net present

value = $250,000,000.
Option E:

Construct a network of renewable energy-powered

(solar, wind, and sea) generating plants at suitable sites.
value of revenues

= $800,000,000.

Net present val ue

= $120,000,000.

Present value of costs

Present

= $680,000,000.

Based on the net present values of the company· 5 estimated future
profits, and assuming that the company profit maximizes, it will choose

to construct a single, high-capacity, nuclear-fueled generating plant.
The nuclear plant, Option A, produces $575,000,000, a higher net
present value than any other option investigated.

The question now

becomes, can the company make its choi ce un; 1atera 11y and proceed with

its nuclear power project?
the company can do so.

The answer is that it is very unl ikely

The reason is that the company has considered

only internal benefits and costs in its estimates. and there are other
so-called external benefits and costs to be considered before a
decision can be made.

Moreover, external constituencies must be

invol ved in the process so that what may seem at first to be a
straight-forward private economic matter all at once becomes a publ ic
and pol itical matter.
EXTERNAL BENEFITS AND COSTS 13

What are the external benefits and costs that must be considered
by the electric utility company?

Or, at a higher level of generaliza-

tion, what are externalities, and how do they differ from internal
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benefits and costs?

Simply stated, an external ity is said to exist

any time an economic gain or loss accrues to one or more recipient
ag.ent as a consequence of an economic action taken by an initiating
agent, and the gain or loss is not reflected in the price of the
resulting economic good or service.

Or, stated another way, an external

benefit is said to exist when the marginal social cost of a good or

service is less than the marginal social benefit, and an external cost
is said to exist when the opposite occurs--the marginal social cost ;s

greater than the marginal social benefit.
Externalities may also be understood as so-called spill-over
effects, or neighborhood effects.

And external costs might appear in

the form of external diseconomies, or negative externalities.

Likewise,

external benefits might be called by external economies or positive
externalities.

However they are termed they mean external benefits or

external costs in the benefit-cost vernacular.

Social benefits are simply the sum of internal (or private)
benefits, and external (or public) benefits.

And social costs are the

sum of internal (or private) costs and external (or publ ic) costs.
Social costs and benefits diverge at the margin bp.cause external
benefits and costs are non-diVisible, and markets deal only in the
divisible goods and services that comprise internal (or private)
benefits and costs.

Thus markets equate private benefits with private

costs at some certain price.

And if external costs drive social costs

above private costs, the good or service involved will be produced and
consumed at lower costs and higher quantities than would be so if the
external cost It/ere included.

Li kewise, if external benefits drive

social benefits above private benefits, the good or service will be
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under-produced at lower costs because the market will equate only the
private benefits and costs involved.
Externalities involve initiating agents and recipient agents.

An agent that initiates an externality might be either a producer of
goods and services or a consumer.

In like manner, recipients of

external ities might be either producers or consumers

Dr

both together.

Three classes of externalities have been identified--public-good
externalities, technical externalities, and ownership externalities.

Pub 1i c-Good Externa 1it i es
PUblic-good externalities result when the marginal cost of
supplying additional units of a good or service is zero, or very nearly
so.

That is, the product is not divisible, and once it is created, no

affected person can be excluded from enjoying the benefits.

Likewise,

adding an additional person to the affected population will not
increase the cost of supplying the product.

For example, an efficient

police force in a community will result in effective crime prevention
and law enforcement.

Moreover. all residents share in the benefits

once the community is free of crime, and no one can be excluded from
those benefits.

Even visitors and recent immigrants become recipients

of crime prevention benefits, and their arrival in the community and
their enjoyment of its crime-free environment will not usually add to

the cost of supplying the benefits.
However, goods and services involving substantial external
benefits will usually be under produced because such goods and services
are not divisible.

This means that the good or service cannot be

divided into consumer units, packaged, and sold to users on the basis
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of the satisfactions they experience from the benefit.

There is,

therefore, no way to discover the true preferences of the recipient
agents--the residents of a crime·free community in this case.

This

results in a so-called free--rider phenomenon in which a recipient will
understate the value of the benefits he enjoys in order to avoid paying for their production.

He will do this because he knows that he

will receive the benefits once they have been created whether or not
he pays for them.
For these reasons, the allocation of resources to the production

of public goods and services cannot be accomplished solely by market
institutions.

Indeed, it generally falls to governments to

reallocate resources from the private sector to the public sector in

supplying public goods.

Such reallocation is accomplished through

government fiscal processes involving tax revenues and public
expenditure budgets.

And insofar as governments are of the

representative sort, issues surrounding taxes and expenditures are
ultimately resolved in the electoral process.
Technical Externalities
The second class of externalities, technical externalities,
result from technologies that cause evenly-increasing returns to the
scale of the producing plant.

That is, average total costs of

production decl ine with each additional unit of output produced per

unit of time, and the firm with the lowest cost per unit of output
is ipso-facto, the institution with the largest scale of plant in the

industry.

The result is that the firm with the largest scale of plant

can easily under.-price all other institutions in the industry because
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their plants are not large enough to enjoy such low-cost operations.
Only the producer with the largest plant can survive in competitive
markets, and the outcome is a monopoly industry in which all of the
consumers in the industry must buy from a single large seller.

Once

such a monopoly emerges, the monopolist can control the price of his
product by restricting output to that rate per unit of time that
produces the greatest profits.

That is generally at a significantly

lower rate of output and a higher price than would prevail under
competitive conditions.

The externality in this case is the loss in social benefits
occasioned by the monopoly solution, assuming that there are only
technical externalities involved.

A competitive solution would produce

a price that would equate marginal social benefits to marginal social

costs.

This is so because there are no technical externalities

involved with a perfectly competitive solution. and marginal social

benefits are therefore the same as marginal private benefits and
marginal social costs are also the same as marginal private costs.

However, under monopoly conditions, marginal private benefits
are less than marginal social benefits, the difference representing
external benefits.

The profit-maximizing monopolist will set his out-

put where marginal private (and social) costs equal marginal private

benefits (or marginal revenue).

This will usually be at a lower

marginal cost than with a competitive solution, and it will be at a
lower rate of output but at a higher market price.

In microeconomic

j!argon, the monopolist is said to be appropriating a larger portion of
the consumer surplus to his profits than he would receive under
competitive market conditions where there are no technical externalities.
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A by-product of this kind of ceremonial behavior is also an absolute
loss in social welfare.

The loss comprises that portion of consumer

surplus that is denied consumers, but cannot be appropriated to the

monopo 1i st

I

5

prof; ts.

Another feature that distinguishes firms that operate in
industries containing substantial technical externalities is that they
tend to be high fixed-cost enterprises--meaning that their fixed costs
are very high in relation to their variable costs.

Such institutions

are thought to be natural monopolies because, as noted above,

monopolies tend to emerge naturally as a result of the increasing

returns to scale occasioned by the technical externalities in such
industries.

.fJ..

second reason such firms are considered natural

monopolies ;s because they operate most efficiently as monopolies--

which is to say that resources are wasted if society attempts to impose
competitive market conditions on the industries.
An example of a natural monopoly ;s a utility industry.

An

e1 ectrica 1 util ity industry possesses techn; cal external ities, and its
operating company or companies are high fixed-cost firms.

Thus, the

necessary conditions for efficiency-fostering competition in the
electric utility industry do not exist.

One can imagine, for example,

how the landscape and skyline of the ordinary city would look with
fifty or more duplicate sets of electrical power-distribution lines

hanging from fifty or more sets of power poles, and connecting fifty
or more transformers, switches, and meters at each structure buying
electrical power.
Moreover, each power company would ideally build generating
capacity to carry the entire market just in case it could somehow
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entice all of the customers away from its competitors.

But more than

that, each company would have to build capacity for expected future
load--not just for the existing customers--because of the long lead
time required to bring new generators on line.

The point is that each

competitor would have full capacity to carry the total present and
projected load.

Thus, the industry would have excess generating

capacity that is some multiple greater than the number of institutions

operating in the industry.
Finally, cut-throat price competition would eventually eliminate
all but a few of the largest, and thus the lowest cost, operating
companies.

And the surviving companies would find it economically

more efficient to consolidate into a single operating company.

A

monopoly with gross excess capacity would therefore emerge, and the
resources allocated to the generation and distribution systems of the

defunct competitors waul d have been wasted because the systems waul d
have to be dismantled and removed to make way for productive uses of

the lands they occupied.
el early. the market will not all ocate resources eff; ci ently where
technical externalities pervade the industry.

It is for these reasons

that uti 1i ty companies are ei ther operated by governments as publ i c
enterprises, or by private corporations under strict government control.
Controls of private uti 1i ty corporati ons invol ve excl usi ve franchi ses

and rate regulati on.

The uti 1ity is granted ali cense that permits it

to serve a11 of the consumers in its market area free from competition
with other institutions supplying the same utility services.

In

exchange, the company must forego the right to set its own prices in
favor of public-rate regulation, and it must serve every customer in
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its market area who is willing and able to pay the established rate.
Government regulation of utility companies' attempts to avoid
the economic waste inherent in utility industries under the ceremony
of competition, and to bring social benefits into equilibrium with
social costs.

Thus, rates would ideally be set where marginal (social)

cost equals average revenue (or marginal social benefit).

However,

because of technical externa1ities--the high fixed cost and the need to
bui1 d capacity that exceeds average demand so as to accommodate peak
loading and meet expected growth in demand--the socially desirable
rate may cause a utility company to operate at a loss.

This is because

the marginal cost will probably be below the average total cost of the
firm under such circumstances.

Governments must therefore either

subsidize the company from taxes of other revenues, or use a so-called
IIfair-return" pricing technique.

A fair-return rate is one that

equilibrates average revenue (marginal social benefits) with average
total cost.

This permits the firm to "break even" without subsidy.

The fair return approach is generally used because it is politically
more palatable than subsidies from tax revenues.
Ownership External ities

The third class of externalities is called ownership externalities.
Ownership external ities occur because certain resources are divorced

from effective ownership, and their marginal private costs are
essentially zero.

They are therefore looked upon as free goods, and

they tend to be employed so intensely in some cases that they are
rendered less suitable for continued human use.

In other words

external costs drive social costs above private costs so that there is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

387

a welfare loss even though marginal private costs may be at or near
zero.

For example. a producer who pollutes water by discharging his
toxic wastes upstream imposes an external cost on downstream recipients
whether they be consumers who draw drinking water from the stream. or
other producers who require clean water in their production processes.
The producer-initiator uses the stream as a means of disposing of his
wastes because it is the least costly method open to him. and because
the flowing water is owned by no one. or it is owned by the government-which is to say that it is owned by everyone and anyone who chooses to
use it.

If enough people choose to dispose of their wastes in the

stream, it may become so intensely used that it is rendered unfit for
any other use.

External costs result in lower internal or private

costs to initiators. and therefore a greater than socially desirable
production and consumption of the good or service for which the
external cost was imposed.

Moreover, they result in loss of profits

for recipient producers and loss of util ity for recipient consumers.
In any case, there is no market method by which the recipients of

external costs can recover their losses from the initiators of the
costs.
A similar problem arises when an economic agent initiates

external benefits.

A private i.ntra-tlrban bus company that covers its

internal costs of operation solely on the basis of revenues from trip
fares may produce external benefi ts for 1oca 1 merchants because the
company provides transportation for some of the merchants customers who
might otherwise be unable to commute for shopping.

The bus company

might also be partly responsible for a reduction in traffic congestion
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and for some air PQJlution abatement in the corrununity insofar as
residents are wooed away from their private automobiles to commute by
bus.

The external benefits initiated by the bus company increase the

sales of recipient producers and reduce some dissatisfactions of

recipient consumers and producers.

But, here again, there is no market

mechanism by which the initiating bus company can obtain payment from

the recipients of the external benefits because ownership of the
benefits are effectively divorced from the initiating institution.
Here again, the welfare gains and losses attributable to owner-

ship externalities are not effectively handled by markets.

When

externai benefits raise social benefits above private benefits, the
involved good or service is under-produced because the initiator is

not paid for the benefits he produces.

Governments attempt to correct

this kind of misallocation by paying subsidies equal to the estimated
pecuniary value of the external benefit to the initiator of the
benefits.

Such subsidies are sometimes raised from taxes levied

against the recipients of the benefits.
In similar fashion. a good or service is overproduced and overconsumed when external costs raise social costs above private costs.
This happens because the internal or private costs of production are

lower than they would be if the initiator had to bear the full social
costs of production.

Governments attempt to correct this kind of

misallocation by direct regulation or by taxing the initiator of the
external cost.

Direct regulation involves establishing and enforcing

efficient standards based upon the technical character of the toxic
wastes discharged and the capacity of the disposal medium to assimilate
the wastes without significant degradation.

Taxes may take the form
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of a disposal fee or an effluent charge.

Either way, the tax is

intended to internalize the external cost so that consumers of the
resulting products pay a price that covers all of the social costs
incurred in their production.
The foregoing three classes of externalities--public goods
externalities, technical externalities, and ownership externalities--

possess several common attributes.

Each involves either an economic

gain or loss accrurng to one or more recipient agents as a result of
an economic action taken by an initiating agent, and the gain or loss
is not reflected in the price of the resulting economic good or service.
In other words, an external benefit will drive social benefits above
internal or private benefits, and insofar as the market will equilibrate only private benefits and costs, the good or service resulting
in the externality will be underproduced.

In similar fashion an

external cost which drives social costs above private costs will
result in Dver-production and consumption of the resulting good or
service because the external cost is not borne by the producer and
reflected in the consumer price.
Moreover, there is no simple or direct way of measuring the worth
of externalities because they are indivisible, and there is no
institutional ceremony for internalizing them.

That is, they cannot

be divided into user units and sold to individuals on the basis of the
personal utilities or disutilities the externalities generate.

There

is therefore no simple or direct way of discovering the individual
preferences of recipient agents.

As a result. recipients of

externalities tend to free-ride by understating their benefits and
overstating their costs because they know that they cannot be excluded
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from the external benefits or avo; d the external costs once they are

created.

Li kewi sa, there is no market method for remunerating

initiators of external benefits or for collecting external costs from
initiators and paying them to recipients.
For these reasons, the ex; stence of extern a 1iti es converts what

might otherl'lise be relatively simple economic problems with more-orless direct market solutions into very complex social issues that can

only be resolved, if at all, in political arenas.

One might say that

externalities are the combinations that open Pandora's box releasing

the disparate and competing values that plague choices between ends-inview and between means to be employed in reaching selected ends.

This

is simply because almost anything can be claimed as an external cost
by possible recipient agents, or claimed as external benefits by
initiating agents.

And since such claims are buttressed by one or

more of the plethora of non-pecuniary values, it is often extremely
difficult to empirically prove or disprove the actual existence of the
claimed externality.

And even if it can be shown to exist, it is often

more difficult to place an accurate pecuniary value on it--all of which
opens the way to participation by almost anyone in the decision process,

and to political game playing by the groups participating in the
process.

Externalities and Benefit-Cost AnalYSiS 14
With that explanation of externalities, it is possible to return
to the benefit-cost analysis of the alternative ways to increase the
e1 ectrica 1 generati ng capacity for the util ity company introduced

earlier.

It is recalled that there were five options that the utility
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company found to be profitable when it considered only internal or
private benefits and costs.

The first option, and the one found to be

most profitable, was (A) to build a single nuclear-fueled, generating
p1 ant with capacity to supply the expected growth in demand.

The

other options in descending order of profitability were: (B) to build
one large conventional thermal plant powered by fossil fuels; (C) to
build several small plants at dispersed locations and using nuclear
fuel, fossil fuel. and solar. wind, or sea energy as appropriate to

the site; (0) do nothing, letting other uti1 ities construct the
additional generating plants; (E) build many solar, wind, and seapowered plants.
The question was asked, can the company make its choice
unilaterally and proceed with its nuclear power project?

The answer

was that it is very unlikely that the company could do so because it
had not considered external benefits and costs in its evaluative
analyses.

The next question was, what are the external benefits and

costs that must be considered before the company can proceed?

Despite

its present length, this tome will thankfully not be protracted to a
length sufficient to fully explore that question.

However, it is

possible to trace out the general kinds of external ities that will
most likely be involved.
It appears unlikely that there will be any public goods
externalities because the company is a private one. and its product.
electrical power. is divisible into

kilowatt~.

and it can be sold in

individual units on the basis of the satisfactions enjoyed by consumers.
On the other hand, technical externalities are clearly involved, and
it is very likely that ownership externalities will also be
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significant.
Technical externalities are a consideration because a private,
electric utility corporation precisely fits the definition of a natural
monopoly.

It is a high-fixed cost institution, and it operates in an

industry that enjoys (or suffers) increasing returns to plant scale.
The company is therefore subject to government regulation of its
operations and rates.

If for no other reason, this condition alone

would subject the company's expansion plans to public scrutiny, and
much of that scrutiny would center on the provable external ities of
whatever it planned to do.

Anyhow, the technical externalities would

likely be a factor in some degree on the benefits side of the analysis
for each option considered.
Likewise, some ownership externalities cannot be avoided for

most, if not all, options.

Probably the most obvious are the external

costs of pollution resulting from gaseous and liquid waste emissions.
This is undoubtedly the greatest with the first two options--a single
nuclear plant, and a single conventional, thermal plant.

However, air

and water pollution would also be an external cost of the third option,
although the pollution would not be so concentrated and thus not so
great a problem as with the first two.

On the other hand, air and water

pollution would not be a problem under the last two options--do nothing,
and develop solar, wind, and sea energy sources.

The first two alternatives might also lead to increased traffic
congestion and air pollution from auto exhaust emission in the
community on which the plant is satellited. This might occur because
of population added to the community by the addition of a new exportbase industry, and it could lead to greater public expenditures to
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widen and maintain streets, as well as other actions to remedy the
congestion and adjust to the degradation of its environment.

This is

not 1ike1y to be a problem with any other option.
Ecological disruption would undoubtedly occur with all options
except 0, do nothin9.

It is difficult to say where such disruptions

would be the greatest, but one is intuitively attracted to the first
two once agai n as the options bearing the greatest prospects for
ecological damage.
The risk of cataclysmic nuclear accident is, of course, an

external cost of the first option.

A malfunction that resulted in a

reactor melt-down would no doubt dump radioactive water and gas into
the air and streams, contaminating large areas surrounding the plant,
and rendering them uninhabitable for a time.

On the other hand, the

nuclear alternative m'1ht lead to long-run improvements in a promising,
inchoate technology, and in that case there may be external benefits
involved.

Those benefits might apply as well to the solar, wind, and

sea options.

The list of ownership externalities is limited only by the
bounds of one's imagination.

One could go on listing and rationalizing

possible external benefits or costs to support whatever outcome he
favored.

But a comprehensive catalog of such external ities go beyond

the purposes at hand--which is simply to show how external ities fit
into a benefit-cost analysis, and how they provoke controversy and cast
doubt on the outcomes of benefit-cost analysis if they are not carefully
handled.
For purposes of illustrating the latter point, suppose that the
utility company prepares itself for the long and tedious hearings and
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possible litigations by having its benefit-cost analysis expanded to
include externalities.

Believing that its own staff, while thoroughly

competent, would lack credibility before public bodies, the management
contracts with an outside consultant to complete the study.

The

economists and technicians of the consultant firm, working with the

utility's planning staff to collect and analyze data and arrive at the
results reflected in Table 1.

The data in the external benefit and

external cost columns naturally embody the conclusions of an
environmental impact statement which is appended to the benefit-cost
analysis,
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TABLE I
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL GENERATION ALTERNATIVES
(VALUES STATES IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Present Values
of Costs

Present Values

OPTIONS

of Benefits

Present Values
of Net Benefits
Total

Private

Social

225

180

405

575

445

970

240

160

400

560

570

210

1010

370

55

425

430

585

250

1050

550

60

610

250

440

Private External

A - Nuclear only

800

50

B - Conventional Fossil
Fuel Only

800

170

800

800

Total

Pri vate External

850

C - Di spersed Small
Plants Using Nuclear,

Fossil-Fuel and Solar,
Wi nd. and Sea

o - Do Nothing
E - Solar, Wind, and

800

Sea Energy on ly
-

-

~

--

~

230
-

---

1030
... -

---

680
-

30
-

~-

-

710
----

120
~---

320
-~-

W
<0

'"
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Armed with the benefit-cost analysis, the environmental impact

statement and other appended materials, the electric utility company
initiates its permit application expressing its continued preference

for the nuclear option and rationalizing it on the grounds that the
figures are simply estimates and that the utility staff is confident
that actual results will vindicate its choice.

The entire process has

passed with the application into the arena of public choice.

How will

it fare in the political realm?
For purposes of examining that question, suppose that the

population is evenly divided between five distinct points-of-view.
And further assume that those five points-of-view are equally
represented on the commission or other body that wi 11 act on the

application.

One hastens to admit that such a diverse body is unlikely

to exist for long because the colleague nature of such institutional
groups usually brings their members to some kind of consensus about
the matters on which they del iberate and rule.

Proceeding anyhow on

the assumpti on, the poi nts-of-vi ew are those of pri vate bus inessmen,
fiscal conservatives. economic idealists, fiscal liberals. and
envi ronmenta 1i sts.
Aside from their titles, the attribute that most separates these
views from one another is the implicit goal-orientation of each.

This

surfaces as that which each constituency believes ought to be maximized
or minimized.

One can see that the profit orientation of private

businessmen leads them to favor maximizing net private benefits--which
is the benefit-cost euphemism for private business profits.

And, of

course, option A in Table I maximizes net private benefits.
The fiscal conservative is the person who religiously votes
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votes against all money measures in elections.

The goal-orientation of

the fiscal conservative would therefore lead him to favor the least
cost solution--option B in Table I if the person happens also to be
concerned about environmental matters, or option A if his concern is

only for private costs.

These two views, that of the private

businessman and the fiscal conservative are not far apart.

They are

both cut of the same conservative cloth, and they are often sewn into
the same cloak surrounding issues.
On the other hand, economic idealists are persons who tend to
measure the real world by how far it deviates from their models.

This

view is usually found abundantly in the economics departments of
liberal-arts colleges and business schools, and frequently in
engineering schools and in the professional constituencies surrounding
those schools.

Inculcated with the importance of maximizing social

welfare, economic idealists are most likely to favor maximizing net

social benefits because their theories tell them that maximum net
social benefits is the benefit-cost euphemism for maximum social
welfare.
solution.

This just happens to be option C in Table I, the eclectic
However, economic idealists are not wed to any particular

solution on a priori grounds, and if it can be empirically demonstrated
that some other option achieves a higher net social welfare, economic

idealists would support that option.

CoincidentalJi, the e-cMomic

idealist's goal-orientation happens to be the most generally used
choice criterion.
Fiscal liberals are very nearly the polar opposites of fiscal
conservatives.

They religiously vote in favor of every money issue on

an election ballot.

They tend to feel that private profits are the
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scourge of society, and that the best way to deal with matters is to
tax the rich who essentially 1 ive on profits and to use the revenues

to sustain the poor by income supplements, and to reallocate resources

from the private sector to the production of public goods nnd services.
Given his goal-orientation, the fiscal liberal is most likely to favor
option 0 in Table I because it produces the greatest total external
benefits. and external benefits are the benefit-cost euphemism for

public goods.
Finally, the environmentalist possesses an enormous affinity for

zoological and geological nature.

He believes that the natural state

is an ecologically balanced paradise and that the best of all possible
worlds is a wilderness that has somehow escaped the fettering touch of
man.

He therefore implicitly opposes all civilized activities because

they are not in accord with his vision of paradise and because they
foul natural environments with human artificiality, upsetting the

ecological balance and wreaking havoc across the land.

Clearly, if the

environmentalist must support one of the five options, it will be
option E because it involves the lowest external cost, and external
cost is a benefit-cost euphemism for environmental degradation.

The

environmentalist is often found in coalition with the fiscal liberal
because he sees the profit motives of private business as an engine
driving humanity to degrade the environment and because he feels that
the most effective brake on that engine is governmental power.

Assuming that deep in his heart each archetype has faith in the
integrity of the consultants who prepared the environmental impact

statement and polished the benefit-cost analysis, what inside
strategies will each employ to achieve selection of that option that
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best fits his goal-orientation?

(For purposes of this paper, an

inside strategy is one that does not involve explicit coalitions among

the factions that make up the decision group).

Since each knows that

the choice criterion is to be maximum net social benefits, the
strategies must somehow result in increasing the net social benefits
of his preferred option, or reducing the net social benefits of

alternative options.

It may be possible to achieve this by contesting

one or more of the following elements of the benefit-cost analysis:
the items included either as external benefits or external costs, the
pecuniary values aSSigned to the external benefits or external-cost
items. the social discount rate. and the number af years aver which

the present values of benefits and costs were discounted.

The effects

of changes in the first two elements will be considered in the next
section below.

The latter two elements are called the "preferredness

criteria l' and the effects of changes in them will be considered in a

subsequent part of the chapter.
Alterations in Externalities
One way each of the commi ssi oners can press the ascendancy of hi s
preferred solution is to somehow raise the net present benefits of
that solution in relation to the others.

As noted above, one way this

can be accomplished is to somehow bring about a reduction in the costs
or an increase in the benefits of the solution he prefers, or to
decrease the benefits and increase the costs of the alternatives that

stand ahead of his.

He can do these things by raising questions

regarding either the inclusion or the exclusion of some particular
benefit or cost item, or regarding the pecuniary value assigned to
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any item.
He will, of course, raise questions about any glaring

deficiencies in the schedules of internal or private benefits and
costs particularly if doing

50

will enhance his preference.

However,

he is unlikely to find the best picking among the private benefits and
costs because they are the most easily quantified empirically, and
they are therefore the least controversial and the least susceptible
to challenge.

On the other hand, the schedules of external benefits

and costs are replete with controversy--controversy about which items
should be included and about the pecuniary values to be assigned to
the included items.

Controversy reigns because there is no simple or

direct way of establishing the existences of externalities or of
accurately measuring their magnitudes if they are found to exist.

In

like manner, there is no fool-proof way of placing pecuniary values on

whatever magnitudes one perceives for external ities.

Thus, the best

picking for the antagonist is among the external ities.
On that basis, the private businessman may be expected to
initially ignore options 0 and E in Table I because they pose no
immediate threat to his preference.

On the other hand, he may be

expected to raise questions about possible exclusions and low valuations of external cost items, and about the inclusions and high
valuations of external benefits for alternatives Band C, the
conventional and eclectic options, because they both produce higher
net social benefits than his favored nuclear solution.

If he fails

to bring the present value of net social benefits for those options
down below that of his solution, he will then attempt to raise the
net social benefits of his preferred solution by posing questions
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about its exclusions and low valuations of external benefit items, and
inclusions and high valuations of external cost items.

Of course,

consistency requires that any changes in standards for either
inclusions or valuations must be applied uniformly to all like
situations under each alternative.

Thus, an advocate must take care

that a change he proffers in support of his preference does not also
change other solutions adversely to his cause.
For example, an argument the businessman might make is that the
schedule of external costs of the conventional option do not include
the contribution of that option to the depletion of a non-renewable
resource--fossil fuels.

This would also apply with less force to

option C, the eclectic option.

Likewise, he might argue that the

inflation factor (an internal cost item) used in determining the
operating costs for options Band C is too low in view of the
{armeeable depletion of fossil fuels.

If either of these arguments

carry, the effect wi 11 be to increase the present va 1ues of total
social costs and thus reduce the present values of net social benefits
for options Band C.

If this does not give the edge to the

businessman's preference, he will argue further that the external costs
of his solution have been grossly inflated by the inclusion of an item
for the risk of a cataclysmic nuclear accident, and another for thermal
pollution of stream water.

If these two items are not removed, he can

insist that the pecuniary values assigned to them are much too great.
Each commissioner will similarly support his preferred alternative
Thus, the fiscal conservative will initially ignore options A, D, and
E, and he will pose questions that tend toward decreases in the present
value of net social benefits for option C, and that tend toward
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increases in the net social benefits of his preferred solution.

option B.

In like manner, the fiscal liberal will ignore option E,

oppose options A, B, and C, and support option D.

And the

environmentalist will ignore none of the options, support his
preference, option E, and oppose the rest.

Finally, the economic

idealist will see his role as one of protecting the empirical integrity
of the benefit-cost analysis because he does not care which option is

finally implemented so long as it is the one truly possessing the
hi ghest net soci a1 benefits.

The point is that the opportunity for manipulation of possible
benefit-cost analysis outcomes is greatly expanded by the tenuous
nature of externalities and the often questionable pecuniary values

assigned to them.

External ities are so malleable that the benefit-

cost analysis can frequently be made to come out any way the consensus
of a decision body chooses.

Indeed, the benefit-cost analysis becomes

speculative at best, and implausible at worst when externalities loom

so large.

All of which underscores the problem: there is no easy or

direct way of weighing disparate and competing values in the selection

of ends-to-be-reached and in the employment of means such that social
welfare is maximized subject to resource constraints.
PREFERREDNESS CRITERIA 15

Another element that enhances the mall eabil ity of benefit-cost
analyses is preferredness criteria.

Preferredness criteria is

generally thought of in terms of social discount rates.

However, it

also includes the time preference, or the period of time over which
benefits and costs are discounted back to present values.
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Social Discount Rates
A very important choice to be made in every benefit-cost analysis
regards what social discount rate to use to discount the benefits and
costs back to present values.

The choice is important because of the

relationship between the rate and the resulting present values.
Recalling from a previous part of this chapter, the discounting
equation for benefits is

PVg -

~

L-

Ai
(1

= 4)1

i = 1

The equation is the same for costs, substituting C for Band A.

The

social discount rate, r, is in the denominator of the term, and it

follows that a high discount rate increases the denominator and
therefore decreases the resulting present value of the benefit or
cost.

And the opposite is also true.

The lower the social discount

rate, the higher the resulting present value.

Thus, present values

are inversely related to social discount rates.
The relationship between social discount rates and present
values opens the way for further manipulation of benefit-cost results.
Interinstitutional biases can be introduced when several institutions
are competing for the same funds.

If the funding authority is

deciding which institutions shall receive money for its projects on
the basis of net present values, the institution that can justify the
lowest social discount rate will have an advantage, other things being
equal.

For example, if the electric utility company described above

was not privately owned, but was an element of government, its
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projects would compete with projects of other government agencies for
priority and funding.

And it could obtain an advantage for itself if

it could justify a lower social discount rate than the rates used by
competing agencies.

The same problem occurs with intersectoral allocations as well.

Social discount rates for federal projects in the United States have
traditionally used some sort of average interest rate conjured up from

market interest rates paid on U. S. Treasury bonds.

Of course, the

treasury rate represents an almost risk-free investment and it is

therefore substantially lower than private interest rates in money

markets.

On the other hand, corporate interest rates reflect all of

the risks borne by private business, and they are therefore higher.
The present values on private projects are usually calculated using
some kind of weighted average yield on private investments.

The

point is that government sector projects often appear more productive

than private sector projects because the net present values on
government projects are usually calculated using lower discount rates.

This can and does lead public policy-makers to believe that money
spent in the public sector produces greater welfare than money spent
in the private sector.

And, of course, this will affect the

propensity of those pol icy-makers to propose hi gher taxes and hi gher
public expenditure programs.
Moreover, intrainstitutional biases may be introduced by a
particulai" discount rate even if it appl ies uniformly throughout the
institution using it.

This is because a low rate favors long-term

projects over short-term projects, and a high rate favors shortterm projects over long-term projects.

This is simply because lower
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discount rates give greater significance to distant future values than

higher discount rates.

In other words, one dollar discounted from

thirty years in the future at four percent is worth thirty-one cents
today.

Oiscounted at 12 percent, it is worth only about three cents.

For example, ignore initial construction costs and inflation, and
assume that a project produces current net benefits of $1700 per year.
These values discounted at four percent over ten years yield a net

present value of $13,792.

However, a project producing only $1000

per year and discounted at the same rate over a thirty-year life
yields a net present value of $17,295.

Clearly, the longer-term

project produces a higher net present value even though its annual

net revenue is lower.

On the other hand, a twelve percent discount

rate reverses the order of preference--$9,607 for the ten-year project,

and $8,508 for the 30-year project.

The point is that the social

discount rate is crucial to the outcome of the analysis.
Similarly, low social discount rates favor high initial cost
projects with low operation and maintenance costs, while high rates

give the edge to projects with low initial costs and high costs of
operation and maintenance.

For example, using the preceding

illustration, and assuming a useful 1 ife of 10 years and the same
current values of benefits for both projects, the project producing

$1700 in current net benefits per year is operating at lower
operation and maintenance costs than the project that produces only

$1000 per year.

On that basis, the net present values of the first

project are unchanged (S1700/yr. at 4%/year for 10 yrs.= $13,792,
and at 12%/year = $9,607.)

However, the net present values of the

second project change because of the change in useful 1 ife from thirty
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to ten years.

(They become $lOOO/yr. at 4%/yr. for 10 yrs.= $8,113),

and at 12%/yr.= $5,651.)
If it is assumed that the initial construction costs occur only

in the first year of each project, then the net present values of the
projects will be reduced in each case by the discounted values of
their initial costs.

If the present values of initial costs of the

projects are assumed to be $7,500 for the first, and $2,500 for the
second, then the net present values resulting with a four-percent

discount rate are $6,292 and $5,613 respectively.

Clearly, the high

initial cost project with low operation and maintenance costs is

preferred over the other project at a four-percent discount rate.
However, if the discount rate is 12 percent, the outcome is

rev~rsed-

$2,107 in net present values for the first project, and $3,151 for
the second--and the low initial cost project with high operation and
maintenance costs is preferred over the other project.

Here again,

the discount rate is crucial to the outcome.

The foregoing suggests that there should perhaps be a single
social discount rate to be applied to all projects in the entire
national economy--public and private, long-term and short-term.

A

so-called net yield approach is often suggested in which some average
of interest rates and rates of return on private investments is
adjusted by removing inflation risks, solvency risks, liquidity risks,
interest rate or term risks, and all other elements that elevate the
rate above the pure cost of money, wratever that is.

Under these

arrangements, every project in every institution across the country is
using precisely the same social discount rate, and that rate is the
pure cost of using money.

Such an arrangement, if it could be achieved,
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would greatly simplify decisions made on the bases of interproject
comparisons of benefit-cost analyses.
A counter argument is that structures of market interest rates

and returns on private investments are so varied and complex that any
so-called average is almost useless.

Moreover, when the resulting

average rate is refined by removing the factors that elevate it above

the pure money rate, it is like removing the salt, leavening. and
spices from bread--one is left with a bland, and unpalatable product.
That is, a pure money rate--if such a rate exists--is void of most

ingredients that give interest and profit rates any significance.

Idea lly, the rate used to di scount net benefits back to a present
value on any given project would reflect at least the cost of the
capital funds used to create and operate the project over its

productive life.

Thus, the rate should incorporate every risk and

yield factor involved in the project and in like projects throughout
the economy.

According to this view, each project would use a social

discount rate that was uniquely calculated using the risk and yield
factors inherent in the project. 16
One of many examples that might be cited to justify special
discount rates is the term structure of interest rates--the
distribution of rates according to the lengths of term for the
securities represented.

The yield curve in the term structure of

interest rates usually (but not always) reflects short-term rates
that are loltJer than intermediate-term rates. and intermediate-term
rates that are lower than long-term rates.

It is sometimes argued

that these variations result from the unwillingness of lenders to give
up control of their moneys for longer periods because of inflation
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risks, and that the yield curve can be leveled out by simply removing

inflation risk from the rates.

However, this argument does not square

with a so-called perversion of the yield curve during periods of high
inflation.

The short-term rates rise higher than long-term rates at

such times--perhaps reflecting the expectations that long-term rates

are too high and can only decline, and thus borrowers are unwilling to
make long-term commitments at such high interest rates.

However, the

more usual shape of the yield curve suggests that social discount
rates should increase with increases in the duration of the useful

life of the project.
The discount rate strategies that might be employed by antagonists in the utility company example would depend upon features of
the possible solutions that are not revealed in the data of Table I.
However, it is apparent from the discussion in this section that an

advocate in that example would argue to justify a lower social
discount rate if his preferred option were either a longer term
project than the competing alternatives, or if it were a high initial
cost project with low operation and maintenance costs.

On the other

hand, he would argue in favor of a high social discount rate if his

preferred option were either a short-term project or a low initial
cost project with high operation and maintenance costs.

All of which

demonstrates that the relationship between social discount rates and
net present values and the opportunities for manipulation of the

former adds to the mall eabil ity of benefit-cost ana lysi s.
Time Preferences
Another important choice to be made in every benefit-cost analysis
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is the duration over which benefits and costs shall be discounted back
to present values.

The choice is important because the choice can

affect the resulttng net present values.

A long duration with many

years over which to discount benefits and costs will project higher
net present values than a short duration--other things equal.
Of course, the duration of a project should not be in dispute.
It should simply be the productive life of the project.

However, that

period may be indeterminate at the outset of a project because of
factors that do not enter into the physical condition of the capital
goods in the project.

For example, secondary and tertiary effects

might endure much longer than the productive life of the primary
physical features of the project.

This is also true of externalities.

The time over which an external benefit or cost endures may exceed
the internal, physical life of the project.

For example, nuclear

contamination caused by a serious accident at a reactor site might
render the site unusable for a number of hUman generations beyond the

estimated productive life of the project.

Finally, there is the

possibility that new technologies may render the project obsolete

before its estimated productive life is expended.

Conversely, the

project may remain productive long after its estimated productive

1ife has passed.
The point is that the duration of the productive life of a
project is not always so certain at the outset of the project.

Thus

there is some discretion in setting the number of years over which

benefits and costs are to be discounted back to present va1ues.

This

then allows for further manipulations of possible benefit-cost analysis
outcomes.

And if one wished to gain priority for his preferred
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project, he would argue to increase the duration of its productive
life, and thereby inflate the project's net present values in

relation to alternative projects of shorter duration but discounted
at the same social discount rate.
Some of the foregoing tactics for manipulating time
preferences are e1 iminated if the choi ce criter; on is changed from
net present values to benefit-cost ratios.

Benefit-cost ratios were

described earlier as an alternative technique to net present values
for choosing a project methodology and for prioritizing a list of
projects.

The principal advantages of benefit-cost ratios over net

present values are that they discriminate on a basis of net present
values, but they screen out manipulations involving time

preferences and overall project magnitudes.

The inflation of net present values accomp1 ished by increasing
the productive life of the project will not change the project
priority if benefit-cost ratios are the criteria of choice.

For

example, assume that benefits and costs of a project are discounted
at four percent over ten years and that the present value of benefits

is $13,800,000, and the present value of costs is $8,100,000.

This

produces a net present value of $5,700,000, and a benefit cost ratio
of 1.7.

Now assume that the productive 1 ife over I<hich the benefits

and costs are di scounted is changed from ten to thi rty years.

The

present value of benefits is nOl< $29,400,000, and the present value of
costs is $17,300,000.

This dramatically increases the net present

value from $5,700,000 to $12,100,000.
cost rati a remains 1.7.

But notice that the benefit-

Thus, the tact; c for improvi ng the pri ority of

a project by increasing its productive life and thereby inflating its
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net present value is overcome by using benefit-cost ratios for

prioritizing projects.
Likewise, advantages of project size are eliminated by

prioritizi ng project 1 i sts according to benefit-cost rati os.

For

example, assume two competing projects X and Yare analyzed using the
same social rate of discount and the same productive life.

And

further assume that the present value of benefits for project X is
$20,000,000, and its present value of costs is $18,000,000, yielding
a net present value of $2,000,000.

Now, assume that the present value

of benefits for project Y is $6,000,000, and its present value of
costs is $5,000,000, yielding a net present value of only $1,000,000.
On a project 1 i st pri or; tized sol ely according to net present val ues,
project X would be listed ahead of project Y because its net present

value is higher by double that of project Y.

This is so even though

project Y produces'} higher rate of return than project X.

However,

if the list is prioritized by benefit-cost ratios, project Y is
listed ahead of project X because the ratio for Y is 1.2 while the
ratio for X is only 1.1.

Thus, prioritizing project 1 ists according to

benefit-cost ratios el iminates advantages (or disadvantages) of
project size.

However. pri orit; zi ng projects accord; n9 to benefit-cost ratios
will not have any effect on benefit-cost analysis outcomes that
involve manipulations of externalities or social-discount rates.

The

ranking of alternative project methodologies or the priority of a
project can be increased on a project list by strategies to increase
its net present value in relation to those of other projects.

The
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strategies of change described above involving manipulation of
externalities and social-discount rates will also change benefit-cost
ratios to enhance project priority.

Once again, benefit-cost analysis

is a pliant process because of the opportunities to maneuver outcomes
by jockeying elements of the analysis.
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND WELFARE

This chapter commenced with the question, how are the tensions
between forward-urging technology and backward-clinging technology
resolved into human progress, where progress is forward movement along
the ends-means continuum--the continuum of on-going life processes.
Future orientation and forward movement along the continuum also
suggests the triumph of technology over aspects of ceremonialism,
and the resulting improvements in social welfare.
The linkage between ceremonialism and human values was
acknowledged, and it was observed that values in an industrial society
are as multifarious and disparate as society is pluralistic.
preceding question was then rephrased to:

The

How are the diverse values

in an industrial society structured and weighed in choosing between
competing future ends and between alternative methods of employing
present means toward the selected ends so that social welfare is
maximized.

After all, it is in the process of choosing between such

alternatives that new technologies are or are not chosen to be
innovated, diffused, and integrated.
However, since the implicit summum bonum in all of this is
maximum social welfare, it was necessary to explore that concept.

Social welfare is simply the aggregate of individual welfare, and the
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latter is the sum of one's satisfaction with life subject to technical

and ceremonial constraints.

The tenets of social welfare were

examined from the perspective of welfare economics.

While the theories

of welfare economics are internally consistent, their predictive and
prescriptive powers are suspect because they are empirically weak.
That is, the theories are so abstract that there is little correspondence with reality or it is sometimes difficult. if not impossible. to
empirically establish the correspondence.

As consistent as it is

internally, much of welfare economics is simply implausible.
Neverthel ess, the wel fare economi c concepts of Pareto-eff; ciency,
and of equity within a Pareto-efficient system were found to be
humanely attractive ideas.

A Pareto-efficient system is one in which

resources have been allocated such that the welfare of anyone person
can be improved only at the cost of the welfare of others.

Equity

within a Pareto-efficient system is improved if income is redistributed
such that the gaining persons value their gains more than the losing
persons value their losses.

These concepts were found to be so

intuitively compelling that it was suggested that their conditions
ought to be as nearly achieved as possible.
However, operationalizing the Pareto criteria is another matter,
given the implausibility of significant aspects of welfare economics.
The problem is one of accurately measuring the confl icting and
competing values, weighing them in some sort of choice mechanism,
making decisions, and actualizing the decisions according to some
criterion of choice.
Benefit-cost analysis is a technique by which values measured in
pecuni ary terms are organized and analyzed to facil itate human
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decision-making.

The technique moves decision-makers toward choices

that, in theory, should at least enhance, if not maximize, social

welfarf!: subject to resource constraints.

118enefits" is the b'enefit-

cost jargon for social welfare, while Ilcosts" is the term analogous to

resource constraints.

The benefit-cost analysis procedure by which

only methods and projects that produce maximum net social benefits

(or maximum excess of benefits over costs) or the highest benefitcost ratios will be implemented is the element that augurs toward
maximum social welfare.

As explained above, social welfare is enhanced

in Pareto-efficiency terms any time someone can be made better off

without making any other person worse off.

This has a high

probabi 1ity of occurrence whenever an investment project--pri vate or
public--truly

produces a net positive present value, and that value

is the highest in relation to relevant alternatives.
The decision to innovate new technologies occurs out of the
benefit-cost analysis process any time a new technology promises to
increase social benefits relative to social costs, or to reduce social
costs relative to social benefits. and the increase in net social
benefits is great enough to overcome ceremonial resistances to the

technical change.

When these things coalesce, technology produces or

widens the excess of social benefits over social costs, and social
welfare "is thereby improved.

Of course, the successful innovation of

a new technology--an innovation that does indeed improve social

welfare--is unlikely to happen unless all social benefits and costs
are accurately assessed and included in the analysis, and all phantom

benefits or costs are excluded from the analysis that led to the
decision to innovate the new technology.
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A good bit of this chapter has been devoted to describing how
benefit-cost analyses can be manipulated to produce outcomes that are
favored by one or another special-interest group.

The production of

favored outcomes can be achieved by manipulation of certain elements

of the analysis--chiefly, externalities, social-discount rates, and
time preferences.

Manipulation of the latter two, social discount

rates and time preferences, can be done, but it is not so facile in
present institutional environments because they may be more effectively

dealt with in the pecuniary frame-of-reference.

However. this is not

altogether the case with externalities.
To be sure, many external effects are very real.

There are

external benefits initiated by both producing and consuming agents for
which the market neither extracts payments from the recipients who

enjoy the benefits, nor remunerates the initiators for the external
benefits they produce.

And there are external costs initiated again

by both producing and consuming agents for which the market again
neither extracts payments from the initiators, nor sees to payment of
the recipients who bear the costs.

Real external benefits and costs

must somehow be verified, quantified, and included in benefit-cost
analyses if social decisions are to lead to efficient allocations of
resources and equitable distributions of incomes.
There, however, is the rub.

Externalities are ethereal.

are non-divisible, vaporous, and illusory.

They

They are like smoke in a

bar, and no person who stays in the room can avoid breathing it if he
is to breathe at all.

Or they are 1ike the fragrance of a bouquet in

a parlor, and no person who remains in the parlor can be excluded from
the pleasant redolence as a way of inducing him to contribute to the
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cost of the bouquet.

In many cases, there is no simple or direct way

of either verifying the existence of externalities, or of assessing
their pecuniary values when they are found to exist.

Most techniques

for eva1 uating external effects therefore come down to intuitive
opinions on the part of the analyst, and this injects subjective and
sometimes unsubstantiated judgments into what may otherwise be a more-

or-less objective analysis.
It is the problem of verifying and quantifying externalities that
opens opportunities to maneuver the benefit and cost elements of

benefit-cost analysis to favor the outcomes preferred by the interestgroups with the greatest influence in the process.

Preferred outcomes

can be assured by the maneuvering of phantom benefits or costs into

the analyses, and it is the spiritual essence of externalities that
increases the 1i ke1 i hood that such maneuveri ng wi 11 be successful.
There is a gargantuan preoccupation with external costs under the
institutional environment that prevails in the United States in this

1ast quarter of the twenti eth century.

The preoccupation has ri sen

like a spectre from the past concomitant with the rise of new technologies that promise greater and greater social wel fare and at the
same time threaten revel ut;onary inst; tutiona 1 changes.

The questi on

relevant to the continuum of on-going life processes is. to what
extent are phantom ceremonial values cloaked as external costs and
maneuvered into benefit-cost analyses simply to prevent the

innovations of new technologies?
manipulations take place.

There is little doubt that such

But because of the ethereal quality of

externalities, it appears doubtful that it can be prevented.
Benefit-cost analysis possesses important advantages despite the
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weaknesses described above.

To the degree that manipulation of its

various elements can be controlled, benefit-cost analysis appears to
be the most promising technique now available to evaluate alternatives--both as to ends to be achieved and ways to allocate resources
to achieve the selected ends.
the table.

It tends to move issues to the top of

It arrays costs along side benefits for analysis, and it

forces the examination of spending in terms of goals.

It therefore

holds forth the prospect for greater efficiency in the allocation of
resources and in the distribution of incomes, and thus for improvements
in social welfare.
However, the weaknesses inherent in benefit-cost analysis
admonish additional research to discover better empirical ways of
verifying the existence of true external ities and of quantifying them
when they have been established.

They also admonish constant

vigilance on the parts of all affected groups to detect and prevent
the improper manipulation of benefit-cost analysis elements to
artificially favor the outcomes preferred by one of another special
interest group.17
It has been the purpose of this chapter to examine the modern
economic processes by which the tensions between technology and
ceremonialism are resolved into human progress.

The process involves

choosing goals and ways of employing resources to achieve the goals.
Choices are made by weighing benefits and costs and by choosing the
a1ternati ves that produce the greatest net of benefits over costs, or
the goals that render the greatest increase in social welfare.

But

because of opportunities for manipulation of elements in the process,
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the outcomes that promise the greatest social welfare may not be
selected.

The problem remains--there is no simple or direct method

to structure and weigh values in a pluralistic, industrial society for
choosing between competing future ends and alternative ways to employ
resources such that social welfare is maximized.
This chapter did not consider the political and other social
processes by which decisions are made.

For example, it left the

question open as to how the power to control or influence the
decision processes is distributed in a pluralist society.

This and

other related paints are considered in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER X
URBAN PLURALISM

The preceding chapter sought to explain how institutional values
are measured in dealing with the tensions between technology and

ceremonialism--tensions that frequently lead to decisions to innovate

new technologies, and ultimately to the institutional changes
precipitated by the new technologies.

This chapter takes up the

processes by which societies reconcile the social tensions that
result in institutional changes.
question~

In other words, it addresses the

how do institutions change in modern. industrial democracies?

The tentative answer, and the central idea in this chapter, is

that institutions eventually adjust to the new technologies by
diffusing and integrating them across the institutional system through
a process called "collective action n by economists. and lIinterestgroup politics!! by political scientists.

This does not mean that

collective action and interest-group politics are simply different
names for the same phenomenon.

However, it acknowledges a substantial

and complementary overlap regarding the economic and political
relationship between technological innovations and institutional

changes.
It will help to briefly review appropriate parts of preceding
chapters as a way of setting the stage for this chapter.

It is

recalled that ceremonialism arises from the cultural past, and it
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embodies traditional ways of knowing and doing.

Thus, it is the

technique by which institutions discharge their social functions of
maintaining social stability.

Ceremonialism accomplishes this by

transmi tting culture, structuring society, social izing members of
society. and controlling social interaction.

Ceremonialism seeks in

these ways to preserve the cultural values out of which the
instituti cns have grown.

Ceremon; a 1ism is therefore stat; c and

oriented toward the past in terms of the ends-means continuum.

Hence,

ceremonialism prescribes selection of only those future ends that are

congruent with traditional values, and the employment of means in
ways that do not deviate from traditional techniques.

For these

reasons, ceremonialism opposes selection of any future end or any
technique for employment of means that is not established ;n tradition.

On the other hand, technology is that qual ity of a tool that
enables it to be substituted for human labor in the creation of goods
and services having human value.

Insofar as the production of goods

and servi ces presumes future human uses, technology is future-ori ented,
continuous, dynamic, and progressive.

The innovation of new

technology opens ways of organizing means to future ends in different
ways than the traditional, and it may also bring future ends into
human reach that were previously beyond known means.

The dynamic

qual ity and forward-urging of technology bring it into confl ict with
backward-cl inging ceremoni a1 ism as to the selecti on of ends-to-bereached, and as to the employment of means to the selected ends.
How much of new technology is actually innovated depends on the powers
of ceremonial ism to resist change and on the tenacity of the
institutional values upon which the ceremonial ism is founded.
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Modern innovations of new technologies arise out of decision
techniques in industrial societies.

Such techniques presume to

evaluate alternatives by defining, quantifying, and weighing social
benefits and costs.

And they usually involve selection of the

alternatives that yield the highest net present values (or excess of
the present value of social benefits over the present value of social
costs).

The decision to innovate a new technology is reached when

the analysis reveals that use of the new technology will so increase
net present values (by increasing present values of benefits, or
decreasing present values of costs, or both) that ceremonial

resistance to the ensuing change is overcome.
The actual innovation of a new technology is destabilizing to
institutional environments because it opens opportunities for social
mobility in which traditional social statuses and ceremonial systems

of rank may be changed.

It is this institutional feedback from

technological change that precipitates social revolutions.

Such

revolutions occur when the innovation of new technology changes
interinstitutional arrangements so that one or more institutions are

no longer fully complimentary to the institutional system.

Certain

ceremoni es founded on the incongruous institutional arrangements
become dysfunctional within the system.

The resulting social

instability reflects institutional responses to the technical change--

first to oppose, and then to adjust itself to the change.
Social stability resumes when the new technology is fully
integrated into the institutional system, and ceremonial arrangements
have been altered to accommodate the technical change.

Some

institutions may have gained, and some may have lost social power.
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New institutions may have come into existence, and some established

institutions may have disappeared.

It is this process of diffusion

and integration of technology that produces institutional change and
is the subject of this chapter.

The process involves what economists

call collective action, and aspects of collective action involve what
political scientists call interest-group politics.
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Institutional economic theory possesses two main branches.

The

first has to do with institutional instability and discontinuity, and
the second with institutional adjustments to change.

That is, the

first branch deals with the disequilibrating social elements that
lead to revolution, and the second branch deals with the equilibrating
social elements that lead to adjustment and stability.

The seminal

works in the first branch were produced by Thorstein Veblen and
Clarence E. Ayres, and Chapters III through VIII above are an
attempted summary restatement and embellishment of the applicable
portions of their works.

The seminal works in the second branch, the one dealing with
institutional adjustments and stabi1 ity, were produced by John R.

Commons.

The first part of this chapter is an attempted summary and

restatement of applicable portions of Commons' institutional economic

theory.

The reader is placed on notice that many of the terms

developed in Chapters III through VIII according to the Veblen and
Ayres lexicon are called by different names in the Commons vernacular.
As in the translation from one language to another. there is not
perfect 1iteration between words in the two branches.

However. there
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are terms in each branch that have approximately synonYmous counterterms in the other branch.

Appropriate interpretations will· be made

in the applicable parts of the following text.
It was Commons' view that institutions adjust in the face of
technological change and social stability is restored through
collective action.

Indeed, his clearest and most complete, and yet

concise, statements of theory are found in a monograph he titled
The Economics of Collective Action.

Collective action deals with

conflicts of interests between institutions, and the ceremonial modes
of behavior by which the conflicts are resolved.

And it purports to

explain how the ceremonial norms are changed in the resolution process.
Conflicts of Interests 1
Conflicts of interests arise between going concerns because of
the volitional or purposive nature of mankind and because of the
material scarcities induced by the institution of property.

The

purposive nature of humans gives rise to the uses of goods and
services while the institution of property limits the availability of
the same.

In other words, it is the disparity between the demand for

and the supply of goods and services that causes conflicts of
interests between goi ng concerns.

Purposiveness, the central feature of volitional psychology,
represents the behavioral qualities that inhere in humans and enable
them to think and act in the longitudinal dimension of the ends-means
continuum, the continuum of on-going life processes that was
described in Chapter III above.

They are descriptive of the traits

that allow humans to visual ize their wants and conceptual ize them
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in terms of distant future goals, and to plan and develop complex
organizations of means to reach those goals.

The goals are, of course,

finished goods and services of both the producer and consumer kinds.
The organization of means involves marshalling both the human and the

nonhuman resource components.

The former leads to the creation of one

or more going concerns and a consequent demand for human labors.

The

latter leads to demands for material and other nonhuman resources.
And the outcome of volitional motives is to secure the expected

stream of future incomes as present values.

Commons uses the term "going COI'leernll to mean approximately what
Veblen and Ayres calls lIinstitution. 1I

The former is a legal term used

in courts of law that are trying civil litigations involving economic
matters.

In that context, a going concern ;s a lawful, solvent, whole,

and viable economic unit.
lIinstitution

li

Thus a Commons' IIgoing concern II is an

in the Veblen-Ayres vernacular, but the latter appears

to have a somewhat broader meaning than the former.

Nevertheless,

going concern will be used interchangeably with institution in this
chapter.
As noted, going concerns came into being because of human
purposiveness.

Possible future ends are brought into view, and when

one is selected as an end-to-be-reached, a going concern is employed
or organized to secure it.
organization composed of

II

A going concern is an institutional
complimentary factors II which, when

organized correctly, enable the going concern to accomplish the goal
or goals for which it was created.

People are transitory in going

concerns, but going concerns pers; st generation upon generation in
one institutional form or another.

It is the going concern that
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discharges human purposiveness according to volitional psychology.
Going concerns use material things, and the uses of material

things are regularized by the institution of property.

Private

property rights are nothing more than the interests of owners that
the state will enforce against non-owners. 2

It is recalled from a

previous chapter that property was fused with sovereignty during the
European feudal era, and it was gradually separated with the
monetization of feudal obl igations.

The separation of sovereignty and

property institutions came to be founded on the natural rights doctrine

of John Locke.

The doctrine justified certain common liberties on

the ground that one gained a property right independent of the
sovereign when he created a good by mixing ois personal labors with

naturels materials.

This followed because one must certainly have a

right to the fruits of his own labors.
The property rights severed from the institution of sovereignty
included the private ownership and use of corporeal properties.
Corporeal properties are tangible things such as land (or realty) and
physical commodities (or personalty) other than land and features
attached to the land.

The expectation that the sovereign would

enforce the ownerls quiet enjoyment of his private properties against

trespass by non-owners gave rise to the Engl ish Common Law.
specifically:

As distinguished from law created by the enactment of
1egi s 1a tures, the common 1aw compri ses the body of those
principles and rules of action, relating to the government
and security of persons and property, which derive their
authority from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity,
or from the judgements and decrees of the courts
recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs;
and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law

of Engl and. 3
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Incorporeal private property came into being when the courts
commenced to enforce so-called obligations of contracts. This consists
of a debtor's duty to pay his just debt to a creditor.

The creditor's

right to receive future payment is a property right conveyed by
contract.

The contract is an intangible private property because it

came into being only in connection with some other property matter,
and the right conveyed is an incorporeal property because it involves
no tangible, material thing.

However, the contract and its rights

can be exchanged for other property ri ghts, ri ghts to both corporeal
and incorporeal properties as well as to both tangible and intangible
properties.

Such private rights are preserved against public medd1 ing

by the "obligations of contracts" clause of the U. S. Constitution.
The constitutional meaning of property was enlarged by courts and
legislatures in the United States during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century to include other forms of intangible properties.
These properties consisted of business goodwill, patents, trademarks,
copyrights, franchises, etc.

They were effectually laws proscribing

unfair competition, and they created duties of avoidance and
forbearance in others.

They give the owners of intangible properties

the economic power to withhold from others, until an agreeable price
is negotiated, certain rights the non-owners might use and may need.
The modern property distinctions result in proprietary scarcity
as distinguished from biological and psychological scarcity.
Biological scarcity relates to the Malthusian notion of scarce
resources because of poor natural endowments, and psychological
scarcity arises from the so-called hedonistic nature of man described
by utilitarians like Bentham. The former contemplates resource
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availability in terms of the past, and the latter in terms of the
present.

Both are based on a ceremonial concept of corporeal and

tangible properties.

The concept of tangible property is the holding

of corporeal things for onels own use and enjoyment, and it fosters

a sense of individualism and economic independence.
Proprietary scarcity, on the other hand, relates to
institutional present and contemplated future uses of resources to

secure on-going future ends.

It is therefore based on a ceremonial

concept of incorporeal and intangible properties--ceremonial rights
that give persons and institutions status in the form of present
claims on future incomes.

Such rights are ceremonially conveyed by

contracts. and they give the owners the power to ceremonially withhold

from others present and future uses of properti es the non-owners need
until the owners and non-owners can ceremonially negotiate working
rules, the prices, and other terms of future exchange.

Thus,

proprietary scarcity is enforced by a set of ceremonial arrangements
involving a concept of intangible properties.

Finally, proprietary

scarcity ultimately fosters interdependence of interests as opposed

to the independence of interest embodied in a concept of tangible
property.
However. proprietary scarcity leads to conflicts of interests
between going concerns.

One institution has legal title and physical

possession of the property or the document or other evidence of the

property, while another lacks legal title and possession but needs
present or probable future use of the property to achieve the
institutions

I

planned future ends.

The resolution of such conflicts

is the subject matter of collective action, as Commons believed,
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"in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action,II4

Ceremoni a1 Norms

Conflicts of interests are resolved by transactions that are

structured by working rules and, at the same time, are concerned with
creating and changing the working rules.

IIWorking rules" is the

Corranons term for that aspect of ceremonialism that has so far been
called traditional ways of knowing and doing.

Working rules are the

ceremonial modes of behavior that are expected of persons occupying

institutional positions.

They are the ceremonial role patterns that

descend from the cultural past and inform the present of customari ly
acceptable forms of human interaction.

They are the taboos that cement

institutions together internally and that bind them to one another
externally.

They are all the laws of the nation as well as the

conditions of every private contract or other agreement hammered out
by bargaining.

And they are the managerial decisions and rules

promulgated by every executive officer across the land.
In short. they are ceremonial ism. the instrumentality of the
institutional system for maintaining social stability.

Working rules

will be used interchangeably with ceremonial ways of knowing and doing
(taboos) and with ceremonial modes of behavior.
Working rules are the institutional guidelines for transactions.
and the "transaction" is a Commons term approximately meaning
"ceremonial exchange" in the language of Veblen and Ayres.

Transac-

tions are the ceremoni a1 methods for acknowl edgi ng rank and va 1 idating
status.

They are therefore the varieties of ceremonial interactions

that bind persons together with flurries of activities within the
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institutional system, and they thereby maintain the system and preserve
social stability.

The word transaction will be used interchangeably

with ceremonial exchange in this chapter.

Taking place according to

working rules, transactions dissolve conflicts of interests into
interdependencies of interests by providing legal forums for the
exchange of property ri ghts.
The exchange of property ri ghts between gO;"9 concerns ; s, of

course, economic activity.

Any economic activity takes place in three

stages--a negotiation stage. a transaction stage, and an administration
stage.

The negotiation stage ends with agreement on the values to be

exchanged.

It is approximately the offer and the acceptance in

contract parlance.

The transaction stage lays down the working rules

that culminate in a binding contract which will govern the exchange.
And the administration stage discharges the exchange according to the
conditions or working rules laid down in the transaction stage.

This

includes the lawful alienations and acquisitions of ownerships, the
physical transfers of the rights exchanged, and the future payments
if any.

The transaction stage is the crucial stage because it is the

apex of economic exchange where the working rules are established that
will govern the activity during its future existence.
All transactions are collective action in practice.

There are

three kinds of transactions--bargaining transactions. rationing
transactions, and manageri a 1 transacti ons.

Bargaini n9 transactions

are the most recent to rise out of custom in the western world.

The

going concerns in a bargaining transaction are private institutions
that are legal equals.

They employ persuasion and sometimes coercion

as inducements in the negotiation stage to buy and sell commodities or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

432

other property rights.

The working rules of the transaction stage

produce collateral debts--a debt of performance by the seller and a
debt of payment by the buyer.

The debts are discharged in the

administration stage as the seller alienates the property right sold
to the buyer and acquires payment of consideration by the buyer, and
the buyer al ienates the consideration to the seller and acquires the

property right purchased from the seller.
Bargaining transactions are collective actions because at the
outset each bargaining transaction has not two, but at least five

potential parties.

There are at least two competitors on each side

of the transaction--two potential buyers offering the two best
opportunities for the seller, and two potential sellers offering the
two best opportunities for the buyer.

The buying and selling parties

will, of course, be narrowed to the actual buyer and seller by the end

of the negotiation stage.

Finally, there is at least one judge who

stands ready to hear any disputes and to issue decrees in the name of
the state to an actual seller or buyer.

The judge represents the

sovereign power of the state enforcing custom and law.

It;s this

arrangement that makes bargaining transactions juridicial in character.

Rationing transactions are the oldest in point of time, and

they are the commands of a governing body allocating property rights
among the governed.

They take place between legal superiors and legal

subordinates, whether or not there is perfect agreement on the parts
of subordinates.

The negotiation stage involves command as an

inducement to obedience, and the working rules of the transaction

stage have to do with budgetary commitments that affect the future
distributions of wea1th, assets, and incomes.

The budgets are
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discharged in the administration stage through the collection of
revenues and the disbursement of funds.
Obvious examples of rationing transactions are the taxation and

expenditure programs of governments.

Dictatorships are the more

primitive and autocratic superiors in rationing transactions.

However,

taxes are no less onerous to the citizen of a democracy in which the

tax laws are enacted by legislatures composed of elected
representatives.

The citizen is nevertheless compelled by law and the

possible sanctions of the state against his person and properties to
pay his taxes.

Moreover, the state will use the tax revenues to pay

for whatever public programs emerge from the legislative consensus

whether or not all taxpayers agree with that consensus.

Other less

obvious examples of rationing transactions are the allocations of

rights made by boards of directors to the operating officers of

private institutions like business corporations, labor unions, and
churches.

As one can see, the central stage of such activity, the

rationing transaction, is legislative in character.
Finally, managerial transactions arise out of bargaining
transactions or rationing transactions, or both.

The working rules

emerging from bargaining and rationing transactions may contain areas
of discretion.

Those areas of discretion are filled by managerial

transactions during the administration stage of the bargaining or
rationing transaction out of which the discretion emerged.

Managerial

transactions are executive in nature. and they take place between

legal superiors (the managers) and legal subordinates (the persons
managed).

Thus. the negotiation stage involves command as an inducement

to obedience.

The commitments and rules of future actions resulting
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from the transaction stage are to the output of goods and services.

Discharge of the commitment takes place in the administration stage
by the actual combining of inputs to produce the outputs.
For example, the general manager of an enterprise may be

empowered by the rationing transactions of the board of directors to
manage the company' 5 resources in the production of commodities for
sale through retail merchants to consumers.

The working rules will

no doubt give the manager substantial discretionary authority to

discharge the production commitment in the administration stage.

The

discretionary authorities will be exercised through additional
transactions of the bargaining and managerial sort.
In pursuit of his responsibilities, the manager may hire an

employee.

The hiring invol ves a bargaining transaction because it

takes place voluntarily between legal equals.

And, in cases of

employment, the commitment to render future labor services is
consensual under the working rules (custom and law) that govern such
commitments in the western world.

The commitment may therefore be

terminated at will by the employee and under collective bargaining
provisions by the employer.

However, once the employment commitment

is made, and as long as it remains in force, the status relationship
between the employer and employee is one of master and servant.

And,

as long as that relationship obtains, the servant is obliged to obey
the cOTTUllands of the master in their productive enterprise.

Thus, the

transactions that thereafter ensue between them are managerial
transactions which are corollary to the bargaining transaction that
initiated the master-servant relationship.
The three forms of transactions--bargaining, rationing, and
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managerial--resolve confl icts of interests between going concerns by
providing ceremonially-sanctioned methods for exchanging property
rights.

The exchange of property rights is necessary to permit going

concerns access to the scarce resources needed for the institutions to
achieve their future ends-to-be-reached.

The transactions are

governed externally by working rules (custom and law), and they are
concerned with the creation of the internal working rules to govern the
on-going features of the exchanges with which they deal.

It is

therefore transactions that maintain the institutional system by
binding persons together with collective activities within the system-activities that reinforce human interactions by ceremonially
acknowledging ranks and validating statuses.
Changing Ceremonial Norms 6
The key to understanding institutional changes is in
understanding how ceremonial ism changes--how changes are brought in
the ceremonial totems and taboos, in the ceremonial systems of status
and rank, and in the methods of ceremonial exchange that val idate
institutional statuses.

In short, it is changes in the panoply of

the ceremoni a1 canons of taste and the ceremoni a 1 modes of behavi or
that perpetuate institutions and the cultural values on which they
are founded.

It is changes in the very forces that operate against

change.
And the key to understanding how ceremonial ism changes is to
understand the nature of transactions and their relationships to
customs and laws.

The simplest statement of those relationships is:

transactions are structured by customs and the law, while laws are
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slowly changed to conform to underlying customs, and customs evolve out
of the routine practices of transactions.

In other words, customs are

little more than routinized working rules, and they therefore rise out
of working rules that have become routinized by transactions.

And the

laws are slowly changed to bring them into accord with certain
evolving customs.

Changes in the law involve interest-group politics

and they are the subject of the next part of this chapter.
This section deals with the causal relationships between
transactions, working rules, and customs that lead to changes in

ceremonial norms.

A summary of those relationships follows:

(1) Assuming a very long-run social stability based on a mature

technology--one which has been fully diffused and integrated--going
concerns are found to be operating with complimentary factors which
include firmly established working rules, and the transactions between
going concerns are completely routine.

(2) The discovery of a pervasive new technology will open
opportunities to increase benefits (increases in quantity or quality

or both of goods or services or both) proportionately more than the
increases in corresponding casts.

(3) However, innovation of the new technology will be difficult
and may be impossible under some of the established working rules.
While those working rules were complimentary factors in the established
environment, they become 1imi ting factors with the new technology.
(4) Human purposiveness I'/ill cause some going concerns to

attempt to innovate the new technology and to realize the profits or
other social gains from doing so.

They will therefore search for ways

to bring the 1 imiting factors under control and to convert them to
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complimentary factors in terms of the new technology.

The efforts will

take the form of strategic transactions which have the functions of
changing the working rules in terms of the new technology.

Strategic

transactions are simply bargaining, rationing, and managerial

transactions that introduce neoteric working rules.

(5) If the strategic transactions are successful, they will

produce revised working rules that prove themselves instrumental toward
innovation and integration of the new technology, and the revisions

will be routinized by repetitive transactions if the innovation is

fruitful.
(6) Finally, the limiting factors will have been converted to
complimentary factors when the revised working rules have been fully

routinized, and fully routinized working rules are, after all,
customary ways of doing things.

An example that illustrates the foregoing process is the
innovation of the motor vehicle and some of the very long-run changes

in urban affairs that are attributable to the diffusion and
integration of automotive technology.

It must be admitted at the

outset that only a few of the more obvious effects can be described
here because the effects are so pervasive that there is hardly an
aspect of human existence that has not been significantly touched by
that technology.

Likewise, it is not possible to describe even a

small fraction of the immense profusion of transactions that were
somehow involved with the innovation, diffusion, and integration of
automotive technology.

The transactions must surely number in the

billions, and perhaps in the trillions.

With this ;n mind, it is

only possible to savor the essence of what occurred.
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The self-propelled vehicle is a creature of the twentieth century.

To be sure. automat hIe technology is continuous with other
technologies. and its genesis extends back in time before the

twentieth century,

But the innovation, diffusion, and integration of

automotive technology are very recent phenomena.

Working rules

centering on transportation arrangements were based on horse and rail
technologies at the turn of the present century.

The innovation and

diffusion of horse technology was described in Chapter VIII above.
The di stri but; on of settlements, the patterns of interurban and
interregional trade and exchange, and the differential rates of urban

development and growth described in Chapter VIII were changed again
in the nineteenth century by the innovation, diffusion, and inte-

gration of railroad technology.

The use of horse-drawn, rail

transport reaches well back before 1800, particularly in mining
operations and in intra-urban transportation.

However, inter-urban

transportation remained unaffected by railroad technology until the

innovation of steam locomotion. 7
The first inter-urban railroad, the Stockton and Dar1 ington
Railway, opened passenger and freight service in England in 1825.
The Baltimore and Ohio commenced rail service in the United States in
1828 using horse-drawn cars.

The 8 and

a converted

to locomotives in

1830 using the litom thumb,1i a locomotive built by Peter Cooper.

The

superiority of railroads in the cross-country transportation of
freight and passengers was demonstrated during the U. S. Civil War,
and that war gave impetus to railroad construction in the United States.

Acts of the U. S. Congress in 1862 and 1864 provided pub1 ic lands for
construction of a transcontinental railroad.

The Union Pacific
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Railroad was built westward from Illinois, and the Central Pacific
Railroad was built eastward from California.

The two met at

Promontory, Utah on May 10, 1869.
Railroad construction proved to be a boon to the westward
expansion of the United States, and construction proceeded throughout

much of the remaining nineteenth century until the entire country was
served in one way or another by railroads.

The U. S. Interstate

Commerce COrTUTlission was created in 1887 to regulate the expanding
private railroads.

By the end of the century routine working rules

based on inter-urban rail technology and intra-urban horse technology
were well established, and the routine working rules were
substanti ally integrated wi th soc; a1 customs and traditional bel i efs.

Likewise. physical arrangements had been changed to accommodate
the railroad technology.

After all, railroad construction included

more than simply laying track between two cities.

It also involved

the construct; on of terminal facil it; es for fre; ght and passengers.
Thus, cities like New York, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco,
that were major ports for water-borne cargo and passengers, had to be
partially rebuilt to link rail terminal facilities to water terminal

facilities so that ,o'rgoes could be transshipped without double and
triple handling.

Other cities like Omaha, Kansas City, Indianapolis,

Oklahoma City, and Denver that were developing during the era of
railroad construction were expanded around a rail terminal.
This feature of railroads, the central terminal for inter-city
transportation, and the relatively high cost of horse-drawn intra-city
transport caused cities to be monocentric with high population
densities at and adjacent to the central core.

All commerce and
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industry took place at a central business district, and people resided
in or inmediately next to the central business district.

Everything

tended to center on the railroad terminal in order to minimize the
cost of transportation.

land rents, wages, and net income were

accordingly higher in the core area, and they decl ined with distance
from the core area.

On the other hand, transportation costs and thus

the prices of goods increased with distance from the core area.

There

were no suburbs as they are known in the latter quarter of the
twenti eth century. 8
This was the situation, then, at the outset of the automobile
era.

Cit1es were generally monocentric and centered on inter-city

railroad terminals.

The intra-city transportation of cargo was by

horse-drawn vehicles, and the intra-city transportation of passengers
was by the same means and by electric-powered trolleys.

Working rules

based on horse and rail technologies were routinized and were
reconciled with traditional beliefs and social customs.

In other

words, the ceremoni a1 norms had been changed suffi ci ently to
accommodate the technologies, and the technologies were integrated
with the institutional system so that all affected institutions were
congruent with the system.
However, the first fity years of the twentieth century witnessed
first a peak in railroad prosperity and then a decline in the
significance of the railroads.

There were many factors contributing

to the changes, but the chief factor was innovation of the selfpropelled vehicle.

The first record of a self-propelled vehicle

dates back to 1769 when Nicholas Joseph Cugnot demonstrated a steampowered three-wheeled carriage in Paris.

Cugnot's invention was
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treated as a curiosity. and it was not produced for sale to users. 9

However, a similar vehicle built in 1801 by Richard Trevithick
in England gave rise to the production and use of both steam- and
electric-powered vehicles in England during the nineteenth century.
Even so, the self-propelled vehicles did not come into full use there
until their worth was demonstrated in the United States during the

first quarter of the present century.

This was because the British did

not find it possible to change the existing working rules to allow the
full diffusion and integration of self-propelled vehicles with the
existing institutional system.

For example. such vehicles were

limited to a four mile-per-hour speed, and they were subject to

discriminatory bridge and road tolls.

Likewise, a so-called Red Flag

Act was passed in England requiring that each self-propelled vehicle
be preceded by a man on foot carrying a red flag by day and a red
lantern by night to warn approaching teamsters and carriage-masters so
they might control their horses as the vehicles passed.

The

requirement remained in force from 1836 to 1896.

Ceremonial powers and institutional resistance to change were

simply too great in England to permit the full integration of selfpropell ed veh; c1 es there.

The Sri ti sh experi ence demonstrated that

innovation of the new automotive technology was difficult, and full
integration was impossible under some of the established working rules.
While those working rules were complimentary factors in the
established environment, they were limiting factors with the new
technology.

The same ceremonial situation prevailed with more or

less intensity elsewhere in the world.
In the meantime, it was becoming clear to other enterprising
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people that the self-propelled vehicle held great potential for
sUbstantial improvements in overland transportation.

Under the

correct circumstances, such vehicles could provide personal portal-to-

portal passage commencing at any moment of the owner's choosing, and
they could do so with unprecedented privacy, speed, comfort, and

hauling capacity.

Moreover. the costs of maintenance and operation

could be far less than the same costs using teams of horses for motive

power.

There were no extensive preparations required before the trip,

as with horses, and there were no special livery requirements at the
end of the trip.

All-in-all, the potential gains in human welfare

seemed impressive to those persons with the vision to look ahead.

Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler were two such vis'ionaries.

Benz

introduced a three-wheeled carriage powered by an internal combustion
engine in Germany in 1885.

In the same year, Daimler produced an

internal combustion engine that was better suited to self-propelled
vehicles, and the Daimler Company brought out the "panhard car" in
France by 1894.

So-called "horse1ess carriages II were introduced on

the other side of the Atlantic during the 1890s in various power and
size configurations by Charles and J. Frank Duryea, Ramsom 01ds, Henry
Ford, Elwood Haynes, Al exander Winton. and others.
It was the work of entrepreneurs like Benz. Daimler. Dlds, Ford,
Winton, and others that led to the creation of going concerns for the
purpose of innovating the new automotive technology and realizing the
private profits and other social gains for doing so.

Their strategies

involved searching for ways to bring the limiting factors under
control and to convert them to complimentary factory ;n terms of the
new techno1 09Y.

Thei r methods took the form of strategic transacti ons
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by which working rules were changed to facilitate diffusion and
integration of the new technology.

The strategic transactions were

rationing, bargaining, and managerial transactions that introduced

novel working rules.

The novel working rules might apply to creation

and organization of the going concern, purchases of inputs, production
arrangements, or marketing the final product.

Perhaps the most successful and best-known i nnavatar in the
automotive field in that era was Henry Ford.

It is therefore possible

to draw from Ford biographical materials to illustrate the employment
of strategic transactions that changed working rules, and to illustrate
the routinization of working rules into customary ways of knowing and

doing.

Ford was born on a farm near Dearborn, Michigan in 1863.

He

was employed by the Edison Company as a machinist and engineer from
1890 to 1899.

Working in his spare time, he completed his first

automobile in 1892. 10
Resigning from the Edison Company in 1899, Ford and others formed
the Detroit Automobile Company.

However. eventual disagreement with

his associates caused Ford to withdraw, and in 1903 he formed the Ford
Motor Company in associ ation wi th James Couzens. the Dodge brothers.
and others.

Ford had bought out hi s associ ates by 1907, and the Ford

Motor Company has since remained under control of the Ford family.
Each of these actions involved strategic bargaining transactions in
the creation of a going concern for the purpose of producing and

selling automobiles.

The first attempt proved fruitless, but the

second set of transactions culminated in the Ford Motor Company,
perhaps the most successful pioneering automobile producer in the

world.
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Success of the Ford Motor Company is attributable to many things.

However, three novel and revolutionary arrangements stand out because
they eventually became the models for other successful manufacturers.
The first was to adapt the conveyor belt principle to the mass
production of automobiles.
supply of inputs.

The second was to gain control over the

And, finally, Ford established control over the

distribution and sale of his automobiles.

Undoubtedly the most revol uti onary of Ford's novel arrangements
was adaptat·ion of the conveyor-belt principle to the mass production
of automobiles.

This was accomplished by strategic rationing

transactions that committed the Ford Motor Company to the assemblyline principle. and allocated internal resources to company managers

to carry out production according to that principle.

On-going

strategic bargaining and managerial transactions further shaped the
working rules to actualize the novel concept.

StrategiC bargaining

transactions involved hiring units of labor and buying other resources,
and strategic managerial transactions involved integrating the labor

and other resources into the assembly-l ine process.

The result was a

manufacturing process that substantially reduced the unit cost of
automobiles by taking advantage of increasing returns to large-scale
production.

And the Ford assembly-l ine process became a model of

production efficiency that was ultimately copied and adapted to the
manufacture of nearly every product in modern industrial systems.
'The other two novelties initiated by the Ford Motor Company,
gaining control over input supplies and over distribution and sale

of the final products, resulted in much the same way.

Strategic

rationing transactions committed the company and allocated its
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resources to those ends, and company agents secured the ends, largely
through strategic bargaining transactions with other going concerns.

Because of the advantages Ford Motor Company real ized from those
arrangements, it soon became the largest and most profitable
automobile producer in the world.

Ford introduced the Mode1-T in 1908.

The Mode1-T was an inexpensive, mass-produced, standard car that sold
15,000,000 before it was discontinued in 192B.

The initial success of

the Mode1-T enabled Ford to expand in the 19205 with branches in
England and other countries.

The mass-production techn; que and the vert; ca 1 conso1; dations

that gave Ford Motor Company control of its automobile distribution
and sales as well as many of its input supplies became prototypes for
other successful automobile producers and other manufacturers.

Thus,

Fordls strategic transactions successfully adapted the traditional
working rules, converting them from limiting factors to complimentary

factors in terms of automobile manufacturing, distribution, and sales.
And continuous repetition of the transactions by Ford and the other
going concerns that copied Ford routinized the novel working rules so
that they became customary ways of knowing and doing.
This section has described how changes in ceremonial norms are

brought about through collective action to adapt the institutional
system to technological changes.

This involves changes in ceremonial

tastes and in the ceremonial modes of behavior that perpetuate
institutions and the customs and traditional beliefs around which
institutions are formed.

The changes derive from the nature of

transactions and their relationships to custom and law.

Transactions

are guided by customs and the law, while laws slowly change to conform
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to customs, and customs evolve out of the routine practices of
transactions.

That is, customs are simply working rules that have

been routinized by transactions, and customs change as working rules
are changed and routinized by transactions.
INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS
The previous section described how ceremonial norms are changed

by collective action through the medium of transactions between going
concerns.

Transactions are governed by customs and the law. while

customs evolve out of the routine practices of transactions, and laws
slowly change to conform to evolving customs.

The section described

how transactions change and rout; n; ze working rul es, and routine
working rules are customary ways of knowing and doing.

And. since

ceremonial norms are also customary ways, they change as novel working
rules are routinized by transactions.

Since laws are little more than

codification of certain customary beliefs, they are slowly changed
with changes in the underlying customs.

However, the section did not

elaborate on this latter point, noting that changes in the laws involve

interest-group politics.

This part of the chapter deals with interest-

group politics and changes in the laws.
The main idea in this part is that laws are founded on customs,
and they are enacted and changed in a pluralist democracy by interestgroup interaction in which persons are free to form, join, quit, and
dissolve interest groups, and interest groups are free to form, jOin.
quit, and dissolve coalitions in support of or opposition to the
enactment of new laws and changes in old laws.

Consensus can be

reached and human wel fare enhanced ; n thi s way through interest-group
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interaction alone.

Moreover, a public-interest equilibrium results and

can be maintained solely by the interaction of opposing interest groups
and interest-group coalitions.

The first section examines the

relationship between law and sovereignty, and the second section
describes how interest-group interactions bring about changes in the law.
Law and Soverei gnty
Laws are based on customary ways of knowing and doing.

They are

codifications of the traditional bel iefs that descend from the
ancient past.

They are all of the rules of ceremonial conduct of a

nation-state in which the rules are enforced by a sovereign authority
with powers to impose punishments for violations of the rules.

There

is. therefore, no systematic development of law until the appearance
of a sovereign state with centralized police authority.

The state

rises in response to what appears to be a universal tendency for the
institutions of a society to produce a legal order to preserve and
enforce their ceremonial mandates.

Thus, governments come into

existence with social activities which threaten certain taboos that
are held sacred by the more powerful institutions in a society.
Any social activity involves at least two groups, one composed
of those persons who are directly involved in the activity, and others
composed of those persons who are indirectly affected for good or bad
by the activity.

Those groups which are indirectly affected and who

perceive their interests involved in the activity will organize to
preserve their customs and to protect their interests.

The resulting

organized interest is a public, and insofar as the public commissions
agents to operate in its behalf to control the activity, the
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institution of government comes into being. ll
The power to control is coercive power--the power tc compel
people to do things they would not otherwise do, and to desist from
doing things they would otherwise do.

And since the ultimate in

coercion is physical violence, sovereign government is, at base,

institutionalized violence--that is, violence that enjoys the sanction

of law.

This is so whether the form of government is monarchic or

democratic, albeit that the coercive powers may be more restrained by
custom and law in the latter than in the former.

The earliest governments were monarchical in which all sovereign
powers--legislative, executive, and judicial--were vested in a single

ruler who was supreme in ceremonial power, rank, and

author~ty.

The

earliest surviving legal codes were nothing more than collections of

ancient beliefs regarding ceremonial behavior that were assembled by
such monarchs in discharge of their legislative powers.

Much of what

is now known of the governments and traditions of antiquity survives
in the form of legal codes--the Code of Hammurabi (Babylonia), the
Laws of Manu (India), the Mosaic Code (Palestine), and the Law of the
Twelve Tables (Rome).
these~

Indeed, Roman law developed from the latter of

and was summarized in the Corpus Juris Civilis at the time of

Justinian.

While the Roman law was eclipsed for a time by Germanic

Codes after the decl ine of Rome, it was later revived and became the
basis of most Continental European 1aws. 12
However, development of the law in England followed a different
course.

Revolt of the barons against King John led to sealing the

Magna Charta at Runnymede in 1215.

The document was sealed under duress,

and the king repudiated it as soon as he was free from baronial
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coercion.

Nevertheless, certain aspeCts of British law trace their

origins to the Magna Charta.

Among these are the right to trial by

jury and the guarantee of habeas corpus which are traced to the clause
against the oppression of subjects.

Likewise, some have traced the

House of Lords, and thus the British parliamentary system, to the
Magna Charta provisions that secure certain feudal rights, privileges,
dues of the barons against encroachment by the king.

This and other

matters led the king to convene a Curia Regis, or Great Council, to
consider judicial matters of the realm that affected baronial
prerogatives.

The chief effect of Magna Charta was to limit the

sovereign powers of the monarch. 13
Royal courts were created in partial response to the Magna Charta
limitations on royal prerogatives, but also on the medieval theory that
the laws administered by the King's Courts (King's Bench, Exchequer,
and Court of Common PI eas) represent the common customs of the realm
as opposed to the customs of local jurisdictions that were applied in
baronial courts.

The King's Courts served to undermine the local

administrative powers of the landed aristocracy as against the
sovereign powers of the monarch in England by providing recourse to
1itigants that was less partial than the often capricious judgments
handed down in the local courts under baronial control.
Common recourse to the King's Courts gave rise to the Common Law
that is now a basis of law in most English-speaking countries and
other countries that were colonized by the British. 14 The Common Law
gave supremacy to the customs or judicial precedents over the
administrative edicts of local aristocracies.

This led to the doctrine

of Llsupremacy of the lawll under which not even the sovereign is above
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the law.

It also led to the presumption of innocence under which a

defendant is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.

This, of course, placed the burden of proof on

the plaintiff in civil litigations and upon the state in criminal
trials.

Finally, it led to common trials by jury in which matters of

guilt and innocence must be decided on the evidences by panels of
peers rather than by the aristocracy or by officers of the sovereign.
The result of all of this was to separate and distinguish judicial
powers from other forms of sovere; gn power.

Representative government emerged in England concomitant with
but ostensibly separate from rise of the Common Law.

It was a long,

slow process that corrmenced in the thirteenth century with the Curia

Regis, the kernel from which the House of Lords evolved.

The House

of Commons also originated in the thirteenth century with the
convocation of knights and burgesses to report the consent of counties
and towns to taxes imposed by the kind.

However, the legislative

powers of Parliament were not fully secure until the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 which saw James II deposed and William III subject

to great 1imitations on the powers of the crown.

Moreover. it was not

until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the House
of Commons secured its ascendancy in British government.

Likewise, it

has only been·in recent times that the lower social classes have
secured the franchise and have enjoyed full representation in the House

of Commons. 15
Because of the long history and continuity of its laws, the
British Constitution is unwritten and flexible.

The fundamental laws

and principles of government that make up the British Constitution
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implicitly include the whole body of common and statutory laws of the
realm as well as the practices and traditional workings of government.
It can therefore be changed simply by acts of parliament, by judicial
construction, or even by changes in customs. 16

On the other hand, many nations made sharp pol itical and economic
departures from the past in revolutions over the last two or more

centuries.

They have therefore had little in the way of indigenous

legal customs on which to rely in constituting their new governments.
Thus, they have used written constitutions to initiate governments

and to specify the fundamental laws and principles of government by
which they will be governed.

For this purpose they have drawn largely

from pol itical phi 1osophy or from 1ega 1 precedents successfully
applied by other nations, or from some combination of these two.

The Constitution of the United States is of this latter form-specific, written. and having superior sanction to the ordinary laws

of the land.

It is rigid insofar as it is subject to specifically

prescri bed processes of amendment wh; ch make it di fficul t to change
by amendment.

23 amendments.

It consists of a preamble, seven articles, and presently,

It is based on the natural-rights doctrine formulated

by John Locke, and eloquently restated in the Declaration of Independence.

The delegated powers were constructed largely from so much

of the Commentaries on the Law of England by Sir William Blackstone as
deal with the sovereign powers of nation states. 17
The U. S. Constitution serves to delegate powers from the several
states to the federal government.

This is because powers of

sovereignty reposed originally and solely in the states, and the states
acquired their powers from the colonial charters granted by royal
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decrees and by acts of the British Parliament.

It was therefore

ceremonially impossible for a federation to take place until the
states relinquished some of their sovereign powers to the new republic.
However, those powers not specifically delegated elsewhere in the
Constitution were reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.

As

will soon be clear, these provisions no longer have much meaning
because statutes and judicial constructions have preempted the powers
of the various states and have opened them to invasions by federal
authori ti es.
Article One delegates the legislative powers to a Congress
composed of a House of Representatives with representation apportioned
by population, and a Senate with representation apportioned by states.
Each representative must stand for election biannually, and each
senator every six years.

Article Two delegates certain executive

powers to an office of President.
every four years.

That office is filled by election

Article Three delegates judicial powers to a

Supreme Court composed of justices who are appointed for 1ife by the
President, and their appointments are confirmed by the Senate.

The

remaining articles deal respectively with relations of the states,
amendments to the Constitution, supremacy of the federal Constitution,
and the conditions under which the Constitution was to be ratified.
The separation of powers into three branches is thought to create
a system of checks and balances that will so diffuse sovereign powers
as to preclude the concentration and usurpation of power by anyone
branch.

for example, the legislative powers of the Congress are

limited in three ways.

first, both houses must pass each bill before

it can be sent to the President for signature.

Second, any bill passed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

453

by both houses may be vetoed by the President before it becomes law.
However, a presidential veto may be overturned by a two-thirds majority
in both houses.

Finally, the constitutional ity of any statute may be

tested in the courts by any person who wishes to bring legal suit to
that end, and if the statute is found to be unconstitutional, it will
be set aside by the courts.
The executive powers of the President are likewise limited in

three ways.

First, he can generally take no actions without the

statutory authority of Congress.

Second, in those few areas in which

he is empowered to initiate action his actions are subject to

ratification by the Senate.

And third, the constitutionality of any

presidential action may be tested in the courts by any person who
wishes to bring legal suit to that end, and if the action is found
to be unconstitutional, it will be set aside by the courts.

Finally,

the Supreme Court and all of the lesser federal courts are limited to
hearing only those cases that are properly brought before them through
judicial process.

The courts cannot initiate legislative and

executive actions, nor can they undertake review of such actions upon

their own initiatives.
The U. S. Constitution also places other limits on the sovereign
powers of the federal and state governments.

These limitations are

contained chiefly in the first nine amendments, the so-called I1B111 of
Rights, II and the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection of the
laws amendment.

The essence of these amendments is to secure

individual civil liberties from invasion by sovereign powers.
The U. S. Constitution with its various amendments is a very

brief but vastly important statement of the fundamental laws and
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of government for the United States.

Beneath the constitutional veil

lurks an enormous body of statutory, administrative, and case law.

Statutory law embodies all of the enactments of 'he Congress and the
legislatures of the various states that have been signed into law by
the President and the state governors.

Administrative law embodies

all of the rules promulgated by all of the regulatory agencies created
by the federal and state governments.

And case law embodies all of

the judgments rendered by all of the courts in the land.
Despite the difficulties in making formal amendments, the federal

Constitution has been elaborately embellished to extend and increase
the sovereign powers of the federal government into what was formerly

the constitutionally sanctified domain of the states and the realm of
individual freedoms.

This has been accomplished by statute and

judicial construction relying chiefly on the interstate commerce and
implied-powers clauses of Section 8, Article one of the Constitution.

The interstate commerce clause delegates to the federal government the
exclusive power to regulate international and interstate commerce.
The implied-powers clause gives Congress the power to enact whatever

laws are necessary to execute the other powers expressly delegated to

it. la
Until the 1ate 1930s, Congress exerei sed its powers under the
interstate commerce clause exclusively with the regulation of

transportation that crossed state boundaries.

The agency for

regulation. the Interstate Commerce Commission, was created by statute

in 1887 to regulate the private railroads that were ascending at that
time to dominate the economy.

Case law generally affirmed a strict,

literal interpretation of the interstate commerce clause that limited

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

455
federal regulation to those activities that literally and physically
crossed state boundaries.
However, the depreSSion that plunged the country into economic
chaos during most of the 1930s spawned a rash of recovery legislation
during the pre-World War II administrations of President Franklin
Roosevelt.

The resulting statutes constituted a massive expansion in

the federal regulation of private business whether or not the business
activities physically crossed state boundaries.

Hardly any aspect of

American economic life remained free from federal regulation.

This

likewise constituted a massive invasion of the states' domains and a

federal preemption of their sovereign powers.

The courts, relying on the precedents of strict and literal
interpretations of the commerce clause. responded by declaring crucial
recovery statutes unconstitutional.

However, the Supreme Court slowly

came to a more liberal interpretation, one that simply confirmed a

social trend already established in practice.

In 1937, the Court

handed down a landmark judgment that effectively removed any
constitutional bar to the expansion of federal control of private
social activities, economic or otherwise.

The case was the National

Labor Relations Board Y..2. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, and it

was the constitutional test of the National Labor Relations Act.

In

order to uphold the statute, the Supreme Court had to so . broaden its
interpretation of the interstate commerce clause that virtually any
activity that can be shown to affect the general welfare may now be
construed as in interstate corrrrnerce for purposes of exercising federal
soverei gn powers.
The Jones and Laughl in case 1aid to rest any serious question of
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states' rights, and it opened the way to the unbridled proliferation of
federal regulatory agencies.

The federal structure is literally

plastered with acronyms representing the institutions that have since
been created by congressional statute to regulate nearly every aspect
of human existence in the United States.
and regu1 atory standards had become so

The problems of regulation
acute by the end of Wor1 d

War II that Congress found it necessary to enact the Federal
Administrative Procedures Act in 1946.

The Act simply standardized

and codified the customary procedures that had evo1 ved out of the

rationing, bargaining, and managerial transactions involving
regulatory practice and that had proven to be ceremonially viable in
the i nst i tuti ona 1 system.
There are no expressly stated constitutional provisions for the
creation of federal regulatory agencies.

Hence, they have been created

under the implied powers clause, and they are generally considered to
be parts of the executive branch of government.

Their governing boards

and chief administrators are therefore appointed by the President and
their appointments are confirmed by the Senate.

Even so, most such

agencies function with a high degree of autonomy under the statutes
that created them.

This is because they are presumed to be staffed

with persons possessing a high level of technical expertise in the

areas of their regulatory powers.

And they fUnction to provide expert

control over social matters in which neither the Congress nor the
courts possess technical competence.
For these reasons, the statutes under whi ch regul atory agencies
are established generally delegate legislative, executive, and judicial
powers to be exercised in the technical realm in which the agencies
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are to operate.

Thus, such agencies make the rules by which they will

regulate, and under which the regulated going concerns will operate.
Moreover, the agencies enforce the rules, adjudicate in the
prosecution of going concerns that are suspected of being in violation
of the rules, and impose sanctions on those institutions found guilty

of rule infractions.

All of these matters are subject to review

through appropriate appeals to the federal courts.

However, the court

system will not hear an appeal until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted.

Likewise, it will not exercise original jurisdiction,

hear new evidence, or place itself in the positions of agency hearings

officers in exercising judgments on evidence.

The emerging system of federal regulation of heretofore private
activities has been criticized on several grounds.

An important

criticism argues that Congress has abdicated its legislative

authorities and has wrongly delegated its legislative powers to
autonomous agencies that are directed by officials who are apPointed
and who are not accountable back to the electorate.
the agencies are accountable to Congress.

On the other hand,

They are subject to audit

by the General Accounting Office, and they are dependent on Congress
for funding of their operations.

Congress may eliminate an agency or

change its operations either by statute or by fiscal controls.

And

since Congress is accountable to the electorate, it is argued that
regul atory agenci es are 1i kewise accountable through Congress.
Another important criticism argues that endowment of a single
agency with legislative, executive. and judicial powers blurs the
tradition of separation of powers that is supposed to characterize the
federal government.

On the other hand, it is argued that so long as
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Congress retains the legislative power to change or eliminate an
agency, and so long as going concerns that are subject to agency rules
have appellate recourse to the federal court system, the integrity of
the checks and balances principle is preserved.

The point is that

there does not now appear to be any further constitutional or commonlaw ground for turning back the ever-deepening waves of federal
regulation of private social activities in the United States.

It has

become a solid fact of American life and nothing short of cataclysmic
revolution is likely to change it--if, indeed, even that can change it.
The whole body of administrative law, and a substantial body of
case law has grown out of the regulatory process both at the federal
level and at the state level.

These laws along with the bodies of

statutory and cnnstitutional laws that make up the American legal
system represent the institutional responses to the technological
.changes that have thrust humanity into the twentieth century. They
are codifications of traditional bel iefs that descend from the past.
They are based on customary ways of knowing and doing, and they raise
ceremonialism and institutional rigidities to their zenith by giving
them the force of law--the power of rules that can and will be enforced
by the institutionalized violence of sovereign government if necessary.
Interest Groups and the Law
The first part of this chapter described how institutions are
adapted to technological changes through collective action.

According

to this idea, the customs and traditions, the ceremonial norms. around

which institutions are formed, are changed by transactions between
going concerns in which the transactions change and routinize working
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rules regarding the new technologies.

And since customary ways of

knowing and doing are simply routine working rules. the customs change

with routinization of new working rules.
This part of the chapter considers how the laws are slowly
changed in accord with certain evolving customs.

The inunediately

preceding section described the relationships between law and
sDvereignty--that laws raise ceremonialism to its greatest tenacity

by placing it within the enforcement powers of sovereignty.

Thus.

customs that are given the force of law are more difficult to change
than those that do not possess that force.

And to change working

rules that are specified in law sometimes requires first changing or

relaxing the appl icable laws.

Laws are enacted and changed in a

pluralist democracy by interest-group interaction in which persons

are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve interest-groups, and
interest-groups are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve coalitions

in support of and in opposition to the enactment of new laws and
changes in 01 d 1aws.
A pluralist democracy is founded on the principle of process
democracy,

II • •

•

that institutional arrangement for arriving at

political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide

by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.,,19

While

the lIprocess ll in process democracy is related in terms of inputs and
outputs, the struggle for the people l s vote ;s group process in which
the struggle is carried on inside and between groups--institutional
groups 1 i ke 1abor unions. trade associ ations. business corporati ons.
universities, political parties, units of government, churches, etc ..
and factions and splinter or subgroups of institutional groups.
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Chapter II above described the attributes and functions of institutions
generally in terms of the social sciences, and Chapters IV and V
expanded on the description in terms of institutional economic theory.
The contents of those chapters generally apply to the interest-group
politics of pluralist theory.

It is, therefore. only necessary to

summarily relate key aspects of the former to the latter.
It was explained in Chapter V how all of society is a network or

structure of interlocking and interrelated institutions.

The social

values commonly cherished by individuals are a product of socialization carried on by institutions, and they are real ized through

memberships in institutions and institutionally-related groups.
Individuals commonly occupy positions in several
voluntary and some involuntary.

institutions~-some

Involuntary memberships result from

chance of birth and the like over which the individual has no control.
However, the point is that individuals are simultaneously members of

several potential interest groups (surrounding institutional values

that are so universally held that they are not actively pol iticised),
and one or more organized interest groups.

An organized interest group is a politicized interest group-one which actively seeks to influence political decisions to affect
particular outcomes regarding the selection of ends-to-be-reached and
the employment of means toward the selected ends.

Again, from

Chapter V, it is recalled that such institutional groups are structured
by ceremony, and persons occupy positions within the structure that
equip them with ceremonial roles to play.

The rank, status. and power

to wield influence both within and without the organization is a
function of both one's position in the organization, and the position
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of the organization in relation to other institutions 1n the system.
Which position one acquires in an organization is the

produc~

of

a number of ceremonial factors that depend on the nature of the
institution involved.

However, the matter generally comes down to how

meticulous one is in adhering to the ceremonial taboos and in employing the ceremonial totems of the group, and of the positions one seeks
within the group.

In the final analysis, it is how well the image one

projects compares with the ceremonial expectations specified in the
institutional norms.

In the terms of elite theorists, it is the range

of skills and resources one possesses--knowledge of organization,
ability to manipulate word symbols, and professional competence.

It

is one's connections--schools, church, social clubs, other institutional connections--or lack of connections that determine onels access

to pOSitions of institutional power, rank, and prestige. 21
All organizations are controlled under their ceremonial norms by
the few persons who occupy the highest positions in the organization,
the positions that bestow the highest rank and status on their
incumbents.

Those persons speak for the organization, and they wield

whatever external influence and power the organization enjoys.

That

is, all organizations are under the titular directions of ceremonial

elites.

The range of discretionary powers enjoyed by an elite is a

function of the ceremonial constraints of the organization it directs.
As noted in Chapter IV above, this is chiefly a matter of the
traditional values and customary ways of knowing and doing that
descended from the past.
The obvious individual inequalities under these arrangements may
appear to be inherently undemocratic in terms of the classical liberal
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concept of democracy.

However, democracy is preserved, according to a

pluralist concept of democracy, so long as the inequalities are
dispersed and not cumulative.

That is, so long as the persons who

occupy positions of influence in one organization do not enjoy the
same advantages in all organizations, and so long as such positions
are not all occupied by persons from the same ethnic or social strata.
Dispersed and noncumulative inequalities are evidences of social
mobility in a society by which it is possible for almost anyone who
seriously seeks a position of influence to attain it.

This is most

1ikely to result in societies in which organizational memberships are
predominantly voluntary, and pluralist societies are generally of
that sort. 22
Organized interest groups will attempt to influence political
decisions regarding the outcomes of social activities.

The usual

approach is to seek the enactment of laws that will increase the
proportionate, incremental share of the benefits more than the increase
in the proportionate, incremental share of the relevant costs--or,
conversely, laws that will decrease the proportionate, incremental

share of benefits less than the decline in the proportionate,
incremental share of costs--that accrue to its constituents in any

authoritative distribution of benefits and costs.

And since the law

is concerned with the distribution rather than the creation of benefits
and costs, the success of one interest-group will be at the expense of
other interest groups, both potential and organized. 23
Assume, for example, the successful innovation of a new

technology for which new working rules are being routinized by
transactions to integrate the technology into the institutional system.
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Some indirectly-involved institutions may find their interests
adversely affected by the customs evolving from the transactions.
Assuming further that there are no private counter-measures open to
the indirectly-involved institutions, they may either acquiesce in the
activities and silently suffer the adverse effects, or they can press

for laws that protect their interests.

If they seek relief through

the enactment of new laws or the changing of old laws, they may seek
either prohibition of the new technology or proscription of the new
working rules, or public compensation for their losses.

prohibition, they would seek proscription.

Failing the

And failing proscription,

they would seek compensation.

Access to changes in the law is through the agents of sovereignty.the interest groups that make up the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government, and whose interests are the laws
themselves and the preservations and expansions of their own power

bases.

The executive interest groups are addressed by counsel to

seek changes in administrative laws.

The legislative interest groups

are plied by lobbying to obtain desired statutory changes.

And,

failing both of these, the judicial interest groups may be petitioned
for judgments that affect changes through case law. 24
Of course, any effort to initiate changes in the law will
precipitate counter actions by interest groups that will be adversely
affected by the proposed legal change.

Moreover, each opposing

faction will enlist support from other interest groups that can be
convinced that their interests are likewise affected or that can be

induced into a coalition by other means.

The point is that there will

be at least three factions surrounding any proposed change in the law--
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a coalition of interest groups supporting the change, one or more
coalitions of interest groups that either oppose the change outright
or stand ready with alternative changes, a coalition of the interest
groups that are competing for the people's votes.
The most likely outcome of these ceremonial processes of legal
change is one that either departs as 1itt1e as possible from antecedent
customs and laws or that produces more votes than it loses for the
interest groups in the vote-conscious coalition.

Judiciaries are more

inclined to the former, and legislatures to the latter.

Either way,

no change is likely to occur until the aggregate size of the
constituencies behind the interest groups favoring the change is
greater than the aggregate size of the constituencies behind the
interest groups clearly oPPosing the change.

And that division will

depend on how each group perceives and evaluates its alternatives in
terms of its proportionate benefits and costs. 25 Finally, how each
group evaluates its alternatives will depend on the ceremonial values
that are weighted into the applicable benefits and costs.
An example that illustrates many of the foregoing points is

urban renewal in the United States.

To understand the institutional

explanation of that program, one must pick up the thread in the
preceding part of this chapter that described the transactions dealing
with innovation of the automobile.

It is recalled that integration of

railroad technology had left urban form essentially monocentric around
a central rail road terminal.

Commerce and industry took place in a

central business district in order to minimize transportation costs.

People tended to live in and immediately adjacent to the central
business district for the same reasons, and the central core therefore
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had high population densities.

Land rents, wages, and net income were

higher in the core and decl ined with distance from the core, and
transportation costs and the costs of goods increased with the
distance from the core.

It is also recalled that innovation of the automobile succeeded
because of the expectation that, under the right conditions, it could
provide personal portal-te-portal passage for its owner commencing at

any time of the day or night, and it could do so with unprecedented
speed, comfort, privacy, and hauling capacity.

Finally, it could

provide these services at less operating and maintenance cost than a

stable of horses.

The expectations that fostered innovation of the

automobile were largely realized by the end of World War II, and the
coro11ary improvements in the automotive technology since that time

have simply extended and consolidated the social gains attributable
to the automobil e.
It was these two social phenomena that led to the urban
redevelopment program in the United States--the monocentric urban
form centered on a railroad terminal, and the passenger automobile

with its cargo counterpart, the truck.

As the horse changed the

distribution and composition of settlements from the time of the ox,
and the railroad changed them again in the nineteenth century. so the

automobile and the truck changed them in the twentieth.
Railroads continued to dominate intercity transportation of
passengers and freight until the end of World War II.

However, intra-

city transport of freight was shifted from the horse-drawn wagon to
the motor truck commencing after World War I.

Likewise, both engine-

and motor-driven trolley systems were expanded so that these two
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events made it possible for some residents to move farther away from
city core areas.

Thus, the first waves of suburbanization corrnnenced

in some American cities as early as 1920.

Of course, this did not

particularly affect central business districts that continued to be
dominated by intercity railroad terminals.

However, it did affect the

core residential arrangements, and upward pressures on residential

rents were arrested as popul ati on growth was 1argely absorbed by the
first suburbs. 26
A trend toward moving passengers between cities by automobile,

bus, and aircraft was clearly evident at the end of World War II, and
the drop in rail passenger traffic was so great that many railroads
simply ceased to carry passengers.

The personal private automobile

was more convenient, and the bus less expensive for short intercity
trips.

And the aircraft was no more expensive than the train, but it

was much faster on long intercity trips.

At the same time, the

intercity transportation of certain kinds of goods was shifted from
railroads to motor trucks and aircraft.

The trucks could eliminate

transshipment costs by moving goods directly from a seller in one city
to a buyer in another--something the railroads could not generally do.

And air freight is much faster than rail freight even though it is
also more expensive.

Finally, private automobiles were putting intra-

urban trolleys out of business as people increasingly drove their

family cars to and from work and shopping.
The effects of these changes were many.

The changes accel era ted

the move of upper- and middle-income residents to suburbs followed by
the commercial businesses that served them and by the large-scale
enterprises that were liberated from central rail terminals and high
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rents by the shift to intercity truck transportation.

The metropolitan

area was becoming polycentric with a large central city surrounded by
many smaller suburban centers.

Indeed, cities like Los Angeles,

California that experienced their most expansive growth after the
initial integration of automotive technology have developed without
one large central city, and they consist mainly of many small centers
connected by highway corridors and patchworks of residential housing.
However, the suburban dispersal of housing and business reduced the
economic functions of older metropol itan core areas to producing

highly specialized regional services and providing agglomerative
economies for certain kinds of high-risk enterprises. 27
The dec1 ine in demands for core-area sites were fe1 t in lower
rents for both residential and commercial properties in those areas
while rents and incomes were increasing in the suburban rings that
were developing around central cities.

And since the suburban rings

were beyond the central-city boundaries, the corresponding loss in
core real-property values meant a shrinkage in property-tax bases,
and thus an increase in tax rates or a reduction in urban-tax revenues

to finance urban services.

In many cases it meant both.

The continued diffusion and integration of automobile technology
was also producing a further revolution in agriculture.

The

mechanization of farming was increasing the returns to large-scale

agricultural production at the same time that agricultural lands in
war-torn European countri es were bei ng restored to producti on.

The

result was a decline in foreign demands for American agricultural
goods while rises in American agricultural productivity were increasing

the supplies of those goods.

Thus, farm incomes were held down during
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a period in which other incomes were rising.

Families were finding it

increasingly difficult to subsist on small acreages, and they were

more and more incl ined to abandon farming in favor of urban
employments.
The natural refuge for the recently unemployed rural-to-urban

ill1Tligrants was the now low-rent housing left in the core areas of
central cities by upper- and middle-income families.

The cultural

shocks of life-style changes and the lack of skills and urban employment opportunities made adjustments for the new wave of irrnlligrants

difficult.

Moreover, many of the irrunigrants were southern negroes,

and their plights were further complicated by the racial prejudices

that confronted them in their new environments.

Many found it

difficult, if not impossible, to subsist in their new homes, and their
landlords found it impossible to collect rents high enough to cover
all taxes and maintenance costs.

The result was a rapid depreciation

in the quality of affected neighborhoods, and an enonnous increase in
the demand for urban services at precisely the time when urban
property-tax revenues to finance such services were shrinking with
declining real-property values. 28
The myriad of transactions that integrated the automotive

technology and secured the social gains from that technology changed
inter-institutional arrangements so that many institutions experienced
substantial gains in net present values.

But some institutions found

it impossible to adapt, and those institutions suffered reductions in
net present values.

It was clearly too late to prevent innovation of

the automobile or to proscribe the working rules that had already been
routinized surrounding that technology by the end of World War II.
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The only relief open to the adversely affected going concerns was
publ ic compensations to eradicate or arnel iorate the adverse effects.
Affected going concerns,

therefor~

organized interest groups and

the interest groups formed coalitions to press for laws that would
compensate them at the expense of others for the losses they suffered.
And other persons and institutions that saw their interest adversely

affected by the proposed redistributi ons 1i kewise formed interest
groups and coalitions to protect their interest.

The list of going

concerns and interest groups is mLlch too long to examine here.
However, over the years, it has included such luminaries as the
National Urban League, the Federal National t40rtgage Association, the

National Association of Home Builders, the AFL-CIO, the Bureau of the

Census, the Federal Reserve Board, the National Association of Real
Estate Boards, the U. S. Conference of Mayors, and the Ford Foundaticn.

The list also includes an imposing number of private companies--

predominantly banking and insurance corporations. 29
Likewise, the details of their opposrng

views as well as the

impressive list of resulting statutes, regulations, and legal decisions
go beyond the scope of this treatise.

However, the result was a

plethora of laws that created more federal and state agencies and
authoritative redistribution programs for the agencies to manage.

Among the agencies created to date to deal with the automobile effect
were the cabinet-l evel, federal executi ve departments of Health,

Education and Welfare (HEW), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
and all of the existing and new federal administrative agencies that
fell within their statutory areas of concern were organized under them
for program coordination and funding.

Of course, the redistribution
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programs are managed by the administrative agencies. 30
One such program, Urban Redevelopment, was initiated as Title
to the Housing Act of 1949.

The name was a euphemism for slum

clearance, and the latter a euphemism to some people for eliminating
what they considered to be undesirable residents.

The naive saw the

program as a way to restore the older and decaying central cities to
their former and rightful eminence.

The practical-minded found the

program to be a way of acquiring or preserving income at public
expense.

Still others found that the program imposed substantial costs

on them by disrupting their life-styles and forcing them to move from
the low-cost housing in familiar neighborhoods populated by friends to
housing they could not afford in unfamiliar surroundings populated by
strangers.

Moreover, the initial program foroseeably reduced the

standing stock of urban housing for those low-income famil ies that
could least afford to arrange other accommodations. 31
The name was later changed to Urban Renewal, and the program

became the umbrella for a number of subsequent laws of a similar sort.
Despite the detractions implied by the above remarks, the
accompl ishments of the program are as impressive as they were costly.

The program did assist the cities that completed urban-renewal projects
to make many needed physical adjustments to the automobile effect
described above.

Likewise, the skylines of many cities are now

adorned with stately public structures where once stood only

dilapidated older houses.

Finally, some high- and middle-income

families have found the renewed urban core an attractive place to make
their homes, and they have moved back to the city from the suburbs.
Even so, the modern, industrial city is not and perhaps never can be
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what it was before the automobile.
The conclusion of this section concludes the chapter.

The

chapter has attempted to describe how institutions adapt to
technological change through collective action.

The principle of

adaptation is found in the relationships between transactions, customs,

and law.

Transactions are structured by custom and law, while customs

evolve out of the routine practices of transactions, and laws are

slowly changed to bring them into accord with the evolving customs.
Transactions between going concerns change and routinize working
rules. and since customs are simply routine working rules, they
change with the routinizing transactions.
Since laws are little more than codified customs, they are

changed to bring them into accord with the evolving customs.

This

last section has attempted to illustrate how laws are changed in a
pluralist democracy by interest-group interaction in which persons
are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve interest groups, and
interest groups are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve coalitions
in support of or opposition to the enactment of any new law or change
in any old law.

Consensus can be reached and human welfare enhanced

through interest-group interaction, and a public-interest equilibrium
can be maintained solely by the interaction of opposing-interest
groups and interest-group coal itions.
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
This work commenced with the contention that progress toward a
more complete theory of urban affairs might be made by integrating

institutional economic theory and elements of the more orthodox economic theory with aspects of pluralist theory from political science and
relating the resulting whole in an urban context.

This is the last and

concluding chapter in the work that attempted that synthesis.

The

chapter briefly summarizes key elements of the intervening chapters, and

it suggests possible on-going implications that might be deduced from the

work.
SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS

The synthesis commenced with an exploration of selected social

sciences literature to establish a definition of the word "institution
that would serve throughout the remainder of the work.

Jl

The definition

finally settled out of Chapter II was that:
An institution is an organized social group which has evolved
from and is united with some particular system of cultural values,
and it serves through processes of social control to stabilize
social interaction by preserving and perpetuating those values
in the society of which the institution is a part.

Equipped with the foregoing definition, the work examined institu-

tions in light of selected elements from institutional economic theory,
orthodox economic theory, and pluralist political theory.

Following is

a brief summary of the major points made ;n the preceding chapters.
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Institutional Economics
There are two main branches of institutional economic theory.

The first branch deals with the forces in society that tend toward
instability and revolution.

The second branch deals with the forces

that tend toward adjustment and stability.

The former is the product

of Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres, and the latter is that of John
R. Commons.

The former branch has been described as institutional

economics in this treatise.

The second ;s properly the same, but it

has been called the economics of collective action, and it was described

along with interest group-politics in the chapter on pluralism.
Institutional economics views economic phenomena as products of
institutional systems in which markets will exist subject always to

i nstituti ona1 constra i nts.

It concentrates on the inst; tutional mil i eu

in which markets exist, and the feed-back effects of market activities
on institutional arrangements--the ways in which society1s uses and
changes in uses of material devices structure
itself.

and restructure

society

These effects occur only in the very long run, and institu-

tional economic time periods are therefore anthropological time periods.

periods of sufficient duration to study the institutional changes that
result from economic and quasi-economic activities.
The very long run is a longitudinal dimension in time. according
to John Dewey and Clarence Ayres, called an ends-means continuum--a continuum of on-going life processes.

The present is a constantly changing

instant of time which divides the past from the future.
exists in the present is the effect

Everything that

of causes from the past, and those

same effects are the means to ends that 1i e in the future along the
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the continuum.

Lying in the future along the continuum, possible future ends
exist only in human contemplation, and they will not become actual
states of being unless man chooses to bring them into being and
actuates choices by organizing and employing means to attain his chosen

ends.

Ends-in-view are alternative and competing, and the selection of

one set of ends may preclude the possible achievement of competing ends

because means are either too scarce to permit the attainment of all
sets, or the alternative sets of ends may be incongruous.
Ends are not ends-;n-themselves.

Once they are secured, ends

become means to on-going ends that lie even farther in the future along
the continuum.

Ends have value because people, through institutions,

set them out as desired, while the value of means is partly deternined
by their instrumentalism in securing desired future ends.

raised by this concept of an ends-means continuum are:

The questions

Why and how are

particul ar ends-to-be-reached chosen from among a 1ternati ve and
competing ends-in-view?

And what determines how means are chosen and

organized toward achievement of the ends selected?
According to Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres, the practice of
ceremonialism supplies part of the answer.

Ceremonialism is the instru-

ment of the institutional system for discharging its social control
functions, and it is the subject of Chapters IV and V.

Ceremonialism

transmits culture and achieves the social control required to maintain
social stability by conferring and validating status upon members of
society.
Ceremonialism is founded on the beliefs of tradition that inform
the present from the past.

Ceremonial values are transmitted by the
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legends and myths that pervade the 1iterature and drama of a culture
and that describe the mystical powers of ancestors and the tribal
triumphs of the past.
the culture.

Such ITIYths transmit the totems and taboos of

They promote cultural status systems and social order by

teaching persons the correct ethical and aesthetical values to hold.

Ceremonial ism social izes members of society by teaching and rei nforcing them from birth until death with the ancient systems of social
status and rank.

They come to understand and accept their positions

and the roles they must play in society.

They accept the mystical

potency of each social rank, and they come to recognize and respect the
distinctions of rank that distinguish themselves from others both
above and below them in the institutional hierarchies of society.
Ceremonial ism also teaches people how to acknowledge ranks and
va 1; date statuses through ceremon; a1 exchange, ceremon; a1 gi ft-giving
and ceremonial destruction of goods.

And it teaches them of the serious

consequences of failure to know and abide by the ceremonially-sanctioned

modes of behavior.

Lastly, the cultural ways of knowing and dOing, the

taboos and the mana of rank and status are reconstructed and reinforced
by mystical ceremonies--awe-inspiring religious liturgies, graphic arts.

literature, and dramas that extol the tribal values of culture.

All of

this ceremonial activity augurs social stabil ity by involving persons
in webs of institutionally-sanctioned social interaction.

It is a

result of socialization and social control accomplished by institutions
that are attempting to preserve and perpetuate traditional value systems.
Ceremonialism is therefore backward-clinging in terms of the endsmeans continuum.

It rational izes present euphorias in terms of the

powers of mystical past causes, and it brooks no departures from
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customary techniques.

It measures the desirability of possible future

ends in terms of the values that descended from the past, and it
prescribes antecedent techniques as the best methods for employment of

means toward attainment of future ends.

The ceremonial dimension of

society attempts to extend the past forever into the future.
On the other hand, institutions are not always successful in

perpetuating cultural values and preserving social stability.

Indeed,

new institutions rise, some institutions decline, and some disappear

altogether.

Why does this happen in the face of the powerful cere-

monial hold on the past?

According to Thorstein Veblen and Clarence

Ayres, the answer is found in the social consequences of new technol-

ogies.

Chapter VI above distinguished technology from human skill and

technique.

Technology is that quality of a tool that enables it to be

substituted for human effort in the creation of goods and services

having human value.

Human skill is the propensity and ability to apply

technique to the use of tools, and techniques are the methods by which
hUmans employ tools in production.

cedure

Technique is therefore the pro-

by which ends are converted to means as an on-gOing process.

Technology is continuous, dynamic, and progressive.

The continu-

ous and dynamic qualities of technology were described in Chapter VII.
Technology is continuous because the invention of new technologies ;s
based on scientific knowledge, and such knowledge results from

empirical verification and critical testing of hypotheses that purport
to link events causally.

Scientific knowledge is continuous because it

is based on scientific discoveries, and such discoveries are cumulative
in the sense that they are founded on the reservoir of scientific
knowledge that has been built up from prior discoveries.

Insofar as
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the invention of new technologies 'is founded on scientific understanding, technology is likewise continuous.

The innovation of new technology is dynamic because it opens
opportunities to allocate resources (employ means) in ways that are different from the ceremonially prescribed methods that descended from the
cultural past.

It may also change the ends selected to be attained

because it brings ends into view that were previously beyond available
means.

The innovation of new technology will therefore also open oppor-

tunities to change traditional social statuses and ceremonial systems of
rank~

affording new avenues of social mobility toward higher relative

statuses for some persons and lower relative statuses for others.

The progressive character of technology was described in Chapter
VIII.

Insofar as new technology succeeds in substituting tool s for

human effort in the production of goods and services having human value
it will produce a social dividend in the way of a greater surplus of

social benefits over social costs.

And since those benefits afe distrib-

uted to enhance human welfare, the new technology wi11 contribute to human

progress.

The distribution of the social dividend is a function of the

institutional system in society, and the progressive quality of new tech-

nology is realized by the diffusion and integration of the technology
throughout that system.

In the integration process the institutional

system is changed to bri ng it· into accord wi th the new technology.
The dynamic and progressive features of new technology make it forward-urging in terms of the ends-means continuum, that of on-going life
processes.

However, these features bring technology into tension with

tradition-bound ceremonialism, and the resulting environment is filled
with confl icts between those persons whose ranks and statuses are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

480

threatened, and those persons who stand to gain in position and status
by the innovation, diffusion, and integration of the new technology.
To what extent new technologies are actually innovated and integrated depends upon the strength of ceremonial ism in relation to the
forward pull of the potential net social benefits expected from the new
technology.

In other words, it depends on the relative strength of

institutional values and ceremonial resistances to changes.

To the

extent that new technologies are innovated, diffused, and integrated
with the institutional system, some of the ceremonial norms and modes
of behavior will become redundant and fade. causing some institutions
to decline in influence, power, and importance.

The question raised by

the relationship between technology and ceremonialism is:

How does

society reconcile the tensions between new technologies and

ceremon i ali sm into soci a1 change and human progress?

Valuations

The answer to the foregoing question is found in methods for valuing social benefits and social costs, and in techniques for making social

choices.

Valuation methods are found in orthodox economic theory, and

social-choice techniques are the concerns of political pluralist theory
and of that branch of institutional economics called the economics of

collective action.

Chapter IX is concerned with the former and Chapter

X with the latter.

This section of the summary covers Chapter IX.

The first step in reconciling the tensions between tradition-bound
ceremonialism and forward-leaning new technologies is to accurately
measure the benefits and costs of alternative courses of action.

However.

the values perceived by individuals and institutions are as multifarious
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and disparate as society is pluralistic, and there are therefore a
myriad of competing and conflicting values.

Moreover, there is no

simple or direct way to structure and weigh competing values in select-

ing ends-to-be-reached, and to organize and employ means to whatever
ends are selected such that social welfare is enhanced.

Indeed, it is not always clear what social welfare is or how it
should be measured.

Nevertheless. orthodox economists argue that

welfare can somehow be maximized if resources (means) can be allocated
optimally.

Vilfredo Pareto describes an efficient allocation as one in

which means have been allocated such that it is impossible to improve

anyone's welfare without adversely affecting the welfare of others .

.J. R. Hicks and Nicholas Ka1dor maintain that. even though a Paretooptimal allocation of means exists, social welfare can be improved if
social product is redistributed in such a way that gaining persons
value their gains more than losing persons value their losses.

The "possibil ity theorem" of Kenneth Arrow holds that there are
some conditions of choice under which neither market nor political
arrangements will define a social-welfare function by which Paretcrmaximum welfare can be measured or achieved.

Notwithstanding Arrow1s con-

vincing arguments, the Pareto criterion remains a very compelling ideal
to be as nearly achieved as possible.

But, again, any movement toward

that idea needs to be founded on empirically accurate valuations--valuations that weigh costs and benefits, where benefits are human satisfactions attained by achieving the most desirable sets of future ends, and
costs are the alternative ends foregone to secure the benefits.
Both benefits and costs may possess internal attributes and
external attributes.

Internal attributes involve divisible (private,
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personal, visceral, aesthetic) values, while external attributes

involve nondivisib1e (public, ethical, collective, institutional)
values.

Economists argue that goods and services that possess only

internal (divisible and private) attributes may be provided through the

pricing mechanisms of private markets.
Some economists have argued with conviction that goods and ser-

vices possessing substantial externalities cannot be efficiently provided through private markets.

This is because such goods and services

are not divisible, and no one can be excluded from enjoying the benefits

once they have been produced.

Since they cannot be divided, such goods

cannot be packaged and sold in consumer units.

Persons therefore tend

to nfree ride" with such goods by understating their benefits and over-

stating their costs because they know that, once the goods have been
created, they cannot be denied the benefits.

Goods possessing substan-

tial externalities are collective or public goods, and they must be
provided by other institutional arrangements than private markets.

The alternative to private markets is, of course, the variety of

governments in which pub1 ic goods are said to be provided through the
electoral process.

Whatever the institutional process, the technique

that is gaining currency is benefit-cost analysis--a technique in which
annual benefits and costs are estimated and net social benefits are
discounted back to a net present value.

Several issues surrounding the

technique raise questions about its viability as a means of valuing

alternatives.

The issues involve the following problems:

--Which external benefits and costs will be included?
--What pecuniary values are to be assigned to external benefits
and costs?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

483

--What social discount rate will be used to discount future
benefits and costs back to present values?
--Over what useful life will the benefits and costs be discounted?
--What is to be maximized or minimized in the outcome?

--Which institutional values will dominate the process?
The benefit-cost analysis of social alternatives can lead to many
different outcomes depending on how the foregoing questions are

answered.

And since each one can be answered a number of ways, benefit-

cost analyses can be manipulated to yield outcomes favored by one or
another special-interest group.

The problem in terms of the ends-means

continuum is that the innovation of an otherwise justified new technology may be defeated through such manipulations by the forces of ceremonialism.

Despite these obvious limitations, benefit-cost analysis may be

the best available method for valuing social alternatives.
Which underscores the problem--values as perceived by individuals
and institutions are as multifarious and disparate as society is pluralistic, and there is no Simple or direct way to structure and weigh competing values regarding ends and means.

The question remains: How does

society reconcile tensions between ceremonial ism and technology in sel-

ection of ends-to-be-reached and in employing means to the ends selected?
Pl ural ism
The answer to the foregoi ng questi on ; s found in the economi cs of
co11ective action and in pluralist theory, particularly theories of
interest-group politics.

These bodies of theory and their relevance to

urban affairs were described in Chapter X above.

Together, the two sets

of theory help explain how institutions adjust to the disequilibrating

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

484

influences of new technologies through changes in customs and laws.
According to the theory of collective action advanced by John R.
Commons, confl icts of interests occur between going concerns (or institutions) over the present and future uses of scarce resources.

Resource

scarcity is caused by intangible property rights--claims on streams of
future incomes arising from the expected future employment of material
things.

The conflicts of interests are resolved by transactions (or

ceremonial exchanges) that bring about exchanges of property rights
between institutions.

Transactions are limited by working rules (or

ceremonial norms cloaked as traditions) in the form of custom and law,
and each transaction is concerned with settling the particular working
rules governing its own exchange.

Customs evolve out of working rules

that are changed and routinized by transactions.
There are three kinds of transactions--bargaining, rationing, and

managerial.

Bargaining transactions take place between going concerns

with approximately equal bargaining powers.

Bargaining transactions

are voluntary arrangements and they tend to be juridical in nature.

On

the other hand, rationing transactions take place between legal
superiors and legal subordinates.

Rationing transactions are therefore

involuntary arrangements, and they tend to be legislative in character.
Finally, managerial transactions are likewise involuntary, and they
concern the organized uses of properties and other rights established
out of prior bargaining or rationing transactions.

Managerial trans-

actions tend to be executive in nature.

All transactions involve at least three elements--conflicts of
interests caused by proprietary scarcity, interdependence of interests
arising from the need for exchange, and order stemming from the need for
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working rul es to fac; 1itate exchange.

Transactions funct; on to convert

conflicts of interests to interdependencies of interests.

Transactions

also create and change working rules where necessary to meet the needs
of exchange.
The relevance of collective action to institutional changes, and
thus to thE resolution of tensions between ceremonialism and technology,
is found in the relationship between transactions. working rules,
customs, and laws.

Transactions are structured by the working rules

in customs and laws; working rules are changed by transactions to fit
the needs of exchange, while customs evolve from new working rules that

are routinized by transactions, and laws are slowly changed in
accordance with the evolving customs.
Laws are customs that have been set apart by placing the coercive
powers of the state behind their enforcement.

Law does not come into

being, therefore, until there is a sovereign state with centralized
police authority.

And such an authority rises in response to what is

apparently a universal propensity for institutions to produce a legal
order to enforce their ceremonial norms.

Governments are therefore the

institutional agencies for making, enforcing, and adjudicating laws.
Making and changing laws are legislative functions, while enforcing laws
is an executive function, and adjudicating violations and disputes under
the law ;s a judicial function.

Customs that have been given the force

of law, are of course, more difficult to change than other customs.
The way laws are made and changed to conform with evolving
customs in a pluralist democracy is explained by theories of interestgroup politics.

The main idea is that laws are made and changed

through interest-group interaction in which persons are free to create,
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join, quit, and dissolve interest groups, and interest groups are free
to form, join, quit, and dissolve coalitions in support of or opposi-

tion to the enactment of any new law or the change of any old law.
According to this idea, consensus can be reached and political

stabil ity maintained through the interaction of opposing interest
groups while laws are in a perpetual state of adjustment.
This ends the summary of the key points that were expanded and
illustrated in the preceding chapters.

The summary has shown how the

component theories--from institutional economics and political

pluralism--were integrated in the main work.
tional points must be stressed.

However, several addi-

The first is to underscore the places

where the component theories converge and overlap, and the possible
normative relevance of that.

The second is to point out the places

where the theories appear to have import for urban affairs, and to

consider the possible normative relevances in each case.
INSTITUTlONf.L eCONOMICS AND PLURALISM

One aspect of the contention in the first chapter of this work
was that institutional economic theory, and selected elements of

orthodox economic theory might be brought into productive synthesis
with political pluralist theories.

This part of the concluding chapter

pOints to the places in the main text where it seems to this author

that the component theories converge and overlap, and to the possible

normative relevance of the results.
There were many places throughout the main text at which the

component theories overlapped.

However, ignoring the introductory and

concluding chapters, the chapters in which institutional and other
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economic theories were significantly in union with political theories

were Chapters II, IV, V, IX, and X.

The institutional essence of

those chapters was predominantly ceremonial ism, vis technology.
Chapters II, IV, and V related institutions to groups, and group
activities to ceremonial activities.

Chapter II defined institutions

in part as human groups organized around particular sets of cultural
values, and it sought to expand the definition by exploring the origins
of institutions, social functions of institutions. the structure of
institutions, and the nature of institutional influence and power.

While Chapter II was a wide-ranging examination of the social-sciences
literature on institutions, much of the literature was consistent with

institutional economic theories, and the latter theories were consistent with some ideas espoused by political theorists like David Truman

at one extreme, and C. Wright Mills at the other.
Chapters IV and V explored ceremonialism and the social functions
of institutions, noting that ceremonialism is the social mechanism by
which institutions discharge their functions--in particular, to
stabilize society by transmitting culture, organizing society, socializing members of sOciety, and exercising social control.

These aspects

of institutional economic theory from the works of Thorstein Veblen and

Cl arence Ayres have good correspondence with pol iti cal theori sts 1i ke
Harold Lasswell and David Truman, to name only two.

Chapter IX brought together the disti 11 ed works of many orthodox
economists, and several other social scientists to examine the matter of
human welfare, and of valuing social alternatives for improving on

welfare.

While the material in that chapter was not explicitly from

institutional economics, the tone of the economic content was
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institutional in character.

Moreover, the institutional tone of the

chapter was consistent with the interest-group theories of David Truman
and Ea r 1 La tham.
Finally, Chapter X combined the economics of collective action, a

branch of institutional economic theory from the works of John Commons,
with theories of interest groups from the works of political scientists
like David Truman, Earl Latham, and Robert Dahl to explain how institutions adjust to technological change.

Commons described how the customs

around which institutions are organized are changed through what he
called collective action. The works of Truman, Latham, and Dahl complemented that of Commons by offering an explanation of how laws are changed

through interest-group interaction to conform with evolving customs.
Of course, the fit between institutional economic theory and con-

temporary political theories is not perfect.

For that matter, neither

is the correspondence perfect between the two main branches of institutional economic theory.

However. there are many points on which one or

another aspect of institutional theory para 11e1 s, overl aps, or campl ements contemporary political theory.

The opposite is also true, and

drawing from political theory, it has been possible to augment and

expand the body of institutional economic theory.
One might conjure up a great many possible implications from
these conclusions.

However, it seems that the principal relevance of

this part of the tome lies in the essentially provincial nature of the
social sciences in a real world that is inherently diverse, varied, and
heterogeneous.

The understanding of social phenomena is rarely achieved

by attempting to explain it within the limits of a single discipline.

If it is to be understood at all through the application of social

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

489

theories, the theories must at least be eclectic--drawn from as many
sources and discipl ines as necessary to render a consistent explanation

that has empirical validity and is relevant to real-world problems.
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND URBAN AFFAIRS

Another contention at the beginning of this work was that progress
toward a more complete theory of urban affairs might be possible by
relating the synthesis in terms of urban affairs.

The examples used

to illustrate the component institutional and political theories were

therefore directly related to cities, or they had a reasonably clear
relationship to urban affairs.

That is, they were either non-urban

consequences of causes that were c1 early urban, or they were urban
consequences of causes that were non-urban.
Of course, it was not possible to include every urban matter that

might be meaningfully related to the synthesis.
omena used were selected on two bases.

Thus, the urban phen-

The first was according to how

well the material could be adapted to the component theories, and the
second was according to a time 1 ine that extended roughly from

antiquity to the present.

The theme that seemed to be most amenable to

these bases was urbanization.

Aspects of both technology and ceremon-

ialism were accordingly illustrated by selected urbanization topics.

Technology and Urbanization
Chapters III, VI, VII, VIII, and X contain technology-related
examples from the history and related theories of urbanization.

The

underlying notion in those chapters was that modern industrial cities
represent the highest achievements of civilization and that they are
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the products of technological developments.

Those developments

commenced before recorded history and they continue to this very moment.
As long as man progresses along the continuum of on-going life
processes, technological development will provide the means of progress
and increased urbanization and the embellishment of urban life will be
one of its products.
The means-ends continuum, the continuum of on-going 1ife
processes, was illustrated in Chapter III by discussion of the Roman
establishment of the City of London, England.

The main idea in

Chapter III was that a city is the effect of causes that 1ie in the
past, and it is a collection of means to ends that lie in the future.
It is the product of human deliberations and choices, and usually
deliberations and choices that extend backward for many centuries in
time.

Chapter VI employs a discussion of technological developments in
agriculture as a way of deriving a definition for the word IItechnology."
The urban relevance of agricultural development is that urbanization is,
in the first instance, a product of improvements in agricultural produc-

tivity, and agricultural productivity is a function of technological

developments in agriculture.

The concluding part of Chapter VI

describes how anatomical parts of man have been replaced in production
processes by tools embodying successively more complex and instrumental

technologies.

These developments both improved agricultural produc-

tivities and enhanced human existence in modern industrial cities.
The economic principle of comparative advantage was used in Chap-

ter VII to explain central-place theory, and central-place theory to
explain the effects of internal economies of large-scale production in
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bringing about urbanization.

Technology is a central feature in this

chain of causes because it is improvements in technology that bring
about increases in internal economies of large-scale production.

And

insofar as economies of scale bring about increased special ;zations,

there are increased pressures for urbanization for it is in cities that
special ;zation, the division of labor, reaches its highest level.
The invention and innovation of new technologies and effects of

those innovations on urbanization was also described in Chapter VII.
It was argued that the underlying factor in the change from prehistoric folk society to the pre-urban folk community was the change from
the use of humans for motive power in agriculture to the use of oxen as

draft animals.

The technological change that moved society from the

prehi stori c and pre-urban fol k community to the truly urban feudal city
was the di scovery of metallurgy, the subsequent improvements in too 15,

and the consequential increases in productiv;ties.

Fina1ly. urban

society moved to the era of the industrial city with the substitution
of mechani ca 1 power technol og; es for animals in productive processes.

The progressive qualities of technology were illustrated using
central-place theory again in Chapters VII and VIII to show how increasing degrees of specialization leads to agglomeration of institutions at
central places in response to increasing external economies of large
urban scale.

Likewise, changing technologies that lowered costs of

transportation were shown in Chapter VIII to effect changes in the
distribution of urban settlements within hierarchies of central places.

History of the diffusions and integration of the heavy plow and the
heavy horse in agriculture and the horse in overland transportation in
Medieval Europe lent empirical weight to the theories in Chapter VIII.
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Export-base theory was used in Chapter VIII to illustrate the ongoing effects of technological integration on urban growth in Medieval
and Renaissance Europe.

Increasing first the internal economies of

large-scale production, and then the external economies of urban scale,

the diffusion of technology promoted productive surpluses that were
used as exports in interregional trade and exchange.

The net revenues

realized from the trade were used to expand local urban bases and were

thus responsible for urban growth.
Finally, how collective action and interest-group politics bring
institutional norms into accord with changing technologies was

described in Chapter X.

One aspect of that adjustment was illustrated

by the changes in urban form precipitated by changes in transportation
technologies.

That part of the chapter explained how the railroads

produced monocentric cities in the nineteenth century, and how the

later diffusion and integration of automotive technology produced
suburban;zation, polycentric cities, and a plague of urban problems

that are a part of the on-going institutional adjustment process.
Urbanization as a theme to describe the dynamic and progressive

effects of technology according to institutional economic theory seems

to be a useful approach.

It appears to add both color and dimension to

institutional economics, political theory, and explanations of urban
affairs.

And insofar as advances in social theory are incremental at

best and are based upon insights drawn from antecedent theories, it may

be said that the work at hand has advanced urbanology toward a more
complete theoretical base--albeit ever so slightly.
The normative implications of this aspect of the work appear to
center on the very long-run relationship between technological
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development, urbanization, and the quality of urban life.

The signifi-

cance of this relationship is often and unfortunately lost in a labyrinth of what can only be called short-sighted ceremonial concerns that
appear as traditional values, the preservation of which is most likely
to retard technological development, inhibit urban development, and
impair the quality of urban life.

In the very long run, improvements

in the qual ity of urban 1 ife are keyed to urban development, and urban
development is keyed to technological development.

And since human

progress points toward continued urbanization, progress is likewise

tied to technological development--just as it has always been.
Urbanization and Ceremonial ism

Urban-related examples were employed to illustrate the ceremonial
aspects of institutional economics in Chapters II, IV, V, IX, and X.

The central urban-related idea is that institutions agglomerate at
urban places to take advantage of the external economies of large urban
scale.

Thus urban areas are simply domiciles for institutions, and

they provide the physical forums for ceremonial interaction.

Any

reference to institutions or ceremonialism. the instrument for
discharging institutional functions, is therefore related to urban
affairs.

An important related idea is that ceremonial ism is tradition-

bound and backward-clinging in terms of the ends-means continuum.

Chapter II was given over to exploring the ontological meaning
of the word 'Iinstitution" in order to devise a definition that would

serve throughout the work that followed.

Chapters IV and V expanded

on the institutional functions gleaned from the review of literature in
Chapter II.

A product of those expansions was to show how institutions
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evolved as social mechanisms to reduce human uncertainties and to
stabilize human interactions.

The legendary establishment of the city

of Rome, Italy, by Romulus was described in Chapter IV to show how the
institutional system of antiquity finally adjusted to the modest
urbanization that was occurring in those times.
Finally, Chapters IX and X are devoted to explanations of how
institutions adjust to technological changes in modern pluralist democracies--societies that are both industrialized and urbanized.

It was

demonstrated in Chapter IX how ceremonial influences might defeat the
innovation or the integration of new technologies by manipulating
benefi t-cost ana lyses to favor outcomes that were preferred by
reactionary institutional groups that were bent on preserving their
traditional values.
Chapter X described how the institutional system adjusts itself
through collective action and interest-group politics.

Collective

action brings about changes in customs by transactions (ceremonial
exchanges) between going concerns (institutions) in which working rules
(ceremonial norms) are adapted to new and different circumstances.
The routinization of such adapted working rules produces changes in
customs.

The chapter also demonstrated how 1aws are changed to bri ng

them slowly into agreement with evolving customs.

Customs that have

been given the force of law are much more difficult to change than
other customary ways; the process of change in a pluralist democracy
is through interest-group pol itics.
Once again, urbanization as a theme around which to unify the
synthesis and describe the ceremonial dimension of institutional
economics has been a useful approach.

The theme has highl ighted the
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ceremonial aspect of urban existence by first demonstrating the
agglomerative linkage between cities and institutions and thus the
domicil iary role of the former for the latter, and second by expanding
on the functional influences of ceremonialism toward the maintenance
of social order in all places that institutions exist.

This is, of

course, predominantly in urban settings where the external economies
of large urban scale have attracted an agglomeration of institutions.
The normative implications that might be drawn from the relationship between urban affairs and ceremonial ism appear to center on the

tradition-orientation of ceremonialism.

The first concern is with the

maTIeabi1 ity of benefit-cost analysis by which it may be possible for
reactionary institutions to defeat the innovation, diffusion, and integration of new technologies that would otherwise advance human welfare
in terms of the continuum of on-going 1ife processes.

It can only be

hoped that persons will become wary of such strategies as they become
better informed on the essential character of ceremonialism and its role
of preserving traditional values by opposing innovations that threaten

the mythical foundations on which those values are based.
The second concern is with what appears to be the modern tendency
to declare more and more human interaction as subject to law and thus
to the coercive enforcement powers of governments.

Over and against

the need for stability is an equally important need for flexibility,
and expansion of the rule of law, vis the reign of customs aiorie, is

to forfeit the latter for the former.

Laws are much more rigid and

more difficult to change than customs that do not have the force of
law.

The more a society gives its customs the force of law, the more

inflexible that society becomes.

And the more inflexible a society,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

496

the less likely it will be to realize the progressive powers of new
technologies in expanded human welfare.
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

Another purpose in the foregoing work was to make a contribution
of sorts to institutional economics--although that purpose was not
expressed in so many words.

The question raistd in this part of the

concluding chapter is whether that implicit purpose has been fulfilled.
Finally, this part will compare the institutional works of a selected
group of contemporary economists with the interpretations made here of
the seminal works in institutional economic theory.

Economic Theory
Viewed exclusively from the economic perspective, description of

the two foregoing relationships may be considered a contribution to
institutional economic theory.

That is, the parallel augmenting and

complementary relationships between aspects of pluralist political
theory and institutional economic theory may be said to enhance both
bodies of theory, and thus to be a contribution to the latter as well
as the former.

Likewise, describing urbanization and urban development

in terms of institutional economic theory is a contribution to the

latter as well as to a better understanding of the former.
It appears to this writer that the work at hand makes several
other contributions to the field of institutional economics as well-albeit they are minuscule ones. The main contributions are: Designation
of a fourth economic time period, the livery long-run.

II

Expanded

redefinition of the words lIinstitution." and Ittechnology."

Giving
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more precise description to the institutional relationships between
discovery, invention, innovation, integration, and diffusion as they
relate to science and technology, and reorganization, and embel1ish-

ment of institutional economic theory as it is interpreted from the
semi na 1 works by thi s author.
Chapter I above designates the relevant institutional economic
time period of analysis as the livery long run," and defines it as a

period of sufficient duration to study the institutional changes that
result from economic and quasi-economic activities.

To be sure, other

economists have acknowledged the anthropological and evolutionary
nature of institutional economic theory. but none have distinguished

its time period of analysis from other economic time periods. 6 The
institutional time period differs from the three time periods of
orthodox economic theory in that the latter are concerned primarily
with elasticities of resource supply, given a state of institutional
arrangements.

As the name implies, and the definition confirms, the

institutional time period is much longer than the longest orthodox
economic time period.

Indeed, the essential distinction of institu-

tional economic theory is this time period dimension and the evolu-

tionary perspective it connotes.

Chapter II sought an operational definition of the word
lIinstitution.1I

Previous definitions were generally found deficient

because they were not sufficiently inclusive.

Selected topics of

social sciences literature were surveyed, and the definition quoted in

the beginning of the summary at the head of this chapter was adopted.
The definition describes the institutional components (human group and
cultural values), the social function of institutions (to preserve
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social stability), and the institutional methodology (by perpetuating
cultural values).

Chapters IV and V further elaborated an the adapted

definition in terms of the ceremonial nature of institutional functions
and methods.1 Thus this work has produced a definition of the ward
"institution" that is mare complete and more suited to the purposes of
institutional economic theory.
Considerable verbiage has been produced by others about technology.
However, this writer could find no adequate definition in all the
literature dealing with the word.

Mast previous definitions are

deficient because they either confuse technology with technical skill-which is a nonmaterial, human quality--or with all culture without
distinction.

Chapter VI attempts to sort out these issues and to

derive an operational definition of the ward.
is:

The resulting definition

Technology is that quality of a tool that enables it to be

substituted for human effort in the creation of goads and services
having human value.

Moreover, the chapter distinguished technology

from technique and technical skill.

Technique is the method by which

tools (embodying technology) are employed by humans.

And technical

skill is the ability of persons to apply technique to the employment of
tools.

This work has therefore produced definitions of the word

"technology" and of related terms that are more clearly delineated than
previous definitions and that appear to be better suited to the
purposes of institutional economic theory.
8uilding on the definition of technology from Chapter VI,
Chapters VII and VIII offered a mare exacting explanation of the
institutional relationships between scientific discoveries and the
invention, innovation, integration, and diffusion of new technologies.
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Scientific discoveries and the invention of new technologies relate to

technological continuity while the innovation of new technologies
relates to the dynamic qualities of the latter--to the powers of
technology to induce social change.

The integration and diffusion of

new technologies relate to improvements in human welfare, and the
latter to social progress. B

Finally, this work has produced a new interpretation of the

seminal works in institutional economic theory and has reorganized and
embellished the theory with historical examples.

It was noted in the

beginning chapter that institutional economic theory is in a state of

disarray with unreconciled inconsistencies between its main branches.

It is therefore not clear how institutional economists can claim a
coherent body of theory, or justify it as a discreet field within the
economics discipline.

Indeed. it is not at all clear how institutional

economics fits within the discipline of economics. 9 Thus more orthodox

economists tend to treat the field with disdain and to escape
completely into the fairyland of mathematical economic models.

The preceding chapters have attempted to demonstrate that there
is a coherent body of institutional economic theory, and that the
field serves a number of important functions within the economics
discipline.

Institutional economics adds a dimension and a perspective

all its own by which economics may be more closely related to and more
nearly integrated with other social science disciplines, and it
functions to criticise, augment, and complement other fields within
the economics discipl ine.
While no exhaustive effort was made to reconcile the
inconsistencies in institutional economic theory, the theory was
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organized and rationalized along particular lines so that the major
premises of this work might be developed.

As noted in Chapter I, the

criteria used to achieve consistency between the fragments of
institutional economic theory were to use those parts that are in

essential agreement, to use those parts that this author believes are
most va 1i d where there is confl i ct and where the materi ali s needed to
systematize the theory, and to ignore remaining parts that do not

appear to be particularly applicable.
There are points on which the seminal institutional writers are

clearly in agreement.

They all shared an evolutionary outlook--what

this writer characterizes as a very long-run perspective.

Tiley all

were concerned with the .. position and nature of institutions in

society.

And they were all critical of orthodox economic theory for

its static method of analysis.

Notwithstanding these points of

agreement, certain inconsistencies persist to plague the field.
By now, the reader knows very well that the theory is organized
in this work around the idea of an ends-means continuum and the choices

surrounding the selection of future ends and the employment of means
toward achievement of the ends selected. 10

Likewise, the reader knows

about the past-cl i ngi ng of tradition-bound ceremoni ali sm and of the
fonv-ard-urging of new technology.

These ideas were described in

Chapters III through VIII, and they were taken from The Theory of
Economic Progress by Clarence Ayres.
Ayres combi ned the concept of ceremoni ali sm from The Theory of

The Leisure Class by Thorstein Veblen with the progressive technologies
from The Theory of Business Enterprise and other works also by Veblen
to describe the ceremonial-technology dichotomy.

Further, he related
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the dichotoll\Y to a continuum of on-going life processes, a concept that
he drew from Theory of Valuation by John Dewey.

However, the original

AYres rendition of these ideas did not follow the form described here.
Indeed, his work was so difficult for some scholars to understand that
he had to clarify it in a protracted foreward to his second edition. ll
Even there, his organization does not seem to this writer to be a good
one.

The reorganization given in this work to these aspects of the

theory has hopefully given it better clarity and coherence.
The Veblen-AYres branch of institutional economics sees
institutions and their ceremonial practices as villains in the play of
human progress.

Institutions serve to stabilize social interaction,

and this means placing restraints on individual actions that contravene
institutional norms.

It means preclusion of technological innovation,

proscription of change, and inhibition of human progress where the
former are instrumental toward progress.

The Veblen-Ayres branch sees

progress as the triumph of its hero technology over the villain
institutions.

It explains institutional discontinuities in terms of

technological continuities.

In short, the Veblen-Ayres branch of

institutional economics concentrates on the unstabi1izing forces that
cause social revolutions.

It gives practically no explanation to how

stability is maintained while social change is under way.

On the other hand, the John R. Commons branch views institutions
as the heroes in the piece.

After all, institutions are "collective

action in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action.

1I

The Commons view proceeds on the premise that at least some level of
certainty and stabil ity in human interaction is necessary in any
civilized society.

It is, of course, institutions that maintain social
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stability before, during, and after social changes.

Moreover, the

Commons branch attempts to explain institutional changes in terms of
collective action, and it succeeds thereby to shed light on the area
of economic interaction left murky from the Veblen-Ayres point of
view--the social processes whereby the tensions between ceremonialism
and technology are resolved into human progress.
The inconsistencies related above stem, in this writer's opinion,
from differences in pOints-of-view.

The Veblen-Ayres view concentrates

on the technology and the social forces that tend toward change, and

thus toward social instability.

Conversely, the Commons view

concentrates on the forces of soci ety that tend toward stabi 1ity--on
what Veblen and Ayres call ceremonialism, and Commons thinks of as
working rules and transactions.

At any rate, the interpretation in

this work sees the two views as complementary, and it has been

expedient to develop this idea in Chapter X above as a partial
reconciliation of the two branches of institutional economics. 12

The apparent inconsistencies between the Veblen-Ayres branch and
the Commons branch of institutional economics are complicated by

problems of vocabulary.

This difficulty is further compl icated by

modern writers who tend to coin their own terms for phenomena on which
there is not wide-spread semantical agreement.

At any rate, an under-

standing of the synonymity of terms is useful in seeing that Veblen,
Ayres, and Commons were, indeed, comprehending and writing of the same

things.

Chapter X above attempts to clarify this by translating

certain terms from Commons to the verbiage of Veblen.
the Commons

I1

For example,

go ing concern" is approximately synonymous with the Veblen

l1institution.1l

Likewise, Commons I Ilworking rules, custom, and lawll are
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approximately synonymous with Veblen's "ceremonialism," and the former's
"transactions" may be viewed as the latterls "ceremonial exchanges. II

This part of the chapter attempts to justify the claim that
substantive contributions to the field of institutional economics have
been made in this monograph.

The supposed contributions are:

Demonstrating a parallel, augmenting and complementary relationship
between political pluralist theory and institutional economic theory.
Showing the relevance of institutional economic theory to urbanization
and urban development.

Designating the "very long-run" as the

institutional economic time-period of analysis.

Redefining the words

"institution,lI "technology," and related tenns.

And reorganizing and

expanding institutional economic theory as it has been interpreted
from the seminal works by this writer.
Contemporary Institutional Economists
Until now, this writer has adhered closely to the seminal writers
in institutional economics.

Indeed, even this was very selective, and

only the writings of Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, C. E. Ayres, and
John R. Commons were seriously consulted.

This was done to assure that

the original works were interpreted with fidelity.

Curiously, none of

the seminal writers were economists in the orthodox sense.

Veblen,

Dewey, and Ayres were educated in the discipline of philosophy, and
Commons failed in his efforts to complete a doctorate in economics. This
might account for what no doubt appears to other economists as the former writers' contrariwise approach to economic orthodoxy.

And it might

also account in part for the apparent lack of interest shown in the
field by most traditionally-trained economists.

Nevertheless, each
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man made one or more substantial and significant contributions to :the
field that is known today as institutional economics., and it is on
their works that the field is founded.
Are there any contemporary scholars in the field today?

If so,

who are they? How shall they be distinguished from other economists?
What is the nature of their work? And how do their writings relate to
this work? There are, of course, contemporary scholars of institutional
economics that are distinguishable from other economists, although some
contemporary institutionalists might resist their inclusion in that
classification. Moreover, many contemporary institutional economists
are d1stingu1shed in other fields of economics as well.

Interestingly,

contemporary institutional economists are some of the most widely
read in the economics discipline today.
The attributes of institutional works that distinguish them from
tlose of other economists include the characteristics described above as
unique to the field of institutional economics.

The essential

attributes that are common to the works of all institutional economists
are employment of the very long-run time-period of analysis along with
the evolutionary perspective that the time-period involves, and the
concentration on institutional arrangements.

Other corollary attributes that may indicate an institutional
linkage are tendencies to niggle and criticise economic orthodoxy on
the bases of empirical and historical examples drawn from other
disciplines and theoretical views, and preoccupations with economic

development and growth.
A good many economists who are much better known for their
contributions to orthodox economics might incidentally be classified
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as institutional economists on the foregoing bases,13

However, the

contemporary scholars selected for inclusion here as institutionalists
have, in the opinion of this writer, distinguished themselves by

producing works that are substantial contributions in the field.
works of these men defy easy subclassification.
and are descriptive.

Some look to the future and are predictive.

deal with normative values and are prescriptive.
three.

The

Some survey the past
Some

And some are all

Some of their works deal with contemporary problems, and others

with very long-run developmental problems.

Some tend to stress

technological aspects of socio-economic problems, and others stress the

ceremon; a1 .
At any rate, the best-known contemporary institutional economist,
in this writer1s opinion, is John Kenneth Galbraith.

Galbraith has

been a prolific commentator on the American and world economies since

the early 1950s.

Spiced with a smidgen of prescriptive exposition,

his works have been primarily descriptive.

Moreover, he tends to take

the phenomenon of technical change as given, and he concentrates his
analysis on the problems of ceremonial ism and institutional adjustment.
His contributions to vocabulary include the concept of countervailing
power, dependence effect, conventional wisdom, social balance,
industrial state, technostructure. rev; sed sequence, educati ana 1 and
scientific estate, planning system, and more.
Galbraith's first work of institutional significance is American
Capitalism, subtitled liThe Concept of Countervailing Power.1I

The work

applied the interest-group politics of Dewey. Truman, and others to
economic interaction. holding that ". . . private economic power is

held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to
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it."

By which, Galbraith means that "In the typical modern market of

few sellers, the

ac~ive

restraint is provided not by competition but

from the other side of the market by strong buyers.,,15

Moreover, each

side will attempt to enlist public opinion in its cause and to
influence the enactment of laws that will enhance its bargaining power.
Galbraith illustrates the operation of countervail ing power with

examples drawn from the history of labor and farm legislation, among
others.
As well as coining a new term, "countervail ing power, II American

Capitalism ;s a criticism of economic orthodoxy for concentrating on
imaginary competitive markets while ignoring the very long-run insti-

tutiona1 changes that have rendered the orthodox paradigm ever less
relevant.

COlTUTlons.

In this sense, the work is more in the tradition of John R.

Indeed, one can almost imagine Commons ~ "collective action ll

operating as Galbraith's

II

coun tervailing power. 1I

Perhaps Galbraith's most influential work is The Affluent Society
which, along with American Capital ism lays a foundation of theory on
which most of his subsequent works are erected.

Indeed, Affluent

Society is the first volume in a trilogy, the remaining volumes of
which are reviewed below.

The book is also a social criticism that

became a favorite conversation piece of the liberal dilettanti, and it

topped the best-seller lists for six months or so.

Moreover, the work

has so far had a lasting effect on recent generations of pol icy makers

and scholars.
Approximately the first third of Affluent Society is, of course,
an introduction, and it states the historical context in which the

remainder of the work is developed.

The center piece of the
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introduction is lithe Concept of the Conventional Wisdom," ", . . the
ideas which are esteemed at any time for their acceptability."lll
Acceptability is tested by familiarity, and the wider the familiarity,
the less changeable the ideas.

It is, of course, the conventional

wisdom that rules the lives of men and is therefore the basis of social
policies.

Galbraith traces the roots of the conventional wisdom from

the fundamental ideas of modern Western Civilization--the notions of
rational economic man, competitive markets, consumer sovereignty, the
liberal state with limited powers, etc.--to the present flowering of
high consumption in modern industrial life.

That ties economic security

to employment, employment to production, and production to consumer
demand.
The center third or so of Affluent Society is devoted to an
attack on the institutional fruits of a conventional wisdom that is
sadly out of touch with the economic realities of industrial times.
The p;~ce de r~sistance of that section and perhaps the entire book ;s

the "dependence effect," which Galbraith describes thus:
As a society becomes increasingly affl uent, wants are
increasingly created by the process by which they are
satisfied. . . Increases in consumption, the counterpart of
increases in production, act by suggestion or emulation to
create wants. Or producers may proceed actively to create
wants through advertising and salesmanship. Wants thus come
to depend on output. In technical terms it can no longer be
assumed that welfare is greater at an all round higher level
of production than at a lower one . . . the higher level of
production has, merely, a higher level of want creation
necessitating a higher level of want satisfaction . . . this is
not true of all goods, but that it is true of a substantial
part is sufficient. It means that since the demand for this
part would not exist, were it not contrived, its utility or
urgency, ex contri vance is zero. 17
The notion embodied in Galbraith1s dependence effect is, of
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course, not affirmed in the conventional wisdom which believes the
opposite, that production is called up by consumer demand.
di.sparity

The

between the illusions that people hold (the conventional

wisdom) and Galbraith's reality (dependence effect) is responsible for
serious misallocations of resources and a variety of socioeconomic
It results ill a lack of "social balance," and social balance is

ills.

defined by Galbraith as ". . . a sati sfactory J'el ationshi p between the
supply of privately produced goods and services and those of the state,
,,18

The dependence effect results in social imbalance because
lI

advertising operates exclusively, and emulation mainly, on behalf of

privately produced goods and services.

Since management and emulative

effects operate on behalf of private production, public services will

have an inherent tendency to 1ag behind."

In ampl ifyi ng thi 5, Gal braith

writes:
The scientist or engineer or advertising man who devotes
himself to developing a new carburetor, cleanser or depilatory
for which the public recognizes no need and will feel none until
an advertising campaign arouses it, is one of the valued members
of our society. A politician or public servant who dreams up a
new public service is a wastrel. Few public offenses are more

reprehensible. 19

The theory of social balance is the heart of the prescriptive
portion of Affluent Society.

Galbraith devotes the last third of his

book to matters that should be changed to correct the misallocations,
bring the economy into social balance, and remedy other social ills

traceable to the dependence effect.

Finally, the book ends with a

prediction of the benefits that might be expected if his prescriptions
are followed.
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Affluent Society was a popular conversation piece on the academic
circuit as well.

The avant garde scholars delighted in its implied

criticisms of conservatism.

But, understandably, not all of Galbraith's

colleagues agreed with him.

Some attacked his dependence effect,

arguing that there is much more to advertising than want creation, that
advertising also conveys all sorts of information needed by consumers if

they are to make intelligent economic choices.

Others raised questions

about the theory of social balance, arguing that many of the goods and
services deSignated as so-called public goods by Galbraith might be

provided more effi ci ently by private markets.

Fina lly, others called

Galbraith to task for what they saw in Affluent Society as a sellout
to socialism. 20

But what about the relationship of Affluent Society to the
interpretation of institutional economics exposed in this work?

Galbraith's contribution in The Affluent Society is in the very best
tradition of institutional economics.

One can see Veblen's influence,

and perhaps that of Ayres, in the work.
Galbraith's term for ceremonial beliefs
the Commons vernacular.

Indeed, conventional wisdom is
~

Veblen, or for custom in

Likewise, the emulative quality of the

dependence effect is straight out of Veblen's Leisure Class.

Finally,

the work is a scholarly social criticism of the first order.

Neverthe-

less, there are some disquieting reservations of Galbraith's normative
pronouncements that will be reserved for the end of this review of his
works.
At this writing, Galbraith has produced two more works that merit
comments as institutional economics.

Indeed, the two selections

complete the trilogy that commenced with and evolved from The Affluent
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Society.

The New Industrial State is a carefully delineated

description of the corporate system and the relationship of the corporation to the state and the individual.

While it is an overstatement

to say that New Industrial State is simply a restatement of The
Affluent Society, the reader has little trouble seeing the influence

of the latter in the former even though Gal braith has taken some pains
to attire phenomena in the former in different idiomatic regal ia.

What Galbraith is describing has long since been described by
others.

However, at least two things distinguish this work.

The first

is that he has brought a considerable mass of scholarship together in a
single volume to support his contentions.

The second is that he has in

some ways disclosed his own ideological preferences more openly and
thus more clearly--with reasonable scholarly reservations. of course.

The dominant feature of the industrial state is the industrial
system comprisi'ng

large producing organizations, planning, discipline,

and economic growth as the principal measure of success.
producing organizations are, of course, corporations.

The large

Galbraith

descri bes how the lItechnostructure" has 1argely repl aced traditi ana 1
management in cantrall ing the modern corporation.

The technostructure

consists of "those who, as participants, contribute information to
group dec; s; ons. II

Gal bra; th descri bes this group as very 1arge--

. . . it extends from the most senior officials of the
corporation to where it meets, at the outer perimeter, the white
and blue collar workers whose function is to conform more or
less mechanically to instruction or routine. It embraces all
who bring specialized knowledge or experience to group decisionmaking. This, not the management, is the guiding intelligence-the brain--of the enterprise. 21
Everything in the industrial state is harnessed to the needs of
the technostructure.

Members of the technostructure "adapt the goals of
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the corporation to their own; by extension, the corporation seeks to

adapt social attitudes and goals to those of the members of the

technostructure.

II

Thus the accepted sequence is revised.

The accepted

sequence is founded on the notion of consumer sQvereignty-_lIthe uni-

directional flow of instruction from consumer to market to producer ..

Galbraith explains the revised sequence:

,II

"Instead the producing

firm reaches forward to control its market and on beyond to manage the
market behavior and shape the social attitudes of those, ostensibly,
that it serves. 1122

The technostructure, through its management and control, have
brought the state itself into 1 ine so that the state serves the former
by "regulation of aggregate demand, maintenance of a large public.

sector on which this regulation depends, unden-lriting of advanced
technology and provision of an increasing volume of trained and
educated manpower. 11 23

The latter of these state functions in service to the technostructure--provision of an increasing volume of trained and educated

manpower--is discharged by state and corporate support of higher
education, what Galbraith calls the "educational and scientific estate.

II

The traditional antagonisms between the latter and the corporate world
have all but vanished since ascendance of the technostructure, the
members of which are products of the educational and scientific estat2.

The estate has expanded enormously to meet the needs of the technostructure,and it is gaining in political influence at the same time
that organized labor is declining in s:lch influence. 24
Most of 1he New Industrial State is given over to description of
the present economic condition of modern American society and of the
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institutional changes that have brought it to that condition.

However,

in the last chapter Galbraith speculates on the probable future of the
industrial system.

His predictions suggest a convergence wherein any

nation that achieves mature industrialization will, irrespective of
its professed ideology, become an industrial state in service to its
citizens.

Thus, the state enterprises of the professed communist

nations will be indistinguishable from the mature, modern corporations

of the professed capitalist nations.

And the states in both cases will

be serving their industrial systems in the same ways.25

What Galbraith calls the industrial system in New Industrial State
he roughly translates to the Ilplanning system" in Economics and the
Public Purpose.

The planning is, of course, carried on by the techno-

structure which, by the way, survived the transition from the former

volume to the latter without perceptible change.

The planning enables

the technostructure to rna i nta i n its control of the ent i re economy and
thereby to assure an unending continuation and growth of its prestige,
power, and income.

However, Galbraith contrasts the planning system with the market
system, the less than half of the economy that continues to serve the
American consumer.

This is essentia11y the noncorporate, proprietary

part of the business world, and it is composed of many small
enterprises that tender services, vis the supply of goods or things

that are manufactured by the 1arge corporati ons.

The important

differences are that members of the planning system are able to control
their environments while members of the market system remain subject
to their environments.

These circumstances lead to exploitation of the

market system by the planning system.

Moreover, such economic ills as
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recession and inflation fa11 heavily on the market system, but leave

the planning system little affected, or perhaps even better if than
before. 26
Economics and the Public Purpose is Galbraith's major prescriptive work.

The last third of the volume is given over to an agenda of

reform that seems remarkable in light of the institutional problems
Galbraith has so assiduously sketched out.

Some of the most conserva-

tive persons might consider his reforms radical while the most liberal
constituency might feel they were on the conservative side.

Indeed,

as he is careful to point out, many of the reforms were well under way

before the book was published in the early 1970s.
Interestingly, Galbraith rejects the tired liberal palliatives of
the past that attacked market power.
opinion of this writer, that:

He argues correctly, in the

liThe central problem of the modern

economy is unequal development.

The least developed is where there is

the least monopoly and market power; the greatest development is where

there is the most." 27
He therefore rejects anti-trust enforcement both because it has

been ineffective and because it proceeds on the classical theory that
monopoly power leads to inefficient allocations of resources.

He

rejects regulation in its present form because the state is essentially

a captive of the planning system and regulation simply leaves the
technostructure to regulate itself.

Placing so-called public-interest

members on corporate boards of directors is a toothless remedy because
corporate boards are almost as powerless before the technostructure as

the corporate stockholders.

Finally, he rejects wholesale publ ic

ownership of corporate business because the evidence fails in many cases
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to demonstrate that public ownership is an improvement over private

ownership--and, indeed, some evidence suggests the contrary in some
kinds of enterprise. 28
What Galbraith argues for is emancipation; emancipation of

belief, emancipation of women, emancipation of the state, and emancipation of the market system.

The agenda call s first for emancipation of

belief by jettisoning the worn-out baggage of the conventional
and its classical economic contents.

wisdo~

It means leaving hold of the

accepted sequence and grasping the revised sequence in all of its
ramifications.

Only with those new understandings can the state be

emancipated from the technostructure and its planning system.

And only

then can the state become the agency for carrying forth the remainder
of Gal bra i th 's agenda of reform.
The remaining Galbraith agenda calls for the emancipation of

women from the menial household competitions that occupy suburban
populations.

Among other things. this means equal educational

opportunities. equal employment opportunities, equal pay for equal work,
choices of work week and work year, and child-care centers.

The agenda

calls for enhancement of the power and competence of the market system,
vis that of the planning system.

Likewise, it calls for disciplining

the purposes and methods of the planning system, and seeing to a more

equitable distribution of income both within the planning system and
between that system and the market system.

It calls for better social

balance in the allocation of resources between the private and public
sectors.

Finally, it calls for a new socialism--public provision of

hoUSing, medical care, and transportation based on need. 29

What then of Galbraith's institutionalism in the last two
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volumes of his trilogy?

First, it needs be noted that Galbraith is

guilty of the infamous style change procedure he so deplores among
01igopo1istic manufacturers.

The reader will recognize the

IIconventional wisdom ll of The Affluent Society attired as lIaccepted
sequence ll in New Industrial State.

Thus, like the conventional wisdom,

the accepted sequence is an aspect of ceremonial knowledge in VeblenAyres terms.

Likewise, the reader will recognize the IIdependence

effect" of The Affluent Society disguised as the "revised sequence II
in New Industrial State.

Thus, like the former term. revised sequence

relates to the human propensity to emulate that was a central theme in
Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class.

Finally, as already noted,

Galbraith has dressed up the lIindustrial system l1 of New Industrial
State as the

II

planning system" in Economics and the Public Purpose.

Like Veblen, Galbraith shines as a great popularizer of new expressions.
Style changes aside, New Industrial State looks in many ways like
an update of Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise.

Additionally, one

can almost read the sequel to Veblen IS Engineers and the Price System
in Galbraith's treatment of the "technostructure."

And the techno-

structure sounds very much 1i ke the IIpower el ite" of C. Wri ght Mi 11 s.
Likewise, Veblen's lamentations in the Higher Learning in America are
reaffirmed with a special twist in Galbraith's description of the
lIeducational and scientific estate. !,30

Finally, Galbraith ' s treatment

of the state in relation to the industrial system is strikingly similar
to that of Marx in his critique of capitalism--and Marx is, after all,
a superb institutional economist when his work ;s measured by the
criteria stated above.

One must, of course, avoid the logical fallacy--

that since Marx was an institutional economist, all institutional
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economi sts are Marxi sts.
In addition to restating a good many old institutional themes
Galbraith's work possesses other qualities that mark it as
institutional economics.

It involves a very long-run dimension, and

it deals with institutional change.

It recognizes, but does not dwell

upon, the function of technology in inducing social change.

Moreover,

it expands incrementally on an understanding of modern techniques for
innovating new technologies in what Galbraith calls "process
innovation" or the institutional ization of innovation through the
research and development programs carried on for the technostructure
and its planning system by the state and the educational and scientific
estate.

He correctly notes that this is done to insulate the

technostructure and its planning system by controlling the unstabi1izing
effects of new technologies. 31
Finally, Galbraith's work might be viewed as a modern and carefully argued restatement of Say's Law--that market demand is created by
the forces of SUPP1y.32 That is, the supply of goods and services give
rise to returns of income (rent, wages, interest, and profits) to the
factors of production that were employed to produce the supply.

There

could, therefore, not be an insufficiency of demand resulting in
unemployment because the recipients will, in the aggregate, spend their

incomes on the consumer goods they were employed to produce.

Say's

Law was more or 1ess up-ended by the so-ca 11 ed new economi cs of John
Maynard Keynes. 33

Keynes argued that the end of production is

consumption, and that the level of aggregate consumption may be
insufficient, resulting in unemployment, if the level of aggregate
saving is greater than the level of aggregate investment.

Thus,
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Galbraith's version of

Say's Law takes the form of the dependence effect.

Given institutional

arrangements to maintain buying power (employment compensation,
transfer payments, government subsidies, etc.) demand is created by
producers through adverti sing.
Notwithstanding its institutional virtues, Galbraith's work
possesses some disquieting features.

First, the entire Galbraithian

edifice hangs on the dependence effect, and the dependence effect is
founded on a fallacy of composition--because a part of the economy
conforms to his model, then his model explains the entire economy.
He alludes to this in the early pages of The Affluent Society when he
writes:

"This {the dependency effecy is not true of all goods, but

that it is true of a substantial part is sufficient. ,,34

And he

proclaims it loudly in the front two-thirds of Economics and the Public
Purpose where he aCknowledges the existence of a market system that is
Moreover. a

more or less explained by orthodox economic theory.

substantial part of the goods produced by the manufacturing sector (the
industrial or planning system) are important subsistence items and they

likewise escape Galbraith's classification as goods subject to the
dependence effect.

Finally, even the advertising that ;s intended to

create demand for goods that would otherwise have no apparent demand has

information value over and above demand cl"eation.

Thus, the dependence

effect might actually apply to as little as one-tenth or less of the
goods and services consumed in the United States in any given year.

If the dependence effect cannot stand, then a good bit of that which
follows in The Affluent Society and in the remaining volumes of
Ga 1bra ith' s tri logy may be subj ect to seri ous doubt.
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Second, Galbraith takes orthodox neoclassical economic theory to
task for its supposed failure to adequately deal with market
imperfections--that ;s to deal with them according to the Galbraith
In fact, a good bit of Galbraith's polemic, including the

world view.

phenomenon he calls the dependence effect, is taken out of contemporary
neoclassical economic theory or applied economics fields that are

founded on such theory.

More specifically, it is taken from the econ-

omics of market or industrial structure.

The field branches into the

economics of anti-trust and the economics of regulation.

And those

appl ied fields are founded on the microeconomics of imperfect
competition.
Regarding Galbraithls agenda for reform, it is not entirely clear

how the state can be, or whether it should be, emancipated from the
institutional system of which it is, like all other institutions, a
component part.

As the earlier chapters of this essay attempted to

demonstrate, and Galbraith faithfully acknowledged in the early chapters
of The Affluent Society, there is a large and commonly held body of
received (conventional) wisdom that, right or wrong, binds a stable
society together.

And all of the institutions--the state, the economy,

the family, the church, etc.--are, for good or bad, in near unanimous
affirmation of those ceremonial beliefs.

Moreover, the various

components of the institutional system are interrelated and inter-

dependent.

They constantly rei nforce one another through the

ceremonial exchanges of their respective members.

And those members

occupy positions in not one, but a number of the interdependent

institutions.

It is difficult to see how the state can be severed

from the institutional system and still remain effective in its
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dealings with that system--particularly if the state is to be a
representative democracy.

Moreover, Gal braith

I

5

approach to reform comes down essent; a11y

to handing over the power to a sovereign state that is liemancipatedU

from what may be its mcst important constituency and expecting the
state to effect redistributions of economic and other institutional
powers on the basis of some higher kind of wisdom--appa.rer.tly the

unconventional wisdoms flowing from Galbraith's pen.

It seems to this

writer that such an expectation is uncommonly naive.

If history

demonstrates anything, it is that there is no tyranny more oppressive
than that of an all-powerful sovereign, ar.d no attribute more

corruptible and corrupting than unrestrained political power.
Even if the state could be emancipated and it did altruistically
embark on the mis::.ion of bringing Galbraithian reform to fruition, the

probabl e outcomes deserve closer examination.
for redressing an

Gal braith

I

5

prescription

skewed' distribution of institutional powers appears

to be the creation of countervailing powers in the weaker institutional
sectors.

It seems to this writer that this could be jumping from the

institutional frying pan into the ceremonial fire.

It could lead to

the escalation of countervailing (and counter-countervailing, etc.)
powers, and thus to a prol iferation of institutions and successive
layers of ceremonial crust over a society already burdened with
oppressive ceremonialism.
Whether or not one agrees with either his descriptions or his
prescriptions, Galbraith is to be applauded for presenting relevant,
timely, controversial, and provocative issues and views in words the

general publ ic can understand.

He is perhaps the most 1 iterary of
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contemporary economists.

He is lucid and articulate.

He is sometimes

satirical, often humorous, always witty--a 11 of which no doubt accounts
for his popularity with the reading pub1 ie.
A seemingly disproportionate amount of space has been given over
to reviewing the principal institutional works of John Kenneth Galbraith.
This was done because, in the opinion of this author, he is the best

known and most read institutional economist in the world today.

His

works are also among the best examples of social criticism in the field.
However, there are a good many other solid institutional economists on
the contemporary scene.

Unfortunately, space does not permit them to

be given the same treatment accorded here to J. K. Galbraith.

However,

some c1 early deserve more than passing mention.
Two other important institutional economists who, like J. K.

Galbraith, tend to concentrate their works on problems of ceremonial
adjustments, are Gordon C. Bjork and Robert L. Heilbroner.

Bjork, who

is the least published of the two, picked up a thread from John R.
Commons and has attempted to weave it into whole cloth.

The Commons

thread is an observation that private property is nothing more than
those assets the personal possession of which the state recognizes and

stands ready to defend.

Bjork develops this notion into a theory of

institutional change based in part on interest-group pol itics .
. . . sets of institutional arrangements are vlOrked out by men
and survive as long as they are perceived to be useful in
contributing to such individual and social goals as security,
provision of the material means of existence, and opportunity
for individual advancement. The arrangements are changed when
technologica1 advances create new opportunities for economic
improvement or when they create a demand for protection by
groups who are able to exercise political power to win grotection of their interests from other members of society.35
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The argument about the logic and development of capital ism
presented in this book, then, is one which emphasizes the social

util ity of capital ist arrangements for a ·society interested in
maximizing economic growth while retaining the security of the
individual. It does not depend on any belief in the I1l1 na tural" 11
or IIlImorall111 rights of men to property in assets or freedom from

social control of their use. It emphasizes that institutions
have been changed as individuals have been able to convince the
rest of society that the rest of society would be better off by
recognizing certain rights to freedom and property than it would
be if it did not recognize them. 36
Bjork develops these ideas in the remainder of his work.

Chapters

III through V describe the origins of his ideas in political and
economic thought and in the so-called Illogic of property. It

Chapters VI

through IX develop the freedom and property aspects of his thesis in a
more or less historical context looking at developments from antiquity,

through the medieval period, and into modern times.

Chapters X through

XIV examine public regulation of market activities--or limitations on
the unconstrained uses of property--first by comparisons with medieval
markets, then in a description of Soviet economic organization, and
finally with an examination of anti-trust policies, labor legislation,
and monetary controls in the United States.

Chapter XV examines the

United States record of income distribution and shows that the
distribution of income is determined by institutional factors and that
such factors must change if the distribution of income is to change.
Bjork's work closes in Chapter XVI by encouraging a "capitalist ethic ll

patterned on the philosophy of the commonwealth adopted in Massachusetts
by its founding fathers.

Bjork observes:
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In his economic transactions with other members of society,

each individual was to be free to enrich himself as long as his
actions also enriched the rest of society. Transactions which
merely redistributed existing wealth or income were not to be
socially condoned. The analysis of property and freedom of
exchange elaborated in preceding chapters have been informed
with this ethic. This writer believes such an ethic does
provide a recanc;l iation between private enterprise and publ ic
interest, bei..ween individual ism and community.37
Bjork's work is a superb look at the history and development of
the institution of private property and the role private property has
and is playing in the stabilization of social interactions in a

capitalist system.

The work is therefore devoted to the aspects of

ceremonialism surrounding the institutions involved with private

property--private markets, the state, the family, etc.

This is a

different, but fruitful, way to study economics, and Bjork is to be
applauded for expanding knowledge and understanding in this way.
However, it seems to thi s author that Pr; vate Enterpri S8 and
Public Interest possesses some weaknesses in terms of the institutional

theories described in this work.

First, it appears to this writer

that Bjork assumes by implication

Il

ra tional economic man. II

Such an

assumption seems unrealistic. and it does not fit well with the concept
of ceremonialism developed in this essay--unless. of course, one defines
rational behavior to be any behavior that is ceremonial.

Finally,

Bjork appears to have an inadequate concept of the tensions between
ceremonial ism and technology in the selection of ends and the employment of means.

Perhaps this is because, like Commons before him, Bjork

is more concerned with the institutional powers that augur social

stability than the technological factors that tend toward instability-even though he does acknowledge the dynamism of technology in inducing
soci a1 changes.
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Robert L. Heilbroner has been a prolific writer with contributions
to a number of fields in economics.

His first publications were very

popular selections ;n econom;c biography and history.

He later turned

his attentions to economic theory, and several of his works were

eventually gathered together into a somewhat popular textbook for
beginning economics students.

He gradually shifted his attentions

toward institutional economics, seemingly in respite from his work in

theoretical and applied economics.
Heilbronerls first major journey into institutional economics

resulted in the publication of The Future as History, subtitled "The
Historic Events of Our Times and the Direction in Which They are Taking

America,I1 38 The essay explores what Heilbroner calls the l1inertia of
ideologies,U or what Veblen and Ayres refer to as "ceremonial
resistance to change. II

Heilbroner claims that coels ideology is a

product of what he calls a IIphi 1osophy of histori c expectations, II and

he describes that philosophy as one of optimism in the United States.
He argues that a phi 1osophy of optimi sm tends to equate the movement
of historic forces with the idea of progress, and to obscure the
historic possibilities and impossibilities regarding freedom and
necessity.
Thus, Americans possess an unrealistically rosy image of what is
actually a dismal world existing and developing around them.

They are

lulled into complacency by such an ideology, and the complacency leads
to inertia and the failure to respond with needed change.

This

eventuallY 1 eads to frustration and di si 11 usionment because of what
Heilbroner calls the "ambiguity of eventsll--people are confounded when

they achieve goals only to find that their achievements have
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unexpectedly produced new and different sets of problems.

The

challenge for the West is to somehow produce the fortitude and understanding to maintain an outlook of humane optimism.
Between The Future as History and his next contribution to

institutional economics, Heilbroner wrote The Great Ascent; The Struggle

for Economic Development in Our Time. 39 Of course, one might argue
that Great Ascent was a contribution to institutional economics because

one can hardly write on the subject of development without taking the
very long-run view and applying institutional economic analysis.

However, the book is one in an established field of applied economics
even though it contains much in the way of institutional theory.

Like

most other writers in the economic development field. Heilbroner makes
the point that "economic" development is too narrow a term.

Develop-

ment actually involves all aspects of society, of which the economy is
only a part.

He also observes that the outlook for significant

improvements in the 1e35 developed nations in this generation is very
gl um.
Heilbronerls next piece of institutional writing is The Limits

to American Capitalism, which is well described by the title. 40 The
book contains a superb discourse on the relationship between technology,
productivity, and social change.

Heilbroner argues that technology has

pushed society to the IIboundaries of the business system," and he

predicts that capitalism will survive well into the next century, but
that it will ultimately yield to a very different kind of social order.
One aspect of that change will be the rise of a I1 scientific elite."
Heilbroner produced another title in applied economics between
limits to American Capitalism and his next and most ambitious
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institutional scholarship.

This time, his work was in what is called

ucomparative economic systems, II another field that is akin to

institutional economics.

The work, Between Capital ism and Social ism,

is a collection of essays written since 1966, and, like Great Ascent,
is important to Hellbroner's metamorphosis to institutional economics
because his study in the applied fields obviously helped shape some of
his thoughts for his major contribution to institutional economics. 41
Heilbroner's most ambitious piece of institutional scholarship
to date is An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect. 42 The inquiry is in
the vein of his previous institutional works.

However, where the

latter tend to be more descriptivenFuture as History deal ing with the
inhibitive effects of ceremony, and Limits to American Capitalism
dealing with the unstabi1izing effects of new techno10gies--the former
is more predictive.

Heilbroner's institutional writings have always

had a significant international flavor, but Inquiry is cast in the
international mold, albeit that he views international events from the
Western vantage point.

That is, while his previous institutional

works dealt primarily, but not exclusively, with internal matters over
which the United States has some control, Inquiry deals primarily with
the external challenges over which the U. s. may have very little if
any contra 1 .
He argues that the United States and all of Western Civilization
is gravely threatened by external challenges, or challenges from the
Third World that will multiply over the years and that cannot be met
or overcome with the usual industrial solutions.

Indeed, it is

precisely the efforts and successes of the less developed nations in
achieving industrialization that is and will continue to exacerbate
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the problems.

Moreover, the West cannot morally deny the peoples of

those countries their fair share of world resources and of what has
come to be viewed as the materially good 1ife in the West.
The external challenge, then, is a combination of affluent Western life styles and continued industrialization of the economically
depressed nations in the face of dwindl ing world resources and
burgeoning populations in the latter nations.

Obviously, increasing

populations alone will place insufferable strains on already scant
resource pools.

And each improvement in the livelihood of the poverty-

stricken part of the world will multiply the resource drain.
Moreover, each improvement for the poverty-stricken will be
accomplished by expansion of industry, and each expansion of industry
will add to the technology-induced pollution already choking the
biosphere.

Finally, industrialization must eventually make nuclear

materials available to all nations, and this can only lead to widespread access to the most gruesome of lI obliterative" weapons.

According to Heilbroner, such weapons will be great equalizers in a
world of otherwise unequal nations.
What, then, is the hUman prospect?

Heilbroner.

Several scenarios occur to

The most dismal is a cataclysmic end a few generations

hence after mankind has integrated and diffused enough technology to
completely overload and perhaps destroy the life-support capacity of
the earth.

The next and equally dismal scenario is widespread nuclear

warfare between nations attempting to acquire or preserve parts of the
shrinking reSources for themselves.

The least dismal is a continuing

series of convulsive changes forced on the West and the rest of
humanity by the foregoing external forces.

Clearly, the meritorious
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Western ceremonies of peace, democracy, freedom, individualism, etc.
cannot fare well under such circumstances.

What does Hei1broner see as the nature of future society if,

indeed, humanity somehow manages to survive? Heilbroner calls such a
society "post industrial. II

He describes it as one in which the

institutions will stress parsimony over pf'ofligate consumption, quality
of life over quantity of goods, and rendering services over production

of material weal tho

He sees a decl ine in scientific endeavor and a

return to preindustrial introspection and speculations about ultimate

values.

People will be better educated, and they will look upon

resource consumption and heat generati on as necessary evil s.
Heilbronerls most recent works are Business Civilization in
Decline and Beyond Boom and Crash.43 The former is essentially an
expansion on The Limits of American Capitalism in light of his revelations in An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect, and the latter is little
more than a progress report on the former in light of the oil crisis.

Hei 1broner attempts to construct a time-tab1 e for hi s predi cted dec1 ine
in industrial capitalism in the United States and the West, and for the
rise of the so-called post-industrial society.

He sees little change

except in the growth of planning in the near future.

However, he

prophesies the advent of "trans-systemic" challenges during the middle

range (25-50 years) in which the external challenges he described in
An Inguiry will start producing institutional changes in both the
capitalist and socialist economies of the Western World.

Finally,

those same challenges will lead to post-industrial society 100 or 150
years hence.
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What can be said of Heilbroner's institutional economics? The
least is that he has a good comprehension of ceremonial ism--the inertia
of ideology as it applies to American capitalism".

However, he does not

appear to understand that the same forces are worki ng in every other
system, be it democratic socialism, Marxian socialism, fascism,

tribalism, or any other ism that afflicts a people.

The less developed

nations are in a state of deplorable misery today (by Western standards)
because their peoples vehemently oppose any technological influence
that may require them to abandon their cherished tribal traditions.
While there may be emulative pull to development, development will not
take place without considerable push to overcome institutional
ba rri ers as well.
Moreover, Heilbroner appears to be trapped in an embrace between
straight-line extrapolations and unilinear causality.

He has bought

into the Neo-Malthusian Meadows study--the original study of the socalled Club of Rome that the Club itself repudiated in recent sequels~4
It nevertheless appears that Heilbroner has seated himself firmly with
other doomsday seers who are neurotically searching for the ends of
the earth from atop the environmental band wagon.
passengers suffer the same myopic afflictions.

Most of those

They are straight-

line extrapolators who reason unilinearly.
The error in this approach is that it overlooks the progressive
qualities of technologies.

The difficulties with modern technology

are mainly transitory institutional maladjustments in the integration
and diffusion processes.

There is no reason to believe that the needed

adjustments will not be made, or that the quality of life on earth will
not be immeasurably improved for more people in the outcomes.
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Moreover, the qual ity of 1ife will be improved precisely because of
substantial increases in per-capita quantities of goods.

And all of

this will occur directly with the pace at which people disabuse themselves of mysticism and false notions of mythical supernatural powers

in control of their lives.
Heil broner is certainly not the first person to overlook the
progressive qualities of new technologies.

That oversight afflicted

both Malthus and Marx and caused their most dire predictions to fail. 45
Likewise, it accounts for the intellectually bankrupt "stagnation
thesis" of Alvin H. Hansen a generation or so ago. 46

Indeed, Hansen

achieved fame in large part for the publications he ground out to

first rationalize his mistake, then to repudiate it, and finally to
erect new theories on diametrically opposite assumptions.

Finally,

the gloomy prophesies of the such recent harbingers of doom as Rachel
Carson, Paul Ebrlich, and the Meadows family have not and are extremely
unlikely to materialize for the same reasons. 47
Heilbroner's assumptions aside, this age is not perfectly unique.
The present human condition is different in at least one absolute

dimension.

It is enormously superior to other ages because of

technological developments.

But problems facing present man are the

same in substance as those fae; ng other ages even though they are

different in kind.

In substance the problem is to reconcile the

tensions between tradi tion-bound ceremonialism and dynamic technol 09i es
in the selection of future ends and the employment of means so that
progress results in the enhancement of human welfare.
What then can be said of Heilbroner1s foreboding descriptions
and ominous predictions?

Certainly, he has made the dismal science
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dismal indeed.

Although he seems to admonish otherwise, his implied

prescription appears to be that Western man must substitute a
philosophy of pessimism for his inherently optimistic outlook.
a change does not seem warranted.

Such

Hei! braner is undoubtedly correct

in predicting a different social order in the very long run because
institutional change follows inevitably when mankind has the courage
to innovate new technologies.

However, this writer cannot agree, and

history does not affirm that the induced changes are likely to result
in diminished human welfare.
This review cannot end without mention of a number of economists
who have expanded understanding of the social significance of
technology.

Not all of them can be considered to be institutional

economists because their analyses ignored institutional arrangements
and they dealt with technology in terms of the usual orthodox time
peri ods.

Interest in the economi c effects of technology were

stimulated by revelation in 1928 of the "Cobb-Douglas Production
Function," the technical characteristics of which need not concern

this study.48 There foil owed a period of speculation and additional
research on the Cobb-Douglas findings, but the matter of technical
change was subordinated to other factors because of certain economic
characteristics of the aggregate production function.
After a much too respectable interval (1957), Robert M. Solow
produced an article dealing with "Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function. ,,49 Solow's work greatly heightened interest in
the economic effects of technology, and the economic vocabulary
concerning technical change was greatly expanded by Solow and other
economists who carried on the research.

Finally, Edwin Mansfield
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produced a book on the subject that summarized and integrated much of
the work done by others on the economic effects of technical change. 50
While none of this work was institutional in character, it was important
to institutional economics because it was giving empirical substantiation to pronouncements made previously by Veblen and Ayres about
techno logy.
In the meantime, W. W. Rostow produced The Stages of Economic
Growth; A Non Communist Manifesto in which he posited a theory of
traditional society and five stages through which such a society must
pass in the process of developing itself into a mass-consumption
ecenomy.5l
an aircraft.

Rostow drew an analogy between the developing country and
One of Rostow's stages is therefore called the "take-off,"

the period during which the country makes itself airborne in terms of
economic growth.

The so-called take-off stage is crucial because it

is the period in which the country is at full throttle, so to speak,
making heavy investments in the capital goods that will turn it into
an industrial nation.

The capital goods, of course, embody technol-

ogies, and the effects on the country are unstabilizing.
Rostow's take-off stage captured the imagination of every
economist who had an interest in economic development and much attention
focused on the matter of innovation or diffusing new technologies in

developing countries.

One such economist was Simon Kuznets who did a

survey of the quantitative knowledge of economic growth. 52

Part of

Kuznets' survey recapitulated data on rates of technical change and
their effects on gross national product and on other variables.
Kuznets produced his own writings on economic development in which he
stressed the importance of technological diffusion and the resulting
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institutional changes to economic development.

Finally, Gerald M.

Meier wrote The International Economics of Development in which he
integrated orthodox theories of technical change with international
trade and exchange theories to show the relationship between those
factors in the matter of economic development. 53

While these econ-

omists were working in applie rl fields of orthodox economic theories,

their works shed more light on the nature of technology and the
relationship between technical change and institutional change.
This review would not be complete without mention of at least

one more scholar.

Donald A. Schon has produced several works with

significance for institutional economics.

The first of such works

published in the United States is Technology and Change; The New
Heraclitus.

Schon explored the nature of invention and innovation

in terms of risk, uncertainty, and decision-making in corporations.
He reviewed the history of American technical change, and examined
what he believes to be the ethical issues surrounding national policies

devi sed to enhance technological advance. 54
Schon's next title is Beyond the Stable State in which he
examines the role of "dynamic conservatism"--what he calls a tendency
to fight to remain the same--in institutional resistance to change.

He argues that the stable state (institutional constancy and
predictabil ity) is eternally lost because the innovation of new
technologies has made continuous institutional transformation a central
feature of modern society.

He asks how institutions can become

effective fllearning systems II so that the exponential growth in
information can be managed.

He dismisses the so-called rational

scientific modes of understanding because they depend on the
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predictability and continuity that are lost in the on-rush of technology.

He advocates an "existential strategy" for managing the flow

of information and the rapid rate of change. 55
Schon's stable state is the epitome of institutional rigidity,

and his dynamic conservatism is yet another term for ceremonial ways
of knowing and doing.

However, his term is a contradiction of sorts

because conservatism is not dynamic in the usual sense.
dynamism conservative.

general tenor.

Nor is

The words are diametrically opposite in their

Conservative. the adjective form, describes resistance

to change, while dynamic describes forces in motion, that is, movement

or change of position.

Semantics aside, Schon is good on the tensions between ceremonialism and technology.

Even so, his solution to instability is to

let the institutions manage the flow of information and thereby the
rate of change.

While there can be no other solution--because that is

the modus operandi anyhow--it is like letting the wolf tend the flock.
In short, Schon does not appear to understand the nature of institutional change in terms of Commons I "collective action.

II

This somewhat lengthy review of selected literature from
contemporary institutional economics was accomplished to show how the

contemporary work relates to the seminal works in the field, and how
this essay relates to the contemporary· literature.

As with all

scholarship, there is not perfect agreement among scholars.

However,

it is hoped that the reader has been able to detect sufficient
agreement among contemporary scholars and between them and the works
of Veblen, Commons, and Ayres to see a consistent and relevant body
of institutional economic theory.
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Most contemporary institutional writers have 1imited themselves
to t.he application of institutional economics to current problems.

They have been commentators who describe and explain modern events ;n
terms of institutional causality, and who criticise their colleagues

and public policy-makers in the light of institutional theory.

Some

few institutional scholars have sought to expand or to deepen the
theory by synthesis and testing.

These latter scholars have confined

thei r works to one or another component of the theory.

None have

attempted to bring the elements of theory into a consistent whole.
As noted above, a necessary step in aChieving the stated purpose
of this paper was to interpret and give some organization to the
components of theory heretofore loosely known as institutional

economics.

While this was done with care, the work remains the

author's interpretations, and whether or not the outcome is satisfactory remains for others to judge.

However, the point is that this

work differs from other work in the field insofar as it is an
attempted organization of the essential body of institutional economic
theory known at this time.
This review was also made to demonstrate how institutional
economic theory relates to orthodox economics and to other sacialscience disciplines.

It seems to this writer that institutional

economics is solidly established in the economics discipline because
both the field and the discipline share a common concern--the selection

of future ends from competing possible ends, and the alternative
employments of resource means to attainment of those ends so that
human welfare is best served.

Moreover. institutional economics adds

an important dimension--the very long-run--to the understanding of
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economic phenomena.

The field therefore augments both the positive

and the normative powers of the discipl ine.
Finally, it is hoped that this review will so stimulate the
interest of other scholars that at least some of them will turn their
considerable research talents to furthering understanding in
institutional economics.
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